CONCEPTS

LOOKING FOR THE HEDGEHOG IDEA

JUSTIN KELLY AND MIKE BRENNAN

ABSTRACT

This article examines the limitations of traditional strategic approaches to the resolution of contemporary conflicts. It proposes control as the unifying idea for military action.

*Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate…*

– Clausewitz

Isaiah Berlin's famous essay *The Hedgehog and the Fox* was an examination of the work of Leo Tolstoy that rested on an observation from the ancient Greek poet Archilocus that 'the fox knows many things but the hedgehog knows one big thing.' From this platform, Berlin argued that:

there exists a great chasm between those… who relate everything to a single central vision,…—a single, universal, organising principle—and… those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way.
Berlin likened the former category to hedgehogs and the latter to foxes. This simple idea has been taken up by a multitude of writers for a multitude of reasons and there is a need for some caution. In fact, immediately, Berlin himself warns: ‘of course, like all over-simple classifications of this type, the dichotomy becomes, if pressed, artificial, scholastic and ultimately absurd’. In the context in which he used these characterisations, Berlin was looking only to illuminate the distinctions between hedgehogs, whose adherence to a single organising principle made their actions and thoughts centripetal, and the more centrifugal foxes. Importantly, in Berlin’s mind, hedgehogs were not stupid or limited, they were simply focused.

War is a complex undertaking and armed forces are complex organisations comprising many autonomous entities subject to the vagaries of a myriad of pressures, most of which are beyond their control. In order to provide a measure of cohesion to the preparation and conduct of war, a degree of focus is needed: a hedgehog idea. Failure to find this idea threatens what Berlin warned about: the pursuit of ‘many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way’. As we stumble through the maze of contemporary conflict and find ourselves dealing with wicked problems, design thinking, complex adaptive systems, anthropology, sociology, community policing, development aid, and the provision of reticulated water and sewerage to remote localities in the developing world—as well as combat against a highly motivated and ruthless enemy—the need for a unifying hedgehog idea is greater than ever.

Clausewitz was a hedgehog and believed that war was the domain of hedgehogs. Despite recognising the vast complexity and uncontrollable dynamism of war and accepting the dominance of politics in the interplay between them and tactics, Clausewitz settled on a simple, central, unifying idea for the conduct of wars: ‘the destruction of the enemy is what matters most’. Interestingly, here he is grappling with the same question that caused Berlin to write the essay mentioned above: ‘what power is it that moves the destinies of peoples’. Clausewitz understood and discussed the power of moral factors in the execution and conclusion of wars but accepted the limitations of the application of military force as a means to change people’s minds. Therefore, to him, the best that was possible was the destruction of the enemy’s powers of resistance carried out in a way that convinced the enemy’s people that submission was their best option. This was the single, big, hedgehog idea that shaped military theory from the time of Napoleon until very recently. This is reflected in the doctrine, organisation and equipment of the militaries of the world—or at least...
looking for the hedgehog idea

those that were prepared for industrial age warfare. The idea is now discredited, or at best incomplete as a unifying idea for the contemporary development and application of military force.

The aim of this article is to investigate whether there is still ‘a single universal organising principle’—a hedgehog idea—that underpins contemporary warfare, as annihilation underpinned that of the industrial age.

strategic approaches

From the time of Napoleon until the end of the Cold War, the basis of Western military theory and practice was dominated by Clausewitz’s hedgehog focus on the annihilation of the enemy. Whatever their provenance or objectives, wars were resolved through successful battles which, singly or in combination, destroyed the enemy’s military capacity and laid the enemy nation prostrate at your feet. This was not simplistic, or even an over simplification, but simply a recognition of the limitations of the utility of force. It also enjoyed the dual advantages of being both easy to understand and, in the social and political contexts in which it arose, of working with reasonable reliability.

Wars arise when frustrations with the distribution of political power become intolerable. Wars are fought to redistribute that political power. Political power rests on the consent of the people. Therefore, warfare attempts to manipulate the consent of the people. Physical force cannot directly influence an abstract concept like consent (except by its abnegation) and so it needs to act through an intermediary. In Clausewitz’s view, manipulation was best done by destroying the web of mutual obligations that join the individual with the state by demonstrably removing the state’s ability to meet its end of the bargain. The individual citizens, motivated by the pressures described by Hobbes in Leviathan, are then forced to arrive at a new social arrangement—one that represents a re-distribution of political power in favour of the victor. The beauty of Clausewitz’s hedgehog vision was that it described how political objectives could be translated into tactical actions—that is, whatever the objective of the war, the tactical choices were largely restricted to where and how best to kill the enemy army. These were the good old days.

Because it seeks the physical manipulation of an abstract quality, strategy is always conjectural. In essence, all strategies are based on hypothetical stimulus-response pairings to be applied in an incompletely understood socioeconomic model. As a result, strategies can only be validated by praxis. In the case of annihilation, there can be no certainty that a population that is placed at the mercy of...
of an enemy army will admit that it is, in fact, beaten. The 2003 ‘Shock and Awe’ campaign in Iraq is a good example. In this campaign, the enemy state and its army were quickly annihilated, but the Iraqi people were left largely untouched by the war. In addition, the connections between many Iraqis and the Saddam-state were different from those anticipated by Clausewitz and, for them, the annihilation of the state was empowering rather than prostrating. As a result, the chosen strategy (annihilation) failed to sufficiently manipulate their consent to support a transition to the democratic rule initially envisaged by the West.

Existing in parallel with the idea of annihilation, and only temporarily obscured by the shadow of Napoleon, is a set of complementary ideas, collected into so-called strategies of exhaustion. Strategies of exhaustion typically seek to manipulate the consent of populations by acting directly on the people. Until the last few years, this usually involved the laying on of Sherman’s ‘hard hand of war’ to impose such pain that the population sought to alleviate it by re-ordering political arrangements. This thinking connects the chevauchee of the 100 Years War with Sherman’s march to the sea, the bombing of British, German and Japanese cities during the Second World War, and counter-value nuclear targeting in the Cold War. Like annihilation, exhaustion enables the more or less direct translation of political intent into tactical action.

The Second World War strategic bombing campaign against German cities was an attempt to directly manipulate the consent of the people by imposing on them such pain that they would feel compelled to withdraw their support for the Nazi regime. It failed for a number of reasons. First, shared hardships tend (and tended) to cause communities to coalesce rather than shatter, and so the experience of being bombed apparently reinforced the cohesion of the German people and through that, reinforced the Nazi messages surrounding the singularity of the volk. Second, the coercive authority of the Nazi state was substantial and, viewed in hindsight, it was not clear how a people under pressure from all sides could organise themselves to withdraw their consent. Third, the necessary British and US alliance with the USSR played to the atavistic German fear of the Slavic east and made the war an existential matter for both the German people and the Nazi regime—again reinforcing rather than destroying cohesion. Fourth, the Allies’ demand for unconditional surrender meant that no bargain could be struck short of complete submission—which in view of the Russian involvement—could be seen as an acceptance of the threat of the genetic eradication of the German people. The result of these factors was that the exhaustion sought by the strategic bombing campaign of German cities didn’t work during the war.
However, when the Allies’ annihilating military campaign was eventually successful, and the Nazi regime removed, the impact of the strategic bombing campaign was felt in the ready submission of the people. By and large there was no insurgency or resistance movement and people were ready to move on with reconstruction.

Within the broad church of strategies of exhaustion there exists an even more speculative, yet enormously influential, chapel dedicated to the cult of denial. This strategic school has ancient and honourable antecedents: Athens’ Periclean strategy during the Peloponnesian War and Rome’s Fabian strategy in the face of the Carthaginian invasion of Italy being two examples. In both these cases, faced with a more powerful enemy conducting strategic offensives, the defenders declined to join battle with the aggressors and sought to vanquish them merely by avoiding defeat—the idea being that eventually they would tire of the game and go home. This worked for the Romans, who were able to maintain political cohesion in the face of the Carthaginian onslaught, but not for the Athenians, who eventually found themselves emotionally compelled to adopt a more active strategy.

Strategies of denial are clearly very indirect, seeking to manipulate the consent of the enemy population simply by denying them strategic success while ceding them more or less unconstrained tactical success. This indirectness makes denial even more highly speculative than the other strategic schools. The uncertainties created by long cause-effect chains, the time necessary for discouragement to take root and eventually become dominant, and the uncertainties attendant on predicting the behaviour of humans, all make denial so uncertain that is it typically a strategy of last resort. Because it is therefore a strategy of the weak, it is generally how insurgents win—when they win. In Vietnam, for example, the United States lost heart and went home rather than being militarily defeated although, in that case, exhaustion through denial was not a strategy that North Vietnam settled on until all other options had failed, the war was over, and the histories were being written.\(^{15}\)

These traditional strategic approaches remain important today. Al-Qaeda attacks in our Western homelands were and are intended to propagandise the Ummah and to exhaust our willingness to resist their attempt to establish political control over the Middle East; while in Afghanistan, the Taliban is attempting simply to exhaust us. Annihilation was the West’s chosen approach in all of our twentieth century wars (although invariably as part of a larger collective) and, if the recent Australian Defence White Paper is right, we may even have the need for annihilation again. Denial remains the most problematic of the traditional approaches. Although Australia effectively
embraced a strategy of denial (of continental Australia) in the 1980s, it was never tested. Today the implications, particularly for trade and the economy, of implementing a strategy of denial might make it hard to define victory for a market state like Australia. In Australia’s circumstances, it might provide the basis for a useful deterrent strategy because it relies on an initial misappreciation by the aggressor and a subsequent ability by both sides to make decisions that are severely bounded by rationality. However, it is not a strategy which degrades gracefully—it will either work as a deterrent or it will, most likely, not work at all. As a result, since Plans A, B and C are probably best left on the shelf for the time being, we need to find a Plan D.

---

**THE EXPANSION OF WAR**

To date, nothing has replaced annihilation as the single universal organising principle for militaries. Instead we are faced with a multitude of contending propositions and theories that purport to describe what wars will be like in the future, how they should be waged and how victory might be defined. There are many reasons for this, though none startling or new:

- There is a sense that the modern world is so dynamic that everything that existed before is merely burdensome legacy, which engenders a corresponding urgency in the search for novelty.
- In the last one hundred years, warfare has continued to expand, but the rate of expansion has accelerated. Since the conceptual initiation of the ‘nation-in-arms’ a little over two hundred years ago, we have seen the industrial revolution and the enhanced economic organisation of states producing lavishly equipped and supported mass armies that enabled them to seek the annihilation of their enemies. In the last one hundred years the same roots have allowed warfare to break the bonds of the surface of the land and sea and expand into the air, space, sub-surface and cyber domains.
- Warfare has been democratised. Instead of being an affair limited to the chosen representatives of states, active warfare now involves anyone who feels sufficiently motivated to pitch in. At the same time, the ‘intrusion’ of both professional representatives of media organisations and individual cell phone amateurs into the tactical battle has enabled people everywhere around the globe to take a position on the consequences of combat and on the means employed. The immediacy of these issues constantly threatens to overshadow the typically more abstract and remote questions about why we are fighting and what we are fighting for—even...
the strategic premise on which the conflict began. As a result, the importance of
the informational domain, propaganda, has grown exponentially.

- The modern state is losing its hold over its people. Although war continues to be
exclusively for or about states, the relationship between the state and its people is
changing. In the advanced market states of the West, the state exists to provide
opportunities to its citizens. It does this by nurturing the market, privatising
many of its functions, encouraging the growth of multi-national corporations, and
through international cooperation. By definition, this form of state has a very
limited ability to conscript its people to ‘its,’
as opposed to ‘their’, interests. The result of
this is that popular support for any war is
even more uncertain than in previous ages
and that warfare therefore needs to be more
intensively managed to connect the tactical
with the political. The corollary is of course
that, more than ever before, the home front
of market states promises to be the decisive
theatre from an enemy perspective.

General Sir Rupert Smith used the term ‘war among the people’ to describe the
result of the continued expansion and democratisation of war. His proposition is that
the utility of military force has declined in the face of

the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields—all the people,
anywhere—are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere, with
civilians around, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets,
objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force.

This was also the basic proposition underpinning the 2003 Army concept Complex
Warfighting, which has been further elaborated in Adaptive Campaigning.

The problem thus created is a substantial one: none of the strategic approaches
discussed above was intended, or is well suited to, the problem of resolving wars
fought among people; hence, our existing unifying ideas are unhinged. In his book,
Smith refers to this, explaining that when he was the NATO commander in Bosnia
‘we had no strategies’; that is, not that there was an absence of a specific strategy
(although that was also true) but that there was no clear idea of how military force
could be used to achieve the aspirations of the mission.

Part of the problem is that we have heightened aspirations for war. We have come
a long way since Horace’s exhortation that it was sweet and fitting for a man to die
for his country. The notion of individual negation is an absurdity in a market state
that exists to create opportunity for individuals. As a result, in modern war, the death
of a soldier is accepted as an unquestioned national tragedy. Furthermore, the West
no longer views war as a wholly legitimate means of advancing the interests of a state or group of states. Even if the United Nations grants formal legitimacy, there exists the underlying view that not only is it a last resort but it is not really a resort at all. For example, in reviewing Smith’s book, *The Guardian* wrote:

…it seems tautologous to say that there is something wrong with war. Morally wrong, of course, but also wrong in the sense that the function of this dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious institution has become increasingly unclear in the past half century.\(^{19}\)

It is interesting that, at least according to *The Guardian*, the notion that war is morally wrong is a given, whatever its causes, aims or outcomes. Next to this, its failure to deliver desirable outcomes reliably is merely a practical difficulty. Even if we accept *The Guardian’s* view as unconsidered and faintly risible, we should also accept that the underlying sentiment exists and that in the view of a substantial portion of our population, war is morally, at least, tainted.

If the reader has come this far with us, then we invite that in combination, these two factors mean that the basic mechanism of warfare, combat, is discredited. The moral taint reduces the tolerance that the community, local and international, has for the death and destruction that is an inevitable corollary of combat and constrains the choice of available means—the current trend of demonising air power being one example. The community is equally reluctant either to see its sons die or to employ the weapons that minimise the chances of this occurring. The inability to resolve this dilemma means that instead of being the principal means to an end, combat is reduced to being an undesirable externality of warfare. This is the basic message underpinning *Adaptive Campaigning* and its principal divergence from *Complex Warfighting*.

In response to these pressures: the need to more directly influence the perceptions of populations, acceptance of the limitations of the utility of force; and a general disenchantment with combat, the militaries of the world have been looking for a new organising principle that might replace annihilation. Because this period has coincided with a resurgence in counterinsurgency, and because the ‘perceptions of the population’ and ‘hearts and minds’ are apparent synonyms, this search began from a position of adherence to Templar’s dictum from Malaya that the answer lies ‘not in pouring more troops into the jungle’.\(^{20}\)

From this, one comes to the conclusion that there is no military solution to an insurgency and, from there, that direct military action is essentially regressive. As a result, one might conclude that the core business and that for which the military is
Looking For The Hedgehog Idea

trained, organised and equipped is no longer seen as terribly useful. In its stead ‘we’ have committed ourselves to a new order: strategies of inducement.

STRATEGIES OF INDEUCEMENT

Strategies of inducement rest on the proposition that ‘we’ can win the competition for the consent of a population by providing to ‘them’ things that are better than the things that the enemy is able to give them. The actual execution of such strategies involves capacities that are beyond the expertise and resources of most militaries, configured as before for annihilation. Therefore, other agencies, both government and otherwise, need to be enlisted into direct participation in the competition. To ensure the strategy is to offer the ‘right things’, it is necessary to consider and address the entirety of the conflict environment: political, cultural, social and military. To coordinate the actions of variously independent organisations within such a complex endeavour, a ‘dominant narrative’ is established as part of the strategy to provide the basic rationale and objectives for intervention and connect the actions of independent agencies with the political proposition being made to the target population. These are the elements of what has become known as ‘a comprehensive approach’: whole-of-government and multipartite effort, a focus on the causes of conflict rather than its symptoms, and the dominance of a political narrative. They are all implicit in a strategy of inducement.

Strategies of inducement have many positive attributes. They make it possible to engage the instruments of national power directly to the resolution of a conflict rather than indirectly through a primarily military effort. Goodwill is often expressed not merely to benefit its recipients but also to satisfy the needs of its practitioners and, because they are seeking to do good, these strategies buttress popular support for an intervention. Because of the effort to build good governance, law and order, democracy and a market economy trading in acceptable commodities, over time, the target population experiences a better standard of living and becomes more like us. The implicit assumption is that they are less likely to present a threat in the future. Perhaps most importantly, in the confluence of influences described above, there are few apparent alternatives.

Like all strategies, however, inducement remains highly speculative. There is a presumption that what we offer is more attractive than what the enemy is offering, and this necessarily invokes problems of cross-cultural perceptions and mores. In many cases, the West finds itself dealing with ethnic, cultural and national
identities that may be confronted by attempts at modernisation. For some peoples and groups, al-Qaeda and the Taliban being examples, modernisation is seen as Westernisation and is both cultural and religious anathema. In these cases, the source of conflict may be a response to the unwitting Western cultural intrusion accompanying the processes of globalisation. In such cases, the inducements we are offering may actually exacerbate resistance rather than undermine it.

Because of the focus of inducement, there is a tendency to see the enemy as peripheral to the conflict. This is a very sophisticated view that is not without merit, but it must be remembered that war is a dialectical struggle and that the enemy may not be content with a peripheral role. Therefore, although the objective being sought by the overall strategy might not have an enemy focus, it is likely that at least part of the journey will. It should also be expected that the enemy will have a strategy of their own. Although we might be committed to inducement, the enemy might have a quite different approach—it has usually been thus. What would be the consequences, for example, if we embarked on a strategy of inducement (which necessarily involves a protracted commitment) while the enemy was committed to a strategy of exhaustion and was content merely to deny us ‘satisfactory’ progress while sustaining a trickle of casualties? Would the rosy glow of goodwill sustain us through to a recognisable victory?

Despite these risks, because of their strengths, until a conflict arises in which there is a compelling need for one of the more traditional strategic approaches, strategies of inducement are likely to remain at the core of Western approaches to war. This raises lower order, but still important, questions for militaries: what is our role in inducement and how should we be organised, equipped and trained for it?

**CONTROL: THE HEDGEHOG IDEA**

*One man with a gun can control 100 without one.*

– Lenin

There is, at least in the minds of the authors, some confusion over this question at present. Because of the military’s formidable, and unique, capacity for planning, ability to establish in austere surroundings and capability to cope with violent circumstances, there are obvious reasons why they will usually form the first element of any commitment to a conflict. Equally, there is a natural desire to begin the main work of delivering inducements as quickly as possible. As a result, there is a tendency
for militaries to seek to be jacks-of-all-trades: foxes, rather than hedgehogs. The consequence of this is a trend to dilution of force structure, doctrine and training in preparing for wars and a failure to concentrate effort once deployed.

The core of this trend is the proposition that any organisation is able to prepare itself physically and culturally for only a finite array of endeavours and is able to implement simultaneously only a subset of those prepared for. Attempts to diffuse organisational focus beyond this array threaten organisational fragmentation, cultural confusion and the resulting likelihood of failure.

In 1967, Admiral J C Wylie gave us two profound pieces of wisdom when he wrote: ‘The aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy’ and ‘the ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the ultimate power in war. He is control. He determines who wins.’ If we accept Wylie’s proposition that the man on the scene with the gun ‘is control’ then to be in control that man needs to be ‘ours’ and not the enemy’s.

This idea is worthy of some expansion. Whatever convictions individuals hold with respect to the enemy’s political proposition, like the volk in Nazi Germany, if they cannot withdraw their consent at a time of their choosing, then it is unlikely that a strategy of inducement can work. Ultimately, unless you are confident in the ability of your government to enforce its peace, then the man with an AK at your door at midnight is your master. It doesn’t matter if you are happy with your electricity, content with your children’s educational arrangements and satisfied with the government’s agenda—you are in thrall to the threat posed to you and your family by that man with the gun. His removal resolves the competition for control and is the first step towards creating the conditions in which a strategy of inducement can be implemented.

This is so glaringly obvious that it appears banal, but even something so obvious is not always apparent. A number of examples from Iraq are pertinent. The Anbar Awakening—which began the process of the creation of Sunni militias to oppose al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and to protect Sunni populations from Shia militias—did not arise without help. Having initially gained a toe-hold in Iraq as an aspect of the Sunni resistance to US occupation and the rise of a Shia dominated government, AQI, essentially foreign, unacceptably extreme and uncomfortably fundamentalist for secular nationalist Bedouins, quickly marginalised itself. It sustained its position only through fierce internal discipline and the elimination of any opposition. Over a period of many months, relentless US Army, Marine and Special Forces operations eroded the capability and capacity of AQI to such an extent that it was no longer able to maintain its control over the Sunni population.
As a result, when the Awakening began in far western Anbar, AQI was unable to suppress it. This demonstration of weakness was sufficient encouragement for tribal leaders closer to Baghdad to re-assert themselves and follow suit. In this case there was a local desire to move away from AQI control, but that desire could only be pursued when the local control of gunmen and terrorists was removed by the counterinsurgents. It was only following this destruction of AQI’s control that the delivery could proceed of the goods and services that underpin a strategy of inducement.

Only a military can establish control and until it is established, democracy, the economy, the rule of law, policing and social progress must wait. The establishment of control necessarily has two aspects: one focused on the removal (by annihilation?) of the enemy’s ‘man with a gun’, and the other in putting our soldier in that man’s place. It also infers establishing sufficient control over the day-to-day existence of the population that they are in no doubt as to who is in charge. In nearly all cases, the hearts of the population are beyond our grasp but, if we are in charge, it doesn’t matter.

In this model, the national strategy would determine the political objectives being pursued and the dominant narrative to be followed, the campaign plan would lay down the broad agenda to be followed, and operational art would be focused on initially reducing the influence of the enemy to an acceptable level and subsequently preventing a resurgence and establishing control over the population.

CONCLUSION

In the face of a plethora of writings about complexity and the military system, hedgehog ideas remain important if complex organisations are to act purposefully and energetically in the face of complicated and dynamic circumstances. The military’s preoccupation with commander’s intent and task verbs, the sanctity of the mission and the importance of the ‘in order to’ are all manifestations of this idea. Previously the hedgehog idea that unified development, training and application was annihilation, but it has fallen into disfavour, at least for the time being. Of the other traditional strategic approaches, neither provides a good fit to the needs of contemporary war—at least to Western market states. Only the relatively new strategic approach, inducement, is genuinely available today.

Within a strategy of inducement there is a tendency for military preparations and actions to become undesirably diffuse. In the absence of full engagement by the nation-state, in preparing for strategies of inducement, militaries risk organisational
and cultural fragmentation with a consequent reduced ability to cope with actual, rather than theoretical, conflicts. In execution, there is the likelihood of the pursuit of ‘many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some *de facto* way’. 23 The result is typically a lingering conflict in which, at best, modest progress invokes the popular proclamation of ‘quagmire’, the acceptance of exhaustion, the redefinition of victory, and withdrawal.

It is often easy to forget that for Western states, in any dialectical struggle, if you are not winning, you are losing. The key contribution militaries can make to strategies of inducement is to establish effective control over the operating environment. This will require that the enemy’s ability to establish control is reduced to a negligible level. Clausewitz is still right and the destruction of the enemy is what matters most. Today, as in the time of Clausewitz, the destruction of the enemy—the removal of his ability to contest control—is not an end in itself, but it remains an essential prerequisite for subsequent actions that may deliver victory.

Once the enemy’s ability to contest control has been removed, locally or generally, the establishment of friendly control can set the scene for progress in other aspects of the campaign plan. In some cases, controlling a population will require that they feel ‘the hard hand of war’. Although we would not wish to revisit Sherman or Douhet’s measures, strategists should not shy away from taking control of all aspects of the day-to-day existence of a target population. The challenge we would present to the reader is to find a successful example of a war among the people that has not rested on the establishment of such control.

The beauty of accepting control as the military’s hedgehog idea is that it places the notion of annihilation (to which it is closely akin) within a strategic and campaign context and subordinates violence to strategy. Importantly it does not see combat as an undesirable externality or as a manifestation of failure, but as the core business for armies. In short, it helps describe how a blunt instrument like military force can help create the circumstances for positive political change. In this it creates a conceptual bridge with annihilation, exhaustion and denial.

ENDNOTES

4 Ibid., p. 437.
5 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


10 Clausewitz enumerated the three main goals of every war:
   - ‘To defeat the enemy armed force and destroy it. That means to direct the main effort first and always against the opponent’s main army;
   - to take possession of the enemy’s non-military resources, i.e. occupation of the country or at least action against the capital and other important strong points [at least partially because the enemy army was most likely to be found in front of such important assets]; and
   - to win over public opinion [that is to convince the population of the enemy state that they were defeated]. This goal may be achieved by great victories or possession of the capital.’ Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 91.

11 Here ‘nation’ refers to an ethnic or social group that is sufficiently culturally homogeneous to act collectively in response to some stimulus. On occasions, nations establish states to hold a monopoly over violence within their territory (the law) and to protect them from the predations of their neighbours (defence).


13 Before embarking on his march through Georgia and the Carolinas Sherman wrote: ‘We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and we must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war.’ As a result the Union forces needed ‘to humble their pride, to follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread us…’ because ‘we cannot change the hearts and minds of those people of the South, but we can make war so terrible … [and] make them so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it.’
LOOKING FOR THE HEDGEHOG IDEA

14 Phillip Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent*, Allen Lane, London, 2008. Bobbitt describes two types of states: ‘states of terror’ in which the consent of the population is coercively imposed and ‘states of consent’ in which it is freely given. In Second World War Germany (a state of terror) it could be argued that the Allies were attempting to out-terrorise the Nazis. Until their coercive authority was removed from the population the German people were not able to choose to submit.

15 Deterrence falls within the strategic approaches described but is based on perceptions of the threat of annihilation or exhaustion rather than its actuality.

16 ‘State’ here is used with its broadest meaning of a polity defined by the existence of a legal framework imposed over a group of people. This definition covers both the modern idea of states being geographically limited and the earlier idea of law being shared by a people regardless of their geographic location. Under this definition jihadis, for example, are representatives of this earlier form of state—the caliphate—which does not yet have a geographical meaning.

17 Phillip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, Anchor Books, New York, 2003. Bobbitt argues that there are identifiable stages in the evolution of the state, that the dominant form at any time marks an international epoch, and that wars arise as a result of the transition from epoch to epoch. In Bobbitt’s terminology we are presently experiencing a transition from the nation-state (which existed to benefit the nation it governed) to the market-state (which exists to provide opportunities to the individuals its governs).


22 Ibid., p. 72.

CONCEPTS  ~  JUSTIN KELLY AND MIKE BRENNAN

THE AUTHORS

Justin Kelly graduated from RMC in December 1977 and was commissioned into the RAAC. In 1995–96 he commanded 1st Armoured Regiment. He commanded the Peace Monitoring Group on Bougainville in 2000–01, was Deputy Force Commander of the Peace Keeping Force in Timor-Leste in 2002–03 and Director of Strategic Operations in the Multinational Force–Iraq in 2006–07. Justin Kelly has attended a number of training institutions including the UK Armour School (1981–82), the UK Royal Military College of Science (1986), Australian Command and Staff College (1990), Joint Services Staff College (1997) and US Army War College (2002). He retired from the Army in December 2007.

Mike Brennan currently holds the appointment of Director General Simulation in the Australian Department of Defence. His recent appointments include periods as Research Leader Human Systems Integration within Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation and Scientific Adviser–Army. He has a PhD in Physics from the Flinders University of South Australia, and was attached to the USMC Warfighting Laboratory during 1998–99.