Small Wars Journal

The U.S. Army Needs To Say “No Mas” To WAS

Fri, 05/13/2016 - 7:42pm

The U.S. Army Needs To Say “No Mas” To WAS by May 11, 2016 Daniel Gouré, Lexington Institute

Wide Area Security (WAS), what used to be called stability operations, is supposed to be one of the U.S. Army’s core competencies. It involves much more than providing security for rear areas or occupying enemy territory during the course of hostilities. Nor is it limited to classic counterinsurgency operations. As described in Army documents, it includes a range of tasks well beyond those reasonably considered to be part of counterinsurgency: establishing civil control, restoring essential services, supporting governance, supporting economic and infrastructure development.

Until recently, the Army believed WAS to be as important a mission as classic combined arms maneuver, what most civilians would call combat. Army leaders, and a lot of academics and defense experts, made the argument that while superiority in combat was necessary to defeat an adversary, particularly an enemy nation state, only success in conducting WAS could bring about a stable, long term peace. Advocates of WAS like to point out that while it only took this country around three and a half years to defeat the Axis powers, the U.S. military has maintained forces in Germany and Japan for the past 71 years. A similar situation persists in South Korea. The military’s effort to secure the peace in Afghanistan has been going on for more than 15 years and in Iraq for nearly as long without an end in sight in either case…

Simply put, WAS as conceived of and practiced by the U.S. military, but particularly the Army, is not enough. The creation of the political, organizational and economic environments required for a secure and stable peace in places like those in which WAS has been conducted over the past two decades is beyond the capacity of the entire U.S. government. We are fooling ourselves, our indigenous allies and international partners to believe otherwise. The Army War College study is wrong to suggest that the problem can be addressed by improving recruitment and training, working closer with interagency partners or restructuring the National Guard. It is time for the Army to say “no mas” to WAS.

Read on.