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A Culture of Inclusion: Defense, Diplomacy, and Development as a Modern American Foreign Policy

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The Foreign policy of the United States is built on the three Ds: defense, diplomacy, and development.

– Secretary of State Hillary Clinton¹

For the United States to be an effective world leader, it must strategically balance all three aspects of its power – defense, diplomacy, and development.

– General (Ret.) Anthony Zinni²

Observers and commentators on modern American foreign policy have consistently identified that collaboration between the elements of national power appear to be punctuated by years of uncoordinated programs and internecine fighting. In the past the U.S. approach (to foreign policy) was a rather messy amalgam of the dominant preoccupations of the Department of Defense, State Department, and USAID, oftentimes in that order. Broadly speaking, the Pentagon views fragile and post-conflict states primarily through the national security prism, as part of a larger counterterrorist and counterinsurgency agenda, with a particular focus on the Muslim world; the State Department is preoccupied with transforming a wider range of weak and war-torn states into effective democracies; and USAID regards state weakness as a developmental challenge to be addressed by working with local actors to create the institutional foundations of good governance and economic growth.³

In response a 3D (defense, diplomacy, and development) approach is a recent concept described by senior U.S. government officials, including the Secretary of Defense in his Landon Lecture at Kansas State University and the then Secretary of State-select in her testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee. This approach highlights the need for an increased focus on

¹Clinton, Hillary, Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/122463.htm>.

² General Zinni, Anthony, USMC (Ret.), Testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on “Strengthening National Security Through Smart Power—A Military Perspective,” March 5, 2008, <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2008/hrg080305a.html>.

³ Patrick, Stewart & Kaysie Brown, “Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing ‘Whole of Government’ Approaches to Fragile States,” International Peace Academy, 2007, pgs. 35-36.

balancing defense, diplomatic, and developmental elements of national power. It provides “a national security tool chest that has been enhanced with a wide variety of capabilities which would flow from the integration of our nation’s soft power.”⁴

It also reflects the reality that today’s complex operations require a more comprehensive, holistic, and integrated approach that “match[es] our military might with a mature diplomatic and development effort worthy of the task ahead.”⁵ This focus is similar to the whole of government approach described in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, which describes the integration of “the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”⁶

However, some areas of the U.S. government view a 3D approach as merely a descriptor for what each department's role and responsibilities are in a conflict and based on how the 3D activities will be funded. For example, activities funded by the Department of Defense (DoD) will be run by DoD, activities funded by the Department of State (DoS) by DoS, and those funded by US Agency for International Development (USAID) run by USAID. However, this is inaccurate; DoD and USAID execute many activities funded through DoS, and DoS, through Section 1207, executes activities funded by DoD. Additionally, the Department of Justice executes activities funded by State and others – it is much more complex than merely funding streams. Indeed, the DoD’s budget alone dwarfs the others, as does their personnel capacity. The disparity in resources and size make it challenging for the State Department, USAID, and the many NGOs to act as equal partners with the DoD. DoD alone has the capacity to take on some ideally non-military tasks, such as: coordinating Tsunami relief efforts or restructuring government, running elections, and rebuilding infrastructure.⁷

A 3D approach is much more broad and inclusive than parochial departmental budgetary issues or simply a whole of government approach. It includes elements outside of the U.S. government, to include partner nations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector companies. “At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach...that integrates the tools of statecraft with military forces, government and NGOs, international partners/organizations, humanitarian organizations, and private sector actors.”⁸ A comprehensive approach, as defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, is one “that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational

⁴ Zinni, Anthony, General (Retired), USMC, Testimony before the United States Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on “Strengthening National Security Through Smart Power – A Military Perspective,” March 5, 2008, <http://foreign.state.gov/hearings/2008/hrg080305a.html>.

⁵ General Zinni, Anthony, USMC (Ret.), Testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on “Strengthening National Security Through Smart Power—A Military Perspective,” March 5, 2008, <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2008/hrg080305a.html>.

⁶ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, October 2008, pg. 1-4.

⁷ Schirch, Lisa and Aaron Kishbaugh, “Leveraging ‘3D’ Security: From Rhetoric to Reality,” *Foreign Policy in Focus Policy Brief* Vol. 11, No. 2, November 15, 2006, pg. 2.

⁸ Multinational Interoperability Council, “The Military Contribution to Stabilisation Operations (Stabilisation Handbook) Version 1.0,” November 30, 2009, pg. 9.

partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”⁹ As opposed to viewing each “D” as a narrow element of national power or a specific departmental function, a 3D approach should be viewed as offering a foundation for the development of strategies and priorities for U.S. engagement that effectively leverage all relevant U.S. capabilities.

Stabilizing a country or region requires an integrated effort of all the actors involved in defense, diplomacy, and development. The new paradigm reflects the reality that today’s complex operations like stabilization, reconstruction, and security sector reform requires a more holistic integrated approach; one that prior concepts like the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) framework could not fully integrate. Its terms like “information” cut across all the others, and “economic” and “military” was too narrow are no longer sufficient to tackle these complex problems.

In a 3D approach, no single effort (or “D”) takes center stage during assessment and planning, as they all influence one another. All three must be used to determine the right approach and support each of the other Ds. The application of all three Ds into a comprehensive approach is particularly relevant to complex operations, such as stabilization operations, where a diverse range of capabilities is required for success. For example, stabilization cannot be created solely through coercive military operations, but rather through the “military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of national power cooperatively helping to provide a secure environment, making and keeping the peace, restoring or developing economic and social structures, and helping to build free and stable political institutions in the parts of the world in which stabilization and post-conflict operations have been ongoing.”¹⁰ A 3D approach is intended to help frame drivers of conflict and how best to address them through the correct balance of resources/activities of each “D.”

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a good example of activities that require a comprehensive/3D approach. SSR, which can be defined as the “set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice,”¹¹ can take place across the spectrum of conflict: as part of peacetime military engagement, during post-conflict rebuilding of state institutions, and in any counterinsurgency or peace support activity. The military instrument of power in SSR is predominantly centered on supporting the security capabilities of vulnerable or failing states, often in peacetime and in stable post-conflict situations. Military activity conducted during or after armed conflict or state failure, primarily focused on ensuring that conditions do not again foment crisis and conflict, may include support for SSR, and may be concurrent with non-military support to other elements of the security sector, such as the judiciary and related civil institutions. During these events it is necessary to maintain the confidence of the local population while generating the capacity of state and civil institutions responsible for security, governance, and the rule of law.

⁹ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008, pg. 1-4, 1-5.

¹⁰ Manwaring, Dr. Max G., “Defense, Development, and Diplomacy (3D): Canadian and U.S. Military Perspectives,” <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=732>

¹¹ Department of the Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 31 October 2009, pg. 486.

Effective SSR programs conducted by the U.S. with partner nations and the host nation government require a comprehensive approach and a shared vision across all agencies, organizations, institutions, and forces contributing to the reform process. SSR is conducted with many agencies and organizations, including those of the U.S. Government, international organizations, NGOs, multinational partners, and the host nation. Holistic programs that consider the contributions of all actors and the connections among organizations, sectors, and individuals increase the chances of success, minimize the impact of unforeseen developments, and ensure the most effective use of scarce resources for these purposes.¹²

Execution of activities like SSR unites all elements of the 3Ds through a comprehensive approach. In order to accomplish this, though, we “must strengthen [the] elements of national power both institutionally and financially, and create the capability to integrate and apply all the elements of national power to problems and challenges abroad...strengthening our capacity to use ‘soft’ power and for better integrating it with ‘hard’ power.”¹³ This has not been, and will not be easy or quick. Solutions must “recognize that defense, diplomacy and development have different objectives, motivations, timelines, and operating structures that may not be compatible, especially in the short-term.”¹⁴ Solutions for this should include:

- The creation of a central coordinating mechanism for whole-of-government collaboration and engagement across the 3 Ds in which each has equal voice.¹⁵
- The use of appropriate terminology: development assistance is in our national interests, but not always required for our national security.¹⁶

One of the most feasible proposed solutions for a coordinating mechanism and funding system that addresses a comprehensive approach to these complex issues is the Shared Responsibility, Pooled Resources (SRPR) concept.¹⁷ This concept, proposed by the DoD in coordination with the DoS, is based on a similar concept developed by the government of the United Kingdom over the past decade.¹⁸ This SRPR concept would be broken into three separate pools of money that would be used for three key foreign policy areas: security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention. To fund the pools the DoD and DoS would request from Congress funding within its budget to contribute to each of them. Field requirements (requiring approval from both

¹² U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense and USAID paper on Security Sector Reform, January 2009.

¹³ Gates, Robert, Secretary of Defense, Landon Lecture at the Kansas State University, November 26, 2007, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>.

¹⁴ The Aspen Institute, “Guiding Principles for effective Development Assistance in a 3-D World,” Consensus Statement from the May 16-17, 2006 Retreat, Global Interdependence Initiative, Wye River Conference Center.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Summarized based on the Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Secretary of Defense, titled “Options for Remodeling Security Sector Assistance Authorities,” dated December 15, 2009. For more information on SRPR and the “dual-key” concept, see Gates, Robert M., “How Others Defense Themselves,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 3, May/June 2010, pgs. 2-6.

¹⁸ This program is known as the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP).

the Chief of Mission and the Combatant Commander) would be identified to both departments and a “dual-key” approval process would determine which requirements get funded by which pools. This pooled approach would continue the successful joint formulation of necessary projects that have occurred under current funding sources (i.e. Sections 1206 and 1207 funding) and include USAID in projects funded by the conflict prevention and stabilization pools. The funding approval process could be similar to the table below:

	Security Capacity Pool	Stabilization Pool	Conflict Prevention Pool
Field-Level Proposal Development	Endorsed by the Chief of Mission and Combatant Commander	Endorsed by the Chief of Mission, USAID Mission Director, and Combatant Commander	Endorsed by the Chief of Mission, USAID Mission Director, and Combatant Commander
DC-Based Staff Support	Single, co-located staff of interagency detailees; Action agency: DoD	Single, co-located staff of interagency detailees; Action agency: DoS	Single, co-located staff of interagency detailees; Action agency: USAID
Senior Steering Group	Reps. from OSD(P), Joint Staff, and State/PM	Reps. from OSD(P), Joint Staff, S/CRS, and USAID	Reps. from OSD(P), Joint Staff, S/CRS, and USAID
Final Approval Authority	Dual-Key (SecDef and SecState)	Dual-Key (SecDef and SecState)	Dual-Key (SecDef and SecState)

This approach should be informed by several principles described by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a recent *Foreign Affairs* article. First, it must be agile and flexible; second, there must be sufficient oversight mechanisms for Congress; third, it must be conducted steadily and over the long term for predictability and planning/programming purposes; fourth, all decisions must reinforce the State Department’s role as the lead agency for U.S. foreign policy; and finally, the approach must always be modest and realistic.¹⁹

Whatever the mechanisms are for a more coordinated approach to resourcing American foreign policy, it should be more substantial than simply a “Whole of Government Approach.” Instead, the 3D approach must take into account actors outside of DoD, DoS, and USAID. Partner nations, NGOs, international organizations, and private security companies are only a few entities that must be included to truly develop a comprehensive and successful foreign policy.

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¹⁹ Gates, Robert M., “How Others Defense Themselves,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 3, May/June 2010, pgs. 2-6.

writer and wrote the Security Sector Reform section of Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations.

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