
Army Capstone Concept Draft
Version 2.7
21 September 2009

**Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and
Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict**

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Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

42 **Foreword**

43 ***From the Commanding General***
44 ***U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command***

45 ***Ideas matter.*** Emerging from specific human, historical, and technological contexts, ideas
46 affect understanding and influence behavior. Ideas can serve as the driving force behind
47 significant institutional change. Because the need for change will always be with us, the
48 exchange of ideas and guided conceptual development must be among our top priorities.

49 This document, ***the Army Capstone Concept (ACC), also matters.*** The purpose of the ACC
50 is to clearly articulate ideas—how to *think about* future conflict within an uncertain and complex
51 environment. Within the Army Concept Strategy, this concept will form the baseline of a
52 campaign of experimentation and critique that will examine and test these ideas. Ultimately, the
53 ideas that emerge from this process will guide changes in doctrine, organizations, training,
54 materiel, leader development and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

55 ***Sound concepts should possess certain elements.*** First, concepts must be grounded in
56 reality. Current operations, recent experience, and historical insight should all inform conceptual
57 development. Second, concepts should also address specific needs. These needs should not
58 emerge from a vision of warfare that we find convenient or one that we wish existed. Instead, an
59 assessment of the challenges and capabilities of the future force should result from a projection
60 of future warfare based on a deep and broad historical understanding of the nature of war and the
61 characteristics of warfare emerging from current interactions with today's enemies. The
62 combination of these perspectives approaches a realistic view of future conflict. Third, concepts
63 should either introduce new ideas or clarify current doctrine. Perhaps most importantly, the ACC
64 will maintain a complementary relationship with current doctrine.

65 As if dealing with such issues was not difficult enough, the challenge of seriously thinking
66 about an uncertain future brings with it an additional dilemma. ***How does a large institution***
67 ***acknowledge the uncertainty of the future as well as develop the detailed planning required to***
68 ***prepare for that future?*** When the Army attempts to deal with uncertainty, we are faced with
69 two courses of action: we can either attempt to increase our information-processing capacity—to
70 create a network-centric approach and operate with more information; or we can design the
71 entire organization, and indeed structure our conceptualization of warfare itself, in such a way as
72 to maximize our ability to operate on the basis of less than perfect information. Dealing with this
73 dilemma underscores the primary ideas within the ACC. Moreover, this dilemma is at the heart
74 of the challenges the U.S. Army will face in the future.

75 ***The ACC describes the broad capabilities the Army will require in 2016-2028 to apply***
76 ***finite resources to overcome a combination of hybrid threats, adaptive adversaries, and***
77 ***enemies in complex operating environments.*** These factors will challenge the future force's
78 ability to set conditions that achieve or facilitate the achievement of national objectives.
79 Uncertainty will not go away in the future. Fog and friction will remain. Future adversaries will
80 constantly adapt and seek ways to overcome our strengths and capitalize on our vulnerabilities.
81 To counter these threats and deal with these challenges, the U.S. Army must maintain its core
82 competencies of close combat in virtually any terrain, weather, and against a variety of hybrid
83 threats. At the same time, the Army must also hone an ability to continually adapt to the
84 changing situations of conflict.

85 As this concept will highlight, dealing with uncertainty requires a ***mindset*** based on
86 flexibility of thought and ***operational adaptability.*** It calls for leaders at all levels who are

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87 comfortable with collaborative planning and execution, allowable levels of risk, and the ability
88 and willingness to make adjustments according to the situation. Moreover, *operational*
89 *adaptability* acknowledges that we should not impose artificial categories on war—categories
90 that deny war’s ability to change in mid-course, or to adopt different guises at the same time.

91 To achieve this mindset, *the Army must hone its ability to gain, sustain, and exploit*
92 *physical control and psychological influence over land, resources, and people by threat, force,*
93 *or occupation.* The Army must be able to both *persuade* and *coerce*. Future leaders and their
94 organizations must have the capability to think in terms of *friendly* (partners and allies), *the*
95 *enemy*, and *the people*, and possess the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously
96 attacking or defending to defeat enemy organizations. We must prepare our land forces, as part
97 of a joint, intergovernmental, interagency and multinational team to prevail in protracted
98 campaigns; engage to help other nations build capacity and assure friends and allies; to support
99 civil authorities at home and abroad; and deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.
100 The future force must be able to conduct combined arms operations in sufficient force and for an
101 ample duration to establish security and overwhelm the enemy in their area of operations. Thus,
102 *the task of the Army will be to assist its friends, to reassure and protect populations, and to*
103 *identify, isolate, and destroy the enemy.* In the end, this concept will inform the education,
104 training, and organization of future forces.

105 In many ways, *this concept seeks to underscore the importance of decentralization*—or the
106 development of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development and education,
107 personnel, facilities *that can distribute the ability to deal with uncertainty throughout the force.*
108 As we develop these ideas, the Army should look to technology to provide additional capabilities
109 to meet these challenges in the future. At the same time we must reinforce the conclusion that
110 technology is not a panacea to the fog of war and the friction of battle. Critical thinking by
111 Soldiers and their leaders will remain our most valuable asset. Yet circumstances will put even
112 those assets to the test.

113 Our attempts to impose order on the chaos of battle are just that—incomplete attempts. As
114 Martin van Creveld points out, “a certain amount of confusion and waste are, owing to the great
115 uncertainty involved, inevitable in war; and that such confusion is not inconsistent with, and may
116 indeed be a prerequisite for, results.” In other words, our actions in war are merely attempts to
117 impose order on chaos—they do not achieve this goal in its entirety. The ambiguity that remains
118 will be both an asset and a liability. We must accept this ambiguity and adjust our thinking to
119 prepare our organizations to deal with this uncertainty.

120 To achieve clarity in thinking about future war and future Army operations, it is critical that
121 our force engages intellectually with the draft concept that follows. While this document will
122 help provide the conceptual foundation for Army modernization, it is not the final word on these
123 ideas. I cannot overemphasize how important it is to scrutinize this concept. Between 15 August
124 and 01 December 2009, we must continue to question our assumptions and update our concepts,
125 and I welcome your comments and collaboration in this effort. We will publish the final concept
126 at the end of the calendar year. *The more debate that occurs before that time, the better the*
127 *Army Capstone Concept—and the Army—will be.*

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*TRADOC Pam 525-3-0

135 XX December 2009

136 Military Operations

137 ARMY CAPSTONE CONCEPT

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139 FOR THE COMMANDER:

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153 **History.** This pamphlet is an in-cycle revision of the TRADOC Pam 525-3-0. The portions
154 affected by this revision are listed in the summary of change. This revision changes the
155 conceptual focus of the Army from major combat operations to that of operating in uncertainty
156 and complexity.

157 **Summary.** TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 describes broad capabilities the Army will require to apply
158 finite resources to overcome a combination of hybrid threats, and adaptive adversaries in
159 complex operating environments. This operating environment impacts the future force's ability to
160 fight and win the Nation's wars. This capstone concept will lead force development and
161 employment efforts by establishing a common framework to think about future Army operations.
162 TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 places modernization decisions in a broader context of future armed
163 conflict, and establishes the conceptual foundation for subordinate concepts that refine the
164 Army's vision of how it will operate in the future.

165 **Applicability.** This concept is the foundation for future force development and the base for
166 subsequent developments of supporting concepts, concept capability plans, and the Joint
167 Capabilities Integration and Development System process. It supports experimentation described
168 in the ARCIC Campaign Plan and functions as the conceptual basis for developing solutions
169 related to the future force within the doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and
170 education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. This concept applies to all TRADOC,
171 Department of Army and Arm Reserve activities that develop DOTMLPF requirements.

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172 **Proponent and supplementation authority.** The proponent of this pamphlet is the TRADOC
173 Headquarters, Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). The proponent has the
174 authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this pamphlet that are consistent with controlling
175 law and regulations. Do not supplement this pamphlet without prior approval from Director,
176 TRADOC ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 33 Ingalls Road, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-1061.

177 **Suggested improvements.** Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements
178 via The Army Suggestion Program online at <https://armysuggestions.army.mil> (Army
179 Knowledge Online account required) or via DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to
180 Publications and Blank Forms) to Director, TRADOC ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 20 Whistler Lane,
181 Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1046. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA
182 Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).

183 **Availability.** This regulation is available on the TRADOC homepage at
184 <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regndx.htm>.

186 **Summary of Change**

187 TRADOC Pam 525-3-0

188 The Army Capstone Concept

189 This revision, dated XX December 2009-

- 190 o Updates name of concept to reflect changed operating environment.
- 191 o Places uncertainty and complexity as the central themes of the document, replacing major
192 combat operations.
- 193 o Updates specific terminology.
- 194 o Places greater emphasis on fighting for information vice assuming information superiority.
- 195 o Updates key ideas based on comprehensive lessons learned and recent experience.
- 196 o Places greater emphasis on stability and civil support.
- 197 o Updates assumptions, implications, and required capabilities.
- 198 o Creates appendices to provide more comprehensive information.

200 *This regulation supersedes TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, dated 7 April 2005.

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History teaches us that the nations that grow comfortable with the old ways and complacent in the face of new threats, those nations do not long endure. And in the 21st century, we do not have the luxury of deciding which challenges to prepare for and which to ignore. We must overcome the full spectrum of threats—the conventional and the unconventional; the nation-state and the terrorist network; the spread of deadly technologies and the spread of hateful ideologies; 18th century-style piracy and 21st century cyber threats.

—President Barack Obama
United States Naval Academy, 22 May 2009

242 **Chapter 1**
243 **Introduction**

244 **1-1. Purpose**

245 a. The purpose of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, the *Army Capstone Concept (ACC): Operating*
246 *under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, is to describe
247 the how the Army will apply finite resources to overcome a combination of hybrid threats, and
248 adaptive adversaries in complex operating environments. This operating environment—and the
249 inherent choices and prioritizations that it demands—will challenge the future force's ability to
250 fight and win our nation's wars. The concept identifies required capabilities (Appendix B) which
251 will lead force development and employment efforts by establishing a common framework to
252 think about future Army operations. The ACC places modernization decisions in a broader
253 context of future armed conflict, and establishes the foundation for subordinate concepts that
254 refine the Army's vision of how it will operate in the future. Revising the concept supports
255 efforts to improve the Army's requirements review process. The ACC will ultimately guide
256 change by directing experimentation in and exploration of new operational techniques, which, if
257 validated, will lead to changes in doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development
258 and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.

259 b. The ACC describes how the future All-Volunteer Army should conduct operations as part
260 of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) force. This version of
261 TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 is compatible joint and Army doctrine, and the *Capstone Concept for*
262 *Joint Operations (CCJO)*. However, the ACC extends beyond current doctrine and concepts,
263 describing new ways and means of conducting future operations within the land domain. In
264 short, the ACC will frame an answer to the strategic guidance issued in the National Defense
265 Strategy to "...develop the military capability and capacity to hedge against uncertainty, and the
266 institutional agility and flexibility to plan early and respond effectively alongside
267 interdepartmental, non-governmental and international partners."¹

268 c. The 2009 Army Capstone Concept poses and answers the following questions:

269 (1) What is the Army's vision of future armed conflict and how should the Army operate
270 to conduct joint land operations that contribute to attaining strategic objectives consistent with
271 political outcomes?

272 (2) How does the Army adapt to recent and ongoing conflicts and prepare for future
273 threats to U.S. interests?

274 (3) What capabilities should the Army provide to joint force commanders in order to
275 meet a broad range of national security threats on short notice, for indeterminate duration, and in
276 response to unexpected events?

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277 d. To answer these questions and inform internal and external audiences about how the Army
278 will conduct operations as part of a JIIM force in complex and uncertain environments, the ACC
279 requires precise language and clearly articulated ideas. Consequently, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0
280 will address contemporary issues and contentious terms, retaining joint and Army doctrinal and
281 conceptual terms where appropriate, redefining terms as necessary, and recommending removal
282 of others when analysis has found them wanting or redundant.

283 e. The ACC consists of four chapters with specific implications pertaining to the each major
284 section of the chapters. [Chapter 1](#) explains why the Army is revising the concept and introduces
285 the theme of uncertainty and the Army's requisite need to continue to deal with this uncertainty
286 in the near future. [Chapter 2](#) describes national interests that shape the Army's missions and
287 military objectives while also describing the emerging challenges in the operating environment.
288 [Chapter 3](#) discusses core operational actions and key and supporting ideas used to meet the
289 emerging challenges. [Chapter 4](#) presents a summary of the major ideas in the concept relating
290 them to the important thread of leader development that will bind them together.

291 **1-2. References**

292 Required and related publications are listed in Appendix A.

293 **1-3. Explanation of Abbreviations and Terms**

294 Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary (Appendix
295 C).

296 **1-4. Background**

297 a. The April 2005 version of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 firmly focused on the demands of major
298 combat operations and did not explore in depth the demands for countering irregular threats,
299 supporting efforts to establish governance and rule of law, or developing and operating with
300 foreign security forces. Portions of the 2005 version remained grounded in assumptions about the
301 character of future armed conflict derived from thinking associated in the Revolution in Military
302 Affairs and pre-Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
303 publications, such as Joint Vision 2020.

304 b. These assumptions were based on a belief that technology would change the conduct of
305 war from uncertainty toward a high degree of certainty. This, in turn, would allow future forces
306 to achieve information superiority, which would lead to decision superiority. A key benefit of
307 decision superiority would be that the force could economize on manpower, and trade-off
308 protection and firepower for speed and precision.

309 **1-5. Analytical Framework**

310 a. Accordingly, the ACC proposes a new set of assumptions built around *complexity and*
311 *uncertainty*. Unquestionably, the United States (U.S.) will continue to pursue its national
312 interests through proactive global engagement. Until future enemies perceive an asymmetric
313 advantage to employing maneuver warfare against the Army and other U.S. forces, these
314 enemies and adversaries will continue to do what they have always done: employ a mix of
315 traditional and irregular countermeasures while fighting in complex terrain (both urban and rural)
316 in order to limit the Army force's ability to achieve overmatch. Additionally, future enemies—
317 like current and past enemies—will continue to counter and interrupt U.S. significant advantages
318 in communications, surveillance, long-range precision fires, armor protection, and mobility.
319 These same enemies will also continue to seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction as a

320 means to deter the employment of Army forces and, if so employed, to create chaos and limit
321 U.S. forces' effectiveness. Given the homeland as a power projection platform and the
322 expeditionary nature of the Army forces, future adversaries will attempt to penetrate and attack
323 the continental U.S. Additionally, the network (global information grid, collection platforms,
324 fusion and dissemination capabilities, and others) will rarely deliver information superiority.
325 Finally, advanced air and sealift capabilities in the quantities required to meet Army deployment
326 goals² and that permit strategic maneuver over operational distances, mounted vertical maneuver,
327 and avoidance of improved ports of debarkation, will not be fielded in the next 15 years.

328 b. These assumptions serve as the starting point for the analysis which undergirds this
329 concept. These *assumptions* provide the *grounded projection* of threat capabilities and
330 characteristics of the operating environment in which the Army will have to operate in the near
331 future. This projection will develop a *broad range of threats* that, in turn, create a series of
332 operational and tactical challenges and implications. These *implications*—what the grounded
333 projection of future conflict means for the Army—identify a number of *required capabilities* that
334 the future force must possess. Importantly, this concept will also promulgate a unifying *central*
335 *idea* that combines the required capabilities in a coherent way to meet the challenges and
336 implications of future warfare.

337 **1-6. Uncertainty and Dealing with Uncertainty**

338 a. Taken as a whole, this analysis indicates that despite the significant changes that will
339 arrive with the future, noteworthy continuities in the nature of war will remain constant. One of
340 those important continuities exists as a central theme of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0—*uncertainty*.
341 As the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz emphasized, “*In war everything is uncertain and*
342 *variable, intertwined with psychological forces and effects, and the product of a continuous*
343 *interaction of opposites.*”³ The real point is that conflict—war—has its own dynamic and its own
344 interactions that give it a life beyond the initial objectives of its involved parties. War has always
345 defied efforts to control it precisely. It will continue to do so in the future. Moreover, it is this
346 uncertainty—the product of continuous interactions between friendly forces, enemy and
347 adversarial forces, and key populations—that will continue to define the future operating
348 environment.

349 b. Consequently, the U.S. Army must develop the capability to think in terms of friendly
350 (partners and allies), the enemy, and the people, and possess the flexibility to secure populations
351 while simultaneously attacking or defending to defeat and destroy enemy forces and
352 organizations. The Army must provide joint force commanders with forces capable of prompt
353 and sustained operations on land and skilled in *operational adaptation*. As the retired British
354 General Rupert Smith remarked, “On every occasion that I have been sent to achieve some
355 military objective in order to serve a political purpose, I, and those with me, have had to change
356 our method and reorganize in order to succeed.”⁴ The need to adapt results from the decisions of
357 adaptive adversaries, the choice of objectives, the way force is applied, and the political, social,
358 and cultural context of the environment in which the operations take place. The requirement for
359 such operational adaptation will not go away in the future. *The task of the Army will be to assist*
360 *its friends, to reassure and protect populations, and to identify, isolate, and, when necessary,*
361 *defeat the enemy. War is a three-person, not a two-person game. This paradigm must be the*
362 *basis of all education, training, and organization.* In the end, the Army must develop the
363 capabilities to gain, sustain, and exploit physical control and psychological influence over the

364 enemy, people, land, and resources. How the Army should set out to accomplish this is the focus
365 of this concept.

366 c. The U.S. will continue to face multiple national security challenges in the future. Some argue
367 that the next war is never the same as the last, often emphasizing some revolutionary change
368 emerging just beyond the horizon. Yet such sweeping claims often neglect important historical
369 continuities in the nature of war.⁵ Current operations suggest the character of future conflict. The
370 U.S. Army must make grounded projections based on interactions with today's enemies to
371 develop a realistic view of future conflict. At the same time, however, we cannot consider war or
372 conflict in isolation. Conflict is above all a political activity whose political context requires
373 attention.⁶ Acknowledging these enduring facts is a necessary first step when considering the
374 operational context and national security challenges of the future.

In the years ahead, the United States will confront complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to our national security and the collective security of our friends and allies. These challenges will occur in many forms and will be waged across the spectrum of conflict—ranging from peaceful competition to general war and at all points in between— and in all domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.—The Army of the 21st Century: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy. General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army

375 **Chapter 2**
376 **Operational Context**

377 **2-1. The Army's Mission and Military Objectives**

378 a. The Army is America's principal land force, organized, trained, and equipped primarily for
379 prompt and sustained combat [or operations] on land.⁷ Because national policy will shift in
380 response to threats and opportunities, the Army must be prepared to adapt to different levels of
381 demand for its forces, different types of threats, and different types of operations. The Army
382 continually refines the range of potential contingencies based on strategic guidance, defense
383 planning scenarios, and national security objectives. The National Defense Strategy, the
384 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy speech focused on Rebalancing the Force, the *Capstone*
385 *Concept for Joint Operations*, and the Army's Chief of Staff white paper addressing a balanced
386 Army provide an understanding of those objectives: defend the homeland, deter or prevent the
387 use or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), win the nation's wars, deter
388 potential adversaries, protect the global commons (sea, air, space, and cyberspace), develop
389 cooperative security, and respond to civil crises.⁸

390 The following more specific military objectives, derived from those national security
391 guidance documents, inform the ACC.⁹

- 392 • Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression
- 393 • Detect and deter potential adversaries and prevail against enemies, including hostile
394 states, non-state actors, and hybrid threats
- 395 • Secure United States strategic access to the global commons and retain freedom of action
- 396 • Strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships
- 397 • Prevent adversaries from acquiring, using, or proliferating WMD

398 • Engage to help other nations build governance and security capacity, preventing state
399 failure and eliminating safe havens for criminals and terrorists

400 • Respond to civil crises at home and abroad

401 b. Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations to accomplish these military
402 objectives in the evolving operating environment—and against emerging threats that are likely to
403 employ a broad range of capabilities. Assessing and continually reassessing how adversaries and
404 potential enemy organizations are likely to use their forces to pursue strategic and operational
405 objectives that threaten National interests is critical to defining the problems of future armed
406 conflict.

407 **2-2. The Future Operating Environment**

408 a. This concept analyzes the future operating environment with a focus on relating future
409 threats and environmental factors to U.S. national security strategy and Army roles and missions.
410 U.S. Joint Forces Command's *The Joint Operating Environment: Challenges and Implications*
411 *for the Future Joint Force* provides a thorough description of the overarching strategic and
412 operational challenges facing the joint force. Its companion document, the *Capstone Concept for*
413 *Joint Operations*, states that: "The future operating environment will be characterized by
414 uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict."¹⁰ These documents, as well as
415 TRADOC's *Operational Environment 2009-2025*, and analyses from the U.S. national security
416 community, detail emerging threats and environmental factors ranging from state failure, to
417 proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to terrorism and hybrid threats, to natural
418 disaster, and to regional conflict escalation.¹¹ Adding to the challenges will be routine operations
419 against determined threats hiding among the people. Increased proliferation of advanced
420 weapons and communications technologies compound the threats U.S. forces could face as
421 potential enemies continue to pursue methods and tactics to counter U.S. strengths. Advanced
422 and nearly ubiquitous electronic and cyberspace warfare techniques will be available to virtually
423 anyone. Non-state actors already seek WMD. Terrorist and criminal elements operating in
424 lawless spaces will continue to disrupt weak and failing states. Each of these challenges
425 contributes to a complex, uncertain operating environment with significant implications for how
426 the future force will have to operate.¹²

427 b. The ACC develops a framework of analysis that incorporates three distinct components:

428 (1) Harbingers of Future Conflict: What adaptations are happening now that are likely to
429 continue?

430 (2) Projection of Potential Threats and Challenges: What are the likely future threats and
431 challenges based on current conditions?

432 (3) Probable and Likely Technological Advancements: What technologies are likely to
433 influence operations in the near future (five to ten years)?

434 c. Each of these components of analysis will describe challenges for the future force which
435 have implications for force structure, organization, operations, training, leader development, and
436 other areas. These challenges comprise the military problem for the future force.

437 **2-3. Harbingers of Future Conflict**

438 a. Recent history and current operations expose harbingers of future conflict including hybrid
439 threats, information warfare, criminal activities and terrorism, and natural or manmade disasters.

440 A close look at these events reveals types of threats, trends in tactics and techniques, unique and
441 common methods for employing capabilities, environmental conditions for employment of
442 forces, and successful strategies for countering U.S. strengths and attacking U.S. vulnerabilities.
443 Informed judgment can then derive a number of challenges for the future force.

444 b. Hybrid Threats. One of the most significant indicators of future conflict involves the
445 continued presence of hybrid threats. These are organizations capable of pursuing sophisticated
446 strategies that combine political, economic, social, and information means with conventional,
447 irregular, terrorism, and criminal methods. In the future, adversaries will be capable of adapting
448 organizations, equipment, processes, and procedures to minimize their vulnerabilities and attack
449 what they perceive as U.S. weaknesses. Hybrid threats will operate in and take advantage of
450 complex environments and interrelated conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the
451 employment of joint force capabilities and bear on commanders' decisions. Importantly, two
452 recent conflicts offer clear indications of the specific components of future hybrid threats and the
453 environments in which they will operate.

454 (1) *Iraq, 2003-2009*

455 (a) After U.S. forces invaded Iraq in 2003, American Soldiers experienced a
456 combination of success and frustration. A successful conventional campaign against key
457 elements of the Saddam Hussein regime deteriorated into a protracted counterinsurgency
458 campaign. Throughout all phases of the conflict, the enemy's willingness and ability to adapt
459 tactics, operational schemes, and strategic objectives to changing conditions was evident. As
460 early as 2003, the Iraqi regime chose to face U.S. forces with a mix of unconventional tactics
461 combined with conventional defensive operations.¹³ Insurgents emerged in pickup trucks armed
462 with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades from urban terrain to ambush the U.S. forces'
463 logistics tail. The enemy used Global Positioning System jammers in an attempt to neutralize
464 U.S. air superiority, and the Iraqi regime mounted a crude information campaign to erode
465 international support for the coalition while bolstering morale among its own military forces and
466 civilian population.¹⁴ Although the U.S.-led coalition defeated the Hussein regime and achieved
467 the initial objectives of regime change, residual forces in combination with the Baathist
468 intelligence apparatus initiated a localized, decentralized, hybrid insurgency that coalesced and
469 grew in strength over time.¹⁵

470 (b) The ability to employ countermeasures, including dispersion and concealment in
471 urban and complex terrain, allowed the enemy to evade many of the U.S. forces' advantages and
472 frequently conduct attacks at times and places of their choosing. Combat experience and the
473 interaction with the enemy exposed flawed assumptions associated with concepts, such as
474 network-centric warfare and the defense transformation efforts of the late-1990s. Iraqi insurgents
475 adopted off-the-shelf technologies in innovative ways to develop improvised explosive devices
476 (IEDs).¹⁶ While avoiding decisive combat, the enemy used IEDs, ambushes, and complex terrain
477 to inflict casualties on coalition forces. The enemy also endeavored to gain control of the
478 population and frustrate economic and political development through intimidation, coercion, the
479 incitement of ethno-sectarian violence, and a sophisticated propaganda campaign. By 2006, the
480 conflict had evolved into a sectarian civil war that contained strong elements of insurgency and
481 terrorism interacting within the context of a failing state as the institutions of government and
482 security forces themselves became battlegrounds in the conflict.

483 (2) *Southern Lebanon, 2006*

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484 (a) In 2006, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) experienced a similar series of tactical
485 and strategic frustrations at the hands of a very capable non state hybrid enemy. Drawing lessons
486 from a generation of Israeli occupation as well as recent conflicts in Gaza and Iraq, Hezbollah
487 leaders developed a highly effective form of hybrid warfare. When the IDF invaded southern
488 Lebanon in the summer of 2006, it met a well-trained and organized Hezbollah force. In the 34-
489 day campaign that followed, Hezbollah forces surprised the Israelis with a networked defense-in-
490 depth nested within complex terrain.¹⁷ Further, Hezbollah employed a mixture of conventional
491 capabilities—artillery, anti-tank guided missiles, rocket propelled grenade, unmanned aerial
492 system (UAS)-supported targeting and intelligence, and light infantry—with unconventional
493 techniques that included distributed operations coordinated with cell phones, pre-positioned
494 weapons caches, and an extensive use of harassing fires and unattended minefields.¹⁸

495 (b) Hezbollah’s tactical successes, reinforced by a sophisticated information
496 campaign, portrayed the Israelis as the aggressors that heroic Hezbollah fighters thoroughly
497 defeated on the battlefield in defense of their homeland.¹⁹ When Israeli forces withdrew,
498 Hezbollah was able to credibly claim strategic success.

499 c. Information Warfare

500 (1) The Russians and Chinese believe that information warfare is a way of resolving a
501 conflict in their favor. The stated goal is for one side to gain and hold an information advantage
502 over the other. This is achieved by exerting a specific psychological and technical influence on
503 an enemy nation’s decisionmaking system, on the enemy nation’s populace and on its
504 information resource structures using all capabilities available including armed forces, nuclear
505 weapons, and electronic assets.²⁰ Information warfare is a useful term of art for the Army to
506 describe a range of activities inherent in any operation, but especially those amongst the people.

507 (2) As information technology becomes increasingly vital to the political, economic, and
508 social well being of nations, it also emerges as a potential vulnerability. In 2007 and 2008, China
509 and the United States both destroyed aging satellites using ground-based missiles. Other
510 countries have or are developing anti-space military technologies, placing at risk many U.S.
511 spaced-based technological advantages.²¹ Computer network attacks in 2007 crippled Estonia for
512 weeks. Russia's use of combined cyberspace attacks with conventional capabilities in 2008
513 quickly defeated Georgia. Additionally, cyberspace attacks against U.S. networks in July 2009—
514 suspected of originating in North Korea—revealed information vulnerability in the U.S.
515 homeland. In the cyber domain, peacetime does not exist; our nation is under daily attack from
516 cyber threats that are increasing regularly in sophistication and destructive potential.

517 d. Criminal activities and terrorism. High-seas piracy common in the Strait of Malacca and
518 other global choke points, heroin and opium drug traffic flowing through the tribal regions of
519 northern Pakistan, and the cocaine trade growing throughout South America, the Caribbean and
520 Central America, are all criminal activities associated to some extent with violent extremist
521 organizations, insurgencies, and terrorism. These criminal activities originate and flourish in
522 regions where government services and authority are either absent or weak, and are often sources
523 of funding for terrorists and other hybrid adversaries. The enduring nexus of criminality and
524 terrorism will continue to be a threat to stability and productivity in the future.²²

525 e. Natural and manmade disasters. The combination of large urban and poor rural
526 populations, stressed infrastructures, natural disasters and even the effects of war (in the form of
527 refugees, destroyed infrastructure, and even mass atrocities) can produce catastrophic outcomes.
528 This is evident in recent disasters ranging from the tsunami in Malaysia and Thailand, to the

529 Chinese and Indian earthquakes, to Hurricane Katrina in the United States. Some countries band
530 together to provide relief while others may clash over the resulting shortages of potable water,
531 food, medicine, and shelter. The U.S. military will continue to play a major role in disaster relief.
532 Missions include restoring essential services, establishing civil security, establishing civil
533 control, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and
534 consequence management. U.S. forces will work side-by-side with host nation (HN) agencies,
535 U.S. governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

536 **2-4. Projection of Potential Threats and Challenges**

537 a. While it is not possible to predict the future with absolute certainty, it is possible to
538 develop a grounded projection of potential threats, challenges, and enemy capabilities in the
539 future operating environment. Some of these threats include regional power struggles, ethnic
540 tensions, and political instability; threatened WMD proliferation and use; terrorist and criminal
541 activities originating in ungoverned spaces; economic attack launched by an advanced hostile
542 state; and catastrophic natural disasters. Each of the following projected scenarios is based on
543 analysis of current threats and conditions in specific regions and areas:

544 ***Power struggle in WMD-capable failing state:*** A hostile failing state government is thrown
545 into chaos by infighting among leadership factions, resulting in instability, potential WMD
546 proliferation issues, and likely threat to key regional U.S. allies. Critical security challenges
547 include anti-access capabilities, WMD proliferation, state use of proxies, hostile, failing states
548 that harbor terrorist and criminal safe havens, and border tensions.

549 ***Ally launches a pre-emptive surgical strike against a threatening hostile state:*** This results
550 in regional military conflict, global economic instability, and blocked access to shipping lanes.
551 Critical security challenges include anti-access capabilities, WMD proliferation, hybrid threats,
552 terrorist organizations, state use of proxies, hostile state, and violent extremist organizations.

553 ***Terrorists acquire WMD through transnational criminal organizations:*** Supported by
554 transnational organized criminal networks, several terrorist groups acquire WMD materials.
555 Critical security challenges include WMD proliferation, terrorist organizations, violent extremist
556 organizations, and criminal enterprises.

557 ***Intra-state insurgency expands beyond state borders to entire region:*** This threatens UN
558 and U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency and stability operations. Critical security
559 challenges include terrorist organizations, state use of proxies, hostile state, failing or failed state,
560 violent extremist organization, safe havens, and border tension.

561 ***U.S. ally is threatened by violent extremist organization activities emanating from safe
562 havens in a bordering state:*** This results in state-on-state conflict. Critical security challenges
563 include terrorist organizations, state use of proxies, hostile state, violent extremist organization,
564 and safe havens.

565 ***Advanced hostile state launches an economic attack on U.S. firms:*** By dumping economic
566 assets and conducting a concurrent wide-ranging cyber attack, an advanced hostile state can
567 create critical security challenges including state use of proxies, cyber attack, unrestricted
568 warfare, and resource competition.

569 ***Narco-criminal gang violence along the U.S. borders:*** This creates instability in border
570 towns and cities and increases illegal immigration due to people fleeing the violence. Critical

571 security challenges include civil security, violent extremist organizations, criminal enterprises,
572 and border tension.

573 ***Catastrophic natural disaster:*** The United States suffers a 7.0 or greater magnitude
574 earthquake devastating infrastructure across a large region, triggering internally displaced
575 persons, widespread crime, and large scale civil support responses. Critical security challenges
576 include humanitarian assistance and civil security.

577 b. Further, these threats and environmental factors provide a list of critical security
578 challenges which the future force must be prepared to face: Anti-access capabilities, WMD
579 proliferation, state use of proxies, hostile and failing states, terrorist and criminal safe havens,
580 hybrid threats, terrorist organizations, cyberspace attack, unrestricted warfare, resource
581 competition, humanitarian assistance, and civil security.²³

582 **2-5. Probable and Likely Technological Advancements**

583 a. The Army must be prepared to use future technological advancements and counter the
584 technical advances employed by our enemies. The Army works closely with defense and civilian
585 laboratories, [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency](#), academia, and industry to identify
586 trends in technological advances. For example, today the Army employs tele-operated robots and
587 virtual training and will have reliable autonomous robots and neural networked prosthetics in the
588 near future. Development of new technologies is driven by an identified requirement for U.S.
589 forces, or by a need to counter an emerging technology or practice used by an enemy. An
590 example of a new requirement would be the V-22 Osprey which provides a fixed wing vertical
591 take-off and landing platform for transporting troops and materiel. An example of a need to
592 counter an emerging technology or practice by an enemy would be jamming systems mounted on
593 vehicles to disrupt remotely detonated IEDs. Finding the right balance between developing
594 countermeasures and developing new capabilities is critical to ensuring the future force is able to
595 seize and retain the initiative. Being technologically surprised by the enemy could be
596 devastating. The interaction between military technological innovation and the development of
597 countermeasures is likely to introduce the following broad changes to combat operations for the
598 United States and potential enemies.

- 599 • Improvements in computing technology—specifically the development of quantum
600 computers—will enable virtually 100 percent secure communications, non-satellite based
601 precise positioning, navigation, and timing, and advanced image resolution and sensing
602 capabilities²⁴
- 603 • Improvements in non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse technology will likely allow
604 potential enemies to acquire the capability to attack U.S. forces or specific localized areas
605 with weapons capable of producing significant damage to certain fragile electronic
606 control systems of the type critical to the operation of many ground vehicles and aircraft.
607 Military tactical-level networks could remain shielded from an electromagnetic pulse,
608 however, operational-level, interagency and intergovernmental networks could still be at
609 risk.²⁵ More damaging large-area, even up to continent sized, electromagnetic pulse
610 effects would require high altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon. This is potentially
611 more likely given the proliferation of nuclear technologies²⁶
- 612 • Improved sensors, sensor fusion, communications, and knowledge networking will allow
613 higher levels of information sharing, enabling more effective application of combat
614 power, decentralization, and noncontiguous operations under certain conditions²⁷

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- 615 • Improved system durability and reliability, fuel efficiency, and precision munitions will
616 reduce sustainment demands and sustainment infrastructure, and will extend the duration
617 of operations prior to required replenishment²⁸
- 618 • Improved robotics will enable development of autonomous systems which can perform
619 desired tasks in unstructured environments without continuous human guidance²⁹
- 620 • Improvements in immersive technologies will enable development of virtual training
621 areas inside a finite training space, allowing Soldiers to walk through virtual
622 environments that contain both real-world objects and simulated characters, facilitating
623 training and education, and better enabling Soldiers to make decisions under stress, to
624 practice, and to get experiences they would not normally get in the school house or in
625 their unit before they deploy³⁰
- 626 • Improvements in nanotechnology will enable development of materials with increased
627 strength and lighter weight, devices with improved electrical performance, nano-robots
628 for medical, sensor, and weapons applications, and genetically engineered organisms for
629 producing alternative fuels³¹
- 630 • Improvements in neuroscience will mitigate stress and improve mental, moral, and
631 physical capacity³²
- 632 • Improvements in renewable energy and management of fuel and electric power
633 requirements will enable greater fuel efficiency, advances in engine designs, and
634 improved power generation capability for individual Soldier systems³³

635 b. Future force technological asymmetries may erode quickly as agile competitors innovate
636 in disruptive ways or adapt operations to limit U.S. advantages. Potential adversaries will watch
637 wargaming, experimentation, and operational employments in order to estimate future
638 capabilities and vulnerabilities. For example, many of the information technologies U.S. forces
639 are developing are likely to improve the capabilities of peer and near-peer adversaries. U.S.
640 forces must prepare to fight adaptive enemies.

641 **2-6. Conclusion** The key implication of the future operating environment is that due to the
642 uncertainty and complexity of the future operating environment, Army units must be able to
643 respond to a broad range of threats and challenges anywhere in the world, on short notice, for
644 potentially long duration (an Army of expeditionary and campaign quality). The preceding
645 analysis of the operating environment provides many more implications that drive the solution to
646 the military problem facing the future force. Key implications of the harbingers analysis are the
647 requirements to create a combined arms force capable of fighting for information, in close
648 combat, and engaged with partners. Key implications of the emerging threats analysis include
649 developing a force capable of JIIM interoperability, savvy in delivering consistent words and
650 actions, and flexible in securing populations while defeating threats. Finally, key implications of
651 the analysis of future technologies emphasizes requirements for designing a force capable of
652 fighting degraded, operating autonomously across wide areas, and imbedding training and
653 education opportunities that capture lessons learned rapidly. Many implications overlap or are
654 interrelated and can apply to different portions of the solution. In order to demonstrate the logic,
655 each part of the solution addresses implications derived from the analysis of the operating
656 environment.

But in war everything is uncertain... all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War

657 **Chapter 3**
658 **Meeting the Challenges**

659 **3-1. Introduction.** This chapter addresses how the U.S. Army will create conditions that
660 facilitate achievement of national objectives by ensuring future leaders and their organizations
661 have the ability to think in terms of friendly, enemy, and the people, and possess the flexibility to
662 secure populations while simultaneously attacking to defeat enemy organizations. Beginning
663 with a statement of the military problem, the chapter then describes the central idea that aims at
664 dealing with the context of uncertainty outlined in the previous chapter. Next, the chapter
665 presents the military solution—the way the Army will meet future challenges through a series of
666 supporting ideas and operational tasks. Throughout the chapter key implications derived from the
667 analysis of the operating environment set off their supporting ideas in a logical model postulating
668 that *if these conditions exist, then the Army must use this approach and combinations of other*
669 *supporting ideas to achieve its goals.*

670 **3-2. Military Problem.** Given a complex environment of uncertainty and persistent conflict,
671 how will the U.S. Army apply finite resources to fight and win wars? Other than combat, how
672 will Army forces engage in security force assistance to persuade and influence relevant
673 populations in order to achieve strategic goals and policy aims? How will the U.S. Army support
674 joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts to prevent conflict?

675 **3-3. Central Idea.** Dealing with uncertainty requires a mindset based on flexibility of thought
676 and *operational adaptability*. It calls for leaders at all levels who are comfortable with
677 ambiguity, collaborative planning and execution, allowable levels of risk, and the ability and
678 willingness to make adjustments according to the situation. Operational adaptability applies to all
679 levels of command. It is founded on the fundamentals of mission command and decentralization
680 of operations, as well as the commitment of the U.S. Army to maintain an all volunteer force
681 trained and equipped to execute full spectrum operations.

682 **3-4. Military Solution.**

683 a. The ability of the future force to successfully operate in uncertainty requires:

684 (1) An understanding of the environment that is informed by pre-deployment
685 engagement and analysis and then driven and sustained by development of intelligence at all
686 levels of command.

687 (2) Operations against irregular threats and among the people require an intelligence
688 weight of effort significantly tilted toward the tactical level, focusing on reconnaissance and
689 security missions.

690 (3) Commanders who can exploit opportunities, control the tempo of operations, and
691 maintain freedom of action in order to seize and maintain the initiative at the earliest
692 opportunities.

693 (4) The ability to conduct simultaneous, distributed operations across the operational
694 area. This is complementary and synergistic with seizing and maintaining the initiative.

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695 Operations conducted at key points across the operational area extend operational reach,
696 apply continuous pressure to the enemy, and require a joint and combined arms approach.

697 (5) Decentralized and adaptive command and execution at the point of decision.
698 Distributed operations require tactical and operational commanders to understand and
699 develop the situation in their portion of the operational area. Decentralization, guided by
700 mission command, multiplies the capabilities of the force by allowing commanders to take
701 the initiative and exploit opportunities.

702 (6) A combined arms force capable of reacting to the situation as it develops and
703 robust enough to fight and survive in a complex, uncertain environment.

704 (7) These requirements are enabled by and depend on creative leaders and soldiers
705 who exercise individual initiative guided by commander's intent and built on a foundation of
706 trust, training and experience; focused on tactical and technical competence, cultural
707 awareness, and strategic perspective.

708 b. In order to develop leaders and organizations that can think in terms of friendly, enemy,
709 and the people, while retaining flexibility for simultaneous combat, and stability tasks, and acting
710 with initiative, the U.S. Army will require a framework of *operational adaptation* that
711 emphasizes:

- 712 • Understanding the situation in depth, breadth and context
- 713 • Acting in concert with partners
- 714 • Continually assessing and adapting actions
- 715 • Consolidating gains, transitioning between tasks or operations, and transitioning
716 responsibility

717 c. The operating framework builds on the CCJO's three interrelated ideas: Addressing each
718 unique situation on its own terms, conducting and integrating combinations of activities, and
719 assessing results to modify understanding and subsequent operations. To the CCJO ideas, this
720 concept adds the ideas of *consolidating*
721 and *transitioning* as a way to account for
722 the demands of operations unique to the
723 land domain.

724 d. **Understand**

725 (1) *Understanding* is
726 fundamental to battle command and a
727 critical element in developing the
728 situation. Situational understanding is
729 essential to the commander's ability to
730 visualize and describe the situation's
731 context. Analysis of the enemy and
732 operational variables (political, military,
733 economic, social, infrastructure,
734 information, physical environment and
735 time) provides the information that
736 senior commanders use to develop

Implication

Professional Military Education. Because of the need to apply professional judgment to operational and tactical decisions in an uncertain and complex environment, professional military education (PME) must strive to produce leaders that can act wisely and creatively. The key to dealing with uncertainty is the individual, his or her sense of self-confidence, and their innate and learned abilities to apply critical thinking skills under pressure. Cultural awareness, political astuteness, and a pervasive awareness of second and third order effects of their actions are critical to future force leaders. Leaders must be able to see tactical actions in the light of tactical, operational, and strategic effects within the intent of their superiors. The implication for PME is that at each level for all grades the emphasis must be on increasing the intellectual rigor of leader development and education, exposing officers and NCOs to these leadership challenges at earlier points in their careers, and fostering a culture of measured risk-taking and decentralization consistent with mission command.

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737 understanding and frame problems in the operating environment.³⁴ It is particularly important to
738 understand the enemy's risk tolerance, morale, and degree of flexibility or adaptability (both
739 tactical and strategic). In framing the problem, the commander must work closely with the
740 civilian leadership and appropriate higher headquarters to understand the logic that underpins
741 their guidance. In all cases, the commander must work to frame the problem with the best
742 information available and continually reassess the situation and reframe the problem, as
743 necessary.³⁵

744 (2) Situational understanding (SU) is more than the aggregated product of a common
745 operational picture. Situational understanding consists of the concentrated effort to understand
746 the enemy's relationship to, and interaction within, the local environment. This requires applying
747 the commander's judgment and experience to relate local understanding to the operational
748 context. This understanding is a product of planning and action that begins with an effort to
749 understand the operating environment driven by intelligence prior to taking action. But this is
750 just the initial step. To expand understanding, the force develops the situation through positive
751 and directed action. Recent operations continue to emphasize that the local nature of politics and
752 conflict remain critical to understanding the situation and the operating environment in which a
753 commander takes action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Because of the complex nature
754 of potential enemies and the local conditions, action is still required to gain visibility of the
755 enemy organization and understand how they interact with the environment, including the
756 population.³⁶

757 (3) Adaptive enemies will use the complex terrain, particularly urban population centers,
758 to conceal critical aspects of their organization. As a result, action—physical reconnaissance,
759 persistent surveillance, and human intelligence—is essential. Units must determine what must be
760 known about the enemy and the environment. This also includes determining what the enemy
761 organization looks like and how it operates. How does the enemy access resources and support
762 within the area of operations? What are the enemy's strengths and vulnerabilities?³⁷ Or, as C.E.
763 Callwell wrote in *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, “what does the enemy prize most .
764 . . the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a
765 successful conclusion?”³⁸ Answering that question and understanding the likely effects of
766 friendly action will require cultural and historical expertise as well as effective intelligence and
767 reconnaissance efforts.

768 d. **Act.** As units develop SU, they must act using all elements of available combat power and
769 other enablers to isolate the enemy from sources of support and conduct attacks against weak
770 points and vulnerabilities. Commanders develop an understanding of the operating environment,
771 conduct continuous reconnaissance, and encourage prudent risk taking to seize and exploit the
772 operational initiative to reach the desired state. The degree of understanding necessary for
773 successful operations against hybrid threats in complex environments will require not only the
774 employment of technical means, but also the conduct of reconnaissance and the development of
775 intelligence in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. In counterinsurgency
776 operations, reconnaissance efforts must extend beyond combined arms operations and to include
777 interagency and indigenous elements with subject matter experts to help build a holistic estimate
778 of the situation as the basis for applying interagency and HN resources to address local
779 grievances and gain local support. In short, understanding always requires action and often
780 requires fighting for information. Adaptive combinations of offense, defense, and stability (or
781 civil support) operations, guided by mission command—the conduct of military operations

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782 through decentralized execution based on mission orders—are the means that allow units to
783 seize, exploit, and maintain the initiative and create the conditions for success.³⁹

784 e. **Assess and adapt.** Assessment is a continuous effort to measure the progress of the force
785 toward mission accomplishment. Because the enemy and other destabilizing factors will continue
786 to interact with operational plans and actions, commanders and civil authorities must
787 continuously assess the operating environment and the progress of operations, and compare them
788 with their understanding, vision, and intent. Through assessment, commanders determine if the
789 situation has changed sufficiently to warrant reframing the problem. This may require
790 commanders to establish measures to aid in understanding and evaluating progress towards the
791 desired state. They must constantly evaluate these measures to ensure they are viable means of
792 judging progress. To meet objectives and achieve the desired state, commanders adapt operations
793 based on this assessment and their professional military judgment.⁴⁰

794 f. **Consolidate.** The focus of consolidation is to protect what has been gained while retaining
795 the initiative by disorganizing the adversary in depth and across time.
796 Sometimes the initiative is built on operations with the local population,
797 especially during stability and civil support missions. This calls for a
798 continuous effort to organize and strengthen the land force position with
799 respect to the environment and enemy.⁴¹
800 In counterinsurgency and stability operations it is particularly important to sustain improvements in the situation that permit
801 progress toward achieving political goals over time.
802
803
804
805
806

Implication

Area Security. Because of the difficulty in consolidating tactical and operational gains into policy success (or consolidating local improvements in the situation that permit progress toward achieving political goals over time), area security operations cannot be treated as ad hoc ventures. Meeting the challenges of area security involves the creative combination of conventional and counterinsurgency doctrines. The Army must think of area security as a critical element required in all military operations.

807 h. **Transition.** Effective transitions are critical to mission accomplishment. Transitions
808 include shifting between operations and tasks (for example, from reconnaissance to offense) and
809 transitions between phases of a campaign. These transitions may also include the transfer of
810 routine responsibilities over the operational area from military to civilian authorities, another
811 military force, or regional or international organizations. There are unique resource, planning,
812 and command and control requirements to enable effective transitions. The dynamic nature of the
813 threat and environment will make transitions hard to predict and difficult to execute. This, an
814 aspect of *operational adaptability*, implies that transitional forces must be prepared to execute
815 transitions with little or no notice.⁴²

816 i. This framework requires an increased emphasis on specific strategic, operational and
817 tactical enablers. The Army must continue to develop and refine its capabilities for simultaneous
818 offense, defense, and stability (or civil support) operations and imbue its leaders with the
819 contextual understanding and the judgment to make decisions to seize and retain the initiative in
820 complex and uncertain environments. In addition, the Army must team with joint, interagency,
821 and international partners to exploit the comparative advantages that each team member brings to
822 the operation and to align efforts through cooperation and coordination in support of U.S.
823 national policy. Finally, the U.S. Army must understand and exploit technological developments
824 in its own operations while ensuring that the Army can adapt quickly to threats caused by
825 enemies' technological innovations or disruption of friendly technological networks.

826 **3-5. Supporting Ideas.** The central idea is strengthened by related supporting ideas, several
 827 broad fundamental characteristics that underlie all successful future Army operations. Each
 828 supporting idea addresses specific implications derived from the analysis of the future operating
 829 environment shown in Chapter 2. There are six supporting ideas: develop the situation through
 830 action, exert psychological and technical influence, employ a combination of defeat and stability
 831 mechanisms, conduct combined arms operations, cooperate with partners, and leverage joint
 832 capabilities.

833 a. Develop the Situation through Action

834 (1) Developing the situation through action has been an important element of Army
 835 intelligence operations. It is an inherent acknowledgement that intelligence sensors and
 836 surveillance operations cannot by themselves produce a clear picture of the environment, the
 837 enemy, or the other elements of the situation.

838 (2) The Army must develop leaders and Soldiers imbued with the spirit of seizing and
 839 retaining the initiative. This enables Army operations and requires operational and individual
 840 initiative grounded in mission command and supported by Warrior Ethos; a
 841 *fighting centric* approach to operations; combined arms operations; and
 842 operations decentralized to the point of decision. Defeating hybrid threats
 843 requires fighting—the measured application of all elements of combat
 844 power that include leadership, information, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment,
 845 command and control, and protection—in order to seize, retain, and exploit the
 846 initiative.

854 (3) Developing the situation through action will mean a number of things for Army leaders in the future force. Leaders will
 855 need to know how to fight, how to organize information and understand the complex contexts in
 856 which they are operating. They must know when to take decisive action. Acting is not
 857 necessarily attacking. A contextualized understanding and continual assessment will be
 858 necessary to develop the situation through action. Sometimes, “doing nothing is the best
 859 reaction”⁴³ At other times, a specific action to regain the initiative will be necessary. Future
 860 forces and leaders must possess an ability to create surprise through executing operations with
 861 speed and not necessarily in haste. The distinction is important.⁴⁴

863 b. Exert Psychological and Technical Influence

864 (1) Our enemies will employ coercion, intimidation, propaganda, and disinformation to
 865 effect populations. Therefore, Army influence operations (both psychological and technical)
 866 must be relevant to policy goals and objectives, and contribute to the success of the future force.
 867 The future force will employ all available means to achieve influence across the air, land,
 868 maritime and space domains and in the cyberspace environment. This concept will treat
 869 cyberspace in the same way it does communications, as an enabler to all operations and a
 870 component of full spectrum operations. Commanders will employ information engagement

Implications

Fight for Information: Because of technological limitations, enemy countermeasures, and enemy propensity to operate among the people, Army units will have to fight for information and adapt continuously to changing situations, develop the situation through action, and collect intelligence through physical reconnaissance, persistent surveillance, and human intelligence.

Fight Degraded: Because the network may be compromised and subject to enemy actions, units will have to be capable of fighting in a degraded mode. (see Glossary)

Fight in Close Combat: Because operations among the populace and within urban terrain requires increased discrimination and limitations on the use of force, the joint force will have to conduct close combat operations informed by intelligence against a broad array of threats in the land domain.

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871 activities to understand their local
872 operating environment, communicate
873 information, build trust and confidence,
874 and influence the perceptions of key
875 actors and relevant publics—all of which
876 promote support for Army operations.
877 When conducting operations in and
878 among civilian populations, information
879 engagement activities aim to expose the
880 enemy's brutality, clarify U.S. intentions,
881 counter enemy propaganda, and bolster
882 the legitimacy of partners.

Implications

Consistent Messages and Actions. Because future operation will occur in and among the people, under the unblinking eye of the media, and against threats savvy enough to present competing narratives, Army actions and messages must be congruent with and consistent with policy and objectives.

Versatile Cyberspace Forces. Because future cyberspace threats--nation-states, criminal syndicates, activists, terrorists, and other non-state actors--are able to adapt to U.S actions and adopt countermeasures extremely rapidly while posing grave risks to all instruments of national power, the Army must develop and provide versatile cyberspace forces to combatant commanders.

883 (2) Future force commanders face three interconnected operational requirements:
884 defeating enemies; informing and influencing relevant actors and populations; and prevailing in
885 the competition for advanced technologies. To meet these challenges Army commanders must:

- 886 • *Protect and defend* friendly information and information systems to ensure timely,
887 accurate, and relevant information. Information protection denies enemies, adversaries,
888 and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for
889 their own purposes
- 890 • *Inform and educate* U.S., allied, and other relevant publics and actors in order to gain and
891 maintain their trust, confidence, and support. Information engagement is characterized by
892 a comprehensive commitment to transparency, accountability, and credibility
- 893 • *Attack* enemy decisionmaking systems and their information resource structures (such as,
894 networks, computers, and others)

895 (3) Understanding the wide variety of situations in the future requires a realization that
896 fighting is often a necessary but insufficient component of achieving the nation's strategic aims
897 in war. In order to achieve favorable outcomes in complex environments, the Army must be
898 prepared to take action to exert psychological and technical influence on a complex population.
899 This includes ensuring messages and actions are congruent with one another and the policy they
900 seek to achieve. Like fighting, military actions to exert influence must clearly support and further
901 the guiding objectives of national policy and strategy.

902 (4) Instead of developing messages in isolation from national strategic planning
903 processes, Army information engagement needs to integrate with planning processes at every
904 level of war in order to enhance the development of SU, and develop specific plans for land
905 component action that support national policy objectives.

906 (5) Commanders must consider the second and third order effects of not only their
907 actions, but also of their statements. Just as actions inconsistent with the statement damage
908 credibility, statements not supported by action can result in a loss of the trust and support of the
909 audience.

910 (6) The Army will face enemies who will seek to undermine popular support at home and
911 on the battlefield. It will not be enough to act appropriately; it will be just as important to engage
912 in the debate about how to interpret those actions, and it will usually be best to initiate the debate
913 on terms of the joint force's own choosing.⁴⁵

914 (7) The Army’s ability to operate in cyberspace as an important component of
915 simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or civil support operations will be increasingly critical to
916 its future operational success. Army commanders must be able to operate in the cyberspace
917 environment to promote the psychological and technical effects that enable mission success. The
918 Army will use technical methods to both attack adversaries and defend friendly capabilities and
919 electronic warfare (EW) to achieve psychological influence.⁴⁶

920 (8) In addition to preparing for war on land, the Army must be prepared for threats in
921 cyberspace. Cyberspace is a separate warfighting environment in which freedom to maneuver
922 must be safeguarded, just as the joint force ensures freedom of navigation on and over the
923 world’s oceans. Similar to the land domain, cyber operations are conducted with a high degree of
924 uncertainty, and cyber threats—nation-states, criminal syndicates, activists, terrorists, and other
925 non-state actors—are able to adapt to U.S. actions and adopt countermeasures extremely rapidly.
926 These cyber threats pose grave risks to all U.S. instruments of national power, with the potential
927 to conduct crippling attacks on military, government, public and private sector networks.
928 Consequently, the Army needs cyberspace and electronic warfare subject matter experts in their
929 formations to enable access to these capabilities at higher and joint levels, as well as provide
930 continual updates on both capabilities and vulnerabilities to commanders. Army forces must be
931 organized, trained and equipped to continue operations when successful enemy cyberspace or
932 EW attacks degrade capabilities.

933 **c. Employ a Combination of Defeat and Stability Mechanisms**

934 (1) In order to develop the situation through action and to exert psychological and
935 technical influence, the Army must be able to both coerce and persuade. Army forces accomplish
936 this by employing the clearly defined defeat and stability mechanism explained in current
937 doctrine.⁴⁷ They offer important points to consider in future military operations.

938 (2) Defeat mechanisms are the methods through which friendly forces accomplish their
939 mission against enemy opposition. They include: *destroy*, *dislocate*, *disintegrate*, and *isolate*.

940 *Destroy* means to apply lethal combat power against an enemy capability so that it can no longer
941 perform any function and cannot return to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.

942 *Dislocate* means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the
943 enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.

944 *Disintegrate* means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, thus degrading the
945 ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will
946 to fight.

947 *Isolate* means to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of
948 coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action.

949 (3) Army forces are most successful when applying focused combinations of defeat
950 mechanisms in order to produce complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a
951 single mechanism. Defeat mechanisms
952 are not tactical missions; rather, they
953 describe broad operational and tactical
954 effects.

955 (4) A stability mechanism is the
956 method through which friendly forces

Implication
Flexible Civil Security: Because relevant populations are an integral and impressionable part of the OE, the Army will be required to strategically plan for civil security, adapt tactics that boost rather than cripple civilian support, and provide means to redress civilian harm.

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957 affect civilians in order to attain conditions that contribute to a lasting, stable peace. They
958 include: *compel*, *control*, *influence*, and, *support*.

959 *Compel* means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect
960 behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.

961 *Control* means to impose civil order. It includes securing borders, routes, sensitive sites,
962 population centers, and individuals. It also involves physically occupying key terrain and
963 facilities.

964 *Influence* means to alter the opinions and attitudes of a civilian population through information
965 engagement, presence, and conduct. These effects are the most difficult to achieve.

966 *Support* means to establish, reinforce, or
967 set the conditions necessary for the other
968 instruments of national power to function
969 effectively.

Implication

Domestic Civil Support: Because the Army may be called upon to respond to domestic civil crises, the Army must develop and maintain habitual relationships with civilian agencies and federal and local law enforcement authorities. The regular exchange of ideas and intelligence will facilitate rapid integration of Army forces into existing civilian command structures during domestic contingencies.

970 (5) Like defeat mechanisms,
971 stability mechanisms describe both the
972 physical and the psychological effects
973 they are intended to produce. Further, combinations of stability mechanisms produce
974 complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and
975 efficiently.

976 **d. Conduct Combined Arms Operations**

977 (1) To accomplish the associated tasks of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability
978 (or civil support) operations, the Army must use the actions of a balanced combined arms team
979 to throw enemies off balance with powerful blows from unexpected directions, follow up rapidly
980 to prevent recovery, and continue operations to destroy the enemies' will to fight. In simple
981 terms, competency in *combined arms operations is the price of admission to any armed conflict*.
982 It is also a necessary component to developing the situation through action. This notion is not
983 new. *Reducing uncertainty by making contact with the enemy from a position of advantage* is an
984 enduring feature of tactics. In the future, U.S. forces will still need such skills to defeat future
985 enemies. Yet this series of actions must be subordinate to strategic plans that integrate political,
986 military, diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts. Recent experience strongly
987 emphasizes that military operations, all intended to seize the initiative, must be made within a
988 deep contextual understanding of the enemy, the social, cultural, tribal, and political nature of the
989 environment, and the U.S. national policy being enacted. Current and future operating
990 environments are of such a complex
991 political nature that *understanding local*
992 *"human terrain"*—or understanding
993 the enemy and the population in the
994 context of local terrain, culture,
995 resources, and politics—is critical to
996 success. Moreover, this degree of
997 understanding exists as a necessary
998 compliment to the synergy of combined
999 arms-based maneuver.

Implication

Combined Arms Operations: Because future enemies will attempt to counter U.S. significant advantages in communications, surveillance, long-range precision fires, armor protection, and mobility, the Army must provide the Joint Force Commander with combined arms forces capable of operating in a decentralized mode, conducting area security operations over large areas, and capitalizing on joint capabilities at all echelons.

1000 (2) The actions within the operational framework described above (the ability of the U.S.
1001 Army to understand politics and conflict, to project power, to secure objectives, terrain, and
1002 populations, to coerce and defeat enemies, to persuade neutral parties, to win, and to transition),
1003 require competency in combined arms operations. Such competency is also a necessary
1004 component to developing the situation through action. Reducing uncertainty by making contact
1005 with the enemy from a position of advantage is an enduring feature of tactics. U.S. forces will
1006 still need such skills to defeat future enemies.⁴⁸

1007 (3) This type of thinking lies at
1008 the heart of this capstone concept and its
1009 implications for full spectrum
1010 operations. The Army must have the
1011 conceptual capability and the physical
1012 ability to seize the initiative through the
1013 coordinated use of combined arms
1014 operations along all lines of effort
1015 including civil security, host nation security, essential services, governance, and economic
1016 development.⁴⁹ Stability operations require joint forces capable of securing units, installations,
1017 facilities, lines of communication, and indigenous populations from enemy attack, sabotage, or
1018 intimidation. The combination of these operational types also requires a force that is capable of
1019 conducting simultaneous actions, both military and political in nature, under conditions ranging
1020 from peaceful competition to general war and at all points in between.⁵⁰

Implication
Decentralization of Combined Arms Capabilities: Because enemies will utilize complex urban terrain to mitigate U.S. tactical advantages and will expose themselves to U.S. surveillance and firepower for only fleeting engagement opportunities, the Army must decentralize combined arms capabilities to the lowest possible level to facilitate the application of optimal weapons systems on identified targets

1021 (4) To better enable simultaneous FSO in complex environments, commanders must be
1022 prepared to incorporate interagency, intergovernmental, and indigenous actors with expertise in
1023 information operations, civil security, HN security, essential services, governance, and economic
1024 development into their combined arms teams. This ensures a more holistic SU, and enables
1025 commanders to more quickly utilize those resources outside the joint community to improve the
1026 local situation and build popular support.

1027 **e. Cooperate with Partners**

1028 (1) The military will rarely find itself to be the only external actor during military
1029 operations. It is more likely that the military will operate in an environment with a variety of
1030 U.S. domestic, international, and local strategic partners. These partnerships will be essential to
1031 developing mutual understanding of the environment and effective, comprehensive solutions to
1032 address the root causes of conflict that threaten U.S. national interests and international peace
1033 and stability.

1034 (2) Uniting the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in both winning the war
1035 and winning the peace requires focusing the efforts of likeminded actors toward a common goal.
1036 Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and
1037 civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort among the diverse array of actors involved in overseas
1038 interventions whether for offensive and defensive operations, stability operations, or civil
1039 support. Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of U.S.
1040 national power with international partners, and the private sector to respond effectively to
1041 national and international security challenges.

1042 (3) *Interagency.* Interagency
 1043 coordination ensures that all
 1044 participating agencies focus their efforts
 1045 on national objectives. The U.S. Army
 1046 has unique capabilities to offer the
 1047 interagency community. These include
 1048 influence through established military-
 1049 to-military domestic and international
 1050 contacts, resources not available to
 1051 nonmilitary agencies, trained civil
 1052 affairs personnel and their assets; and
 1053 responsiveness based on military
 1054 training and readiness. Additional
 1055 unique military capabilities include
 1056 command and control resources
 1057 supported by worldwide
 1058 communications and intelligence infrastructures, cyberspace capabilities, robust organizational
 1059 and planning processes, training support for large numbers of individuals on myriad skills, and
 1060 support for inter- or intra-theater requirements. Unity of effort can only be achieved through
 1061 close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation.

Implications

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Interoperability: Because achievement of favorable outcomes in complex environments requires unified action, Army units must be interoperable with JIIM partners.

Security Force Assistance: Because joint forces will have to conduct operations among populations with differing cultures, success will require assistance to indigenous security forces and civil military operations (governance, rule of law, and capacity building) in a multinational environment.

Interoperable Design and Planning Processes: Because U.S. interagency, international and indigenous partners reside outside traditional military command and control structures, unity of effort requires the development of common or interoperable design and planning processes in order to establish a shared understanding of the situation, the problems, goals and objectives, and roles and responsibilities.

1062 (4) *Intergovernmental Organizations.*⁵¹ IGOs have assumed increasingly important roles
 1063 in both responding to crises and orchestrating the actions of international actors. IGOs are
 1064 international political entities formed to protect and promote the national interests of each
 1065 member state. IGO treaties provide the norms, rules, and principles that govern IGO operations
 1066 and member state behavior. These treaties often serve as the legal foundation to legitimize an
 1067 intervention within another sovereign state and govern the behavior of intervening actors,
 1068 including the rules of engagement for military operations. IGOs often have global and regional
 1069 influence with member states and may be valuable partners to provide legitimacy, funding, and
 1070 coordination of political and military, state and to non-state actors. In addition, IGOs often have
 1071 extensive local and regional knowledge and experience with humanitarian assistance and
 1072 capacity building particularly in the areas of governance, economic and civil society
 1073 development, justice and reconciliation.

1074 (5) *Multinational Partners.*

1075 (a) While operating with multinational partners will continue to be challenging and
 1076 will demand compatible doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, shared situational
 1077 awareness, interconnected battle-space management systems, and linked intelligence and
 1078 compatible communication systems, multinational partners possess unique capabilities that
 1079 enhance every operation. In order to leverage these capabilities and to improve its own
 1080 capabilities, the Army must understand the resources and limitations of its multinational partners.
 1081 To engender a better mutual understand between the Army and its multinational partners, the
 1082 Army must increase efforts to conduct combined training, education, and cultural exchange.

1083 (b) The Army must understand what assistance its multinational partners require to
 1084 enable their participation (such as sustainment support, close air support, and access to networks
 1085 for example). There are key allies with whom the U.S. Army will partner, making it appropriate
 1086 to clearly articulate those contributions from multinational partners that will be most useful to

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1087 coalition efforts.⁵² The Army must be prepared to assist multinational partners in matching
1088 critical U.S. battle and air space management norms for command and control to enable them to
1089 fully integrate in U.S. operational areas. Additionally, there must be clear understanding at all
1090 levels of each participant's operational capabilities and the likely constraints on their
1091 employment within a theater of operation.

1092 (6) *Nongovernmental Organizations.*⁵³

1093 (a) NGOs operate independently of governments and their militaries. NGOs' interests
1094 differ from those of military and other government entities in that national political objectives do
1095 not drive their missions which derive from humanitarian interests such as the desire to relieve
1096 suffering. Military leaders must work to establish a common cause with NGOs working in
1097 overlapping areas. NGOs tend to operate with a longer term perspective, with operational and
1098 resource flexibility, and with a greater degree of interdependency on local resources and
1099 personnel. Their local contacts and experience make NGOs valuable sources of information
1100 about the environment, local and regional governments, and civilian attitudes toward an
1101 operation.

1102 (b) The willingness of NGOs to interact with the military varies immensely with the
1103 political and local context. The leadership of some large multinational and U.S. domestic NGOs
1104 are more likely to participate in the development of SU and strategic level planning prior to
1105 intervention if there is broad international consensus supporting action. Once military forces are
1106 in theater, some NGOs may prefer to adhere to strict principles of impartiality, neutrality, and
1107 independence in an effort to create humanitarian space while other organizations will seek the
1108 protection and support of military forces. The Army must be adept at working within the
1109 constraints and imperatives of cooperation NGOs with whom it interacts.

1110 (7) *Private Sector.*

1111 (a) Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the fact that the private sector can
1112 play an important role in conflict prevention and post conflict stability operations as well as
1113 contribute to SU, planning, and execution of combat operations. The private sector is a diverse
1114 community of actors with capabilities that can both enhance and complicate military operations
1115 overseas. Private sector assistance in developing sustainable market economies is an essential
1116 element of strategies for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Companies with a
1117 long-term presence in conflict prone areas can help to assess the economic and financial needs of
1118 countries and to develop strategies to address good economic governance in key ministries,
1119 border security, the banking sector, revenue collection, human and social capital, national
1120 resources, host nation and regional infrastructure, regional energy markets, and long term
1121 international investment.⁵⁴ When working with the private sector in overseas interventions, it is
1122 important to analyze each company's culture, motivations, and mission and particularly the role
1123 that profits play in governing company behavior.

1124 (b) In recent years, the U.S. government has become more reliant on private
1125 contractors because they provide a more flexible surge capacity with a diversity of expertise and
1126 are often more politically acceptable than increasing the number of military and civilian
1127 government personnel. Yet, the increased use of private contractors can provoke controversy
1128 based upon a perception of higher cost, less reliability in the field, and challenges in integrating
1129 military, government, and company operations effectively.⁵⁵ In U.S. military operations around
1130 the world, the role of the private sector in both winning the war and winning the peace is
1131 essential. As part of U.S. government action, the Army should integrate private sector

1132 contributions to Army missions in such a way that companies will seek a balance between
1133 making a profit and contributing to long-term sustainable peace and stability in concert with U.S.
1134 national security objectives.

1135 **f. Leverage Joint Capabilities**

1136 (1) In order to achieve synergy, the Army will continue to require access to joint
1137 capabilities at all levels. This has several implications for the future. Improvements in
1138 communications, surveillance, and precision strike technologies permit a higher level of SU,
1139 especially in connection with the disposition of friendly forces. Additionally, U.S. air and naval
1140 strike capabilities make it difficult for
1141 enemy ground forces to concentrate
1142 except in very complex terrain or urban
1143 areas. Vulnerability to the U.S. strike
1144 capabilities compels enemy forces to
1145 disperse and makes them vulnerable to
1146 concentrated efforts on the ground.⁵⁶

<p style="text-align: center;">Implication</p> <p>Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Interoperability: Because achievement of favorable outcomes in complex environments requires unified action, Army units must be interoperable with JIIM partners.</p>
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1147 (2) Training in JIIM operations builds teamwork, cohesion within units, discipline, and
1148 understanding. Ultimately this training helps forces to operate within the law of war, observe the
1149 rules of engagement, and better deal with uncertainty. The psychological benefit that ground
1150 forces gain from knowing that they will face no threat from the air, and that air and naval forces
1151 are prepared to come to their assistance at a moment's notice encourages bold action. As the U.S.
1152 endeavors to expand and improve ground force capability for current operations and future
1153 contingencies, it must increase airlift and sealift capabilities while maintaining air supremacy
1154 and dominance at sea.

1155 (3) Key to maximizing joint capabilities is developing leaders who are educated and
1156 experienced in operating in JIIM environments. This education and experience must inculcate
1157 sensitivity to differing cultures, emphasizing communication skills along with an appreciation of
1158 the role that diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts play in achieving national
1159 objectives.

1160 **3-6. Core Operational Actions.** In addition to the supporting ideas, core operational actions that
1161 emerged from an analysis of ongoing operations provide a foundation for how the Army will
1162 meet future challenges.

1163 **a. Conduct security force assistance (SFA)**

1164 (1) Key to conducting effective
1165 stability operations and to countering
1166 irregular threats is the improvement of
1167 indigenous capabilities at the tactical
1168 through ministerial levels to include
1169 equipping the indigenous force with
1170 weaponry, and the supporting logistics and infrastructure, necessary for them to deliver security.
1171 Therefore, the focus of security force assistance should be the development of trained and robust
1172 indigenous forces that are able to maintain a secure environment and facilitate transition to civil
1173 control. Conditions that require robust SFA are not unique to the current or future operating
1174 environment. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy addressed the importance of SFA when he
1175 called for a “a wholly different kind of force, and...a new and wholly different kind of military

<p style="text-align: center;">Implication</p> <p>Security Force Assistance: Because joint forces will have to conduct operations among populations with differing cultures, success will require assistance to indigenous security forces and civil military operations (governance, rule of law, and capacity building) in a multinational environment.</p>

1176 training” to confront the challenges of his time. Although many aspects of the operating
1177 environment have changed since then, the need to organize forces for effective SFA remains
1178 constant. Today, a “different kind of force” is one that integrates special operations forces (SOF)
1179 and general purpose forces (GPF). A “different kind of military training” requires an integrative
1180 approach that diffuses SFA expertise across the entire Army. Successful SFA that develops
1181 indigenous capacity necessary to achieve and sustain sovereignty or self-determination will
1182 require interagency unity of effort. Although broadly split between civilian, police, and military
1183 implementation in permissive environments, these tasks fall almost exclusively to the military in
1184 non-permissive environments. Failure to develop sufficient indigenous capacity to undertake
1185 stabilization tasks risks strategic failure.

1186 (2) Although SOF and GPF will integrate under a joint commander in all core operational
1187 actions, the increasing role of GPF in SFA treads most heavily on a historically SOF-dominated
1188 mission. Contingencies in the future operating environment may require manpower and logistic
1189 requirements that exceed SOF capabilities. In such instances, GPF assume a larger role in the
1190 conduct of SFA, integrated in planning and execution with SOF. Conditions of the operating
1191 environment, priorities of internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy, and the ratio of
1192 U.S. forces available to indigenous forces to be trained will dictate the nature of SOF-GPF
1193 integration in SFA.

1194 (3) In a permissive environment, SOF will require little GPF support. In the Philippines,
1195 for example, a low-level insurgency against a relatively stable central government, with regular
1196 diplomatic, economic, and military exchanges between the United States and the Philippines, and
1197 the relatively small number of indigenous forces to be trained for counterinsurgency
1198 accommodate classical SOF-dominated SFA. SOF has been highly effective in conducting SFA
1199 in permissive environments with a small manpower and logistic footprint.

1200 (5) As campaigns transition from mainly offensive or defensive to stability operations,
1201 SFA across the breadth of the indigenous force assumes greater priority. In Iraq, for example, a
1202 semi-permissive environment exists that requires the training of a large number of indigenous
1203 military, border patrol, and police forces. In such environments, GPF will assume a larger role in
1204 SFA. SOF-GPF integration will occur under a joint commander, with GPF providing command
1205 and control and combat enablers (Mobile Transition Teams, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Intelligence
1206 Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Fires, Lift, Quick Reaction Forces, Medical Evacuation, and
1207 Sustainment) to SOF within an area of operations.

1208 (6) Should the conclusion of major offensive or defensive operations not yield a
1209 permissive or semi-permissive environment conducive to a full transition to stability operations,
1210 U.S. forces may be required to train a large number of indigenous forces in a short time period.
1211 In such environments, highly-integrated SOF and GPF operating under a joint commander are
1212 critical to success. Concurrent to offensive and defensive operations, GPF will conduct SFA of
1213 indigenous military forces, assuming primary responsibility in this role until indigenous military
1214 forces attain a command-designated level of capability and readiness. SOF provide SFA to
1215 indigenous special operations and police units with command and control and combat enablers
1216 provided by GPF.

1217 **b. Shaping and Entry Operations**

1218 (1) The Army supports shaping and entry operations within Unified Action in order to set
1219 the conditions for follow-on operations once the United States commits forces. The force will
1220 apply joint synergy and conduct immediate combined arms operations upon arrival, leverage

1221 partner capabilities, develop the situation through action and produce multiple dilemmas for the
1222 enemy.

1223 (2) Absent advanced air and
1224 sealift capabilities, overcoming enemy
1225 anti-access efforts will challenge the
1226 joint force. While it will always be
1227 desirable to seek multiple entry points
1228 and to avoid well-defended air and sea
1229 ports of debarkation, the Army must be
1230 prepared as part of the joint force to fight
1231 for points of entry. In order to reduce the
1232 time to deploy and employ Army forces the joint force develops and conducts extensive shaping
1233 efforts.

1234 (3) Army forces conduct shaping by:

- 1235 • Assisting in developing the joint force campaign plan to include deployment schedules
1236 and provision to carry out Army Title 10 logistical requirements.
- 1237 • Establishing intermediate and forward staging bases as necessary to facilitate deployment
1238 and rapid build-up of combat power.
- 1239 • Deploying forward elements such as logistics, theater air defenses, and early entry
1240 command posts as close to the theater as possible.
- 1241 • Finally, by participating in the joint force efforts to establish host nation support.

1242 (4) Commanders conduct joint forcible entry operations under the protection of a rapidly
1243 established joint air and missile defense umbrella, shielded further from interdiction by means of
1244 air and maritime superiority that may be local, wide area, or theater-wide in scope. A means of
1245 accelerating the buildup of combat power will be the use of intermediate staging bases as close to
1246 the joint operations area (JOA) as possible in order to more effectively configure forces for
1247 combat. This will require reloading shipping or aircraft for the final movement to the JOA.
1248 Configuring afloat and land based prepositioned stocks in combat ready packages will also
1249 facilitate the rapid buildup of combat power. Land maneuver forces will defend entry points to
1250 enable follow-on force flow and to hold objectives critical as anchors or start-points for transition
1251 to offensive operations. Forcible entry tactical elements must anticipate and defeat successive
1252 attacks by conventional and unconventional forces.

1253 (5) Army forces conduct entry operations by:

- 1254 • Overcoming enemy anti-access by direct actions of Army forcible entry forces as part of
1255 joint efforts.
- 1256 • Destroying other key enemy capabilities essential to enemy offensive operations or
1257 defensive integrity.
- 1258 • Establishing essential command and logistical infrastructures within and external to the
1259 JOA to facilitate accelerated reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of
1260 Army forces.

Implication

Operational Maneuver: Because U.S. future enemies will seek to deny U.S. joint forces access to predictable staging bases and ports of debarkation by employing a range of strategic preclusion, operational exclusion (anti-access), and tactical access denial capabilities, Army forces must be able to deploy to unpredictable sites, conduct and support forcible entry operations, and conduct and sustain offensive operations from and across extended distances.

- 1261 • Seizing key terrain and facilities required to support force flow and conduct of decisive
1262 operations, extend the area of influence, and dislocate enemy dispositions.

1263 (6) Carefully planned as springboards for early attack of key enemy capabilities, entry
1264 operations are supported by special operations force (SOF), information operations (IO), joint
1265 fires and intelligence, ground-based precision fires, integrated sustainment, and other shaping
1266 actions to assure continuous operations. However, higher echelon Army combat and support
1267 structures may not be fully in place. As a result, early entry maneuver forces must be able to
1268 draw on reinforcing and shaping support from air and naval forces, as well as from engaged
1269 multinational partners. Because these defenses occur during a time when sustainment flow must
1270 compete with force flow, it will be important that the tactical units committed early be
1271 particularly durable to place minimal demands on the logistical system.

1272 **c. Inter- and Intra-theater Operational Maneuver**

1273 (1) Operational maneuver by ground, sea, and air will extend the reach of the JFC.⁵⁷
1274 Army forces will maneuver to a crisis theater to accomplish assigned campaign objectives.
1275 Employing joint lift platforms still limited to improved air and sea ports, the future force will
1276 deploy, using combined arms formations designed for rapid build up to increase deployment
1277 momentum and to close the gap between early entry and follow-on campaign forces.

1278 (2) Intra-theater operational maneuver enables the joint force commander to respond to
1279 opportunity or uncertainty, isolate portions of the battlefield, exploit success, and accomplish key
1280 campaign objectives. Operational movement of the force by ground, sea, or air can secure
1281 positions of advantage to destroy key capabilities and forces, extend tactical reach, achieve
1282 surprise, preemptively seize key terrain, overcome or avoid difficult terrain, accelerate the
1283 advance of the overall force, secure key infrastructure or populations and block enemy forces.
1284 Such operational maneuver can reposition forces in depth increasing the complexity of the
1285 situation for the enemy and potentially exposing the entire enemy area of operations to direct
1286 attack.

1287 (3) In order to be able to execute inter and intra-theater operational maneuver the joint
1288 force commander must consider end-to-end force flow protection along international lines of
1289 communication that may be thousands of miles in length. This will require a whole of
1290 government effort to maintain protection of deploying forces, sustainment flows, and, as
1291 necessary, redeploying forces.

1292 **d. Full Spectrum Operations.**

1293 (1) Simultaneous offensive,
1294 defensive and stability (or civil support)
1295 operations are based on an understanding
1296 of the operating environment and the
1297 strategic and operational objectives.
1298 Army forces combine offensive,
1299 defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent
1300 joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create
1301 opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and
1302 nonlethal—proportional to the mission with as thorough an understanding of all operating
1303 environment variables as possible. No single element is always more important or predominant
1304 over the others. Rather, Army operations integrate combinations of simultaneous offensive,

Implication

Full Spectrum Operations: Because U.S. future enemies will attempt to overcome U.S. strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses, Army forces will combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

1305 defensive and stability (or civil support) operations with fully integrated information warfare
 1306 which commanders constantly adapt to conditions. Small units must possess combined arms
 1307 capabilities and have access to joint capabilities in order to conduct decentralized operations.
 1308 Units must possess the ability to aggregate or disaggregate rapidly to defeat hybrid threats, and
 1309 must be able to adapt as the enemy transitions.

1310 (2) The Army must have the conceptual capability and the physical ability to seize the
 1311 initiative through the coordinated use of combined arms and efforts along other logical lines of
 1312 operations such as civil security, host nation security, essential services, governance, and
 1313 economic development.⁵⁸ Just as offensive operations require strong reconnaissance assets and
 1314 defensive operations require strong security capabilities, stability operations (to include
 1315 counterinsurgency and state-building operations) require joint forces capable of securing the
 1316 population. Each of these operational types also requires a force that is capable of conducting
 1317 simultaneous actions—of both a military and a political nature—across the spectrum of conflict.
 1318 In short, the Army must be able to both persuade and coerce. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting
 1319 the initiative is the object of tactical and operational maneuver throughout the spectrum of
 1320 conflict. This *spirit of the offensive* applies to offensive, defensive, and stability operations in a
 1321 wide variety of operating environments. Further, this fighting-centric approach must be applied
 1322 with the flexibility of mind and the depth of understanding to use any means available—be it
 1323 military, informational, diplomatic, social, cultural, economic, or political in nature—to seize the
 1324 initiative.

1325 (3) Another critical challenge for FSO, specific to homeland security, is the capability for
 1326 efficient integration into federal civilian command structure for domestic contingencies.
 1327 Estimates of the future operating environment highlight the increased likelihood of natural or
 1328 man-made disasters and terrorist attacks in the United States and its territories. Such events may
 1329 require the Army to support civil authorities for domestic emergencies and designated law
 1330 enforcement activities. The Army National Guard will maintain primary responsibility as the
 1331 first military force to respond on behalf of state authorities. Should the scope of a domestic
 1332 emergency exceed the capabilities of the National Guard, the regular Army will be prepared to
 1333 deploy. The Constitution places clear limits on the actions of regular Army forces on U.S. soil;
 1334 therefore, the future force must be able to quickly integrate and operate within command
 1335 structures headed by other civilian agencies.

1336 e. **Ensure overlapping protection.**

1337 (1) Future Army units and fixed
 1338 and semi-fixed locations, along with
 1339 information systems and infrastructure,
 1340 will all require advanced protection
 1341 capabilities. The future force will assist
 1342 interagency and multi-national partners
 1343 and the host nation in providing
 1344 protection capabilities in an area defense
 1345 and area security role which will include
 1346 the population, facilities, population centers, bases, and installations. Future protection must be
 1347 comprehensive and provide layers of capabilities, capitalizing on joint capabilities to create
 1348 overlapping protection, resulting in 360° coverage.

Implications

Overlapping Protection: Because U.S. future enemies will be thinking, adaptive adversaries who strive for increasing lethal capabilities aimed at perceived seams and gaps, the Army future force must provide innovative, conditions based protection capabilities that are layered, overlapping, and networked.

Protection and Security Force Assistance: Because supporting friends, allies, and international groups that may lack advanced protection capabilities, U.S. SFA efforts must include providing protection during operations.

1349 (2) Perhaps the more significant threat to ground forces will come during the conduct of
 1350 enduring, condition-driven operations where maneuver and fires do not dominate. Close
 1351 proximity to the population is common and increases the frequency of *interactions* in this
 1352 environment. This further increases the risk of a threat event. Therefore, combined arms
 1353 operations will continue to provide protective value to the combat force. Protective strategies in
 1354 the future will seek a heavy investment in autonomous capabilities within Soldier and equipment
 1355 systems themselves.

1356 (3) Protection of the force will also involve a thorough understanding of the human
 1357 dimension to identify trends, patterns, and associations in the social environment that will allow
 1358 for the predictive analysis of specified threats. Deterrent and prevention strategies will be
 1359 developed based on an understanding of the local cultural, local psychology, and norms of
 1360 behavior. This knowledge will assist commanders in determining the most effective force
 1361 posture for conflict resolution, countering provocation tactics, and preventing troop over-
 1362 reaction.

1363 f. Distributed Support and Sustainment

1364 (1) Employing distributed support and sustainment will maintain freedom of action and
 1365 provide continuous sustainment of committed forces in all phases of the operation throughout the
 1366 JOA. More than ever before, Army and joint forces must fully integrate operational support and
 1367 sustainment operations with battle, support, and sustainment rhythms executed in close harmony.

1368 (2) Integrated maneuver support
 1369 helps shape the operating environment
 1370 to protect and expand freedom of
 1371 action. The development and
 1372 dissemination of information on the
 1373 totality of the physical environment
 1374 (land air, water, space, and others), as
 1375 well as a wide range of variable factors
 1376 such as weather and health threats
 1377 along with other knowledge helps to diminish an enemy's initial home court advantage. Further,
 1378 tactical and theater maneuver support assets enhance and protect entry points to support
 1379 deployment momentum, expand theater infrastructure, support onward movement, detect and
 1380 eliminate hazards and help provide the deploying force the SU needed to maintain force flow and
 1381 sustainment. Additionally, maneuver support forces contribute to friendly mobility, inhibit
 1382 enemy freedom of maneuver, and contribute to force protection and security, and engage and
 1383 control populations.

Implication

Support and Sustainment Improvements: Because the future force will conduct a range of military activities, often simultaneously, in a variety of secure and unsecure environments, future logistics operations must purposefully employ common processes, reduce requirements for power and commodities, improve autonomous reporting systems, and enhance movement, deployment, and distribution resources.

1384 (3) Operations must blend strategic and operational sustainment flows into the theater to
 1385 provide continuous sustainment throughout the JOA, without requiring an extensive logistical
 1386 buildup or risking a shortage-driven operational pause. They also must fulfill the Army's
 1387 mandate to support other components of the joint force. Sustainment capability will determine
 1388 what is feasible, when the force can fight, and how long it can sustain operations. The goal of
 1389 sustainment is the continuous, precise, assured provisioning of deployed Army and supported
 1390 joint forces in any environment, guaranteeing their ability to generate, maintain, and employ
 1391 combat power throughout the campaign.

1392 g. Network Enabled Mission Command

1393 (1) Exercising mission command in the future operating environment faces the same
1394 challenges articulated throughout this concept. Mission Command is the conduct of military
1395 operations through decentralized
1396 execution based on mission orders. Successful mission command demands
1397 that subordinate leaders at all echelons
1398 exercise disciplined initiative, acting
1399 aggressively and independently to
1400 accomplish the mission within the
1401 commander's intent.⁵⁹ Uncertainty
1402 places an increasing demand on the
1403 command and control system to obtain,
1404 process, and disseminate information in
1405 a timely manner. Technology in the
1406 integrated battle command network provides the backbone for accomplishing command and
1407 control, but leadership is the indispensable element. Network-enabled mission command
1408 capitalizes on the network to extend the interconnectedness of higher levels to the edges of the
1409 force--individual soldiers, weapons, sensors, platforms, etc—while reaching back to both the
1410 operating and generating force. This pervasive connectedness extends the benefits of
1411 decentralization without sacrificing the coordination or unity of effort characteristic of
1412 centralization. Mission command restrains higher level commanders from micromanaging by
1413 freeing commanders to focus on accomplishing their higher commander's intent and on critical
1414 decisions only they can make.
1415

Implications

Design: Because of the uncertainty and complexity inherent in the future OE, adopting design as a process for setting problems is critical.

Fighting Degraded: Because the network may be compromised and subject to enemy actions, units will have to be capable of operating in a degraded mode.

Timeliness of Information: Because command and control in the future OE will face a range of challenges uncertainty places an increasing demand on the command and control systems to obtain, process, synthesize and disseminate information in a timely manner.

1416 (2) Battle command is the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing,
1417 directing, leading, and assessing forces to impose the commander's will on a hostile, thinking,
1418 and adaptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership to translate decisions into action by
1419 synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in space, time, and purpose to accomplish
1420 missions. Battle command involves in part the arrangement of personnel, command and control
1421 information management systems, procedures, and equipment and facilities required to direct
1422 forces. The most important dimension of battle command will be the commander's ability to
1423 cope with uncertainty, conceptualize operations, and direct decentralized efforts toward the
1424 accomplishment of the mission.

1425 (3) Of particular importance to the Army future force is the ability to continue operations
1426 when networks degrade through enemy action or system failures. Commanders at all levels must
1427 integrate operations with degraded command and control systems in training and exercises.
1428 Maintaining competency in fundamental military will continue to be essential counters to
1429 degraded communications and electronic systems impairment.

1430 (4) Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand,
1431 visualize, and describe complex problems and to develop approaches to solve them. Critical
1432 thinking captures the reflective and continuous learning essential to design. Creative thinking
1433 involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel
1434 ideas. Design occurs throughout the operations process—prior to and during detailed planning,
1435 through preparation, and during execution and assessment. Commanders lead design by

1436 employing critical thinking to frame the environment, frame the problem, and begin to identify
1437 approaches that will help achieve the desired end-state.⁶⁰

1438 (5) Mission command is about leadership and all the considerations of the moral,
1439 physical, and cognitive components of the human dimension of warfare.⁶¹ Developing leaders
1440 who are comfortable with uncertainty, who are skilled critical thinkers, and who know the
1441 importance of learning organizations able to adapt to change is a vital requirement for the Army
1442 future force.

*So our future security and prosperity depends on how much—how we respond to this rapidly
changing and complex environment, how well we adapt.*

Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department Of Defense

1443 **Chapter 4**

1444 **Conclusion**

1445 **4-2. Conclusion**

1446 The 2009 version of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 retains enduring conceptual ideas of previous
1447 versions while taking into account the changes that have occurred over the last five years. The
1448 ACC describes the future operating environment and the fundamental military problem it poses
1449 for the U.S. Army. The central idea of the ACC, operational adaptability, provides the
1450 conceptual foundation for pursuit of solutions to the military problem. Meeting the challenges of
1451 the future operating environment will require organizations and leaders that can understand the
1452 situation in depth, act in concert with JIIM partners, assess and adapt actions, consolidate gains
1453 to maintain the initiative, and transition between tasks and operations. Six supporting ideas,
1454 broad fundamental characteristics applicable to all future Army operations, address specific
1455 implications of the future operating environment. They link the core operational actions of the
1456 Army to the military problem at hand and form the foundational capabilities of the future force.
1457 The ACC sets in motion an examination of the implications of future challenges which, in turn,
1458 suggest required future capabilities for combat developers to consider. It also lays the foundation
1459 for the development of subordinate concepts while encouraging further examination of the future
1460 operating environment and the military problem it presents. Ultimately, the ACC gives direction
1461 to the process that will produce an Army that has the ability to gain, sustain, and exploit physical
1462 control and psychological influence over people, land, and resources in the complex future
1463 operating environment.

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Appendix A

References

Section I

Required References

This section contains no entries.

Section II

Related References

ARs, DA pams, field manuals (FM), and DA forms are available at [Army Publishing Directorate \(APD\)— Home Page http://www.usapa.army.mil](http://www.usapa.army.mil). TRADOC publications and forms are available at [TRADOC Publications at http://www.tradoc.army.mil](http://www.tradoc.army.mil).

Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05
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FM 1
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TRADOC Pam 525-3-0
The Army in Joint Operations: The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1
The United States Army’s Operating Concept for Operational Maneuver 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-2
The United States Army Concept for Tactical Maneuver 2015-2024.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-3
The United States Army Functional Concept for Battle Command 2015-2024.

1509 **Appendix B**

1510 **Required Capabilities**

1511 The required capabilities derived from this concept may be used, throughout the Joint
1512 Capabilities Integration Development System, to drive changes in doctrine, organizations,
1513 training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities for the future force. This list is categorized
1514 using the Warfighting Functions from Field Manual 3-0, where applicable. This list, while not
1515 exhaustive, is an attempt to capture some of the more important capabilities required by the
1516 Army in the future. Note that, unless otherwise specifically stated, the other required capabilities
1517 from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept remain valid.

1518 **Command and Control.**

1519 **Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

- 1520
- 1521 • The future force requires the capability of a single, integrated network that enables
1522 leaders to communicate digitally, sending voice and data [to include operational graphics,
1523 a common operating picture, video, intelligence information etc] while enroute to the
1524 objective. These capabilities should be resident in joint and multinational formations
1525 conducting FSO, with built in redundancies to overcome enemy and environmental
1526 interference throughout the area of operations.
 - 1527 • The future force requires the capability to establish essential command and control and
1528 logistical infrastructures in the context of a joint operating environment, within and
1529 external to the JOA, including early entry command posts (EECPs) in order to enable the
joint commander's ability to conduct operations.

1530 **Additional Required Capabilities**

- 1531
- 1532 • The future force requires the capability to integrate joint, coalition, and government
1533 agencies into the planning and execution of FSO. This includes the capability to share
1534 planning, command and control, and intelligence information on compatible networks.
 - 1535 • The future force requires the capability to train against realistic scenarios varying the
1536 situation, and operational variables that allows leaders to analyze the situation and
1537 provide the commander information needed to develop understanding and frame
1538 operational problems in order to develop more adaptive Army leaders. The future force
1539 requires the capability to improve real time integration of joint capabilities (e.g. common
picture, etc.).
 - 1540 • The future force requires the capability to defeat enemy efforts to disrupt or interdict
1541 command, control and intelligence networks.
 - 1542 • The future force requires the capability to command and control operations when C2 and
1543 intelligence networks are degraded due to METT-TC factors.

1544 **Movement and Maneuver.**

1545 **Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

- 1546
- 1547 • The future force requires the capability to conduct shaping and entry operations in the
1548 context of a joint operating environment in order to shape regional security conditions
1549 and – if forces are committed – shape the area of operations, set conditions for maneuver,
and seize the initiative throughout the entire campaign.

- 1550 • The future force requires the capability to conduct inter-theater operational maneuver in
1551 the context of a joint operating environment in order to rapidly deploy ground formations
1552 that strengthen the JTF's ability to deter conflict, limit its escalation, or preclude early
1553 enemy success, through occupation or seizure of strategic and operational positions of
1554 advantage that directly enable subsequent operations.
- 1555 • The future force requires the capability to conduct intra-theater operational maneuver in
1556 the context of a joint operating environment in order to extend the reach of the joint force
1557 thereby enabling the joint force commander to respond to opportunity or uncertainty,
1558 isolate portions of the battlefield, exploit success, destroy key capabilities and forces,
1559 extend tactical reach, achieve surprise, preemptively seize key terrain, overcome or avoid
1560 difficult terrain, accelerate the advance of the overall force, block enemy forces, expose
1561 the entire enemy area of operations to direct attack, prevent resynchronization of enemy
1562 combat power, deny reinforcement and sustainment and accomplish key campaign
1563 objectives.
- 1564 • The future force requires the capability to conduct concurrent and subsequent stability
1565 operations in the context of a joint operating environment in order to establish safe and
1566 secure environments leading to a viable peace, deter irregular action, and secure the
1567 results of maneuver.
- 1568 • The future force requires the capability to overcome enemy anti-access in the context of a
1569 joint operating environment by direct actions of Army forcible entry and strike forces as
1570 part of joint efforts to destroy enemy anti-access elements.
- 1571 • The future force requires the capability to destroy other key enemy capabilities in the
1572 context of a joint operating environment that are essential to enemy offensive operations
1573 or defensive integrity.
- 1574 • The future force requires the capability to seize key terrain and facilities in the context of
1575 a joint operating environment in order to support force flow, conduct decisive operations,
1576 extend the area of influence, and dislocate enemy dispositions.
- 1577 • The future force requires the capability for maneuver support units to obstruct the enemy
1578 by shaping the terrain, rapidly emplacing self-healing minefields and other obstacles,
1579 employing multispectral obscurants and a variety of other lethal and nonlethal means in
1580 the context of a joint operating environment in order to fix, canalize, constrain, and block
1581 the enemy's tactical agility and freedom of maneuver.
- 1582 • The force requires the capability to provide assured mobility in the context of a joint
1583 operating environment in order to achieve and sustain force agility, improve and expand
1584 trafficability, enhance mobility in complex terrain, eliminate obstacles and assist in
1585 preventing the adversary from impeding friendly movement.
- 1586 • The future force requires the capability for maneuver support units, acting in concert with
1587 local authorities, multinational and interagency partners, and private organizations/NGOs
1588 in the context of a joint operating environment to engage and control populations and
1589 interact with indigenous and refugee populations in order to minimize potential
1590 noncombatant interference in operations and mitigate the effects of combat on the civilian
1591 populace.
- 1592 • The future force requires the capability to exploit all available air and sea lift, both
1593 military and commercial, including advanced military lift platforms, such as austere
1594 access high speed sealift (AAHSS), super-short-takeoff-and-landing (SSTOL) aircraft,
1595 and theater watercraft, such as the joint high speed vessel (JHSV) in the context of a joint

1596 operating environment in order to enable deploying forces to avoid vulnerable ports and
1597 airheads and deploy in combat-ready unit configurations to carefully selected positions of
1598 advantage in a matter of days, rather than weeks; further permitting the joint force
1599 commander to accelerate force flow, reduce the enemy's ability to deny physical access to
1600 the theater, and increase the potential for operational surprise.

- 1601 • The future force requires the capability to conduct vertical maneuver with mounted and
1602 dismounted forces employing SSTOL or HLVTOL aircraft in the context of a joint
1603 operating environment in order to exploit positional advantage, put large areas at risk for
1604 the adversary, shorten the duration of battle, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy and
1605 contribute to the more rapid disintegration of the enemy force.
- 1606 • The future force requires the capability to conduct simultaneous distributed operations in
1607 the context of a joint operating environment in order to bypass less important or non-
1608 threatening enemy forces or areas; focus operations against the most critical forces and
1609 capabilities; expand operational reach; reduce vulnerability to enemy counter actions;
1610 reinforce the effects of fires and interdiction; present a set of multidimensional options to
1611 paralyze and overwhelm the enemy, and lead to rapid collapse of enemy forces.
- 1612 • The future force requires the capability to directly attack enemy decisive points and
1613 centers of gravity in the context of a joint operating environment in order to deprive the
1614 enemy of key capabilities essential to his defensive integrity and accelerate collapse.

1615 **Additional Required Capabilities**

- 1616 • The future force requires the capability to conduct area security operations over wide
1617 areas.
- 1618 • The future force requires the support of Joint Synergy (redundancy versus
1619 interdependencies) in certain capability areas such as fires and surveillance platforms.
- 1620 • The future force requires the capability to conduct combined arms offensive operations
1621 and to overcome complex web defenses in complex/urban terrain.
- 1622 • The future force requires the capability to integrate manned and unmanned rotary wing
1623 and fixed wing aircraft in the close fight.
- 1624 • The future force requires the capability to envelop or conduct turning movements against
1625 enemy forces conducting area defense operations.
- 1626 • The future force requires the capability to employ the manpower, mobility, firepower,
1627 and protection necessary to close with the enemy.
- 1628 • The future force requires the capability to employ offensive and defensive EW and Cyber
1629 capabilities.
- 1630 • The future force requires the capability to execute simultaneous combinations of offense,
1631 defense, stability and civil support activities.
- 1632 • The future force requires the capability to execute adaptive combinations of combat,
1633 security, engagement, and relief & reconstruction activities exploit and maintain the
1634 initiative and, ultimately, create the conditions for achievement of objectives.
- 1635 • The future force requires the capability to conduct simultaneous, distributed operations
1636 across the operational area.
- 1637 • The future force requires the capability to fight for information and conduct effective
1638 reconnaissance against an enemy employing countermeasures to surveillance and
1639 UAS/UGVs.

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- 1640 • The future force requires the capability to conduct and sustain operations from and across
1641 extended distances.

1642 **Intelligence.** A detailed list of future required intelligence capabilities can be found in TRADOC
1643 Pamphlet 525-7-9 The United States Army's Concept Capability Plan (CCP) Intelligence,
1644 Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 2015-2024, Version 1.0 12 August 2008. A general statement
1645 of emerging required capabilities is provided below.

- 1646 • The future force requires the capability to develop enduring and continually improving
1647 human intelligence networks and intelligence estimates in the context of a joint operation
1648 and particularly in a counterinsurgency/ irregular warfare environment (despite unit
1649 turnover, etc.).
- 1650 • The future force requires the capability to conduct effective detainee operations in the
1651 context of a joint campaign and especially in irregular warfare environments while
1652 fighting enemies with ambiguous legal status.
- 1653 • The future force requires the capability to use interrogations (and detainees) to develop
1654 intelligence estimates at lower tactical levels.
- 1655 • The future force requires the capability to develop, store, access and share tactical,
1656 political, economic, and cultural intelligence in a database that is enduring, continuously
1657 updated, and accessible to military, intergovernmental and interagency organizations in
1658 the context of a joint campaign and especially in an IW/COIN environment to align
1659 resources with information, allow deploying units access to current and historical
1660 information for planning, and to allow commanders at all echelons the ability to address
1661 gaps.
- 1662 • The future force requires actionable intelligence in order to conduct operations to counter
1663 irregular or hybrid threats.

1664 **Fires.**

1665 **Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

- 1666 • The future force requires the capability to conduct long-range precision surface-to-
1667 surface fires and aviation strikes in the context of a joint operating environment in order
1668 to complement joint counter-precision and counter-anti-access capabilities.

1669 **Additional Required Capabilities**

- 1670
- 1671 • The future force requires the capability of improved integrated joint fire control networks
1672 that provide more effective application of all source fires and effects, from theater to
1673 tactical levels to include precision fires and suppressive fires.

1674 **Sustainment.**

1675 **Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

- 1676 • The future force requires the capability to conduct Distributed Support and Sustainment
1677 in the context of a joint operating environment in order to become fully integrated with
1678 operational requirements.

1679 **Additional Required Capabilities**

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- The future force requires the capability for a single joint capable logistics C2 headquarters with improved C2 and logistic information systems that provide forces a continuously updated logistical picture from the Soldier to the highest levels of command enabling real time collaborative planning; asset and resource visibility; combat power; force health status and material readiness and consumption. The system must assist in coordinating distribution operations and support course of action analysis in order to provide distributed sustainment in FSO.
 - The future force requires the capability for increased reliability, maintainability and sustainability of materiel systems including decreased consumption rates and volume (power sources, fuels, water and munitions), ultra-reliable, intelligent, embedded diagnostic and prognostic technologies with an anticipatory sense.
 - The future force requires the capability for a single joint capable logistics operating picture that is in concert with and in support of the operational commander. The system must enable real time collaborative planning and support course of action analysis.
 - The future force requires the capability to develop operational, tactical, and strategic capabilities that provide complete freedom of movement both inter-theater and intra-theater; rapidly deploy forces, equipment, and materiel, support forces across the area of operations; distribute sustainment from National level to widely dispersed locations down to soldier level, using ground, air, airdrop and sea platforms; and operate in austere locations (with limited infrastructure).

1700 Protection.**1701 Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

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- The future force requires the capability to conduct entry operations in the context of a joint operating environment, under the protection of a rapidly established joint air and missile defense umbrella, shielded from interdiction by means of air and maritime superiority, supported by SOF, IO, joint fires and intelligence, ground-based precision fires, integrated sustainment, and other shaping actions in order to assure continuous operations.
 - The future force requires the capability to conduct land-based theater air and missile defense in the context of a joint operating environment in order to degrade enemy long-range air and missile anti-access threats and form a component of the protective umbrella under which entry and follow-on forces can safely enter the theater.

1712 Additional Required Capabilities

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- The future force requires the capability to deny the enemy the ability to target our forces, allies, and civilian populations with precision systems (missiles, rockets, etc.).
 - The future force requires the capability to detect and locate points of origin of enemy fires.
 - The future force requires the capability for protection of sustainment operations, ensuring freedom of movement and uninterrupted sustainment, including protection of (sustainment) platforms, logistical installations, intermediate staging bases, forward operating bases, and air, sea and ground lines of communication against adversarial threats including: surveillance, operational compromise, improvised explosive devices (IED), snipers, rocket propelled grenades, directed energy, and WMD.

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- 1723 • The future force requires the capability for stand-off detection of explosives and
1724 explosive precursor components

1725 **Leadership.**

- 1726 • The future force requires the capability to educate and train leaders who can perform
1727 effectively in complex, uncertain, and dynamic operating environments.
1728 • The future force requires the capability to create Soldiers and leaders who are adaptive
1729 and agile, able to shift rapidly from one mission to another and can seize, exploit, and
1730 retain the initiative.
1731 • The future force requires the capability to manage personnel based on talent (including
1732 NG and Reserves) to allow the force to identify service members with specific skills.”

1733 **Information.**

- 1734 • The future force requires the capability to integrate the strategic narrative in the conduct
1735 of operations in order to inform and influence perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors and
1736 affect the information domain that exists beyond battle command to educate all audiences
1737 about our intent, and to counter enemy propaganda and dis-information.

1738 **Other.**

1739 **Required Capabilities from the 2005 Army Capstone Concept**

- 1740 • The Future force requires the capability to conduct integrated maneuver support in the
1741 context of a joint operating environment in order to shape the operating environment and
1742 protect and expand freedom of action through a combination of a variety of functional
1743 capabilities (military police; engineers; aviation; nuclear, biological, and chemical
1744 defense; etc.)

1745 **Additional Required Capabilities**

- 1746 • The future force requires the capability to plan and conduct operations with interagency,
1747 intergovernmental, multinational, indigenous, and non-governmental actors and amongst
1748 diverse populations.
1749 • The future force requires the capability to conduct "indirect operations" and
1750 support/influence reluctant and/or weak partners in COIN operations where we have
1751 limited access.
1752 • The future force requires the capability to access adequate resources that improve the
1753 capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces⁶² in the areas of: police
1754 forces, border security, ground combat, air strike, intelligence, command and control,
1755 information operations, and civil-military activities.⁶³
1756 • The future force requires a generating force that can accommodate challenges of an
1757 expanded 1.1 million person force and to meet demands of the changing security
1758 environment.⁶⁴ All institutional processes must adapt to support ARFORGEN for
1759 sustained rotations and achieve shorter timelines to deliver solutions. The Army will need
1760 to synchronize personnel and equipment to achieve and maintain specified readiness
1761 levels.

1762

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1763 **Appendix C**

1764 **Glossary**

1765

1766 **Section I**

1767 **Abbreviations**

1768

1769	AAHSS	austere access high speed sealift
1770	AAR	after action review
1771	AC2	air combat command
1772	AO	area of operations
1773	APOD	aerial port of debarkation
1774	AR	Army regulation
1775	ACC	Army Capstone Concept
1776	ARFORGEN	Army force generation
1777	ARI	Army Research Institute
1778	ARL	U.S. Army Research Laboratory
1779	ARSOF	Army special operations forces
1780	ATLDP	Army Training and Leader Development Panel
1781	BCE	before the common era
1782	BCT	brigade combat team
1783	BNCOG	basic noncommissioned officer course
1784	C2	command and control
1785	CAS	close air support
1786	CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield
1787		explosives
1788	CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
1789	CCMRF	CBRNE consequence management response force
1790	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
1791	CJTF	combined joint task force
1792	COIN	counterinsurgency
1793	COP	common operational picture
1794	COPs	common operating precepts
1795	COSR	combat and operational stress responses
1796	CTC	combat training center
1797	DHS	Department of Homeland Security
1798	DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
1799	DL	distributed learning
1800	DOD	Department of Defense
1801	DOJ	Department of Justice
1802	DOS	Department of State
1803	EECP	early entry command post
1804	ESS	enablers, support, and sustainment
1805	EW	electronic warfare
1806	FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
1807	FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
1808	FID	foreign internal defense

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1809	FM	field manual
1810	FON	freedom of navigation
1811	FSO	full spectrum operations
1812	FSV	full spectrum vehicle
1813	FSV-G	full spectrum vehicle-gun
1814	FSV-R	full spectrum vehicle-reconnaissance
1815	GCV	ground combat vehicle
1816	GEL	guided experiential learning
1817	GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
1818	GIG	global information grid
1819	GOI	Government of Indonesia
1820	GPF	general purpose force
1821	HLVTOL	heavy lift vertical takeoff and landing
1822	HN	host nation
1823	HNS	host nation support
1824	HPI	human performance improvement
1825	HPT	human performance technology
1826	HUMINT	human intelligence
1827	IBCT	infantry brigade combat team
1828	IDF	Israeli Defense Force
1829	IED	improvised explosive device
1830	IET	initial entry training
1831	IFS	integrated fires system
1832	IGO	intergovernmental organization
1833	IMT	initial military training
1834	IO	information operations
1835	IT	information technology
1836	IW	irregular warfare
1837	JHSV	joint high speed vessel
1838	JIM	joint, interagency, and multinational
1839	JIIM	joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
1840	JOA	joint operations area
1841	JOE	joint operating environment
1842	JP	joint publication
1843	JTF	joint task force
1844	MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
1845	MCO	major combat operations
1846	MDMP	military decision making process
1847	METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations
1848		
1849	MNC	Multinational Corporation
1850	MOS	military occupational specialty
1851	MTT	mobile training team
1852	MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
1853	NCO	noncommissioned officer
1854	NCOES	Noncommissioned Officer Education System

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1855	NG	National Guard
1856	NGO	nongovernmental organizations
1857	NIPP	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
1858	NMSCWMD	National Military Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass
1859		Destruction
1860	NSA	National Security Agency
1861	NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
1862	OE	operational environment
1863	OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
1864	OES	Officer Education System
1865	OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
1866	OPFOR	opposing forces
1867	OPTEMPO	operational tempo
1868	Pam	pamphlet
1869	POC	point of contact
1870	ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
1871	RSTA	reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
1872	S3	operations and training officer
1873	S&T	science and technology
1874	SBCT	Stryker brigade combat team
1875	SEAL	sea-air-land team
1876	SIGINT	signals intelligence
1877	SOF	special operations force
1878	SPOD	sea port of debarkation
1879	SSR	security sector reform
1880	SSTOL	super short takeoff and landing
1881	SU	situational understanding
1882	TECHINT	technical intelligence
1883	TF	task force
1884	TRADOC	U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
1885	TRP	target reference point
1886	TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
1887	UAS	unmanned aerial system
1888	UAS	unmanned aerial vehicle
1889	UGV	unmanned ground vehicle
1890	UK	United Kingdom
1891	UN	United Nations
1892	U.S.	United States
1893	USEUCOM	United States European Command
1894	USMA	U.S. Military Academy
1895	USMC	United States Marine Corps
1896	UQ	Unified Quest
1897	WMD	weapons of mass destruction
1898	WMD-CST	Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team
1899	WMD/E	weapons of mass destruction/effects
1900		

1901 **Section II**
 1902 **Terms**

1903 **Introduction.** *This section addresses contemporary issues and contentious terms, retaining*
 1904 *Army and joint doctrinal terms where appropriate, redefining terms as necessary, and*
 1905 *recommending removal of others when analysis has found them wanting or redundant. Lexicon*
 1906 *issues address redundant terminology, colloquialisms, and unnecessary terms. These include:*
 1907 *SFA, BPC, and Irregular Warfare; IO and its relationship to EW and cyber operations;*
 1908 *information engagement and other related terms; stability operations vs civil support; and*
 1909 *disaggregation of ISR.*

1910 The following tables list terms used throughout this concept. Some are terms that have been
 1911 defined in other publications including doctrinal manuals. Some are well defined and in common
 1912 use but are listed here with more discussion as they apply to this concept.

1913 Contentious Terms Requiring More Discussion

anti-access building partnership capacity global commons hybrid threat joint synergy information warfare ISR	operational exclusion remote area operations strategic preclusion synergy unrestricted warfare war
--	---

1914 Current Terms

area security Army Capstone Concept Army Concept Strategy combat power computer network operations cyberspace cyberspace operations design electronic warfare full spectrum operations information information engagement information management	information operations irregular warfare security force assistance seize the initiative shaping operations stability operations or civil support strategic level of war superiority unconventional warfare unified action unity of command unity of effort
--	---

1915 **anti-access.** Actions taken by an enemy to deter, slow, or prevent entry of U.S. forces to an AOR

1916 **area security.** A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations,
 1917 routes, and actions within a specific area. (FM 3-90)

1918 **Army Capstone Concept.** A capstone concept is a holistic future concept that is a primary
 1919 reference for all other concept development. This overarching concept provides direct linkages to
 1920 national and defense level planning documents. A capstone concept drives the development of
 1921 subordinate concepts. For example, the CCJO drives the development of JOCs, JECs, JICs, and
 1922 Service concepts. TP 525-3-0 drives the development of Army operating and functional concepts
 1923 as well as CCPs.(TR 71-20)

- 1924 **Army's Concept Strategy.** The Army documents its fundamental ideas about future joint
1925 operations in an ACS family of concepts. The ACS family of concepts consists of the capstone
1926 concept, Army operating concepts (AOCs), Army functional concepts (AFCs), CCPs, and
1927 concepts directed by CG, TRADOC. Concepts facilitate the visualization and communication of
1928 the Army's key ideas on future operations. (TR 71-20)
- 1929 **balance.** For the purpose of this concept the word *balance* means careful consideration of as
1930 many factors as possible and making choices that achieve the necessary goals and objectives. For
1931 example, commanders will continue to have to strike a balance between risk and mission
1932 accomplishment. "The principle of **balance** in our defense strategy: balance in our response to
1933 the current conflict vice preparing for future conflicts; balance in preparing for irregular warfare
1934 vice conventional warfare; and balance between the cultural advantages that have given us
1935 security vice the cultural changes needed to preserve it." (GEN Casey, *The Army of the 21st*
1936 *Century: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy*, 12 Jun 09 draft)
- 1937 **building partnership capacity.** Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and
1938 performance of the Department of Defense and its partners are part of building this capacity.
1939 (QDR Execution Roadmap Building Partnership Capacity, 22 May 2006)
- 1940 **combat power.** The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a
1941 military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by
1942 converting potential into effective action. (FM 3-0, Operations)
- 1943 **computer network operations.** Comprised of computer network attack, computer network
1944 defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations. (JP 1-02)
- 1945 **cyberspace.** (DOD) A global domain within the information environment consisting of the
1946 interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet,
1947 telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (JP
1948 1-02)
- 1949 **cyberspace operations.** The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to
1950 achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. Such operations include
1951 computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid.
1952 (CJCS CM-0527-08)
- 1953 **degradation.** Conditions that impair or reduce operational effectiveness between or within
1954 communications nodes or networks. Degradation can occur due to deliberate and unintentional
1955 friendly or enemy actions, materiel breakdown, natural atmospheric effects, and geospatial
1956 interference. There are degrees of degradation which can cause minimal effect or complete
1957 interruption of capabilities. Also, adversaries or enemies may deceptively degrade in order to
1958 impede operations undetected or for eavesdropping purposes.
- 1959 **design.** Design is a method of critical and creative thinking for understanding, visualizing, and
1960 describing complex problems and the approaches to resolve them. Critical thinking captures the
1961 reflective learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative
1962 ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. (FM 5-0 Draft)
- 1963 **electronic warfare.** Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to
1964 control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three
1965 divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and

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- 1966 electronic warfare support.(JP 1-02)
- 1967 **full spectrum operations.** The Army’s operational concept: Army forces combine offensive,
1968 defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent
1969 joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create
1970 opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and
1971 nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all
1972 variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an
1973 appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces. (FM 3-0)
- 1974 **global commons.** Global Commons are geographical areas that are outside the jurisdiction of
1975 any nation, and include the oceans outside territorial limits and Antarctica. Global commons do
1976 not include contiguous zones and fisheries zones of foreign nations.(DODD 6050.7)
- 1977 **hybrid threat.** Threats that simultaneously employ regular and irregular forces, including criminal
1978 elements to achieve their objectives using an ever changing variety of conventional and
1979 unconventional tactics to create multiple dilemmas are hybrid threats. (TRADOC G2)
- 1980 **Information.** (DOD) 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that
1981 a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation.(JP 1-
1982 02)
- 1983 **information engagement.** The integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and
1984 friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. Government strategic
1985 communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence
1986 foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts. Commanders use
1987 continuous information engagement shaped by intelligence to inform, influence, and persuade
1988 the local populace within limits prescribed by U.S. law. (FM 3-0)
- 1989 **information operations.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic
1990 warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and
1991 operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence,
1992 disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our
1993 own. (JP 3-13)
- 1994 **information warfare.** Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to
1995 achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. (Archaic joint
1996 term taken from the 23 Mar 03 version of JP 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated*
1997 *Terms*, that has been deleted from the joint lexicon).
- 1998 **irregular warfare.** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and
1999 influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric
2000 approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to
2001 erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.(JP 1-02)
- 2002 **ISR.** For the purpose of this concept ISR is not used as a term and the initials are disassociated
2003 since the term, confusingly, combines a function (intelligence) with a task (surveillance) and a
2004 mission (reconnaissance).
- 2005 **joint synergy.** In this study joint synergy is defined as “combining the advantages of the joint
2006 team across all domains and applying those advantages against our opponents.” A more detailed
2007 description can be found under the term “synergy”.

2008 **operational exclusion.** Based on their perceptions of historical patterns of deployment and
2009 employment, future opponents will apply operational exclusion to prevent U.S. joint forces from
2010 obtaining and using operating bases in the region and, in so doing, delay or preclude American
2011 military operations. Increased threats to forward bases raise the risks to forces, hindering
2012 operational phasing and diminishing host nation support for protection of U.S. lines of
2013 communication (LOCs). While it is possible for the U.S. to conduct an air and missile campaign
2014 without forward basing, a campaign using exclusively strategic rather than a mix of strategic and
2015 operational reach would be greatly diminished in its effectiveness and tempo. Operational
2016 exclusion applies diplomacy and coercion to keep other regional players on the sidelines. It
2017 includes capabilities that have operational reach— medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles,
2018 special operation forces, and WMD to name just a few. As the perception grows of the
2019 inevitability of U.S. operations, exclusion will entail pre-emptive attack, quite likely with
2020 WMD.(TRADOC G2)

2021 **remote area operations.** Remote area operations are operations undertaken in insurgent
2022 controlled or contested areas to establish islands of popular support for the Host Nation (HN)
2023 government and deny support to the insurgents. They differ from consolidation operations in that
2024 they are not designed to establish permanent HN government control over the area.(FM 3-
2025 05.202)

2026 **security force assistance.** The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation
2027 or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Security force assistance (SFA)
2028 improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization's security
2029 forces. These forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces. Foreign security forces
2030 are forces including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces;
2031 border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel
2032 that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security
2033 organization's mission. SFA occurs within the framework of full spectrum operations (see FM 3-
2034 0). In most situations involving this assistance, there is relatively little weight on offensive and
2035 defensive operations from a U.S. perspective. However, when U.S. forces accompany foreign
2036 security forces (FSF) in combat, the weight of offensive and defense operations will change to
2037 address the situation and align with the foreign security force's efforts. SFA is not just a stability
2038 operation, although it is a key contributor to the primary stability tasks of establish civil security
2039 and establish civil control. (FM 3-07)

2040 **seize the initiative.** (in civil support and stability operations): All Army operations aim to seize,
2041 retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Operational initiative is setting or
2042 dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if
2043 not the form, of the offense. It originates in the principle of the offensive. The principle of the
2044 offensive is not just about attacking. It is about seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative as
2045 the surest way to achieve decisive results. It requires positive action to change both information
2046 and the situation on the ground. Risk and opportunity are intrinsic in seizing the initiative. To
2047 seize the initiative, commanders evaluate and accept prudent risks. Opportunities never last long.
2048 Unless commanders are willing to accept risk and then act, the adversary is likely to close the
2049 window of opportunity and exploit friendly inaction. Once they seize the initiative, Army forces
2050 exploit the opportunities it creates. Initiative requires constant effort to control tempo while
2051 maintaining freedom of action. The offensive mindset, with its focus on initiative, is central to
2052 the Army's operational concept and guides all leaders in the performance of their duty. It

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2053 emphasizes opportunity created by action through full spectrum operations, whether offensive,
2054 defensive, stability, or civil support. (FM 3-0)

2055 **shaping operations.** Operations at any echelon that create and preserve conditions for the
2056 success of decisive operations are shaping operations. (FM 3-0)

2057 **stability operations or civil support.** Stability operations encompass various military missions,
2058 tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments
2059 of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential
2060 governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).
2061 Civil support is Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic
2062 emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities (JP 1-02).

2063 **strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of
2064 nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives
2065 and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at
2066 this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define
2067 limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop
2068 global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and
2069 other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. See also operational level of war; tactical
2070 level of war. (JP 1-02)

2071 **strategic preclusion.** Potential adversaries have observed the change in posture of the U.S. from
2072 a globally forward-deployed force to one that is less global and based within the Continental
2073 U.S. (CONUS). Therefore, they know the U.S. has become increasingly reliant upon agreements
2074 with other nations for force projection and subsequent reception in theater. Adversarial alliances
2075 between nations and even non-state actors that support access denial will prevent U.S. staging
2076 privileges. This serves as a buffer or strategic preclusion into a theater and will force the U.S. to
2077 seek alternative, less-desirable, and time-consuming ways of entry. (TRADOC G2)

2078 **superiority.** JP 1-02 and FM 1-02 do not define superiority, but they do define air superiority
2079 as—(DOD, NATO) That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which
2080 permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given
2081 time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

2082 **synergy.** (a) JFCs integrate and synchronize operations and employ military forces and
2083 capabilities, as well as nonmilitary resources, in a manner that results in greater combat power
2084 and applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Further,
2085 JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various domains and
2086 the information environment, all culminating in achieving the assigned military objective(s) in
2087 the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties. Additionally, JFCs not only attack the
2088 enemy's physical capabilities, but also the enemy's morale and will. JP 1, *Doctrine for the*
2089 *Armed Forces of the United States*, contains the basis for this multidimensional concept—one
2090 that describes how JFCs can apply all facets of joint capabilities to accomplish their mission.

2091 (b) In today's complex operational environment, it is impossible to accurately view the
2092 contributions of any individual organization, capability, or the domains and information
2093 environment in which they operate in isolation from all others. Each may be critical to the
2094 success of the joint force, and each has certain capabilities that cannot be duplicated. Given the
2095 appropriate circumstances, any element of military power can be dominant—and even decisive

2096 —in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be
2097 supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature
2098 of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for
2099 supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal
2100 into joint operations. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing the actions of
2101 conventional and special operations forces and capabilities in joint operations and in multiple
2102 domains enables JFCs to maximize available capabilities and minimize potential seams or
2103 vulnerabilities. JFCs are especially suited to develop joint synergy given the multiple unique and
2104 complementary capabilities available in joint forces. The synergy of the joint force depends in
2105 large part on a shared understanding of the operational environment. (JP 3-0)

2106 **unconventional warfare.** Unconventional warfare (UW) consists of activities conducted to
2107 enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power
2108 or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerilla force in a
2109 denied area.(FM 3-05.202)

2110 **unified action.** (DOD) The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of
2111 governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

2112 **unity of command.** One of the nine principles of war: For every objective, ensure unity of effort
2113 under one responsible commander. (FM 1-02)

2114 **unity of effort.** (DOD) Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the
2115 participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of
2116 successful unified action. (JP 1-02)

2117 **unrestricted warfare.**⁶⁵ Actions taken, both military and nonmilitary, to conduct
2118 multidimensional, asymmetric attacks on almost every aspect of an adversary's social, economic,
2119 and political life. Unrestricted warfare employs surprise and deception and uses both civilian
2120 technology and military weapons to break the opponent's will. Attacks are integrated and exploit
2121 diverse areas of vulnerability: cultural warfare by influencing or controlling cultural viewpoints
2122 within the adversary nation; law warfare or political action through transnational or non-
2123 governmental organizations to effect a policy change that would be impossible otherwise;
2124 financial warfare by subverting the adversary's banking system and stock market; media warfare
2125 by manipulating foreign news media; network warfare by dominating or subverting transnational
2126 information systems; psychological warfare by dominating the adversary nation's perception of
2127 its capabilities; resource warfare by controlling access to scarce natural resources or
2128 manipulating their market value; smuggling warfare by flooding an adversary's markets with
2129 illegal goods; and, terrorism to create vastly disproportionate effects on national
2130 welfare.(TRADOC G2)

2131 **war.** An armed conflict, or a state of belligerence, between two factions, states, nations,
2132 coalitions or combinations thereof. Hostilities between the opponents may be initiated with or
2133 without a formal declaration by any of the parties that a state of war exists. A war is fought for a
2134 stated political or economic purpose or to resist an enemy's efforts to impose domination.
2135 (modification of a definition from Dictionary of Military Terms, 2nd edition, H.W. Wilson
2136 Company, New York, 2003, Compiled by Trevor N. Dupuy et al., page 261.)

2137

2138 Section III

2139 Special Abbreviation and Terms

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2140
2141
2142

This section contains no entries.

DRAFT

2143 Appendix D
2144 Endnotes

¹ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, June 2008, p. 5.

² "Army deployment goals" are move a BCT in 4-7 days, 3 BCTs in 10 days, 9 BCTs in 20 days, and 15 BCTs in 30 days, IAW Army Power Projection Program and Army Campaign Plan. See Army Power Projection Program briefing titled, "Army Force Projection Strategy & Management", February 2009.

³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p.134.

⁴ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, x.

⁵ For example, historian Williamson Murray argues that the familiar convention that military institutions fail in war because they focus too closely on the last war is incorrect. In the oft-cited case of German military triumph and French defeat in 1940, for example, the Germans benefited from a detailed study of World War I to determine what really happened and identify implications for future war. Meanwhile, the French studied their last war only superficially and used selective observations to justify existing organizations and doctrinal trends. Actually, the French avoided meaningful debate and designed wargames and exercises to ensure results that reinforced flawed assumptions. See Williamson Murray, "May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA" in *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 157-169. As historian Eugenia Kiesling observed, "hard truths were blurred both by optimistic language and by refusal to ask questions whose answers might have proved unsettling." See Eugenia C. Kiesling, *Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 136-143, 175-181. Quotation from p. 180. Because flawed assumptions escaped exposure, French military doctrine and institutional culture developed in a way that was incongruous with the conditions of war in 1940. When the Germans invaded, the French, who had assumed they would be able to conduct "methodical battle," maintain communications, prevent surprise, and control operations very closely were paralyzed and unable to contend with the actual conditions of war. Robert Doughy, *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1990), 27-32.

⁶ General Sir Richard Dannatt KCB CBE MC ADC Gen, "A Perspective on the Nature of Future Conflict," Speech to Chatham House, 15 May 2009, 2.

⁷ Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, 21 November 2003.

⁸ The National Defense Strategy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy speech focused on Rebalancing the Force, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and the Army's Chief of Staff white paper addressing a balanced Army all provide different lists of national security interests, priorities or objectives. *National Defense Strategy*, June 2008. Objectives: Defend the Homeland; Win the Long War; Promote Security; Deter Conflict; Win our Nation's Wars. *Rebalancing the Force: Major Issues for QDR 2010*, Michele Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Speech to Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 April 2009. Security Challenges: Rise of violent extremist movements; Proliferation of WMD; Rising powers and the shifting balances of power; Failed and failing states; Increasing tensions in the global commons. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, version 3.0, 15 January 2009, pp. 7. National Security Challenges: Win our Nation's Wars; Deter potential adversaries; Develop cooperative security; Defend the homeland; Respond to civil crisis. *The Army of the 21st Century: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy*, Casey, George W., General, Chief of Staff of the Army, 12 June 2009 draft. Objectives: Prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; Engage to help other nations build capacity and assure friends and allies; Support civil authorities at home and abroad; Deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.

⁹ Derived from analysis of the following documents: The National Defense Strategy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy speech focused on Rebalancing the Force, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and the Army's Chief of Staff white paper addressing a balanced Army.

¹⁰ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, version 3.0, 15 January 2009, page 2.

¹¹ *The Operating environment 2009-2025* version 3.0. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 2009, page 5.

¹² Brian Nichiporuk, et al, *Strategic Insights from Unified Quest 2009*, RAND Corporation, July 2009.

¹³ Gordon and Trainor, Operation Cobra II. The first American KIA in Operation Iraqi Freedom was a Marine 1LT who was killed by elements of the SRG manning a civilian pick-up truck and armed with AK47s and RPGs.

¹⁴ Jim Garamone, *CENTCOM Charts Operation Iraqi Freedom Progress*, American Forces Press Service, March 25, 2003.

¹⁵ Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Combat Studies Institute, 2004.

¹⁶ Ibid. and Wright, Reese, et al, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign*, Combat Studies Institute, 2008.

¹⁷ Biddle and Friedman, *The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008.

¹⁸ Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008.

¹⁹ Biddle and Friedman

²⁰ Timothy L. Thomas, *Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows Over Information Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office), pp 238-239.

²¹ Marc Kaufman and Walter Pincus, *Effort to Shoot Down Satellite Could Inform Military Strategy*, Washington Post, February 20, 2008, p. A3.

²² Angel Rabasa, et al, *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, The RAND Corporation, 2007.

²³ Andrew Krepinevich, *7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century*, Bantam Publishing, 2009; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, *The Top Palpable Threat Vignettes*, TRADOC G-2, draft document, June 2009.

²⁴ *Unified Quest 2009—Technology Implications*, Objective 5 Interim Analysis Report, TRADOC Analysis Center, December 2008.

²⁵ *Degraded Operations EMP Vignette: High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Effects on Brigade Combat Teams*, Army Capabilities Integration Center briefing, 2008.

²⁶ For example, Dr. William R. Graham, Chairman, Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, made the following statement while testifying before the Housse Armed Services Committee on July 10, 2008: "Iran, the world's leading sponsor of international terrorism, has practiced launching a mobile ballistic missile from a vessel in the Caspian Sea. Iran has also tested high-

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altitude explosions of the Shahab-III, a test mode consistent with EMP attack, and described the tests as successful. Iranian military writings explicitly discuss a nuclear EMP attack that would gravely harm the United States.”

²⁷ *Unified Quest 2009—Technology Implications*, Objective 5 Interim Analysis Report, TRADOC Analysis Center, December 2008.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ C. Todd Lopez, *Immersive technology melds Hollywood, warrior training*, Army News Service, 10 March 2009.

³¹ *Unified Quest 2009—Technology Implications*, Objective 5 Interim Analysis Report, TRADOC Analysis Center, December 2008.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 27 February 2008, pg. 5-4.

³⁵ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 26 December 2006, pg. III-5.

³⁶ Leaders and units must still understand that these local conditions are connected to larger and often external and transnational dimensions of the problem. As Kimberly Kagan points out, the problem of counterinsurgency is “not only localized, but also systemic.” Kagan observed about the insurgency in Iraq that “the enemy had developed a system of allocating resources; command and control; financing; logistics; recruitment; training capabilities; information operations; force projection capacities; and methods for reinforcing priorities—not just in local areas, but hierarchically within the theater.” Failure to address the systemic dimension of counterinsurgency limits counterinsurgent efforts and creates opportunities for the insurgent organization. Kimberly Kagan, “III Corps AAR,” 5 May 2008, unpublished paper.

³⁷ In *Organizations At War*, Abdul Kader Sinno observes that “ethnic groups, social classes, civilizations, religions, and nations do not engage in conflict or strategy interaction—organizations do,” 13. He argues that because engaging in conflict requires “coordination, mobilizations, and manipulation of information,” detailed studies of organizations are necessary to understand “how conflicts begin, evolve, and conclude.” He draws on organizational theory to develop an understanding of how structure affects the character and outcome of armed conflicts. Sinno also argues that centralized organizations are more capable of seizing the strategic initiative than decentralized organizations because they can “implement complex multistep strategies that require careful coordination, strict discipline and concentrated decision making.” In contrast, non-centralized organizations are “incapable of taking the strategic initiative beyond locales abandoned by weak rivals.” He argues that the non-centralized organizations “must centralize once they gain control of a safe haven,” 16. Interestingly, we have seen this phenomenon in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

³⁸ Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, pg 40.

³⁹ FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, August 2003, pg 1-17

⁴⁰ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 17 September 2006, Incorporating Change 1, 13 February 2008, pg. IV-30.

⁴¹ JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*, 16 September 2002, pg. II-12.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pg. II-13.

⁴³ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 27 February 2

008, pg. 5-4.

⁴⁴ JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 26 December 2006, pg

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Electronic warfare: (DOD) Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Also called EW. JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as amended through 19 June 2009.

⁴⁷ FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2008.

⁴⁸ Defeat: A tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the friendly commander’s will, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result from the use of force or the threat of its use. FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, September 2004.

⁴⁹ FM 3-0, *Operations*, page 6-13.

⁵⁰ General George W. Casey Jr., Army Chief of Staff, *The Army of the 21st Century: A Balanced Army for a Balanced Strategy*, version 10, 12 June 2009.

⁵¹ intergovernmental organization — An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, 17 March 2006.

⁵² Such as those involved in the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Program.

⁵³ nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. JP 3-08.

⁵⁴ Beth Cole DeGrasse and Christina Parajon, *The Afghanistan Reconstruction Group: An Experiment with Future Potential* from the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at the United States Institute of Peace. Available at <http://www.usip.org/resources/afghanistan-reconstruction-group-experiment-future-potential>

⁵⁵ More than half of the American and international personnel operating in Iraq and Afghanistan are private contractors working for the U.S. government. See Robert Perrito, “The Private Sector in Security Sector Reform: Essential but Not Yet Optimized,” USIPeace Briefing, January 2009.

⁵⁶ For one perspective on how technology has influenced the relative roles of air and ground forces, see David Johnson, *Learning Large Lessons The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era*; RAND Corporation, 2007.

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⁵⁷ According to FM 3-0, *Operations*, disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy's command and control system, degrading the ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of enemy's capabilities or will to fight. Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy's dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.

⁵⁸ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 5-1 to 5-5

⁵⁹ FM 3-0, *Operations*:3-39.

⁶⁰ See Chapter 3 of the 2009 draft of FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, for a detailed discussion of the elements of design.

⁶¹ See TRADOC Pamphlets 525-3-7 and 525-3-7-1, *The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept*, and *The U.S. Army Study of the Human Dimension* for a comprehensive treatment of the components of the human dimension. These documents also treat the subject of future leadership in some detail. The Study also contains 102 required capabilities, many of which pertain to the Command and Control warfighting function.

⁶² Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, RAND Counterinsurgency Study No. 4 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), pp. ix and 8; CALL lessons learned; Bing West, "Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq," *Military Review* (March-April 2009), pp. 11-12; Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Feb 6, 2006, Page 23, 42, 80.

⁶³ CSI interview with BG Michael Tucker, former 1st Bde Cdr, 1st Armored Division, Apr to Jul 2003, p. 9; CALL lessons learned. Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, RAND Counterinsurgency Study No. 4 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 111; HQDA G-8-sponsored Former Bde Cdr Seminar No. 2, dtd 13 May 09, p. 7; Bing West, "Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq," *Military Review* (March-April 2009), pp. 11-12.

⁶⁴ Defense Budget Recommendation Statement (Arlington, VA), As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Monday, April 06, 2009; Army War College (Carlisle, PA) As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Carlisle, PA, Thursday, April 16, 2009.

⁶⁵ *The Top Palpable Threat Vignettes*, TRADOC G-2, draft document, June 2009.