Alberechtsen opens with a preview of what President Bush should expect during the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Sydney and cuts to the quick in challenging those who "wish U.S. failure" in Iraq to answer two critical questions:
... Bush arrives in Sydney next week. Mostly, Bush's visit will attract open hostility from feral Bush-haters and quiet ridicule from many others. And the reason is Iraq.
Many have a vested interest in an American failure in Iraq. Not just the emotional anti-Bushies but also the more level-headed people who believe failure in Iraq is needed to puncture American hubris.
Those —a failure in Iraq to vindicate their derision of Bush ought to answer two questions: Do they have an alternative solution? And what does a precipitate troop withdrawal mean for Iraqis?
Alberechtsen explains that these same two questions were posed to attendees of the recent Consilium, an annual gathering hosted by the Centre for Independent Studies.
The recurring theme at Consilium is the power of individual freedom: when people are free, they thrive. Against that background, there was a message from Iraq. David Kilcullen, a former Australian army officer, was one of the driving forces behind the new counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. Back in Australia after spending six months advising General David Petraeus, commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq, Kilcullen delivered a sobering message.
Alberechtsen's take-aways from Consilium:
1. There are increasing signs of ordinary Iraqis fighting for the freedom we take for granted. It is also clear that failure in Iraq will have nothing to do with the resolve of those ordinary Iraqis. Blame will lie at the feet of others: Iraq's political leaders, our own political leaders, and us.
2. Precious time has been wasted, innocent lives sacrificed and political capital expended while the US pursued the wrong strategy in Iraq. With a more effective strategy now in place, the great tragedy is that it may be too late. Not because Iraqis have given up. Too late because in the US, Britain and Australia, our resolve is waning. Too late because Iraq's political leaders have not made progress on a settlement with minority Sunnis.
3. Eighty to 90 per cent of counterinsurgency is about social work and economic development. It's a hearts-and-minds battle, building up trusted governance in communities and convincing them not to side with the enemy. The other 10 to 20 per cent is crucial. It is the military component necessary to keep the enemy off your back while communities are rebuilt and encouraged to reject the propaganda, the intimidation and the provocation by insurgents and terrorists committed to destroying Iraq.
4. Counterinsurgency is a long-term strategy that needs soldiers on the ground, working with these communities -- hence the US troop surge -- and it needs time. Lots of time.
Alberechtsen continues with what she describes as Dave Kilcullen's "snapshot from Iraq":
1. al-Qa'ida's intimidation is aimed at proving US forces cannot protect local Iraqis. With the US troop surge, al-Qa'ida went for broke with its vicious attempt to slaughter schoolgirls. But it backfired. More communities in and around Baghdad have begun turning against al-Qa'ida.
2. Previously the problem was that US troops would enter a community and ask for co-operation to catch insurgents and terrorists, only to decamp soon after. Those who co-operated were often later killed by the enemy. Locals stopped co-operating with US forces and started making deals with insurgents and al-Qa'ida to survive.
3. The new strategy of counter-insurgency is slowly changing that catastrophic dynamic. Communities are being made more secure. As they grow more secure, they grow more —to displace insurgents and terrorists who previously returned once US forces moved on. Kilcullen describes it as "hard-wiring the enemy out of these towns and villages".
... and concludes:
These are small steps towards self-sustaining security for ordinary Iraqis. That they should rise to the challenge is not surprising. Eleven million Iraqis risked bloody violence in order to vote. Ordinary Iraqis want a stable future. The question is whether their leaders and ours can support their brave efforts.
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More by Dave Kilcullen
Understanding Current Operations in Iraq
The Urban Tourniquet -- "Gated Communities" in Baghdad
From the Advisors -- Bombs in Baghdad
The Baghdad Marathon
Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency
Don't confuse the "Surge" with the Strategy
A Framework for thinking about Iraq Strategy
Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgcy Redux
Counterinsurgency -- US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5 (Contributor)
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And as an aside - add The Australian to your daily read list. I've found it an invaluable resource in the research of defense (or defence as you may) and foreign policy issues associated with Australia, New Zealand, and East, South, and Southeast Asia. In particular - this page is one of my "must reads". -- Dave Dilegge (SWJ)
Comments
Is it not incumbent on those who say that 4 years into a war in the Middle East with more than a hundred thousand dead, most of them our Iraqi allies, and thousands of our own troops dead ... is it not incumbent to preface every mention of the great need to stay, and every criticism of "lack of resolve", with bitter criticism of those who led us into a war that the voters were so tepid about in the first place?
Recall that every poll prior to the war said that half the voters were against entering Iraq without UN backing. Our president led us in divided. Is it a great surprise that 4 years of dreadful strategy later, most voters want out?