Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

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Abstract

The most immediate threat to the security of Pakistan is an Islamist insurgency raging in the north-west tribal regions. They have launched a deadly campaign of terror attacks throughout Pakistan over the last few years which have killed large number of civilians and non-civilians alike, devastated infrastructure, and hindered NATO success in Afghanistan. They may be also harbouring high-ranking members of Al-Qaeda. The insurgents are affiliated with various militant groups which pose a threat to the wider region, especially Afghanistan. Tackling this network is necessary to reverse the destabilisation of the Pakistani state and to ensure NATO success in Afghanistan. In 2009 the Pakistani army attempted to pacify this threat in its stronghold of the South Waziristan region in north-west Pakistan. This discussion aims to apply counterinsurgency principles to this particular war and recommend improvements counterinsurgency operators can make for future campaigns. In fact, the counterinsurgents succeeded militarily but the lack of infrastructure building will not ensure South Waziristan does not fall back into the control of the insurgents.

How can the government of Pakistan apply counterinsurgency principles to defeat the Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan?

On the night of 9th June 2009, gunfire followed by a truck bomb ripped through the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar, Pakistan (BBC News, 2009, Suicide attack on Pakistani hotel). Jawad Chaudhry was in his ground floor room at the time and heard the militants open fire on security before a truck laden with explosives ripped through the lower floors of the building. He was to become one of the sixty injured that night in a terrorist attack by a loose collective known as the Pakistani Taliban. Fortunately for him he was not among the fifteen or so that were killed in was only the latest terrorist attack to hit Pakistan in recent years. Since 2003, Pakistan has been engulfed by terrorism. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the number of civilians killed by such attacks has risen virtually every year since 2003, with 2009 being particular bloody (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2010); most of which was conducted by the Pakistani Taliban or groups allied with them with the same objectives. The primary reason they have conducted such attacks has been in retaliation for Pakistani military action against them in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) and North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP). The government launched military operations throughout FATA and NWFP after they realised that they could not rely on peace deals to keep the threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban in check. In May 2009 the government launched Operation Rah-E-Rast to wrestle control from the Pakistani Taliban in the Swat region, while Operation Rah-E-Nijat in mid-2009 aimed to do the same in South Waziristan. They declared victory in both areas and have since moved on to similar operations in North Waziristan and Orakzai Agency.
It is important to give some background information on the main actors which are important in this conflict because they all have a role to play in how successful COIN operations will be. Firstly, the Pakistani Taliban poses the biggest threat to the Pakistani state. By late 2007, thirteen militant groups had united under the Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan banner, and consolidated their position to become the most powerful group on the Afghan-Pakistani tribal regions (Bajoria, 2009). It was headed by Baitullah Mehsud and had around 30,000 to 35,000 members. Their stated purpose is to mount a “defensive jihad against the Pakistani army, enforcement of sharia, and...unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan” (Bajoria, 2009). They are allied to the Afghan Taliban and allow them to use the tribal border region as a rear base for insurgent activity in Afghanistan (Gall, 2009), an advantage NATO resents.

The vast majority of the insurgents come from the Pashtun tribe while other numbers are made up of foreign fighters, primarily Uzbeks. The location of this tribe is central to the nature of the conflict in that the area is divided along an arbitrary border, the Durand Line; which both the Pakistani and Afghan governments have little control over. The culture of the Pashtuns continues to be hostile to central government influence and there is a strong separatist movement for ‘Pashtunistan’. As prominent Pashtun nationalist leader, Khan Abdul Wali, said in 1972 concerning his allegiances, “I have been a Pashtun for six thousand years, a Muslim for thirteen hundred years, and a Pakistani for twenty five” (Synnott, 2009, p.107). The culture of the Pashtuns which includes notions of honour, manliness, tribal solidarity, revenge, and bravery makes it harder for the Pakistani army to defeat insurgents (Kilcullen, 2009, p.229). Weapons especially have been significant in Pashtun culture for usage in “tribal and other feuds” (Synnott, 2009, p.108).

The current democratically elected Pakistani government is responsible for directing policy and has international legitimacy. However the Pakistani army is the country’s strongest institution and has a played a large role in political affairs that go far beyond executing the military will of the central government (Synnott, 2009, p.18). Its experience has been wholly in conventional warfare, as opposed to asymmetric warfare, as historically India has been their main threat. Its primary intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), much like the army is powerful in its own right. It has fostered the growth of militants in both the north-west tribal belt and Kashmir as sub-state proxies to counter Afghan and Indian power respectively, meddled in Pakistani politics, and has been involved with subversion in India (Synnott, 2009, p.57). It’s most infamous creation has been Lashkar-E-Taiba, who carried out the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008. The resultant international tension led to India halting the peace process with Pakistan.

An important factor in policy by these three arms of the Pakistani state towards militant groups is that they weigh up their options against long-term policy. These groups throughout the short history of Pakistan have been more concerned about what they believe to be in Pakistan’s interests rather than of the West or other pressing forces. Thus policies such as sponsoring friendly militant groups as counterweights to foreign nations has seen to be a viable and necessary option for Pakistan’s international security. Pakistan’s international insecurity stems from its geographical location between the simultaneous threats of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban on
its western flank, and India on the east (Synnott, 2009, p.39). The Pakistani Taliban poses a real threat to national security shown by the number of successful terrorist attacks, especially on high security targets such as military, intelligence and UN establishments, and as a result the army has been willing to engage in actual military conflict with them. However the intelligence and military establishment has historically been content to sponsor other sub-state actors “who could supplement to Pakistani security forces in the event of war with India” (Synnott, 2009, p.39). In regard to Afghanistan, there is a belief in the Pakistani army that NATO will pull out in defeat, leaving a power vacuum that Pakistan must prepare for (Rashid, 2008, p.219).

The US also plays an important part in this conflict. It led the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, which resulted in militants seeking refuge in the north-west tribal regions of Pakistan (Bajoria, 2009). It has assisted the Pakistani government with billions of dollars worth of military and humanitarian aid in a bid to stabilise the country, which in turn helps NATO ensure COIN success in Afghanistan. The two different US administrations since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 have differed in their policy toward the wider region. The Bush administration saw Afghanistan and Pakistan as separate entities, while Obama’s ‘Af-Pak’ policy envisages them as a single theatre of war. Its intelligence branch, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has been active in Pakistan directing drone attacks against high ranking Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. These attacks are highly controversial in Pakistan and are publicly condemned by the Pakistani government as breaches of sovereignty; it has become common belief however that the drone attacks are done with the tacit support from President Zardari and Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, who in turn feign public indignation (Synnott, 2009, p.90). India, historically Pakistan’s biggest threat, continues to be the highest item on the agenda of the Pakistani army and intelligence service. The two countries have had three major wars and one minor war, primarily over the Kashmir issue.

It is also critical to understand the context in which the conflict has occurred. There have been two peace deals in South Waziristan - one in April 2004 and the other in February 2005; both of these fell apart and the government saw no other option but to launch a military campaign to destroy the Pakistani Taliban (Synnott, 2009, p.91). South Waziristan served as a base for the Pakistani Taliban and was home to many of its higher-ranking leaders, such as Baitullah Mehsud and his successor Hakimullah Mehsud. The Governor of the North West Frontier Province, Owais Ghani, in June 2009 denounced then Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud as the ‘root of all evils’. The Province had borne the brunt of Taliban expansionism out of FATA. Baitullah had “overseen the killing of more than 1,200 civilians and several hundred soldiers through brutal means, including suicide bombings, kidnappings and beheadings” (Waraich, 2009). The decision by the army to move in Waziristan and defeat insurgents enjoyed widespread public support (Waraich, 2009).

Prior to June 2009, the Pakistani army had been reluctant to initiate a military campaign in Waziristan after previous defeats in 2004 and 2008, which resulted in humiliating ‘peace’ deals. After a short period of relative ease following the death of Baitullah Mehsud in June 2009 by CIA drone attack, the new Taliban leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, even more ruthless than his predecessor, ordered a number of devastating terrorist attacks around the country at important civil and international institutions. These aimed to prove that the Taliban could still strike devastating blows to Pakistani infrastructure even after Baitullah Mehsud’s death. In particular an attack on a Pakistani army base in Rawalpindi by the Taliban deepened the determination of the army to take action against the insurgents. The fact that the attack was led by a former
military major represents the intertwining sympathies some in the army have for the Taliban (Hussain, 2009). A major offensive was launched by the army in mid-October into South Waziristan involving 28,000 troops, in comparison to the 20,000 or so Taliban fighters, including allied Uzbek fighters. The gap between initial fighting and the second part of Operation Rah-E-Nijat was timed so that the militants would be driven out of their mountainous hideouts by the harsh Waziristan winter, the military could acquire more helicopters, and the army could finish their campaign in the Swat region so they would not have to fight the Taliban on two fronts. The army advanced the Taliban’s stronghold in three directions, backed by aircraft bombings which aimed to soften militant hideouts. After successfully seizing key towns such as Kotkai, the hometown of Hakimullah Mehsud, and Kanigurum, an Uzbek militant stronghold, the army announced victory in mid-December, claiming to have gained control of South Waziristan.

A concern for all actors, especially those in the West and India, is that non-state actors in Pakistan or international terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda will be able to exert influence over Pakistan’s nuclear faculties. This fear has been exacerbated by the belief held by those such as US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen that Al Qaeda head, Osama Bin Laden, is in Pakistan (Daily Times, 2009), a claim repeatedly denied by Pakistan. Pakistan first started nuclear development under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1972 under the auspices of the now infamous nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. A nuclear explosion test by India in 1974, codenamed Smiling Buddha, spurred Pakistan to gain nuclear weapons for the sake of self-preservation, the rationale being that in the event of hostilities with India, a Pakistani bomb could help deter full-scale war. The nuclear facilities were to be placed in the north and west of the country, mainly to provide some distance between them and India. However this has meant that they are now placed close to areas where insurgents have a foothold. It is clear that that some Islamist militants know where some nuclear sites are as they have attacked three of those facilities in the last two years (Blakely, 2009).

Former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel has claimed that the current situation in the region could be further exploited by militants. He points to the weak Afghan and Pakistani governments, and the low prospects for strengthening security by both governments (Riedel, 2009). The increasing weariness for war in the West could also mean a premature pulling out of Afghanistan, creating a power vacuum militants are increasing aware of. In such a case, it is speculated that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could conceivably fall into the hands of Al Qaeda or its affiliates, who have sworn to use them on the West. In June 2009 Al Qaeda’s third in command, Mustafa Abul-Yazeed, claimed that those weapons belonged to the Muslim world rather to some nation-state, and that if Al Qaeda gained access to them he would use them against the US (Al Jazeera, 2009, Al-Qaeda commander threatens US). Failing to provide adequate resources to counter this threat would result in “nuclear Armageddon” (Riedel, 2009).

On the other hand, Western politicians and the Pakistani government, at least in public, have denied that Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are at risk of falling into the hands of militants. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates in September 2009 expressed confidence in Pakistan’s security of its nuclear weapons based both on US intelligence and assurances by Pakistan (Agence France-Presse, 2009). A month later, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband stated that “there is no evidence that has been shown publicly or privately of any threat to the Pakistani nuclear facilities” (Reuters, 2009). The complex relationships between Islamist sympathisers in the Pakistani establishment and Al Qaeda makes a judgement on such a subject difficult, which helps to foster the fears held by Riedel and others.
There are three inherent limitations on this discussion. Firstly, the fact that the wider conflict is still ongoing means there is a lack of academic literature, which will have to be supplemented with the author’s analysis using a range of news sources and analysis by high-ranking politicians, academics, intelligence officers, and various experts. It is not possible to analyse the conflict with the benefit of hindsight, which is central to the conventional analysis of how well a military campaign has gone. Furthermore, the fog of war is likely to cloud the judgement of many of these correspondents and analysts. The media reports themselves are not as reliable as they could be since Pakistan barred foreigners from the tribal areas, and local journalists have recently been forced out by both the Taliban and the central government (Shakir & Rupert, 2009).

The criteria by which Pakistan’s counter insurgency operations will be examined have been extracted from the Counterinsurgency Field Manual published by the US Army and Marine Corps in 2007. This contains eight key historical principles, each supported by general theory, and each of which must be adhered to by Pakistan if it is to successfully defeat the insurgency. The discussion will concentrate on the nature of these principles, the extent to which Pakistan has acted in accordance with them, and the extent to which Pakistan can improve in this regard. This particular work has been chosen because, whilst the US has not been historically successful at counterinsurgency operations in practice, it has been successful in providing sound theoretical doctrine. The weakness of US COIN operations lies in its prevailing ‘trigger-happy’ military culture, evidenced in the current Iraq War, which alienates the populace. The role of armchair strategist will not be assumed and an attempt to provide a step by step playbook the Pakistani army will not be made, rather discussion will focus on the application of general principles which should be abided by if the government is to be successful. These principles are namely maintaining legitimacy, overall unity, taking political factors into account, awareness of the environment, the need for intelligence, isolation of the insurgents, maintaining the rule of law, and long term commitment by the COIN operators.

**Legitimacy**

The most important principle Pakistan must abide by if it is to be successful in its counterinsurgency operations in South Waziristan is to gain and maintain a sense of legitimacy among the population, while at the same time delegitimising the insurgents. This ‘hearts and minds’ approach is central because the population is the centre of gravity in counterinsurgency operations. COIN operators will face a population where a minority of people actively support the cause of the insurgents, while a minority support the government. The government must gain the support of the passive majority of the populace who do not proactively support either side if they are to defeat the insurgents (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.35). Insurgents rely on public support for the continual replenishment of resources it needs to survive, such as weaponry and finances. The power of the insurgents will wane if the COIN operators can convince the public not to support them, and instead support the central government. Public support in turn would lead to other benefits, such as low level intelligence and manpower. A sense of legitimacy is especially important with the population of South Waziristan because the central government has failed to provide them with any meaningful services previously. Furthermore, much of the population has had to temporarily flee their homes numerous times in the last few years when army operations went ahead, to return only after unstable ‘peace’ deals were implemented.
Efforts to gain the support of the local population have largely failed. According to polls by Pakistani-based NGOs, the people of FATA, while dissatisfied with their current arrangement, do not want to integrate with mainstream Pakistan. Only 3.2% respondents would like to retain the Frontier Crimes Regulation system of law and order, while 31% want it abolished. Forty percent would like to see it amended rather than abolished. Regarding the adoption of the federal justice system, only 12.8% supported it, while 45% wanted sharia law, and 36% favoured the traditional tribal-assembly system (Synnott, 2009, p.117).

Part of the reason for this alienation has been because of the Pakistani military’s cultural emphasis on kinetic, fire-based, approaches at the expense of protecting the population. The army launches punitive kinetic raids in response to incidents or information because of its “lack of manoeuvre reserve”. This information is usually wrong because there is little small-unit patrolling. The result is that kinetic action often leads to collateral damage, in turn alienating the population (Kilcullen, 2009, p.242).

Efforts at legitimisation were in part damaged by CIA drone attacks in FATA. While they were successful at killing high-ranking Taliban members, a quarter of the deaths caused by drone attacks have been civilian (Bergen, P. & Tiedemann, 2009). The attacks are especially significant to the Pakistani population as, according to the Pew Research Center, “64% of the public regard the US as an enemy, while only 9% describe it as a partner” (Pew Research Center, 2009, p.20). In respect to the drone attacks, those of the 32% of the public are aware of them see them as unnecessary and in an overwhelmingly negative light (Pew Research Center, p.12, 2009). Despite this, the population of South Waziristan generally agree with the cause of the COIN operators. Khadim Hussein, at the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy found that most people in FATA dislike the ideology of the Taliban and support action against the insurgents (Khan & Brulliard, 2009). COIN expert David Kilcullen argues that such attacks encourage a “siege mentality” among the population. This is especially important as the attacks’ effects on popular opinion are not limited to Waziristan, rather, which in turn exacerbates anti-US sentiments. Kilcullen argued that “the persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory offends people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and contributes to Pakistan’s instability” and thus are counterproductive to COIN efforts (Kilcullen & Exum, 2009).

Pakistan could counter negative reaction to its proposed systems of governance by firstly, scrapping the hugely unpopular Frontier Crimes Regulation system. In its place a system should be put in which has a mix of a tribal-assembly system and limited sharia law, but with strict central governmental oversight. The form of sharia law will also have to be in line with cultural norms to ensure its popularity. However it should also guarantee basic rights, especially for women and education. The type of sharia law that could be implemented could possibly reflect General Zia Ul-Haq’s system, where it was evident in spirit but not in practice, thus limiting any international criticism. This system would keep international opinion on their side, as well as being able to have the moral high ground over the Taliban’s brutal interpretation of sharia law. Regarding Pakistan’s emphasis on kinetic methods, the army should completely change its culture to reflect the importance of protecting the population in counterinsurgency operations, particularly emphasising the potential to exploit the insurgent’s culture which encourages brashness in military operations, rather than more covert ways of fighting.

The government could also improve its perceived legitimacy among the population by acquiring drone technology and using it simultaneously with this new military culture. The
delegitimizing force of the current state of events stems in part from a foreign actor, which is negatively viewed in its own right, killing an intolerable number of civilians. If Pakistan were to acquire drone technology it could offset such delegitimizing forces. The CIA could still have a part in such operations because of its superior intelligence gathering ability on high ranking Taliban members, but they would continue to be discreet partners only. Pakistan has asked for such technology from the US on numerous occasions, but the American’s policy on the matter is still to keep quiet about the entire policy (CNN, 2009). The Pakistani government should take this matter to the highest levels of the US government and apply intense diplomatic pressure to hand over the technology, stressing these improvements to counterinsurgency operations and the long-term benefit it would have to US forces in Afghanistan.

Unity

In regard to unity of effort, this needs to be present at all levels for an effective COIN operation. All parties involved, whether civilian, diplomatic or military, of all levels should be aiming for the same outcome. This is critical as otherwise insurgents can take advantage of vulnerabilities created by uncoordinated COIN action (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.39). All instruments of national power should be synchronised in executing a comprehensive strategic plan to meet the needs of the population, which in turn would breed legitimacy which is central to decreasing support for the insurgents. COIN operations come from many backgrounds in this conflict - police, military, diplomats, NGOs, tribal and religious leaders, US politicians, American and Pakistani intelligence etc. They all have different roles to play, but their overall objective should be the same, namely legitimising the government and delegitimizing the insurgents. The ultimate aim of unity of command is for security forces to take effective control while attaining and maintaining the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.56). None-military COIN battles are done in two realms; firstly, providing effective infrastructure which contributes to quality of life such as security and basic utilities; and secondly the battle of ideas. Religious leaders have an important role to play in this conflict because the Taliban rely on religious doctrine as a rallying point and to justify their actions. The voices of anti-Taliban leaders should be amplified to counter insurgent propaganda.

In practice, Pakistan has been disunited in two main areas. Firstly, there still remain cleavages between what the US government is trying to achieve and the sympathies and actions of the ISI. According to US Army Gen. McChrystal, the ISI has been aiding insurgents groups in a bid to destabilise the Afghan government (McChrystal, 2009, p.2-10). The ISI is doing this primarily to provide a line of defence against the Afghan government, which they believe is profoundly anti-Pakistan (Rashid, 2008, p.221). According to Ahmed Rashid, the ISI in 2002 developed a two-track policy of protecting the [Afghan Taliban] while handing over Al Qaeda Arabs to the United States” to keep American support (Rashid, 2008, p.220). The ISI’s support for the Afghan Taliban likely continues to this day, evident by US intelligence accusations that they helped the leader of the Afghanistan Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar, flee from the tribal areas to Karachi (Lake et al, 2009). In particular Pakistan has been reluctant to tackle the Haqqani network based in North Waziristan, who aim to control areas of South East Afghanistan and continue to attack NATO forces. Rashid argues that the ISI gave refuge to prominent Afghan Taliban leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani in the area where he rebuilt his network on both sides of the border (Rashid, 2008, p.221). One Haqqani commander has claimed that every major attack in Afghanistan "is planned in detail with the ISI in camps in Waziristan” (Gopal, 2009). This affects COIN operations in Waziristan in that the public perception is that the state is not fully
committed to the local populace, rather they perceive themselves to be pawns in long-term geopolitics.

Secondly, the Pakistani army has been under resourced, and so effective military tactics have been limited. There was an equipment shortage after the first phase of Operation Rah-E-Nijat in mid-August 2009 which resulted in the postponement of the operation for two months. They could have taken advantage of the killing of Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 to keep up pressure against the Pakistani Taliban. This could have been especially significant because the infighting reported between would-be successors to Baitullah among high ranking Pakistani Taliban could have been exploited by the army (MacSwan, 2009). The situation the army faced in conducting the second phase was a relatively united insurgency lead by an even more callous leader, Hakimullah Mehsud.

The problem of the ISI’s links to militant organisations can be alleviated by a two pronged policy of NATO making it very clear that they will not pull of Afghanistan until they have helped foster an environment where the Afghan government can maintain order and provide an environment that will not be threatening to surrounding countries. The Pakistani government should reform the ISI and the army, making it clear that the Pakistani Taliban are an existential threat to the country, and that aiding them is against the interests of Pakistan. The fact that the Taliban have attacked ISI and military headquarters in the past should be emphasised. There may already shifts in ISI support over the last few years. According to US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, regarding the relationship between the US and the ISI, he said in September 2009 “I believe we are in the same trench, working for the same goal” (Agence France-Presse, 2009). The government should also seek further military aid, stressing the importance of the Waziristan campaign is to regional stability and international terrorism. Countries such as the US have been helpful, in particular in terms of both military and economic aid, and so other NATO countries should be pressured for aid.

**Political factors**

In regard to political factors, they are important because they can affect how the counterinsurgents are seen in terms of legitimacy. As Clausewitz pointed out, the military and political aspects are inseparable. Thus “political objectives must guide the military approach” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.40). The Pakistani army must question how military operations contribute to the legitimacy of the central government. Military action should be an arm of overall government policy, so political leaders and diplomats should be involved with the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of COIN operations (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.40). A political solution is necessary for the defeat of an insurgency; therefore it is imperative that COIN operations do not obstruct political goals.

Similarly geopolitics and COIN success are inseparable. All instruments of national power should be synchronised so COIN operations will not be negatively affected. All policy should aim to strengthen the COIN operators’ position in terms of legitimacy. Regional politics affects the COIN operations both directly and indirectly. Insurgents may be supported by other actors directly with arms, funding, training etc. They may also receive indirect support from fraudulent charities, or given intelligence from hostile nations or groups. The biggest geopolitical challenge Pakistan faces is its long term rivalry with India. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been aiming to exploit this by instigating a war between the two, creating an environment where Pakistan’s attention is focused elsewhere, giving the Taliban insurgency room to breathe. This
seemed to be the motive behind a Taliban attack in Pakistani controlled Kashmir in June 2009 which killed two soldiers. An attack in such a strategically and politically sensitive area a week after the first phase of Operation Rah-E-Nijat may have been an attempt to focus COIN operations in South Waziristan elsewhere (Associated Press, 2009).

Both countries have also accused the other of supporting hostile sub-state actors. Specifically, Pakistani chief army spokesman, Major Gen Athar Abbas claimed that Pakistani troops had recovered "Indian arms, ammunition, literature and medical equipment" from Sherwangi, a key militant base, a claim India denied (BBC News, 2009, India denies assisting militants). In addition, high ranking commanders of the Pakistani Taliban apparently confessed in September 2009 that they had received training, funding, and weaponry by Indian and Afghan security services to use against Pakistani security services (Dawn, 2009). Ahmed Rashid insinuates that a Talibanised FATA was deliberately fostered by the ISI which aimed to "keep pressure on the Karzai government to bend to Pakistani wishes, keep US forces under threat while maintaining their dependence on Pakistani goodwill, and create a buffer zone between Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns". In this view the Taliban would pose a threat to Afghanistan and the US, but Pakistan would be in control of them (Rashid, 2008, p.269).

Indian officials have accused Pakistan of supporting terrorist groups such as Lashkar-E-Taiba who wish to attack India in Kashmir and inside India. Former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel argues Pakistan has been reluctant to shut down Lashkar-E-Taiba for the same reason they have been unwilling to go after the Haqqani network- because they see the group as a strategic asset (MacDonald, Can Pakistan take on the Lashkar-e-Taiban?, 2009). They have also accused Pakistan of offering captured Taliban the option of fighting Indian forces in Kashmir as an alternative to jail in a bid to reassert the Kashmir issue on the international stage (Nelson, 2009). This may have some truth to it as Pakistan has done similar in the past. In the early nineties the ISI trained and funded muhajideen to move into Indian-administered Kashmir and stimulate the insurgency in Kashmir (Synnott, 2009, p.33).

Similarly, there is a fear that Al Qaeda is trying to provoke a war between India and Pakistan to further destabilise the country. Relations between India and Pakistan after the 2008 Mumbai attacks have been at their lowest since 2002. Angry at Pakistan’s refusal to act against Lashkar-E-Taiba, India had cut off all diplomatic relations with Pakistan, and even went as far as to suggest it may retaliate against Pakistan should an attack of similar magnitude happen against India. The potential for exploitation by terrorist groups was articulated by Robert Gates when he said "When [Pakistan] can't guarantee there will be no attacks in their own country, they can't guarantee India won't be attacked" (MacDonald, Qaeda may try to provoke India-Pakistan conflict, 2009). All of these allegations affect COIN operations in South Waziristan in that it breeds mistrust among the population concerning the true intentions of the state, leaving room for insurgents to exploit.

Cleavages between the Afghan security services and Pakistani security services stem from mistrust over long-term US intentions in the region. Again the US must make it clear that it is committed to the long-term stability of Afghanistan before US forces are pulled out. The US should cement such commitment with long term investment plans. Talk in the US of a timetable for withdrawal for domestic political gain will only make relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India more unstable. Only after such a change in approach by the US will the ISI see severing its links with militant groups as a viable option. In regards to India, the Kashmir issue has been central to mistrust and hostility between the states. India has stated that it will
only resume peace talks on the issue after Pakistan has taken real action against Lashkar-E-Taiba (Al Jazeera, 2009, India: Pakistan peace talks on hold). This should be done as soon as possible if the people of Pakistan, and especially Waziristan, see the government is serious about long-term regional stability. The use of sub-state actors such as Lashkar-E-Taiba has proved to be counterproductive by the very fact that India has implied it may attack Pakistan if it suffers a similar assault to the Mumbai attacks in 2008. The government should pressure the ISI to dismantle them as their asset worth is questionable, assuming they still have any control over such groups. Similarly they should cease supporting sub-state actors against India because of the potential for blowback. They do not act as a deterrent rather they increase instability and the likelihood of a pre-emptive strike by India. In regards to Al Qaeda, Pakistan should enhance its cooperation with India in terms of intelligence on this particular group. Al Qaeda is a common threat to both states, and it is in their interests that the organisation is eliminated. Only then will India be comfortable in other areas of cooperation and thus help foster long-term stability between the states.

Environment

In regard to the environment, it must be taken into account in conducting successful COIN operations, both in terms of geography and sociology. Insurgents offset their relative weakness by the shrewd use of the physical landscape. The military would face a great challenge in South Waziristan because of its physical landscape. According to Ahmed Rashid, the area is characterised by high mountains and thick forests. It thus provides an ideal hideout for militants to retreat, especially in the many valleys which are “virtually inaccessible, except along steep winding paths that require the agility of mountain climbers” and therefore easy to defend against conventional military forces (Rashid, 2008, p.268). The limited road network in Waziristan adds another dimension of difficulty for the military. Local knowledge by the insurgents means they can predict routes with relative ease and ambush convoys more easily. Cooperation with the CIA’s intelligence gathering abilities is necessary to observe the Taliban, their supply routes and activities which will build up a picture of how they behave, thus giving the COIN operators opportunities to exploit. They should also concentrate on blocking potential exit routes for the Taliban to other areas in Pakistan. Fearing defeat, the militants may retreat in space only to regroup and reorganise. COIN operators have to be careful not to try to take on more than they can handle - control of land must reflect capabilities. The military must spread out manpower efficiently as it cannot control the entire state at present, so all strategic campaigns must reflect this. The military for example cannot have a huge military presence in both the Swat region and South Waziristan.

The local culture must also be thoroughly understood so that operations can be conducted without negatively affecting the perceived legitimacy of the COIN operators. Insurgents often hold a distinctive advantage over COIN operators in their specialised local knowledge. The Pakistani Taliban speaks the Pashtun language whereas those in the army are more likely to speak Punjabi. In response the army must also fully immerse themselves into the local population but as distinct members of the government. This should be used in conjunction with a promise of long-term commitment which would build up an atmosphere of mutual trust between the COIN operators and the population. This breeds legitimacy and is also important in low-level intelligence gathering.
They have had success and failure in terms of utilising the environment. They were successful to a degree at countering the Taliban stealth tactics by using jets to soften up militant bases, especially a week before the official ground campaign, in a bid to drive them out into the open. This was aimed to counter the asymmetric advantage the Taliban had by forcing them into situations which resembled conventional warfare. They were also successful in juggling time and space effectively by only starting a ground campaign in South Waziristan after securing the Swat Valley, thus not “biting off more than they could chew”, as the Daniel Markey at the Council on Foreign Relations feared (Rupert, 2009). This positively affected COIN operations in that it showed an encouraging amount of tactical ingenuity of the army, and thus they will be viewed more positively in respect to their capabilities.

However, they did not pursue militants into their mountainous hideouts, rather they advanced “along the main roads and not up into the side valleys” according to ex-army brigadier Javed Hussain. The army did not attempt to engage with militants in two key areas, both of which were forested mountain ranges. The first was an area west of Sararogha that includes the Asman Manza valley, while the other was the Shawal range, near the Afghan border, which had peaks exceeding 3,700 meters (Shakir & Rupert, 2009). According to the official army press releases from the time, they managed to secure the Asman Manza on October 29th (ISPR, 29 October Press Release, 2009), and the area south to it three days later (ISPR, 1 November Press Release, 2009). However there is no mention of any attempt to secure the area west to it. Similarly, the ISPR makes no mention of any attempt to secure the Shawal range. The thick forestry and mountainous range in these two areas makes ground operations practically impossible. The very high peaks and limited road system made it difficult for soldiers to even reach these areas, let alone dominate them against a skilled asymmetric opponent. While the army claimed to have dropped soldiers in the area to protect the advances, Javed Hussain claims they were too small in number to stand a chance against regrouping Taliban (Shakir & Rupert, 2009). This will affect COIN operations in that the Taliban may be encouraged by the success of utilising mountainous regions as an unreachable base.

In response to this, the Pakistani army should train soldiers in basic COIN strategy as well as investing in specialised training of units for exactly the types of guerrilla operations needed to flush out militants from thick forestry and mountainous regions. This will decrease the asymmetric advantage, and the added benefits of superior intelligence from the US and resources will give such a unit an advantage. It will be well worth the effort since, as Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq said, this will be a “long war” (Shakir & Rupert, 2009). If this is implemented, future operations will not be limited by mountainous regions to the extent witnessed here. It will still be hard to manoeuvre but the tactic of dropping specialized units will even the playing field. This will improve overall COIN operations because the government would be seen as effective and competent.

**Intelligence**

In regard to *intelligence*, COIN operations are dependent on timely, accurate intelligence gathered at the lowest possible level (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.41). A cycle arises, where good intelligence allows COIN operators to drive later operations. COIN operators have an advantage over insurgents because their intelligence sources come from diverse sources, while the resources of insurgents are limited. Sources at the lowest possible chain of command, and indeed the population generally hold more weight than specialised assets because they are
less likely to hold political biases. Analysing the population is of the utmost importance because it effects military operations and thus how the COIN operators are perceived. In particular, society, social structures, culture, language, authority, and group interests should be concentrated on (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.84). All intelligence assets should be levied, including intelligence from foreign services and open-source intelligence to maintain the advantage of diverse sources.

Intelligence generally focuses on understanding the environment, particularly on the population and the insurgents in order for the government to address issues which affect the driving force behind the insurgency (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.79). Both insurgents and COIN operators try to protect and expand intelligence networks while trying to destabilise that of the others. Intelligence is inherently linked to perceived legitimacy in that the population will be more willing to share information if they see the COIN operators as legitimate. Sharing of information by the population will be facilitated if the population is confident that they will be protected for their services and not be victim to insurgent reprisal. Hence maintaining a certain level of security is vital for low-level intelligence gathering.

A thorough mission analysis should take place before any military operation. This happens in four steps. Firstly, the government should define the operational environment. Secondly, the effects this will have on operations should be described. Thirdly, the threat that emanates from the environment should be evaluated. Fourthly, courses of actions should be determined to counter this threat (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.81). This involves evaluating the population, the insurgents, and the physical environment and aims to reduce the insurgent advantage of the element of surprise. Success in Operation Rah-E-Nijat relied heavily on the CIA providing intelligence for the Pakistani army which filled a gap in Pakistan’s spy arsenal. They provided surveillance from drones, though there is no evidence to show the drones employed their offensive capacities (Barnes & Miller, 2009). The US was also successful in pinpointing and eliminating high-level Taliban leaders using drones, most notably both Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud.

The COIN operators may also have been successful in convincing close associates of the Pakistani Taliban to give information to the authorities on the whereabouts of wanted Taliban leaders. In particular, after the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban detained Mehsud's father-in-law, Ikramuddin Mehsud, his son Akram Gul, one of his brothers and a nephew, Iqbal Mehsud, who the Taliban accused of informing the authorities of Baitullah Mehsud’s whereabouts (Bitani, 2009). The BBC reported that Akram Gul and Iqbal Mehsud were later killed by the Taliban. Iqbal in particular was a very close associate of Baitullah. He acted as his envoy when negotiating peace deals and the release of militants with the government. He was reportedly tortured to death though the Taliban denied this and said he died of heart failure (BBC News, Taliban 'kill' Mehsud relatives, 2009). If indeed he and Akram Gul were informers, it indicates that the intelligence capacities of the COIN operators can reach the highest level of the insurgents’ command structure.

The Pakistani and US intelligence services could improve their intelligence gathering abilities through greater cooperation. The Pakistanis have accused the CIA of not sharing intelligence on Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in the Baluchistan region, which has seen a separatist movement in favour of an independent state (Carter, 2009). Baluchi separatists could well be working with those groups, having a common enemy in the form of the Pakistani state. The CIA is probably unwilling to share such information as they believe the ISI will help the
Afghan Taliban in their insurgency in Afghanistan. However, 2009 saw a growing sense of mutual trust between the two groups. As both parties continue to synergise their aims in the region, intelligence cooperation is likely to increase. This will effect COIN operations positively as better intelligence breeds better execution of military operations and legitimacy among the population.

**Isolation**

In regard to *isolation*, it is important in conducting COIN to reduce the insurgents’ power. This is more effective than kinetic methods, though killing insurgents will still be necessary. However over-reliance on kinetic methods is counterproductive. It can generate cycles of revenge and sympathy for the insurgents, especially in the context of Pashtun culture which embraces the notion of revenge. Furthermore the Taliban will hold the deaths of militants as martyrs and use that for propaganda purposes to rally around a notion that Islam itself is being attacked by ‘Crusaders’, or a government allied with ‘Crusaders’. The Taliban will be able to replace militant losses quickly, and so COIN operators will need to cut resources off from the militants using all instruments of national power. Isolation of the Taliban can be done in three main ways. First, they can be physically isolated from food supplies, shelter, and weaponry. Secondly they can be financially isolated from their sources of funds. Thirdly, they can be socially isolated. As the COIN efforts to increase its legitimacy gains ground by infrastructure construction and other measures, the Taliban will be increasingly marginalised by society. However the insurgency will only be successful if the insurgents are marginalised in the long term. It needs to be ingrained in the public psyche that they are better off under the central government than the Pakistani Taliban.

The COIN operators generally failed in regard to physical isolation. They could not control the availability of food without negatively impacting the population as prices would rise. This would affect their quality of life and act as a delegitimizing force. Also, the Taliban have the ability to be self-sufficient in their food supply, just as the locals are. It may not be possible to isolate the Taliban from shelter, even though the operation was timed so that the winter temperatures forced them out of their hiding places, the lack of security allowed them to commandeer used or unused housing, in turn giving then civilian cover. Isolating the insurgents from shelter can only be done after the operation as basic security would not allow them to take advantage of local housing. They were also unable to isolate the insurgents from their weapons supply. The wider region is awash with readily available weaponry from small pistols to anti-aircraft guns, with little government regulation. Efforts to regulate gun supplies will be seen as governmental interference in Pashtun culture, and thus will act as a delegitimizing force.

The COIN operators also failed in regard to financial isolation. Islamabad-based journalist Tahir Khan has argued that the main sources of Taliban funding are “donations from local and foreign sympathisers, hijacking of NATO trucks, high-profile kidnappings and funds sent by those Jihadists living abroad or running their businesses in Pakistan” (Jan, 2010). Police services around the country are not up to the standard needed to counter these activities. The government also has not closed links to Dubai banks which have an informal money transfer system known as *Hawala* which sympathisers use to give to the Taliban.

The Pakistani government failed to counter the threat of Islamic extremism. According to Ahmed Rashid, “it made no attempt to contain the inflammatory jihadi literature that flooded the country after 9/11” (Rashid, 2008, p.227). Indeed the education system is itself vulnerable to
Taliban indoctrination. A report by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute claims that for the last two decades the public school system institutionally promotes ideals that are contrary to a progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan (Nayyar & Salim, 2003). Chairman of Islamabad-based Quaid-I-Azam University, Pervez Hoodbhoy, argues that “Pakistani schools, and not just madrassas, are churning out fiery zealots, fuelled with a passion for jihad and martyrdom” (Hoodbhoy, 2004). Those who are illiterate are even more at risk from Taliban indoctrination, especially in FATA where male literacy is 29.5%, compared to the national average of 54.8% and female literacy is only 3% percent compared to the national average of 32 percent (FATA Government, 2003).

Pakistan could improve their isolation efforts by working with the Dubai authorities to track sources of funding to the Pakistani Taliban. The CIA can offer considerable help in tracking the money flow out of Dubai. Furthermore, the ISI should be investigated to find any evidence that they have directed funds towards the Pakistani Taliban, as they have done with the Afghan Taliban. The government should put far more effort into promoting religious authorities who reject terrorism and extremism. In particular they should take advantage of the country’s historic links with the moderate Berelvi school of Islam, while rejecting the foreign Deobandi movement which the Taliban and their supporters have embraced. They should also implement National Education Policy 2009 proposals of an “increase on spending on education to 7% of GDP; an increase in public-private partnerships; introducing subjects taught in regular schools in madrassas; increasing teacher training, enact curriculum reform, and improve teaching aid materials; and introducing food-based incentives to increase enrolment and improve retention, especially for girls” (Ministry of Education, 2009, p.13).

Security Under The Rule Of Law

In regard to security under the rule of law, COIN operators should promote an environment where security is established and the rule of law is respected. Security is important to COIN because it is necessary for the introduction and maintaining of permanent infrastructure. If this secure environment does not exist “no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.42). COIN operators can maintain legitimacy by transferring the environment from intermediate security under the military to local police forces, court systems and penal facilities as quickly as feasible. The resultant environment is that where the insurgents are perceived to be criminals, the implication being that the insurgents are illegitimate, thus losing local support. The introduction of such a system can only happen when a basic level of security has been established. The transition to police forces should not be done unless and until the police force can effectively maintain order. Also, the government will only be seen as legitimate if the established law is in line with local culture. The populace will not accept a legal system that goes against their identity. In such a case the government will stall to increase perceived legitimacy and the insurgents can use the unpopular legal system as an ideological rally point for own support.

Illegitimate violence is that perpetrated by those not in the armed forces or police, and is defined in line with constitutional agreements. These include actions by those in the government, be that of the police, military etc. And include “unjustified or excessive use of force, unlawful detention, torture, and punishment without trial” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.42). This is imperative because word of extrajudicial violence spreads quickly among the population and delegitimizes the COIN operators and is thus inherently self defeating, even against
insurgents whose entire method of operating shows a disregard for common values. The use of Lashkars (local tribesman) by the government against the Taliban in this particular campaign should only serve short term utility if the government is going to have a long term monopoly on the use of violence.

The two biggest failures in Pakistan in relation to security under the rule of law have been in respect of probable extrajudicial killings and excessive interrogation techniques. In August 2009 an NGO, the Humans Rights Commission of Pakistan, claimed that there were credible reports of extrajudicial killings by the army (Perlez & Shah, 2009). The government claimed that those doing the killing were locals settling scores with Taliban. In addition, a video surfaced from the Swat Valley showed soldiers brutally abusing local Taliban suspects (BBC News, 2009, Video shows Pakistan army 'abuse'). It represented a wider culture in the army which condones corporal punishment and intimidation in search for intelligence or to create an atmosphere of fear. Importantly, such abuse is most likely happening again and at a worse rate in Waziristan. This culture is unlikely to have changed, and recent attacks on military bases have only increased frustration against the Taliban, which would make such behaviour more tolerable. There has been no evidence in the public sphere that the army has attempted to modify this culture.

However, Pakistan took a large positive step June 2009 where Prime Minister Gilani respected the notion that the rule of law must be upheld by ruling out negotiations with the Taliban, which had the effect of delegitimizing them (Tighe & Sharif, 2009). It divorced the notion that the Taliban are fighting for commendable religious interests to engaging in criminal, and thus inherently illegitimate, behaviour.

The government could tackle the problem of an abusive military culture by providing better training, with the help of US, and by using harsher punitive measures for those found to be acting unlawfully. They could employ a carrot/stick approach to do this; regiments which are the most successful in keeping and maintaining legitimacy should be financially rewarded to decrease corruption motivated by financial gain, while those who are found to be acting unlawfully should be held accountable with the full force of the law. While the army is under resourced, such financial incentives would prove to be more attractive in the long-term because they will breed better COIN results, and thus the army would spend less time and money on the battlefield.

Long-Term Commitment

In respect to long term commitment, this is the notion that the COIN operators must be willing to invest time and resources over a long period, many years or even decades for COIN success. This is necessary because insurgencies are by their very nature protracted (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007, p.43). Even in the situation where the population support the government and are hostile to the ideology of the insurgents, this can be reversed if they are not convinced that the counterinsurgents have the will and means to maintain COIN operations over a long period, and may revert their support to the insurgency for the sake of self preservation. A long term commitment can be evidenced by the constant renewing of support and maintaining of infrastructure. The population of South Waziristan were in October 2009 sceptical of the long term commitment by the central government. As director of the FATA Research Center in Islamabad, Saifullah Mehsud, said “They [the Waziris] will only rise against the Taliban when they are convinced the government means business...but they have never been convinced” (Khan & Brulliard, 2009). Indeed infrastructure building between 2002 and 2007 in
this region left much to be desired. In this time 96% of US funding into FATA focussed on military efforts while only 1% focused on development assistance (US Government Accountability Office, 2008, p.12).

COIN victory in Waziristan will fundamentally depend on the West’s commitment to the war in Afghanistan. Since 2002 Pakistan has been preparing for a worst case scenario where NATO forces pull out of Afghanistan citing lack of progress and an intolerable number of troop deaths. Pakistan will then be vulnerable on its western flank as the Afghan Taliban may turn against Pakistan, citing its campaigns against the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani intelligence and the military most likely recognise this, and thus they will need assurance by NATO that they are willing to invest the necessary time and resources to complete their objectives in Afghanistan if they are to fully cut off strategic alliances with the Taliban and attempt to isolate them. In the case that NATO affirms its long term presence in Afghanistan, the protracted battle against the insurgents in the tribal regions of Pakistan will only be successful if the US affirms its long-term military and economic aid, which Pakistan relies on for success. The issue of Kashmir is also important. Part of the reason why the Taliban were able to grow to its current strength is was because of the misuse of aid. President Musharraf diverted aid intended for countering insurgents to buying weapons to counter the threat of India (Walsh, 2008), which is partly based on the unresolved issue over Kashmir.

Pakistan and the US have had some positive results in the area of evidencing long-term commitment. Firstly, the US has gone to a considerable length to affirm its long term commitment to Pakistan. This has been especially prevalent after the US linked victory in Afghanistan to Pakistani victory in the tribal regions. In September 2009 at a Friends of Democratic Pakistan conference, “the World Bank and Pakistan's government announced a new donor trust fund to help restore infrastructure and services to areas where the government has recently fought militants” (Mohammed, 2009). Such actions create an environment where US support helps Pakistan gain ground against the insurgency, which allows for breathing room to shift focus from military operations to building up infrastructure. This has an effect on public opinion in Waziristan which legitimises the COIN operators over the insurgents because they have taken the first steps toward long term investment in the area. Also, the passing of the Kerry-Lugar bill according to the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry, will help “forge a new long-term relationship between the people of America and Pakistan” by tripling non-military aid to $1.5 billion a year for the next five years, with a Congressional recommendation that it is spent on building infrastructure, thus improving perceived legitimacy in South Waziristan (Dawn, 2009).

Secondly, the efforts to allow mainstream parties to operate in FATA have been a positive move that will reinforce the image of a long-term commitment. They are designed to integrate the tribal regions into mainstream Pakistan. Spokesman for President Zardari, Farhatullah Babar, said that "this breaks the monopoly of clerics to play politics from the pulpit of the mosque to the exclusion of major secular political parties" (BBC News, 2009, Pakistan to reform tribal areas). They will now be allowed to campaign there and will be included in the 2013 general election.

However, the Pakistani government has failed to announce any genuine long-term plan for FATA. In 2006 it released the FATA Sustained Development Plan which says the government will invest over $2 billion into the region until 2015. However Ahmed Rashid sees this plan as disingenuous. He argues that any long-term infrastructure building will be useless.
until the political status of FATA is changed, there is more political choice for the population, and FATA is integrated into mainstream Pakistan (Rashid, 2008, p.273).

The issue of Kashmir also still needs to be resolved. It is important because two of three major wars between the two countries have been over Kashmir. India and Pakistan need to work together to find a solution to this problem so that Pakistan can concentrate on defeating Taliban militants. The first obstacle towards resolving the dispute is Pakistan’s inaction over Lashkar-E-Taiba. India has been frustrated at the slow progress Pakistan has shown in cracking down on the organisation, and similar organisation, which pose a real threat to Indian security. Pakistan needs to cut-off what ties it has to that organisation to the extent these links still exist if they want to bring India to the negotiation table.

**Conclusion**

The importance of this conflict cannot be underestimated. Both NATO and the Pakistani government rely on success in defeating this insurgency as key to long term stability. This conflict will require long-term attention from the government. The Pakistani Taliban will not be defeated through brute force, rather nothing less than a complete overhaul in how the army approaches modern warfare and a commitment to civil development will result in success. This new threat to Pakistani security does not come from India, the source of its threats historically, but from those closer to home who threatens the very fabric of the country. It is clear that the Pakistani army has a deep determination to defeat the Pakistani Taliban, however it suffers from institutional weaknesses which have hampered its success. Lack of discipline and reliance on kinetic methods has isolated them from the population while COIN doctrine emphasizes the need for the complete opposite. Such weaknesses are likely to manifest themselves in future military campaigns. Likewise the CIA is also delusional if they believe success in the region will come from killing militants at the expense of protecting the population. Pakistan will need to undertake huge institutional reforms to counter a new kind of enemy. However the clear disunity between long-term interests of Pakistani and American attitudes towards Afghanistan seems unfixable.

The most critical factor that has yet to be addressed is the extent to which NATO will eventually be successful in Afghanistan as this intrinsically connected to the Pakistani Taliban’s hostility towards the central government. The common perception is that Afghanistan is where empires go to die; Pakistan should concentrate on defeating the insurgents now whilst still preparing for the endgame in Afghanistan.

**Bibliography**


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