Counterinsurgency:
Domestic Politics by Other Means

by Anton Kuruc

Peace is not absence of conflict.it is the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means.
-Ronald Reagan

Clausewitz describes war in a foreign policy context that needs to be adapted to insurgencies. This paper discusses insurgency in the context of domestic rather than foreign policy. It discusses the aspects of domestic politics that help define the role of violent coercion in domestic political discourse. This paper discusses the role of a political campaign to win domestic political competitions. It identifies key assumptions that underpin demographic planning and applies some typical political campaign planning methods to better analyze the human terrain. It also explores how the military campaign should support the overarching political campaign and to better incorporate domestic policy expertise into the whole of government counterinsurgency effort.

Clausewitz defined war as '... an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will'[1] with: 'Violence ... the *means*; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate *object*.'[2] He argues that war's nature is determined by a 'wonderful trinity' of violence, chance and reason, usually attributed to a secondary trinity of: '... different parts of the nation state at war: the people, the general and his Army and the Government'.[3] The level of direct political influence in the war also affects its nature: '... in one kind of War the political element seems almost to disappear, whilst in another kind it occupies a very prominent place, we must affirm that one is as political as the other...[4]

Clausewitz generally portrays war as: 'The War of ... whole Nations ... [that] always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is, therefore, a political act'[5]. This leads him to conclude that 'War is a mere continuation of policy[6] by other means.'[7] Clausewitz's context is invariably foreign policy: '...the plan of a campaign [is designed to cause] the disarming of the nation... [that includes] ... *the military power, the country,* and *the*

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[1] von Clausewitz, C, *On War*, Ed. By Anatol Rapoport, 1982 ed Penguin Books, Lonon, UK, p.101
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid p121
[4] Ibid p.120
[5] Ibid p.118. The Macquarie Dictionary 3rd Ed p.1474 defines political as 'exercising or seeking power in the governmental or public affairs of a state…'
[6] Macquarie dictionary ibid p.1474 defines policy as: 'a course or line of action adopted and pursued by a government, ruler, political party or the like...'
[7] Ibid p.119

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will of the enemy.'[8] Many who question Clausewitz's relevance to insurgency focus on its intrastate nature rather than the political context that animates the conflict.

'[C]ontext is ... the most important variable in the understanding of war.'[9] Clausewitz's wrote in the post enlightenment, Westphalian context of emerging nation states. He wrote with insight on how nations conduct conventional wars, with conventional forces to compel opponents to bend to their will. We might well conclude that for Clausewitz war is the continuation of *foreign policy* by other means. Clausewitz is still a strong intellectual influence on Western military thought.[10] Although counterinsurgency is different, Clausewitz's general theory remains very useful, but it needs a different context - that of domestic politics.[11]

Insurgency as the Continuation of Domestic Politics by Other Means

Insurgency is the continuation of domestic politics by other means. A successful intervention into a host nation's domestic politics demands an understanding of the warring populations in order to resolve their conflict. This understanding will shape the intervention's strategic objectives, the information needed to plan operations and the resources required to conduct them.

A Western military intervention into a host country does not preclude intervention by other powers. Any intervention is shaped by the political, strategic, military and legal culture of the intervening powers, including the insurgents and their international supporters.[12] Intervening Western forces will tend to: favor democracy to legitimately resolve disputes; be conducted by professional militaries; and usually abide by the rule of law. This constrains how the counterinsurgent applies force, whereas the cultural context of the insurgent often expands his scope to apply more violence.

Clausewitz viewed war as a contest for political power *between* states, whereas an insurgency is an armed contest for political power *within* a state. This distinguishes the political objects of an insurgency from a conventional war. In conventional wars the primary focus of the military is on the opposing military and government, whereas in counterinsurgency greater emphasis is placed on the people contesting power.[13]

Domestic Politics

Domestic politics is the contest for political power within a polity. The need for, and nature of, a foreign intervention is determined by the means some participants use to conduct

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[8] Ibid p.123

[9] Gray, C., 2005, *How has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?* In Parameters Spring 2005 Vol 35, US Army War College, USA. P.14

[10] Corn T. 2006, *Clausewitz in Wonderland* in *Foreign Policy* Web Special p.1 http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6795

[11] Brassford C, 2010, *Tiptoe Through the Trinity or the Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare* see the section on 'Non State or Non Trinitarian War' http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/Trinity8.htm , Gray Op Cit and Schuurman B, 2010, Clausewitz and the New War Scholars, in Paramaters Spring 2010, Vol. 40, No. 1, US Army War College, Carlisle, USA.

[12] Gray, C, 2005, Op Cit p.25

[13] E.G. see Corn op cit and Flynn
Flynn M.T. MAJGEN, Pottinger M., and
Batchelor P.D, 2010, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,* Center For A New American Security http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf from the opening statement in the executive summary Flynn et al make clear that this is the greatest challenge for intelligence in Afghanistan.

domestic politics.[14] It is behavior, not ideology, which justifies an intervention. The merits of oppositions and whether some behavior is ideologically driven is beyond this paper's scope.

Domestic Politics and Other Means

Clausewitz's 'other means' is the violent coercion of the enemy nation by a nation's military. Insurgents use the 'other means', or the organized and directed use of armed force, to obtain domestic political power or political change. Democracies ban political violence, and insurgents use it, because it is effective. Unless some competitors use 'the other means' there is no insurgency to counter.

Directed political violence distinguishes insurgents from criminals and legitimate political competitors. Thus, the objective of a military intervention is to change the behavior of the opposition, not necessarily its ideology, except where the ideology directly drives the violence. Insurgencies meet Clausewitz's test that violence is directed by political 'reason' to force change on an unwilling opponent. Hate and enmity, probability and chance, and political reason float between the people, military and government ensuring that insurgency fits Clausewitz's model of war.

Insurgencies differ most from conventional war in the trinity of the people, army and government. Instead of a political object being pursued by applying armed force against the military, an insurgent often uses violence against the people. 'As insurgents are not initially powerful enough to seize power outright, they often resort to terrorist acts to eliminate local authorities ... Terrorism effectively intimidates the vast majority into passivity...terrorist acts... have the correlative effect of controlling the local inhabitants.'[15]

Insurgents use violence to control the population and weaken the government. Millen argues that this is because citizens make a 'covenant' with their government where the government agrees to protect its citizens. The ability to attack the people demonstrates the government's inability to uphold its end of the bargain. This leaves citizens unorganised, isolated and vulnerable arousing their survival instinct.

Self-preservation forces the citizen to passivity or cooperation with the insurgent even when the citizen disagrees with the insurgent's ideology.[16] Most Western military education is delivered in the conventional war context were the 'people' are a tertiary issue. This has left the military establishment scrambling to create a capability to understand the neglected 'people' element of the trinity. Human Terrain Teams and anthropologists have been used to help understand and influence a host nation's 'people'.

Some, such as Larsen et al, exclude kinetic action as an 'influence operation'.[17] They argue that '...influence operations ... need to be coordinated and synchronized with ... kinetic activities ... [such as] military or paramilitary operations...'[18] Kinetic actions are not 'influencing

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[14] The different agencies, force packages and mission profiles of Australian forces that recently intervened in East Timor, Solomon Islands, Iraq, Afghanistan and Timor Leste highlight this point.

[15] Millen, R., 2010, *The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behavior During an Insurgency* in Parameters Spring 2010, Vol. 40, No. 1, US Army War College, Carlisle, USA, p.8

[16] Ibid

[17] Larson E.V., Darilek R.E., Gibran D., Nichiporuk B., Richardson A., Schwartz L.H., Thurston C.Q., 2009, *Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities.* RAND Arroyo Centre, RAND Corp. p.5 Fig 1.1 Elements of Influence Operations clearly excludes Military/paramilitary force as an element of influence.

[18] Larson et al 2009, Op Cit, p.5

operations.' This view marginalises how counterinsurgents' understand the insurgent's use of violence to influence and how to legitimately apply force against the insurgent. Larson et al contradict this argument by noting that '... appeals backed by force are likely to be far more compelling than appeals based on logic, emotion, or social norms'[19]. They argue that this is because violence arouses the citizens' most 'basic' instinct and fundamental need on Maslow's hierarchy. Insurgent violence is more likely to be applied directly to the people[20] in order to influence the government which is why the population is the objective of these wars.[21]

Violence Reflects Weakness

The resort to violence against the people often reflects political weakness. Domestic political violence is usually used to overcome an *ideological* or *structural weakness. Ideological weakness* is where insurgents use violence against a majority because they can't win the political contest using legitimate means. S*tructural weakness* is where the majority supports the insurgency because 'normal' political means aren't available.[22] Insurgencies of ideological weakness are typically waged against democracies whereas insurgencies of structural weakness are generally fought against oppressive governments. Western interventions generally encounter the ideologically weak. The ideologically weak often portray their violence as a response to a nonexistent structural weakness.

Ideologically weak insurgencies invert the order of how to attack 'Clausewitz's secondary trinity'. Rather than attack the military to disarm the people in order to influence the government, the insurgent often attacks the people to convince the government to disarm - or disengage - its military and security forces.

A foreign intervention can further decrease the relative power of the insurgent if he faces the almost prohibitive power of Western military opponents. This may make the insurgent more likely to attack the population to compensate for his inability to directly attack the security forces of the host nation and its Western allies.[23] The insurgent often blames intervening and government forces for creating a structural weakness that leaves no alternative but to attack 'government collaborators'.

Western interventions are restrained by rules of engagement that preclude direct or indiscriminate attacks on the population. Ironically this increases the insurgent's scope to influence the population by attacking them. The counterinsurgent's narrative demands both a legitimate democratic process with restrained use of force to undermine the insurgent's false message of structural weakness. Thus high turnout credible Iraqi elections were important to success whereas low turnout and corrupted elections in Afghanistan in 2009 were a serious setback. Structural strength allows broad political participation which undermines the 'structural weakness' argument of the anti-democratic insurgent, which exposes his ideological weakness.

The opposite position is also very powerful to deter an insurgent. Georgia's fear that Russia would not restrain its use of force and directly rule Georgia, after it annexed Ossetia in

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[19] Larson et al 2009 Op Cit p.69

[20] Kaldor M., 2005 *Iraq: The Wrong War* in Open Democracy http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/wrong_war_2591.jsp for example states that: 'In 'new wars' battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians'.

[21] McChrystal S., GEN, *COMISAF Initial Assessment,* 2009 http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?hpid=topnews p 2-4

[22] A Coup Detat is another form of political violence directed against the government.

[23] Galula D, 1964 Counterinurgency *Warfare: Theory and Practise*, Praeger Security International Paperback. p.4

2008, was possibly critical in Georgia's decision not to resist Russia with insurgency. Colonel Bigeard succeeded in destroying the FLN anti French insurgency in Algiers through extensive extra judicial killing and torture. Although he captured the head of the insurgency and destroyed his force, Bigeard fatally undermined the legitimacy of the French in the process.[24]

Clausewitz's influence on Western military thought might lead to a focus on the government and military leaving the insurgents free to focus directly on the people. This is also partially a result of the transformation of the Afghan and Iraqi wars, from their initial status as foreign policy wars to ones of domestic politics.

Both wars successfully achieved their conventional objective of regime change after the opposing military was rapidly defeated. But both interventions lost momentum when the wars transitioned from a foreign to a domestic political context. Arguably as soon as the regime was deposed these wars became ones of domestic politics.

Difficulties in Domestic Politics

The political objective of the counterinsurgent is to stop violent political competition in order to enable a legitimate process that has 'the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means', as Ronald Reagan put it. This is difficult when there is no cultural or historical precedent for peaceful political discourse within the host country or culture.[25]

Limiting legitimate political behavior will determine who can participate in domestic political competition based on how they participate. To effectively intervene, the counterinsurgent needs to know which participants are illegitimate, which population segments support illegitimate participants, which groups are susceptible to the insurgent's influence and which population elements support the government. It is critical to know the level of support for different political groups amongst distinct constituencies to understand any domestic political competition.

In the conventional context intelligence helps identify and locate the enemy so that operational planners can plan to defeat him to force political change. The successful insurgent understands that this approach is not necessarily effective against an insurgency. It is not clear that Western intelligence and operational planners intuitively understand this point.[26] The insurgent often plays a different 'game' in a cultural context he understands well, leaving the intervening counterinsurgent playing checkers with a 'westernized' system of governance while the insurgents play a culturally well understood game of chess through political violence.

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24 Boot M., The Weekly Standard, July 5 - July 12, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 40
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/consummate-warrior?page=2

[25] Kaldor M., 2005 Op Cit This cultural and historical experience of both parties to the dispute in Northern Ireland is what makes it such a poor example to apply to Afghanistan or Iraq.

[26] Flynn et al Op Cit provide a damning indictment on the irrelevance of intelligence to the war on Afghanistan. P.7 provides a series of devastating insights. For example: 'Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers – whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers – U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency.' and 'This problem and its consequences exist at every level of the U.S. intelligence hierarchy, from ground operations up to headquarters in Kabul and the United States.'

Political Violence

One view of revolutionary war is that the 'revolution' starts with peaceful protest to gain support, transitions through violence and terrorism, to an insurgency and then a civil war before power is won.[27] At the beginning the movement is run by a cell which transforms into an alternate government during the insurgency phase.

Arguably an insurgency becomes a civil war when the 'alternate government' governs a population in a distinct geographic area. In a simplified sense the opposition's role is to increase the level of violence until it win's political power, but always with the caveat that the revolution maintains sufficient power to crush a 'counter revolution' – usually through harsh repressive measures, often applied to former allies.[28]

As the opposition moves along this continuum the scale, frequency, spread and organization of political violence generally grows. The democratically motivated counterinsurgent wants to shift towards 'peaceful opposition' based on the reasonable prospect of nonviolent legitimate political change. The insurgent wants to increase the level of violence so he can enforce his ideology over the whole population.[29] Generally a civil war requires both sides to restrict the spread of violence as it consumes greater resources that are targeted against a visible opposing force. Because 'spontaneous' outburst of violent mass protest require relatively few resources it can be quite widespread without being highly organized.

As an armed political opposition increases the level of political violence it gains access to more coercive tools. For example, during a civil war the opposition can still engage in mass violent political protest, terrorism, insurgency and major military operations. However, an organization that is dedicated to violent political protest must increase its capability to develop a terrorist arm. This requires leadership, logistics, organization, personnel, resources and time, and it leaves a signature.

The inherently domestic context of an insurgency challenges the operational planning and underpinning intelligence used in conventional warfare. This does not invalidate these techniques. Rather they require adaptation to make them more suitable to support counterinsurgency.

Occasionally within this context an opportunity arises to apply massed conventional force against a concentrated enemy. Examples include the second battle for Fallujah or Dien Bien Phu which highlights the potential and risks when massed conventional force is applied to domestic politics. It is beyond the scope of this paper to further discuss this point.

In conventional war the military strategy is a component of foreign politics because it is used to obtain a foreign policy outcome. It should be co-ordinated and synchronized with other elements of national power. As Clausewitz notes: '...this unity is *the conception that War is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.*'[30]

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[27] Methvin E.H., 1972. *The Riot Makers: The Technology of Social Demolition.* Tom Stacey Press, USA., For example gives a good explanation of the continuum of revolutionary war.

[28] The Khomeini led Iranian Revolution is often cited in this case where the religious groups turned viciously against their former Communist allies after power was won.

[29] Clausewitz Op Cit pp102-103. Clausewitz details the tendency to the extreme that is most easily achieved when motivated by supremacist ideology such as the ethnic supremacy of German National Socialists.

[30] Clausewitz Op Cit p.402

Clausewitz makes clear that force supports politics. In a counterinsurgency it should support the plan used to compete for domestic political power, the political campaign plan which should guide the military and security plan and consequently inform the intelligence needed to develop operational plans.

The Political Campaign

A military intervention into a host nation's domestic politics will support the strategic foreign policy objective of the intervening power. However, at the theatre strategic, operational and tactical levels military force will support domestic politics in the host country. The normal model of conducting domestic political competition is through a political campaign.

Some political campaigns are conducted to win public office whilst others advocate policy change. The latter is appropriate for a military intervention that seeks to change political participant behavior in order to build a legitimate government. The intervention rarely tries to ensure a candidate wins an election but rather to ensure that candidates can legitimately compete for political power.

'The basics of any election campaign are deceptively simple. All campaigns must repeatedly communicate a persuasive message to people who will vote. This is "the golden rule" of politics. A political campaign is a communication process - find the right message, target that message to the right group of voters, and repeat that message again and again.'[31] 'To do that, campaigns must define what the message is and devise a strategy to reach voters who will be swayed by that message.'[32] A political campaign develops a message and targets that message at the right people. This is reflected in guides and manuals for candidate and advocacy campaigns.[33]

Some higher order principles underpin an effective political campaign. According to Jones, a campaign should be issue oriented, culturally competent, operate in cooperation with other like-minded campaigns, be financially accountable and pursue good government.[34] Other advocacy campaigning organizations, such as the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) believe that their advocacy campaigns should be coordinated with other groups and affiliates, engage and mobilize the membership, include community outreach, expand the contact list and be conducted in accordance with the broader organizational strategic campaign management.[35]

Political campaigns rely on research that is similar to 'intelligence' and produces product akin to the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). Campaign planners refer to surveying the 'political landscape'[36] which the military might consider as understanding the 'human terrain'. The process to develop an effective campaign plan is dependent on this critical research. The first step of the political planning process is like the military's first principle of war: the selection and maintenance of the aim.

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[31] O'Day undated, *Political Campaign Planning Manual: A Step by Step Guide to Winning Elections*, National DemocraticInstitute for International Affairs p.6 http://lpin.org/files/How%20to%20run%20a_campaign_manual.pdf
[32] Larsen et al Op Cit p.111
[33] For examples see http://www.thechangeagency.org and http://continuousprogress.org/
[34] Jones P. Undated but published post 2002. *Political Campaign Manual* http://129.3.20.41/eps/othr/papers/0411/0411002.pdf
[35] Australian Council of Trade Unions,2009, ACTU Congress 2009 Political and Community Plan 2009-2011, p.2 http://www.actu.org.au/Images/Dynamic/attachments/6541/Political%20and%20community%20plan%20resolution%20-%20final.pdf
[36] Larsen et al Op Cit p.App B p.114

Prior to conducting external research, many campaign planning manuals recommend that, apart from confirming electoral laws and winning criteria, the campaign staff determine why the campaign is being conducted. 'What distinguishes your campaign from those of other campaigns?'[37] The campaign should confirm the strengths and weaknesses of other contesting parties from the point of view of voters[38] which is similar to the mission analysis of the appreciation process. It determines the campaign plan mission and the campaign context. The aim can be selected and the narrative developed from this assessment.

The Political Landscape and the Human Terrain

Political campaign planners identify constituencies to approach and what message to approach them with. '... to target the right voters, political campaigns rely on demographic research. Demographers assume that "populations are heterogeneous," that this "heterogeneity can be used to divide voters into separate analytic groups," and that "membership in a demographic group suggests shared concerns."'[39] This research is generally framed in terms of answering a series of questions. For example: 'What is the demographic composition of the voters' ... income... education ... professions, ethnic backgrounds, religious backgrounds, age, gender, etc.? Where do people work, shop and play? What is the geographic break down of the voters? ... How would you describe your supporters and those voters you hope to persuade?'[40]

These assumptions directly inform critical parts of the campaign plan. There is a degree of probability in the answers in both the characterization of each demographic such as the degree of homogeneity within the demographic and the correlation and causality with other demographic factors and how different demographic segments might respond to the campaign.[41] 'Voters with similar characteristics may have similar interests and may tend to vote the same way. Seniors will be less interested in schools and more interested in pensions ... By determining how many senior citizens there are and how many young mothers there are, you will be better able to target your message to groups that matter to your success.'[42] The campaign doesn't want to waste resources talking retirement policy to young families and vice versa.

There is little evidence that the military applies this level of sophistication when planning how to apply armed force, information operations and other modes of influence to constituencies. Western forces that intervene, such as ISAF in Afghanistan, can be hampered by a lack of census data to analyze. There also appears to be little understanding amongst the military of the critical importance of census data which Galula describes as the first weapon in a counterinsurgents arsenal.[43]

Gathering reliable census data is a difficult, time and resource consuming activity. Insurgents understand the importance of a census which is probably why an Afghan census has been repeatedly delayed.

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[37] Jones Op Cit p.9

[38] O'Day Op Cit p 9

[39] Larsen et al Op Cit p.115. The quoted elements cite Shea D. M., and Burton M.J., 2001, *Campaign Craft:* Praeger Publishing 2001 pp 43-44

[40] O'day op Cit p.9

[41] Larsen et al expand on this pp115-116

[42] O'day Ibid p.9

[43] Galula Op Cit p.82 also commented on by Flynn et al Op Cit p.7

The Canadian military understands the importance of census data and is attempting to develop micro village census during the conduct of operations.[44] Whilst this data will be local and incomplete it will enable some meaningful demographic analysis within an Area of Operations (AO). If every Task Force in Afghanistan developed a census in conjunction with normal operations a large body of relatively accurate data would be collected more quickly than waiting for the national census. Such an effort would need HQ ISAF to determine the minimum census data to be collected to allow data to be compared, matched and analyzed across Afghanistan. Micro census data is not perfect and might not be used at the strategic level but it can usefully inform tactical operations.

Demographic data analysis allows the next steps of the political campaign plan to be developed. '... the key to using Census data is the search for demographic correspondence and specificity.'[45] The census demographic data should be stored in a relational database that enables multiple level queries and outputs to be provided to operational planners. 'This combination of individual-level data with demographic information provides campaign consultants with better insights on subgroups and, thus helps them to convey their messages to the right voters.'[46]

The political campaign can't target its messages to the right population segments if it hasn't conducted this level of analysis and segmentation. This level of analysis belongs in the IPB, probably in the 'define the battlespace environment' step. Segmenting the population should also be the proper start point for effects planning.

Insurgency is a domestic political fight for the support of the people. It is critical to understand the multiple and conflicting constituencies that make up the 'people' and to target the variety within the population. It is unrealistic to try and win a domestic political campaign with a single untargeted meta-message applied to all the people.

Having broken up the population into constituent demographic groups the political analyst needs to determine each demographics' 'orientation' towards the political contest. The political campaign plan will 'diagram' the electorate based on their orientation. This generally consists of identifying which sub groups are 'partisan' and which are 'swingers'.

The 'partisan' vote is the base of very strong supporters, and soft supporters. This is done for each party in the political competition. In between the partisan blocs is the undecided or swing vote which consists of the undecided and the soft supporters of parties. These groups are the most open to influence and are a critical focus in any political campaign. Opinion polling, focus groups and historical voting records are used to help estimate the orientation and strength of support for each demographic segment's orientation.

Targeting the Message to the Demographic

Demographic groups and population segments should be allocated a political orientation. This can be informed by micro census data, opinion and focus group polling, intelligence reporting, historical record of insurgent activity and election results. The allocation of groups into this framework will require some assumptions that are refined through ongoing intelligence. Once the population segments are allocated the intelligence staff can look for homogeneity and

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[44] The author attended a Canadian military presentation to the Regional Command South Operations Analysts symposium in Camp Baker, Kandahar Air Field in Oct 09.
[45] Larsen et al Op Cit p.116
[46] Larsen et al Op Cit p.116

linkages within and between groups assigned similar orientations. Social Network Analysis is a very powerful tool that can help uncover these linkages. This is the basis to develop demographically differentiated operations.

Just as a political campaign uses this information to target the right message to the right demographic, the military must conduct operations that impart the right influence on the right demographic segments. Force is a persuasive message that amplifies our narrative and operations. The message and effects delivered to our hard supporters must be very different to those transmitted to our hard opponents. Demographically differentiated operations enable the military to develop an offensive focus and achieve economy of force. It enables the military to apply the principles of war to a counterinsurgent campaign.

Running the Political Campaign

'There are three ways to view electoral activity. ... the cult of personality ... [which] ... does little to build a ... movement. ... as a way of educating your community about the issues involved in the campaign and how it has relevance in the lives and environment around you. It is a tool to use to reframe how the world is run, how conflicts are resolved and how things get done. ... it is one way to build your organization...'[47] The political campaign that directs the military component of a counterinsurgency is likely to be a hybrid of the second and third types.[48]

Experienced professional political campaigners will be required to assist develop and execute a political campaign. It is unlikely that these individuals will be able to be sourced from the host country, especially if it lacks a domestic democratic infrastructure. It is also unlikely that Western professional domestic political campaigners will understand the culture of the host nation in sufficient detail to be effective. Therefore the political campaign experts will need to be teamed with novice indigenous personnel who bring cultural expertise. These people are most likely to come from successful Western political party operators in the West, some public servants – especially from coordinating agencies like the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and from large scale advocacy groups such as the ACTU. These skills are increasingly likely to be found amongst private sector lobbyist, political consultancies and public relations firms. This staff should be supported by policy implementation experts from domestic policy agencies in the intervening country.

A political campaign adviser deployed as a part of the intervention should bring their own key staff to create a political campaign office seconded to the host government but responsive to the national military and civil commander. This office will develop the political campaign that military operations support. The campaign office should include a small military intelligence and operations staff. The military staff can provide security advice to the political staff and liaise with the military commander.

The campaign staff should also be supplemented by police and other domestic policy advisers depending on the nature of the intervention. The personnel who will be most critical to success are domestic policy and political campaign experts. Western Countries are well stocked with such expertise, although they have not been widely used to assist foreign military interventions.

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[47] Jones, Op Cit P.3
[48] Jones Ibid

Conclusion

In state on state conflicts the enemy is obvious, his territory defined, his source of power clear. When fighting within the state amongst competing members of the state, the enemy is not immediately obvious, his territory rarely well-defined and his source of power often opaque. In a counter insurgency the ability to clarify why we are fighting, who we are fighting and identify their source of power depends almost entirely on our ability to understand the domestic politics within the state. Unfortunately most military theory and doctrine derive from a Clausewitzian foreign policy context.

Insurgency is the conduct of domestic politics by other means. The counterinsurgent must support domestic politics that successfully counters the insurgent by changing the insurgent's behavior not necessarily his ideology. The means for conducting domestic politics is through a political campaign. In a counterinsurgency context the political campaign is supported by coercive force targeted at illegitimate political participants. This element needs to be separated within the 'people' element of the Clausewitzian trinity. Fortunately political campaign planning manuals include tools to help segment populations and identify target audiences. Western military's have made little, if any, use of people with these skills in the conduct of its counter insurgency campaigns.

The expertise that domestic political campaign experts can bring is the ability to craft the overarching domestic political campaign plan that will direct the application of force. A limitation that such people will often encounter is a lack of credible census data. This can be partially overcome by conducting micro census during individual operations. This will require a degree of coordination from higher headquarters to ensure consistency between forces.

Mao understood the importance of this analysis by masterfully answering his own questions: 'Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance ... The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies. ... To distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution.'[49] In order to succeed in countering the insurgency the West must have access to the expertise that can answer these questions.

The expertise to answer these questions is much more likely to be found in domestic political and policy process because counter insurgency is a domestic political campaign. Insurgency is the conduct of domestic politics by other means.

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[49] Mao Tse Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" (March 1926), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 13.

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