Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency

by Robert E. Mitchell

An American-designed strategy attempts to link counterinsurgency and traditional development programs in Yemen and thereby provide a model that can be applied elsewhere. Rapidly changing conditions with simultaneous multiple small wars impair the ability to design and implement such a challenge. At the same time, there are legitimate questions about the thinking that went into the original formulation.

Much can be learned from America’s linked military and civilian development initiatives in Yemen, a country in which the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been active over the years whereas the Department of Defense (DoD) has not had boots-on-the-ground. Boots-on-the-ground, in contrast, preceded USAID in both Afghanistan and Iraq. (USAID was earlier active in the former country.)

If the evidence on which this new combined Yemeni strategy proves approximately accurate, and if the inferences about the outcomes of proposed interventions in this country are sound, then American foreign and military policies have a model potentially exportable to other states in varying stages of failure and where American anti-terrorism programs are not yet active.

Even the best of Yemen’s worst times challenge local development programs and especially those linked with the kinds of anti-terrorism initiatives supported by the U.S. military. During 2009 and 2010, the DoD and USAID formulated a coordinated development-and-security strategy based on evolving conditions at the time. America’s parallel civilian development programs were to be seamlessly linked to those targeting counter anti-regime militant extremists. Of course Yemen has suffered some of its worst times over the past year or so, and it is possible that the proposed American strategy for this country will be aborted or significantly amended.

Still, the present analysis will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the thinking underlying the proposed American strategy. As will be suggested, this joint strategy was based on inadequate evidence, questionable assumptions, and hypothetical intervention-outcome linkages. To move forward in an even more chaotic environment warrants a review of what went into the original strategy that current events suggest are no longer relevant. The assessment to follow has implications not just for USAID’s development assistance programs in Yemen but also for the DoD’s tribal-based counter-insurgency interventions in any environment with occasional non-overlapping small wars.¹

¹ Over the years, Yemeni tribes have fought one another and individually against the state. There have been multiple types of small wars. Space does not permit a review and summary of the growing literature on counter-insurgency, small wars, and terrorism. One starting point for such a review might be William R. Polk’s Violent Politics, A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerrilla War from the American Revolution to Iraq (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). The Small Wars Journal is itself a rich resource of information and analysis that can be hypothetically linked to Yemen. The analysis of al Qaeda’s hard drives captured from Osama bin Laden’s compound on May 2, 2011 provides new insights into the organization of this terrorist group, an analysis that leads in directions different from such works as Louise Richardson’s What Terrorists Want, Understanding the
On March 16, 2010 General David Petraeus outlined the American development and counter-insurgency strategy for Yemen in his testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee. He referred to the DoD’s program in Yemen as “Preventive Counterinsurgency Operations” that will “help Yemen deal with challenges that could become much more significant if not dealt with early on.” In support of this new formulation, a 2010 report issued by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated that “Yemen’s security and socio-economic challenges are inter-related” and, as a consequence, “the military has been given a bigger role than is the norm in carrying out development work—under the banner of countering extremism.” This development work includes village-level nation-building, the traditional responsibility of USAID. Both USAID and the U.S. military are to be responsible for coordinating the design and implementation of their respective projects in Yemen.

Even under normal abnormal conditions, it would be a challenge to formulate and implement these two programs so that they supported one another in ways that contribute to meeting the longer-term development needs of Yemen. USAID programs don’t typically focus on near-term security threats, whereas the U.S. military has more immediate security interests that in Yemen relate to the terrorists who might threaten the American homeland. And whereas USAID has had several decades of on-and-off experiences in Yemen, the U.S. military’s physical presence is more recent as seen in public reports on the training of Yemeni military counterparts, the supply of military ordinance, and the deployment of drone aircraft to track and attack terrorists.

USAID has been intermittently active in Yemen since 1959. Relations between the U.S. and Yemen were broken in 1967 only to be restored in 1973 with a new USAID agreement. It lasted until 1990 when relations were interrupted following Yemen’s UN vote against expelling Iraq from Kuwait. After seven years’ absence, USAID began anew in 2003.

Much had changed in Yemen during USAID’s absence from the country in 1990. In 2003, the Agency had little contemporary field-level country knowledge, experience, or experts to draw on in preparing its renewed country strategies. Not only was USAID absent for seven years, so were social scientists conducting community field studies. This absence, together with U.S. security concerns, influenced both the strengths and possible weaknesses of USAID’s current ambitious (and perhaps unrealistic) strategy and programs.

The Agency’s strategies, mind set and program portfolios changed since 1959. Early on, the Agency funded two major infrastructure projects, the Mocha-Taiz-Sana’a highway and the Kennedy memorial water project in Taiz. In the late 1980s (during my tenure in Yemen), USAID had a traditional portfolio of sectoral projects in agriculture, health, education, and water, as well
as an initiative to strengthen the private sector, support for women in development, and the first initiative to promote democracy and improve the administration of justice in a country covered by AID/Washington’s Near East Bureau.

9/11 changed the way America viewed Yemen. Reflecting America’s new security concerns, USAID’s portfolio of projects in 2003 targeted “five remote, very poor, rural governorates,” also referred to as “tribal governorates” that were sources and havens for terrorism. Traditional community-level health, education and agricultural projects were seen to be promising approaches to alleviating security problems found in these governorates.6

The current 2010-2012 program is built around a security-centered strategy. USAID is to target “highly vulnerable areas” with a “localized stabilization strategy” to address “drivers of instability and conflict” in eight governorates (three more than covered in the 2003-2009 strategy). These drivers are to be identified by the “frustrations and needs” that the targeted local communities themselves identify. However, for the most part, the drivers are long-term sticky national challenges of a “rapidly growing population, unequal development, political marginalization . . . declining government revenues, growing national resource scarcity” and America’s apparent real concern: “violent Islamist extremism.”

Although the illustrative interventions to address long-term challenges describe multi-sectoral programs, elsewhere the strategy implies that project implementers will draw on traditional sectoral programs. If the USAID Mission in Sana’a is organized by sector (with separate offices for agriculture, health and education), then there is a good chance that these offices will drive the selection of interventions, not local communities.

The 2010-2012 strategy has three components: (1) The Community Livelihoods Project, a multi-sectoral initiative that is intended “to mitigate the drivers of instability”; (2) a Responsive Governance Project, a rather standard capacity-building effort but one that will allow USAID to target specific communities with interventions that will “require relatively little effort to garner support, and that will have the biggest strategic impact for the resources extended in quickly and effectively” mitigating “critical threats to stability in Yemen.” Finally, (3), the Yemen Monitoring and Evaluation Program will track and evaluate the first two programs. Security is the ultimate objective; local and national interventions are to achieve the objective. There is certainly nothing unusual in this kind of thinking.

The strategy was developed “amidst growing instability and a greater sense of urgency” that required a “new stabilization strategy.” This urgency (which has been overtaken by recent events over the past several months) may explain why some issues do not appear to have had a full airing. For example, the emphasis is on strengthening governance and local community organizations that central government ministries control. USAID is to “enhance the capacity of government officials, promote decentralization, and empower communities” in the eight high-priority problem governorates. This can be seen as an effort to reduce the power of tribes and traditional leaders, but USAID’s documentation makes only a very few mentions of tribes and no reference to USAID’s support for an earlier “tribal conflict mitigation program,” let alone the recent urban-based opposition to Yemen’s president.7

6 See footnote 4.
7 For USAID’s current role more generally with the “Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework,” see Steven Alan Honley, “Smart Power in Action: S/CRS,” Foreign Service Journal (May 2, 2010), 43.
In skirting a discussion of tribes and the existing research on them (recent evidence suggests a decline in the importance of tribal identification and systems\(^8\)), it would appear that tribalism does not merit a high priority. This oversight may be explained by the nature of a formal bilateral nation-to-nation agreement with the government of Yemen, not its tribes, as the American counterpart. USAID will build the capacity of the Republic of Yemen (ROY), not tribes, in governorates with strong tribal systems. The intention is that “by empowering communities [not tribes] and linking them with governing structures . . . public services will reinforce the presence, and to a lesser extent, legitimacy of the state in those areas.” However, Yemen’s recent urban-based turmoil questioned the legitimacy of the government, if not the state itself. And the open tribal challenges to Yemen’s president question the likelihood that local communities will uniformly accept a strengthened central government.

By focusing on formal government bodies and shading the importance of tribes and the admittedly limited and dated social research on them (concerning, for example, the ROY and Saudi government payments to sheiks), the American program seems to have ignored the real possibility that tribes, through their leaders, would likely capture and direct local programs supported by USAID even though it appears that the Agency’s programs intend to replace tribes by strengthening local councils and associations. These local groups are government entities under the control of national ministries that in turn are often led by tribal members. Reforming the tribal system would replace or reform these ministries and perhaps replace their leaders. This would be done by developing new local non-tribal leadership that would no longer receive payments from the ROY and the Saudi government. The difficulties of achieving this transformation are not mentioned in USAID’s country strategy. Moreover, the urban-based turmoil of recent months suggests that both Yemenis and Americans will need to revisit the meaning of a central government as well as the tribes themselves.\(^9\)

Even if the authority of the already weak central government is not significantly diminished, the lack of security in the targeted governorates means that USAID staff and contractors would only have limited physical access to these areas. This would make it very difficult to base project interventions on “community-determined needs” and to deliver and monitor programs that might adversely affect the tribal system in the eight tribal governorates. Even before the past year’s turmoil, “USAID officers have not been able to visit some USAID-funded projects in many years.”\(^10\)

The current country strategy lists numerous “illustrative activities” that might help achieve program results. Since the Agency’s purpose is to weaken “drivers of instability” (including the tribal system), the challenge will be to collect and assess information on the likely immediate effects an activity will have on the welfare of a community and how that welfare will in turn reduce instability. Research supportive of the proposed activities and their assumed effects is thin at best.\(^11\) One would need to see the social soundness analyses the Mission prepared in support of its three major programs, but the kinds of social research supported by

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\(^8\) Mitchell, “What the Social Sciences Can Tell Policy-Makers in Yemen.”

\(^9\) In July 2011, demonstrators in Taiz, Yemen’s second largest city, questioned the narrow interests of a tribal leader attempting to control opposition to the central government. See Sunarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, tribal militias flex muscles,” Washington Post (July 8, 2011).

\(^10\) Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Following the Money, p. 11.

\(^11\) Mitchell, “What the Social Sciences Can Tell Policy-Makers in Yemen”
USAIDs worldwide are not especially relevant to the security thinking behind the Mission’s current strategy.12

The absence of pertinent USAID research and expertise on Yemen and other countries with serious security challenges suggests that the Yemen mission relied on largely unproven assumptions and assertions about cause-effect relations commonly used in other countries as well as in U.S. domestic programs. For example, the current strategy claims that “the foundation of political opposition and extremist ideologies is, to a great extent, based on people’s level of satisfaction with the services their government provide and whether there are real opportunities.” The strategy also states that “the development hypothesis of the USAID/Yemen Strategy postulates that addressing the development needs of underserved communities is causally related to improving political and social stability.” However, the causal linkages (if there are any) don’t seem to capture the motivations and personal backgrounds of known jihadists (e.g., the 9/11 hijackers) and the leadership of untold other anti-American insurgent groups.13 According to many commentators, America’s opponents base their ideologies both on religious grounds and on what are seen to be American foreign and military policies.

If communities will not base their beliefs and activities on the benefits of USAID-funded local projects, then USAID anticipates that other “outreach efforts will promote behavior change that will help individuals take advantage of service and employment opportunities.” The intention is to forcefully create and enable “agents of change” favorable to the objectives stated in the USAID and DoD programs in Yemen. These are well-intentioned hypothetical aspirations.

USAID staff is challenged to distinguish between needs and preferences. Although there are multiple possible needs as well as initiatives to meet them, there is a danger that USAID’s focus will be primarily on needs for which the agency has traditional programs and Washington offices backstopping them. This suggests that the Mission’s interventions will deal with agriculture, maternal and child health, education, and micro-credit, all long-standing programs with AID/Washington offices promoting and dedicated to these sectors. It would not be the first time (in my memory) when AID/Washington sectoral offices attempted to influence a USAID mission’s program strategy.

Finally, because USAID has a bilateral nation-to-nation program, it is likely that national ministries based in Sana’a will shape if not control which local communities will benefit from American-supplied services and assistance. Even within a modest-size governorate, this would permit Sana’a to reward and co-opt some communities and their leaders rather than others not in favor with the central government. Unfavored groups could be the very same communities “most at-risk of generating political instability and providing possible refuge for terrorists.” Of course, without a widely accepted central government (the current situation), the implementation of this capital-based development strategy is questionable at best.

The DoD appears not to be as reticent as USAID in recognizing the importance of tribes. If the US military (with boots on the ground) adopts a short-term perspective by rewarding tribes and their leaders as the Saudi and ROY have done in the past,14 then both the civilian (USAID)

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12 For guidelines for the conduct of USAID’s social soundness analyses, see http://uccd.lib.columbia.edu/govpubs/for/yemen.htm. For a list of some recent USAID project evaluations, see http://www.google.com/#hl=en&ei=8rLhS6PdNY77lWfFfZGqAg&sa=X&oi=spell&resnum=0&ct=result&ved=0CAUQBSgA&q=http%3A//usaid.gov/pubs/usaid_eval/&spell=1&fp=a86c207b1c79523e
13 As analyzed in Richardson’s What Terrorists Want as well as by numerous other authors.
and military (DoD) will not be mutually supportive of one another. Given the apparent greater freedom of in-country physical movement that DoD personnel have and the US Government’s emphasis on security threats, there is a danger that USAID would become a junior (adjunct) partner in the American assistance and security programs in Yemen. A single US government policy for this country requires not just a commitment to a common objective but also a common understanding of the problems to be addressed, adequate field-level information on the problems, a portfolio of responses to address the problems, and mechanisms in place to implement and monitor project performance. It remains to be seen if USAID and DoD capabilities can in a coordinated manner meet the challenges set forth as a single American strategy for Yemen. And this was just before the recent turmoil.

Under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act, the DoD funds and implements both military and civilian development projects in Yemen. The American military’s Special Operations Command Control office in Yemen manages its own “civil affairs and community outreach projects . . . including community-based development activities” as well as the public diplomacy program staffed by a Military Information Support Team (MIST) with its traditional psychological warfare techniques. While USAID may not be targeting tribes and their leaders, the DoD will carry on an “active dialogue with tribal leadership and civil affairs development projects . . . designed to improve the quality of life and offer a viable alternative to violent extremist activities.” These DoD non-urban projects include economic development and good governance, specifically “rural development programs in Yemen’s tribal areas.” Moreover, according to the earlier-referenced 2010 Senate report, USAID and the DoD have carried out “joint programs,” in part because, from the American perspective, the “challenges facing Yemen are inter-related and cannot be addressed in isolation.” Given the assumed close linkage between USAID and the DoD, it is no wonder that U.S. Senate investigators found that Yemeni government officials “did not distinguish at all between military-administered or civilian-administered programs.” And it is also no wonder that a DoD “rural development program reportedly got off to a rocky start due to misperceptions on the part of tribal leaders about what the USG’s intentions were.”

Although the American ambassador is responsible for assuring coordination between USAID and the DoD, in fact the military “operate under the authority of their respective commands, as opposed to under Chief of Mission authority” and, as one result, U.S. military officers “are allowed to travel to some areas of the country that are off-limits to civilian personnel” and as noted earlier, “due to Embassy travel restrictions for civilian employees, USAID officers have not been able to visit some USAID-funded projects in many years.” These restrictions and USAID’s focus on eight security-challenged tribal governorates raise questions about the ability of the Mission and its contractors to plan and manage the activities proposed under its 2010-2012 country strategy. Moreover, field-level coordination is not possible if USAID does not have access to areas that the DoD has its own targeted development activities. Coordination can become a rather meaningless concept.

15 In the past before becoming part of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency would have provided such services. For more information on MIST, see http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.africa.mil%2FgetArticle.asp%3Fart%3D3642&rct=j&q=military+information+support+team+mist&ei=hZMbTJafO4T68Abk3ayeCQ&usg=AFQjCNGHpSxjB2DfSy0Or3QUULKpIw For more information on SOCCENT, see footnote 17.

16 Following the Money, p. 11. USAID’s national decentralization strategy is online at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/countries/yemen/

17 Following the Money, p. 11.
I have not found a description of the specific community-level projects managed by the DoD in Yemen, but USAID’s own country strategy reports that SOCCENT (Special Operations Command Central) projects involve “active dialogue with tribal leadership.”18 That is, the DoD, unlike USAID (at least in its public documents), seems to consciously target tribes and their leadership. Particular attention, it seems, is likely to be placed on religious leaders. According to the Joint Special Operations University’s Strategic Studies Department, research is invited on how to engage “the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology.” This (non-development) focus is incorporated in the Department’s focus on “combating Terrorist Networks.”19

The above account of two U.S. development programs in Yemen, one by the civilian USAID and the other by a counter-terrorism military group, can be placed in the larger context of the research traditions of the two agencies (USAID and the American military), the potential value of academic field studies of Yemeni tribes, and the distinction between projects addressing long-term development challenges and those with a more immediate (security) focus. Civilian USAID projects worldwide draw on social research to help design projects and evaluate their progress in sectors such as health, education, agriculture, national economic policies as well as in “general development,” governance, and democracy. The U.S. military’s two general social research foci include attention to a government’s stability (as reflected in studies currently funded by the DoD-NSF Minerva Project and in the DoD’s earlier ill-fated Project Camelot) while the other focus has a more immediate tactical value (such as the Human Terrain System used in Afghanistan). Neither DoD focus necessarily includes traditional development objectives supported by USAID.20

SOCCENT would no doubt draw on military intelligence to identify Yemeni communities to receive security-mitigation projects. The Strategic Studies Department within the Joint Special Operations University lists the kinds of research that might help the SOCCENT team in Yemen to design and implement projects in targeted communities. The list is divided into six sections that include “irregular warfare” and “regional and cultural studies.” Two

18 SOCCENT has two teams in Yemen: the Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE) and the Military Information Support Team (MIST). They are the primary interfaces between DOD and USAID/Yemen. The “civil affairs development projects are designed to improve quality of life and offer a viable alternative to violent extremist activities.” CMSE oversees development and humanitarian assistance projects, and MIST implements initiatives that utilize various modes of communications, information networks, and community leaders to spread critical messages that attack drivers of instability and reinforce basic functions of civil society. USAID projects must collaborate closely with DOD where feasible. The DOD and the USG have still other programs in Yemen. For example, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funds projects that help “build the capacity of non-governmental organizations.” This program “targets civil society organizations.” And in addition to the USAID, DOD and MEPI programs, the USG extends assistance through the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce and other Washington-based offices, many of which rely on American contractors to implement projects. Yemen also receives assistance from a range of bilateral and multilateral donors and financial institutions. This large number of donors is said to overwhelm central ministries and, as a result, project funds are not spent or, if spent, not adequately tracked. In its earlier incarnation, MIST was responsible for “psychological operations” (shades of the Phoenix Project in Vietnam). Today MIST produces leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker messages to influence both soldiers and civilians. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this unit dropped leaflets encouraging Iraqis to surrender. Presumably MIST in Yemen would have a different focus, one that requires the unit to be subordinate to the rural development programs initiated and implemented by the U.S. military. Malcolm Nance has proposed that Muslims, Yemeni and foreign groups need to design and implement programs to delegitimize Al-Qaeda and its leaders. His suggestions on how to do this are in his An End of al-Qaeda, Destroying Jihad and Restoring America’s Honor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), Chapters 9 and 10.


research topics specifically mention Yemen: A32: “Engaging the constructive Muslim Ummah to counter violent extremist ideology,” and B.25: “Strategic decision making for irregular warfare—case studies on irregular-warfare success and failure.” 21

Proposed project A32 asks “what are the barriers to the flow of information among 10–40-year-old Muslims? What can the U.S. government, and others, do to reduce these barriers? Which U.S. policies and/or actions should be increased, strengthened, and/or reduced to enhance positive engagement of the constructive Muslim Ummah? Which instruments of U.S. government ‘soft power,’ as identified by Secretary of Defense Gates, should be engaged or enhanced?” The purpose of the proposed B25 project is “is to capture lessons learned from recent, relevant irregular-warfare activities to better understand national decision-making process, accuracy of planning assumptions, and effectiveness of operations to improve future operations.” Unfortunately there is no open-source information on completed or ongoing SOCCENT studies in Yemen. Nor is there information on how SOCCENT-supported research would help in the follow-up design and implementation of field-level projects. And there is an unknown, unstated and questionable linkage between these SOCCENT proposals and the development-oriented ones that USAID is to support. Some DoD initiatives could very likely run counter to those managed by USAID.

Finally, although immediate pre-turmoil short-term security challenges shaped USAID’s program in Yemen, in fact the Agency (worldwide) primarily addresses heavy macro-economic and social challenges (e.g., water, employment and agricultural productivity) that require long-term perspectives and solutions. In contrast, the U.S. military’s SOCCENT program focuses primarily on immediate short-term non-urban security challenges. If successful, USAID’s proposed program in Yemen should over time benefit targeted communities, but it is unrealistic to assume that the Agency’s claims on cause-effect linkages will lead to widespread national benefits that will significantly ameliorate security threats. USAID programs have long-term objectives. The DoD’s projects have a short and almost immediate-term time perspective.

The relatively few dated studies of Yemen’s tribal systems and changes in them could, if ground-tested today, provide an understanding that can be useful to both USAID’s development agenda and to the DoD’s focus on drivers of insecurity. 22 It is not apparent that either US agency has drawn on this literature and updates to it for guidance in formulating and implementing projects. This literature could be especially helpful to the DoD for it, in contrast to USAID, is specifically targeting individual tribes for rural development projects that are intended to lower identified threats to Yemen’s security - - and to America’s as well.

The DoD’s focus on the drivers of insecurity provides a mindset different from USAID’s traditional focus on development. Yet USAID/Yemen has adopted the DoD’s definition of American concerns, making the focus on security the official U.S. strategy for Yemen. USAID’s country strategy is a vehicle to achieve the DoD’s security agenda, an agenda that the DoD is pursuing with its own rural development projects that in the past have been the responsibility of USAID.

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22 Mitchell, “What the Social Sciences Can Tell Policy-Makers in Yemen”
USAID is in danger of being limited to a role primarily (if not exclusively) supportive of the U.S. military. This possibility feeds into charges by critics that the U.S. foreign policy has been militarized and that the missions of civilian agencies are becoming subservient to the military. Although the State Department’s and USAID’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is supposed to enhance civilian capabilities,²³ and although the Pentagon’s own Quadrennial Defense Review supports a strengthened role for civilian agencies, in fact the military has in the past attempted to free itself of restrictions placed on it by the Foreign Assistance Act, including “strict compliance with human rights standards.”²⁴

USAID’s supportive role raises questions concerning the Agency’s traditional approach to program and project design, one that involves linking specific interventions to the achievement of designated goals. The cause-effect (means-ends) links in USAID/Yemen’s country strategy have little if any empirical justification. All the linkages are hypothetical. This judgment applies to the DoD’s community development projects as well.

Both USAID and the DoD are designing programs in an information-and-knowledge poor environment. Information and understanding of individual villages and tribes is required, not just an overall assessment that led to USAID’s focus on eight governorates. Even this primarily village or tribe-centered focus can now be questioned, for the recent turmoil seems to have been primarily urban based, although the media has often focused more on northern tribal opposition to the country’s president. Neither USAID nor the DoD has programs directly addressing the sources of and solutions to the challenges of urban protestors who demand a change in the national government, not solutions to tribal-based threats to American security. This distinction between urban vs. tribal suggests that American assistance programs need (as they often do) to distinguish between short-term security threats and those that influence sustainable long-term economic and political change that minimize drivers of instability and conflict - - between rural-tribal programs and those that address more urban-based grievances. My guess is that USAID and the DoD will need to reformulate their cooperation and begin to draw on individuals who know not just more about Yemen but also about how to wisely select among alternative means-ends solutions to development and security challenges.

Robert E. Mitchell earned degrees from the University of Michigan, Harvard’s China Area Program, and Columbia (Sociology), has been an academic in the US and overseas, a Foreign Service Officer with USAID (including a tour in Yemen in the late 1980s), consultant on various international challenges, and published widely on a variety of topics (most recently in MIT’s Journal of Interdisciplinary History). He is retired, living in Brookline, Massachusetts and an active leader and member in Harvard’s Institute for Learning in Retirement.

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²⁴ Bill Clifton, *RIGHTS: Bill Shields Pentagon Aid Boost Oversight*. Available online at http://www.etan.org/et2007/may/19/13pentag.htm