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## Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

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Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponents' will... Unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part *terra incognita* – still awaiting exploration, and understanding.

--B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (1954)

As countless observers have pointed out, the American-Chinese rivalry in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century bears more than a passing resemblance to the Anglo-German antagonism that led to World War I. In these conditions, it is not surprising if a consensus has emerged, among International Relations (IR) academics, around the proposition that the U.S.-China relation is bound to be the most important bilateral relation in the coming decades.

Yet, the degree of certainty regarding the *salience* of this bilateral relation is only matched by the degree of uncertainty surrounding its *dynamics* and its eventual *outcome*. When it comes to answering the question “Is a conflict inevitable?,” all three IR schools (realism, liberalism, constructivism) hedge their bets by offering both a pessimistic and an optimistic variant – a tacit admission that, on the most burning issue of the day, the predictive value of IR theory is close to nil. (1)

For the outside observer, the most disconcerting aspect of this academic debate is that optimists and pessimists alike share the same unexamined notions of conflict and war, as if “conflict” was a self-explanatory concept, “war” was a trans-historical category. In particular, both proponents and critics of Power Transition Theory (PTT) – the most popular theory about China in academe today - keep arguing about the factors conducive to the initiation, timing, severity, and consequences of “major wars” without giving much thought to either the singularity of Chinese strategic culture or, a fortiori, to three global developments of the past fifty years: the waning of “major wars,” the declining “fungibility” of military force as such and, last but not least, the transformation of “war” itself. (2)

In the military world, by contrast, the defining feature of the present era is precisely the impossibility of coming up with “a coherent concept of war to animate and focus our military efforts” (LTG David Barno, Ret.). Since 9/11, the strategic debate in America has been marked

by a “war over war” and a seemingly endless proliferation of war modifiers: unconventional war, irregular war, asymmetric war, wicked war, criminal war, war of the third kind, non-trinitarian war, new war, counterwar, war amongst the people, three-block war, fourth-generation war, compound war, netwar, insurgency, global guerrilla, econo-jihad, not to mention information warfare, financial warfare, resource warfare, lawfare, cyberwarfare and chaoplexic warfare.

Few strategists, to be sure, are likely to subscribe to British General Rupert Smith’s view that “war no longer exists.”(3) But while conventional, state-on-state, force-on-force, war, is unlikely to disappear any time soon, the fact remains that never before has the concept of War been surrounded with so much “fog and friction.” As Lieutenant General David Barno (USA Ret.) candidly admitted recently:

“In the aftermath of the relative certainty ...of the Cold War, our military today is in a sense operating without a concept of war and is searching desperately for the new “unified field theory” of conflict that will serve to organize and drive military doctrine and tactics, acquisition and research, training and organization, leader development and education, materiel and weaponry, and personnel and promotion policies in ways that could replace the legacy impact that Cold War structures still exert on all facets of the military. Today, no agreed-upon theory of conflict drives all of these critical vectors toward a commonly understood paradigm; the result is a profusion of disparate outlooks leading toward the risk of professional incoherence.” (4)

Lacking a “unified field theory” of war, military analysts in a *status quo* power like America are prone to adopt a “defensive realist” intellectual posture, and settle on a minimalist concept on which an inter-service consensus can be reached, if only by default. For the past three years, the most satisfactory – or least unsatisfactory – organizing concept in the U.S. has been that of Hybrid Threat. (5)

As put forward notably by Colonels Frank Hoffman and Nathan Freier, the concept of Hybrid War is meant to emphasize the convergence of the physical and the psychological dimensions of war, the blurring of the distinctions between conventional and irregular, kinetic and non-kinetic, combatant and non-combatant, and even - in view of what could be called “neo-warlordism” – of the erosion of the once-obvious distinction between organized crime and irregular warfare.

More often than not, though, the conversation on “hybridity” takes place in a geopolitical vacuum, which explains why it has until now been limited to the elaboration of a *grammar of hybrid threats* and has yet to tackle the question of the *logic of hybrid wars*.

By contrast, military strategists in a *revisionist* power like China have proven more inclined to adopt an “offensive realist” intellectual posture, and elaborate a “unified field theory” of war – though one in which, in keeping with Chinese strategic culture, the kinetic dimension is no longer dominant. The most articulate example of such theory to date remains the manifesto published in 1999 by Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui and translated in English under the somewhat misleading title of *Unrestricted Warfare* (Chao Xian Zhan, literally ‘War Beyond Rules’). In a nutshell:

“It is becoming obsolete to automatically consider military action the dominant means and the other means the supporting means in war...Liddell Hart also noted this point. He referred to the approach of selecting the line of least resistance and the direction of action the least expected by the enemy as the “indirect approach.” As the arena of war has expanded, encompassing the political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and psychological spheres, in addition to the land, sea, air, space, and electronics spheres, the interaction among all factors have made it difficult for the military sphere to serve as the automatic dominant sphere in every way. War will be conducted in nonwar [i.e. non-military] spheres...If we want to have victory in future wars, we must be fully prepared intellectually for this scenario, that is, to be ready to carry out a war which, affecting all areas of life of the countries involved, may be conducted in a sphere not dominated by military actions.” (6)

As the quote above ought to make clear, the concept of Unrestricted Warfare is closer to British strategist Liddell Hart’s concept of Grand Strategy than to German strategist Ludendorff’s concept of Total War. Not only do the non-kinetic aspects take precedence over the kinetic dimension, but the *modus operandi* is not all-encompassing *mobilization* so much as variable-geometry *combination*. In addition, while the choice of *means* and *ways* is in theory unrestricted, the *ends* are said to be limited. As our two colonels explicitly warn: “Do not pursue objectives which are unrestricted in time and space.”

Contrary to the catchy subtitle of its English-language translation, then, *Unrestricted Warfare* is not “China’s master plan to destroy America.” All the same, it would be a mistake to reduce it to just an intellectual exercise designed to force Chinese officers to think outside-the-box. Placed in its proper context, *Unrestricted Warfare* is perhaps best defined as the operational code for the kind of “grand strategy on steroids” that befits a rising hegemon, or, alternatively, as a blueprint for “total cold war” in the age of the declining utility of military force. (7)

*Unrestricted Warfare* is an “experimental” work whose institutional significance in China remains the subject of an ongoing debate. Though some observers have argued that Unrestricted Warfare constitutes only one of four competing schools of military thought, a closer examination suggests instead that it actually takes the best of the main three schools and, as such, transcends the divisions between People’s War Traditionalists, Power Projection Neo-Traditionalists, and High-Tech Revolutionists.

As for its influence in civilian circles, not only was the book read at the time by President Jiang Zemin and Defense Minister Chi Haotian (8) but, if the record of the past seven years of the Hu Jintao administration is any indication, the contradiction between the official “Peaceful Rise” diplomatic doctrine and the unofficial “Unrestricted Warfare” military doctrine is in fact more apparent than real. (9)

Thus, in 2003, the same year that saw the emergence of the concept of Peaceful Rise in official circles, the Communist Party Central Committee endorsed the concept of Three Warfares (clearly inspired by *Unrestricted Warfare*) which calls for “a reinforcement of political work in terms of media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.” That same year, the Chinese government launched the “Go Abroad” program, a sophisticated neo-mercantilist offensive

involving strategic investments abroad; meanwhile the PLA organized its first units for cyber warfare, and the magnitude of the so-called “Titan Rain” offensive by Chinese hackers raised the question of the degree of involvement of the Chinese government itself. (10)

By 2008, the U.S. State Department’s own International Security Advisory Board tacitly admitted that the three-pronged non-kinetic war was already underway: “It is essential that the United States better understand and effectively respond to China’s comprehensive approach to strategic rivalry, as reflected in its official concept of “Three Warfares.” If not actively countered, Beijing’s ongoing (*sic*) combination of Psychological Warfare (propaganda, deception, and coercion), Media Warfare (manipulation of public opinion domestically and internationally), and Legal Warfare (use of ‘legal regimes’ to handicap the opponent in fields favorable to him) can precondition key areas of strategic competition in its favor.” (11)

By 2009, mounting concerns about China-generated financial warfare and cyber-warfare capabilities prompted the Pentagon to conduct a major financial war game (in which China turned out to be a better player) and to set up a unified cyber-command within U.S. Strategic Command.

Psychological warfare, media warfare, legal warfare, financial warfare, cyber warfare: a decade after the publication of *Unrestricted Warfare*, while all the twenty-four logical lines of operations identified in the book are obviously not pursued with equal *intensity* (nor along similar *timelines*), it is clear that China’s revisionist grand strategy appears to be making full use of an ever-widening range of non-kinetic means.

Outside Pentagon circles, though, *Unrestricted Warfare* largely remains what Donald Rumsfeld would call an “unknown unknown.” The unclassified literature is scattered in obscure military journals and governmental reports, which does little to increase the situational awareness of the civilian world.

This essay is simply meant as a workmanlike first attempt to both bridge the academic-military gap over the “China Threat,” and to increase the situational awareness of interagency grunts regarding Unrestricted Warfare (URW).

### **Power Transition Theory: Academic Bull in the China Shop?**

Just as there are two ways of conceptualizing History in general, there are two ways of conceptualizing the history of warfare in particular: linear or cyclical.

In a cyclical conception, major wars are called “hegemonic wars,” and considered a recurrent phenomenon of every power transition throughout history: the Greek Peloponnesian Wars, the Thirty Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the two World Wars which Churchill and De Gaulle, sharing the same cyclical conception of history, referred to as the “Second Thirty Years’ War.” (12)

It is this cyclical conception of history which is at the base of Power Transition Theory (PTT) – a theory that has been all the rage in International Relations (IR) since the publication in 2000 of

the collective manifesto *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, and has become the main lens through which to analyze the rising antagonism between America and China. (13)

On the face of it, the allure of PTT rests on the promise of a policy-relevant “unified theory” of war in the context of power transitions: “Of all theories at the international level,” its proponents claim, “Power Transition has the most tightly integrated and internally consistent explanation for why, how, and when war occurs. In addition, it provides evidence about the costs, intensity, duration, and consequences of war.” (14) Upon closer examination, though, the appeal of PTT rests less on its *theoretical* sophistication (more on that later) than on a compelling, and seemingly self-explanatory, *historical* narrative contrasting the Anglo-American and Anglo-German power transitions a century ago. In a nutshell:

“The key difference – from the perspective of power transition theory – is that the United States shared British political and economic institutions, liberal democratic culture, and the British version of the desirable political, economic, and legal international order. The U.S. was a satisfied state and believed that its interests could be served by a change in the hierarchy within that system rather than a replacement of that system with a new order. British leaders understood what kind of order the United States was likely to construct when it ultimately achieved a dominant position, and they were willing to accept a somewhat diminished role within that order. In the Anglo-German transition, however, Germany was politically, economically, and culturally different than Britain, and had a different conception of the desirable international order. Thus Germany was a dissatisfied state. British leaders understood this, and consequently they were willing to make fewer compromises and to accept greater risks of war rather than accept a peaceful transition to a different international order in which British interests would be poorly served.”(15)

Not only is this “tale of two power transitions” questionable in itself (16), but even more problematic are the two key variables said to determine the probability of major wars: “power parity” between the status quo hegemon and its revisionist challenger, and the latter’s “degree of dissatisfaction” with the existing order.

The first problem is that, in the age of the declining fungibility of military power and of the rise of asymmetric strategies, measuring “power parity” has never been so problematic. Leaving aside the question of the lack of transparency of official statistics (China’s real defense budget is estimated to be three times the official budget), America and China have different ways (quantitatively and qualitatively) of assessing Comprehensive National Power (CNP). If anything, it is not power parity, but power incommensurability, which may increase the risk of miscalculation and, by the same token, the risk of war initiation on the part of either player.

The concept of “power” adopted by PTT is just as antiquated as that of “parity” itself. Though the theory pays lip service in one sentence to the modern, *relational* definition of power (“power is defined as the ability to impose on or persuade opponents to comply with demands”), it moves on to assess power in the pre-modern sense of *resources*: “In the lexicon of Power Transition theory, power is a combination of three elements: the number of people who can work and fight, their economic productivity, and the effectiveness of the political system in extracting and

pooling individuals' contributions to advance national goals." (p.8) The net result is a bean-counter's version of Thucydides.

Military power? Unlike PTT theorists, China has not forgotten that the Soviet Union went bankrupt trying to keep up with Reagan's military build-up in the 1980s. In Deng Xiaoping's "four modernizations" program, military modernization therefore came explicitly last, behind agriculture, industry, and science and technology. More important still, "a key distinction between Wilhelmine Germany and [Hu's] China is that Germany was trying to develop a symmetric capability to deal with existent British power. China is going asymmetric." (17) Rather than attempt to, e.g., reach power parity at sea by building eleven aircraft carriers, China prefers to focus (for now at least) on an anti-access strategy relying on a whole range of asymmetric means from satellite warfare to mine warfare, and from anti-ship ballistic missiles to "maritime lawfare." (18)

Economic power? In this day and age, a theory focusing on the *dynamics* of power transition should logically drop any reference to "productivity" as such and take into account instead the radically different salience and dynamics of industry and finance. China still has a long way to go before reaching productivity parity with America; but with its estimated 2.4 trillion dollar reserves, China is already the main global financial player when it comes to determining the future of the dollar as a reserve currency – the very linchpin of America's global supremacy.

Soft power? There is curiously no attempt in PTT to take into account the "power shift" of the past two decades, and the increased salience of soft power – an omission all the more puzzling since the Chinese conception appears to be closer to the maximalist German concept of "civilian power" than to the more minimalist American concept of "soft power." For the Chinese, "soft power means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations" (19)

Second, when it comes to defining the "degree of dissatisfaction" with the existing order, PTT is as impressionistic as it is materialistic when dealing with the question of "power parity." There is simply no way to assess the degree of dissatisfaction of any given power without a closer examination of both its "strategic culture" and "grand strategy" – two questions on which PTT has practically nothing to say.

*Strategic culture*: if, as the foundational narrative of PTT puts it, the problem with the Anglo-German transition was due to the fact that "Germany was politically, economically, and culturally different than Britain," then one would expect PTT to highlight the fact that China is even more politically, economically, and culturally different than America. While the Anglo-German antagonism, to a certain extent, did take the form of a "clash of cultures" (20), the two countries nonetheless belonged to the same civilization. By contrast, China and America represent two distinct civilizations, and one can only assume that PTT's silence on this civilizational difference is motivated mostly by the desire to avoid having to confront that much-dreaded thesis in academe: Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations." (21)

In that respect, missing from Power Transition theory are two key elements. First, the realization that, in contrast to previous power transitions, the transition currently happening at the *national* level (America vs. China) takes place against the backdrop of a broader *civilizational* transition (from the Atlantic to the Pacific in geopolitical terms, or from the West to the Rest in both geo-economic and geo-cultural terms). Second, the realization that the traditional Asian state-system, unlike its European counterpart, favored a logic of hierarchy (tribute system) over a logic of anarchy (balance-of-power), and that the 64-million dollar question today is to what extent will China's neighbors favor "balancing" (as expected by the Euro-centric IR theory) over "bandwagoning." (22)

*Grand strategy*: Logically and chronologically, the first priority of any self-respecting power transition theory should be to assess what kind of revisionist Grand Strategy increases or decreases the risk of major wars, hastens or delays their outbreak and their termination, with what consequences for the parties engaged. From such a study, the theory could then try to advance general propositions regarding timing, duration, severity, and consequences of major wars. But there is no room for the concept of grand strategy in PTT (by "political capacity," PTT means the ability to mobilize resources at home, not the ability to devise and implement a grand strategy abroad). What PTT proponents fail to realize is that, all things (population, production and "political capacity") being equal, the timing, severity, duration, and even outcome of both the Anglo-German and American-German transitions would have been much different, had Germany's Grand Strategy not been such a colossal "comedy of errors."

Finally, PTT is as long on measuring "power" as it is short on assessing "purpose." Based on PTT, you would never know that, far from being interested in competing with America for the title of *global hegemon*, China is in fact more interested in riding the global wave in favor of *multipolarity* – an "indirect approach" of sorts which, more than anything else, makes the prospect of a "hegemonic war" unlikely.

The bottom line: because it focuses mostly on *means* (power resources), PTT forgets to take into account that, while China is indeed "systemically" a revisionist power, it neither shares the *ways* (strategic culture) nor the *ends* (grand strategy) of Wilhelmine Germany.

Where, then, is the much-touted policy relevance of PTT?

At best, the theory offers time-tested truisms presented as profound insights, like "War is most likely, of longest duration, and greatest magnitude, when a challenger to the dominant power enters into approximate parity with the dominant state and is dissatisfied with the existing system" - the kind of banality that has led diplomatic practitioners for the past thirty years to dismiss much IR theory with a derisive "tell me something I don't know."

When warning about the possibility of major conflict, PTT proponents can only conceive of "war" as a transhistorical category. In the Power Transition manifesto published in 2000, there is no evidence that PTT theorists are aware of the evolution of the debate over "war" in the past twenty years, nor is there any hint that, in the post-modern age, a "major war" could actually take the form outlined in *Unrestricted Warfare* a year earlier.

In fairness, when it came out a decade ago, the main virtue of the PTT manifesto resided in the fact that, in arguing for the distinct possibility of a “hegemonic war,” the theory provided a cautionary tale for those Western observers only too willing to believe in an “end of history,” or in a pre-existing “harmony of interest” which could lead, over time, to the rise of a peaceful condominium (G-2 or “Chimerica”).

While conceding the obvious point that the nuclear era has radically altered the costs and benefits of “major wars,” PTT proponents rightly warn that there is no *absolute* guarantee that major wars won’t happen among nuclear powers. But it is a right warning issued mostly for all the wrong reasons (“the choice for war will relate to the twin pillars of power parity – determined by a nation’s population, economic development, and political capacity – and opportunity for redress of grievance.” (23)

Because PTT gives no thought to the importance of strategic cultures, grand strategies, the waning of major wars, the declining utility of force, and the transformation of war itself, the theory has only the crudest *explanatory* power. Because it does not take into account the different dynamics of industry and finance, PTT is dangerously misleading as a *predictive* theory. Last but not least, because it overestimates the possibility of major wars, its *prescriptive* value is even more dubious.

For the ultimate irony of PTT is that an excessive awareness of previous “hegemonic wars” leads its proponents today to advocate peaceful change *a outrance* to the point where “engagement” becomes synonymous with “appeasement.”

At times, the policy recommendations put forward by PTT proponents border on sheer lunacy: “In the case of China, an expansion of NATO to include this nation may help in creating the conditions for a peaceful overtaking, should that occur, thus reducing the possibility of global war.”(24)

China in NATO, or else Global War? *Hel-lo?*

A decade ago, at the peak of the “unipolar moment,” it was not unreasonable to examine the rise of China in the context of a bilateral power transition. A decade later, though, it should be clear that the Post-American World (Zakaria) is upon us, that the evolution of China will be shaped by ASEAN, Russia, and the EU as much as by the U.S. itself, and that the PTT framework has essentially lost its relevance.

There is nothing inherently wrong in a cyclical conception of History, and the Chinese themselves, in recent years, have been carefully studying the rise and fall of the great powers.(25) What is wrong is the Western social scientists’ use of History as a mere “arsenal of arguments,” their infatuation with pseudo-scientific methods, and their concomitant neglect of area studies (26). That a new generation of theorists is willing to “bring policy relevance back in” is a welcome development. But if IR academics want to regain among diplomatic practitioners the credibility they lost a generation ago, they will have to do better than use half-baked historical analogies to deliver goofy policy prescriptions.

## The Road to “Unrestricted Warfare”

In the linear conception of history - which remains the dominant conception in the discipline of military history - the idea of “major wars” is usually associated with one particular period: the Clausewitzian era, i.e. the period from the *levee en masse* of Valmy (1792) to the dropping of the *absolute weapon* at Hiroshima (1945).

For this period, the master narrative of Western military historians is that of a gradual process of escalation, in which societal mobilization (from the French revolution on), coupled with industrial mobilization (from the U.S. Civil War on), eventually combine to produce the Total Wars of the twentieth-century in which the military and civilian spheres become blurred. In Hegelian parlance, the underlying philosophy of history of the Valmy-to-Hiroshima narrative is that of a gradual historical realization, in the form of Total War, of the concept of Absolute War elaborated by Clausewitz (1780-1831).

In the field of military history, this “Road to Total War” from Napoleon to Hitler is fairly straightforward, and has been well-traveled by scholars, particularly in the past two decades.(27) The post-Hiroshima era, by contrast, does not easily fit in a single master narrative. To the extent that one major theme has dominated the 1945-1989 period, it is that of the waning of Major Wars and the proliferation of Small Wars. And in truth, in the second half of the twentieth-century, major inter-state wars have become the exception (even among non-nuclear powers) while intra-state wars have become the norm - whether in the form of revolutionary, ethnic, religious, or criminal/resource wars. But this Major Wars/Small Wars narrative is in fact only half of the story at best.

There is another possible narrative, one that diplomatic history has failed to fully articulate to date: the mutation of kinetic Total War into non-kinetic Total Strategy in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The first part of this narrative - from the birth of the National Security State of the Truman era to the Total Cold War of the Eisenhower era – is by now reasonably well-known.(28) By contrast, the second part - the so-called “Second Cold War” of the Reagan era – remains accessible only in a fragmentary manner, mostly through the accounts of insiders. Yet, as formalized in NSDD-75, Reagan’s grand strategy was in fact the prefiguration of Unrestricted Warfare - with American Characteristics. To make a long story short:

In the aftermath of the Great War, as Western strategists began to analyze in earnest the different aspects of the total war they had just experienced, the concepts of “economic warfare,” “psychological warfare,” and “political warfare” began to enter the lexicon of strategy. In revisionist powers like Germany, the shared goal was to find a more effective way to win a repeat of the Great War. Hence the theory of an offensive Total War developed by General Ludendorff, in which policy ends up being subordinated to strategy, and War itself is seen as “the highest expression of the racial will to life.”

In status quo powers like Britain, by contrast, the goal was to win a “better peace” while avoiding a repeat of the destructiveness associated by many with the Clausewitzian ideology in vogue during the Great War. Hence Liddell Hart’s systematic re-evaluation, at every level (tactical, operational, strategic), of an “Indirect Approach” which eventually led him to formulate

his concept of Grand Strategy. Like Ludendorff's Total War, Liddell Hart's Grand Strategy leads to a blurring of the distinction between wartime and peacetime; but the two conceptions radically differ in that, in Grand Strategy, the military dimension proper only plays a supporting role in what will later become known as the DIME spectrum (diplomacy, military, information, economy).

Overrated during the interwar era, Liddell Hart's reputation suffered an eclipse after WWII for reasons having to do with both theory, history and policy. Theory: unlike Clausewitz, Liddell Hart never offered a systematic treatise on Grand Strategy. His theory remained sketchy, and scattered in a series of books published mostly between 1929 and 1954. History: his theses on the "indirect approach" rests too much on dubious historical claims regarding an alleged "British way in war" – which historians have only been too happy to demolish. Policy: to this day, Liddell Hart is best remembered for his advocacy of "appeasement" in the late 1930s - even though, upon closer scrutiny, his theoretical work itself can be said to anticipate Georges Kennan's "containment." (29)

After WWII, Western officials will stay away altogether from the concept of "grand strategy" and adopt instead the more nebulous concept of "national security strategy." With the advent of the first hydrogen bomb (1952) and for the next decade, the official strategic debate in the West will focus quasi-exclusively on nuclear strategy and will quickly become an exercise in strategic theology.

Meanwhile, Liddell Hart will go on to arguing that an "indirect" grand strategy is now more than ever a matter of necessity: "The H-bomb, even in its trial explosions, has done more than anything else to make it plain that "total war" as a method and "victory" as a war aim are out of date concepts (p.xviii). The common assumption that atomic power has cancelled out strategy [other than in the form of deterrence] is ill-founded and misleading. By carrying destructiveness to a "suicidal" extreme, atomic power is stimulating and accelerating a reversion to the indirect methods that are the essence of strategy." (p.xix) (30)

But his book on *Strategy* (1954) will only devote a few pages to the subject of Grand Strategy, on the ground that "to deal adequately with this wider subject would require not only a much larger volume, but a separate volume – for while grand strategy should control strategy, its principles often run counter to those which prevail in the field of strategy." (p.353). By the time of the revised edition (1967), his interest in the Indirect Approach has shifted from the national-strategic level (grand strategy) to the theater-strategic level (guerrilla warfare).

In 1963, French General Andre Beaufre, the main disciple of Liddell Hart on the Continent, will try to bring greater theoretical rigor by re-framing Grand Strategy in terms of Total Strategy (in an explicit opposition to Ludendorff's Total War). While Beaufre's book is too dense to be done full justice here, two things are worth noting here:

First, his distinction between "interior maneuver" (the Area of Operations proper) and "exterior maneuver" (mostly, strategic communication on the world stage) anticipates today's distinction between "battlefield" and "battlesphere."

Second, long before Stefan Possony published the blueprint for technological warfare that will constitute the core of the Reagan strategy in the Second Cold War, Beaufre presciently remarked: “a new form of strategy is developing in peacetime; a strategy of which the phrase ‘arms race’ used prior to the old great conflicts is hardly more than a faint reflection. There are no battles in this strategy; each side is merely trying to outdo in performance the equipment of the other. It has been termed ‘logistic strategy’. *Its tactics are industrial, technical, and financial.* It is a form of indirect attrition; instead of destroying enemy resources, its object is to make them obsolete, thereby forcing on him an enormous expenditure... *A silent and apparently peaceful war is therefore in progress, but it could well be a war which of itself could be decisive.*” (31)

Though not without merits, Beaufre’s work was definitely “too French” for American audiences. The closest thing to an American version of Total Strategy is to be found in *The New Frontiers of War: Political Warfare, Present and Future*, a book published in 1962 and co-authored by the most improbable odd couple: Colonel William Kintner, a West Point graduate and Omaha Beach veteran, and Joseph Z. Kornfeder, a founding member of the Communist Party of America and a former representative of the Comintern. In retrospect, the book both captures well the spirit of the Total Cold War of the Eisenhower era and, at the same time, anticipates Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s *Unrestricted Warfare* by a generation:

“‘The new frontiers of war’ defines political warfare as a form of conflict between states in which a protagonist nation seeks to impose its will upon its opponents without the direct use of armed force...Political warfare has been defined as consisting of diplomacy, international commerce, information, and other civilian activities, governmental as well as non-governmental, as well as military action....The *higher frequency and intensity* of present-day actions call for new descriptive labels. Let us therefore substitute new terms: for diplomacy, political action; for commerce, economic warfare; for information, psychological warfare. And let us extend the term “military action” beyond its traditional scope to include intervention to aid foreign governments and populations, and guerrilla and partisan warfare.” (32)

Kintner’s book never got the attention it deserves, for two reasons. On the one hand, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, American strategists became less interested in grand strategy than in its opposite: crisis management. (McNamara: “Today, there is no longer any such thing as strategy; there is only crisis management”). On the other hand, with the ongoing escalation in Vietnam, grand strategy took a back-seat to something more urgent: counterinsurgency.

In IR theory, meanwhile, due to the victory of the “numerates” (social scientists) over the “literates” (historians) in the 1970s, classical realism - and its attention to *statecraft* - gave way to a mechanistic structural realism in which, by definition, there was no room for a concept like “grand strategy.” Despite the meritorious efforts of British historian Paul Kennedy (Liddell Hart’s former assistant), the study of grand strategy will be relegated to the margins of both international relations theory and diplomatic history. (33)

Then came the “Second Cold War” of the Reagan era, and with it, a grand strategic shift from Containment to Rollback.

By 1979, the conventional wisdom in the West was that the Soviet Union was on the offensive, and America in terminal decline; by 1989, it was the Soviet Union's turn to be in terminal decline, and the U.S. to be in the position of "lone remaining superpower." Even more than the Eisenhower era, the Reagan era's Second Cold War deserved to be called a Total Cold War. Surprisingly enough, though, there is still not a single book-length, *strategic* study of this grand strategic "surge" formalized by NSDD-75.

In part, this absence is due to the fact that the Second Cold War was waged essentially covertly, and that some elements remain classified to this day. For the most part, though, it is due to the academic world's tendency to give excessive credit to Gorbachev, and to see in Reagan nothing more than a Hollywood actor "sleepwalking through history." Thus, in their account of the end of the Cold War, most historians have focused on the role of Gorbachev (i.e. from 1985 on), and neglected Reagan's role during his first term (1981-1985). To put it differently: by defining the Second Cold War as the period between 1979 and 1985, academics have managed to give the impression there was no causal relation between the Rollback strategy of Reagan and the end of the Cold War itself.

The truth is that, even as Reagan warmed up to Gorbachev, the grand strategy devised during the early 1980s by Bill Clark (NSC), Bill Casey (CIA), and Cap Weinberger (DOD) continued to produce effects at the working level long after the departure from the scene of these policy principals.

The debate over the Second Cold War Even is further muddled by an endless debate opposing those, on the Right, who argue that the hard power surge (SDI in particular) were the decisive factors, and those, on the Left, who credit the soft power surge made possible by the "third basket" of the Helsinki Accords. In truth, while both the military build-up and democracy promotion constituted important pillars, the core of the Reagan strategy was an elaborate economic warfare *a outrance* ranging from restricting technology transfers to Russia, to enlisting third parties to keep oil prices artificially low so as to deprive Moscow of hard currency earnings.

From a functional standpoint, Reagan's grand strategy ranged from patent warfare to petro-warfare, and from low-intensity warfare to "theological warfare" (through the weaponization of religion in both Poland and Afghanistan). From a geopolitical standpoint, Reagan's strategy went beyond rolling back Soviet gains in Central America, undermining Soviet control of Eastern Europe, and forcing Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan: with the help of China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Reagan's strategy included a campaign of subversion within the Muslim republics of the USSR, which hastened the demise of the Soviet empire.<sup>(34)</sup> Last but not least, Reagan's combination of ways and means not only ran along the whole DIME spectrum (diplomacy, information, military, economy) at the horizontal level, but also from IGOs (NATO, COCOM, IEA) to NGOs (NED, AFL-CIO, Solidarnosc) at the vertical level.

In short, the Reagan Rollback offensive was a prefiguration of Unrestricted Warfare. <sup>(35)</sup> But there was a flaw.

Though from a formal standpoint, Reagan's total strategy was extremely sophisticated, wide-ranging, and terribly effective, the downside of this "unrestricted war" was the absence of any cost-benefit analysis, leading to what can only be described, in retrospect, as a Pyrrhic victory. Domestically, America, once the world's main creditor nation, had become by 1986 the main debtor nation. Internationally, America's empowerment of China and of the Muslim world (particularly Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) against Soviet Russia created unexpected consequences that we are still living with thirty years later.

As military strategist John Arquilla recently pointed out, since Pakistan "served as a haven for the rebels resisting Russian occupation of Afghanistan, Reagan was unwilling to pressure the ruling Pakistani military dictator to forgo his efforts to develop such deadly [nuclear] weapons. The consequences of this error have resonated in ever more troubling ways, as an illicit proliferation network originating in Pakistan has played a powerful role in the secret struggles of North Korea, Iran, and even the al Qaeda terror organization to acquire weapons of mass destruction of their own."

In addition to this blind spot concerning WMD proliferation, the Reagan administration gave a blank check to U.S. armed forces for a post-Vietnam conventional rebuilding and, Arquilla argues, neglected the then-emerging problem of counterterrorism: "For the most part, these funds were spent preparing for a cataclysmic conventional war in the heart of Europe that was never more than a remote possibility, while at the same time terror was emerging as a form of warfare in its own right. And when some members of Reagan's team urged a retooling of the military to launch a commando-style preventive war on terrorism – more than twenty years ago – they were loudly shouted down by traditionalists."(36) In short, the Reagan administration was instrumental in creating the Sino-Islamic nexus identified by Samuel Huntington a decade later (more on that later).

For two reasons, Reagan's grand strategy (engineered mostly by the intelligence community) failed to register with either the academic or military community. From 1979 on, the interest of IR academics massively shifted from policy-making to theory-building, and structural realism ("the science of Realpolitik without politics") became hegemonic in the field until the end of the Cold War. Around 1979 as well, a freshly-defeated, but newly-professionalized, U.S. military decided that the job of the professional soldier was to focus exclusively on conventional tactical and operational matters and, drawing the wrong lessons from Vietnam, took refuge in Clausewitzology - the science of War without strategy. (37)

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of strategy and, a fortiori, that of "grand strategy," became even more neglected in both academic and military circles.

On the military side, as Carl Builder remarked in the mid-nineties: "With the end of the Cold War and the political constraints imposed by the risks of nuclear confrontation, one might have expected a renaissance in strategic thinking in the American military. It hasn't happened. Both the Persian Gulf War and Bosnian conflict have been approached mostly in operational and tactical terms....Strategic thinking by the American military appears to have gone into hiding... Three decades ago, strategic thought burnt bright in the sanctuary of the national security temple. And for three decades prior to that—back to the 1930s—strategic theorizing dominated military

debates in this country....If the operational thinking of our military is secure and without peer, and if tactical thinking has come to the fore, strategic thought has been all but abandoned. The difficulty lies in seeing the strategic side of national security increasingly as the province of politicians and diplomats while the operational and tactical sides belong to the military, free from civilian meddling....” (38)

On the academic side, meanwhile, noted scholars like Richard Betts began to wonder out loud whether – given the declining strategic literacy of Western elites, the diminishing fungibility of military force, and the increasing nonlinearity of war itself - strategy as such had become an “illusion.”(39) As a result, the academic subfield of “strategic studies” dissolved into an amorphous “security studies” and, in the process, not only did the concept of “grand strategy” altogether disappear, but the concept of “national security” itself dissolved into the nebulous (UN- and EU-sponsored) concept of “human security.” As for War itself, it was increasingly treated, in civilian circles, as a subset of “risk management.” (40)

In the post-cold War era, in fairness, neither the academic nor the military world had any (monetary) incentive to invest intellectual efforts in grand strategy. For academics, research money from the major foundations was available only to those willing to wax lyrical about “global governance” and/or “human security” – the very negation of grand strategy. Within the military, against the backdrop of drastic budget cuts, the official strategic debate was quickly reduced to a “Clausewitz vs. Computers”(41) *faux debat* pitting the manpower-intensive Army and Marine Corps against the platform-centric Navy and Air Force.

Except for a few fundamentalists convinced of the “inerrancy” of *Vom Kriege*, most U.S. military intellectuals were by then aware of the increasing inadequacy of the Clausewitzian straight-jacket but, given the rhetorical self-intoxication of the supporters of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the old Prussian looked like a lesser evil. At the Naval War College, influential professor Michael Handel, in a well-meaning attempt to reconcile Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu, the Western and Eastern tradition, did not hesitate to push the interpretative envelope and to highlight the “complementarity” between the two authors: Sun-Tzu approached war from the standpoint of grand strategy, while Clausewitz was mostly concerned with sub-strategic matters.

Despite his meritorious efforts to salvage Clausewitz, Handel was forced to reluctantly conclude: “Sun Tzu’s comprehensive framework for the analysis of strategy and war is much more relevant to our own time than that of Clausewitz.” On the eve of 9/11, Handel could only express the hope to see the emergence of a “unified theory of war” – that very unified theory the absence of which General Barno would lament a decade later. (42)

Meanwhile, while keeping an eye on the ongoing American Revolution in *Military Affairs*, the Chinese military was busy rediscovering its own strategic tradition and, in the process, elaborating something bigger: a Revolution in *Strategic Affairs*. (43)

## The Tao of Unrestricted Warfare

Ever since the Enlightenment at least, the distinction between a Western and an Eastern tradition of war and/or strategy has been part of conventional wisdom. At the risk of caricaturing: on the Western side, discipline, technology, and decisive battle; on the Eastern side, deception, stratagems, and reluctance to use force.

This distinction began to break down in the 20<sup>th</sup> century with the pervasiveness of technology. In the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-5, much to everybody's surprise, Japan turned out to be more "Western" than Russia in military terms (even as the Japanese victory was interpreted in the non-Western world as the first victory of an Eastern power over a Western power in political terms). The military Westernization of the East continued unabated throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the point where, by 1998, the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan would lead some Western observers to announce the end of two centuries of Western military supremacy:

"For two hundred years the world has been shaped by the fact of Western military dominance. Gunboats as agents of national power have been supplanted by warplanes, and they in turn by missiles and satellites and computers, but until very recently all were monopoly of Europeans and North Americans. Now that monopoly is coming to an end."(44)

In the aftermath of 9/11, other observers have gone as far as to wonder whether the end of Western military supremacy, far from being limited to *technology*, extends to *strategy* as well. (45)

Even before the end of the Cold War, as longtime China watcher Ralph Sawyer pointed out, the Chinese themselves had begun to rediscover their own strategic tradition:

"Since 1985, coincident with the founding of the National Defense University and the publication of the initial volumes of the great Chinese military corpus (Zhongguo Bingshu Jicheng), Chinese military science has been increasingly looking to its own heritage for theories and practices that will enable it to formulate a distinctive military science, one that will allow its practitioners not to just be imitators, second-best in Western thinking and methods, but to surpass Western strategists and be unfathomable while yet incorporating all the latest advances in weaponry, command, and communications. The traditional Chinese military writings, especially Sun-Tzu's Art of War, the Six Secret Teachings, Hundred Unorthodox Strategies, and Thirty-Six Stratagems, have also enjoyed astonishing popularity among the populace at large and appear in many formats ranging from vernacular editions through serialized television dramas and comic book versions." (46)

A decade later, even as it was 'Westernizing' itself in terms of technology, the PLA was increasingly 'Easternizing' itself in terms of strategy. As Sinologist Arthur Waldron presciently argued at the time:

“Since at least the beginning of revolutions in military affairs in the early 19th century there has been a tendency in the West to assume that increased power would make military solutions to problems easier. So time and again we have looked to weapons for decisiveness—be it rapid-firing guns, tanks, airpower, or current high tech. But with the advent of nuclear weapons and the expansion of potential battlefields to a global scale, we may reach a point where decisive force is increasingly difficult to achieve. This situation, however, is familiar to Chinese whose fundamental approach to warfare stresses the limits and hazards of relying too heavily on force alone... It may be that the Chinese emphasis on stratagem...offers an intellectual context for modern weaponry that the Western tradition has difficulty providing.” (47)

Ironically, it is precisely at the time when the Chinese were busy rediscovering their own tradition that revisionist academics in the West began to claim there was no such thing as a Chinese tradition.(48) For the most part, our revisionists only ended up trading one “essentialist” view of Chinese strategic culture for another. At most, what they succeeded in demonstrating is that, when confronted with “wars of necessity,” the Chinese could be just as Clausewitzian as anybody else. (No surprise here: had the Chinese tried the “indirect approach” against the Mongols, China would be known today as Greater Mongolia). When it comes to “wars of choice,” though, the fact remains that the Chinese have traditionally favored the indirect approach. Winning by outsmarting, rather than by outfighting, has remained “the acme of skill.”

Contrary to the claims of our revisionists, Chinese strategic culture is not primarily defined by half-a-dozen canonical texts but, like any other strategic culture, by historical experiences and collective memories (49). And while the Chinese have made an honest effort to understand the logic behind the rise of Western powers, their understanding of “power transitions” is not primarily based on European references dear to Western IR theorists (be it the Peloponnesian wars or the Anglo-German rivalry), but on their own history: the Warring States era (475-221 BC) and the Sino-Japanese Wars (1894-95 and 1937-45).

Central in China’s collective memory is the memory of its encounter with the West in the form of the Opium Wars - an episode long forgotten in the West itself, but which the Chinese see as marking the beginning of the so-called “century of humiliation.” In truth, what must have been particularly humiliating was that China was in essence “out-Suntzued” by foreign devils who opted for the ultimate indirect approach: the weaponization of opium. This “war-beyond-rules,” which began in earnest at the end of the eighteenth century, ended up by contaminating four million members of the Chinese elite, so that, by the time the military operations proper began in earnest (1839), the outcome was a foregone conclusion. (50)

In China as elsewhere, “collective memories” often have little in common with factual history. Yet, even when the collective memories happen to be *imaginary*, their effects on collective action are *real*. “Politics is perception”: the financial crisis of 1997-98 (now forgotten in the West) was perceived in some Asian quarters as a “financial 9/11” of sorts engineered by Western powers. For our two colonels, who don’t hesitate to compare financier George Soros to terrorist Osama Bin Laden, the Asian crisis was a watershed event: “Non-state organizations, in this first war without the use of military force, are using non-military means to engage sovereign nations. Thus, financial war is a form of non-military warfare which is just as terribly destructive as a

bloody war, but in which no blood is actually shed. Financial warfare has now officially come to war's center stage... Today, when nuclear weapons have already become frightening mantelpiece decorations that are losing their real operational value with each passing day, financial war has become a "hyperstrategic" weapon that is attracting the attention of the whole world." (pp. 39-40)

For Qiao and Wang, it seems, the historical significance of the Asian "financial war" of 1998 actually trumps that of the Gulf War of 1991. Hence their view that the technological revolution in military affairs is only a first step that must lead to a conceptual revolution, i.e. a revolution in *strategic* affairs:

"For a long time both military people and politicians have become accustomed to employing a certain mode of thinking, that is, the major factor posing a threat to national security is the military power of an enemy state or potential enemy state. However, the wars and major incidents which have occurred during the last ten years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have provided to us in a calm and composed fashion proof that the opposite is true: military threats are already often no longer the major factors affecting national security. Even though they are the same ancient territorial disputes, nationality conflicts, religious clashes... these traditional factors are increasingly becoming more intertwined with grabbing resources, contending for markets, controlling capital trade sanctions, and other economic factors, to the extent that they are even becoming secondary to these factors." (p.95)

The idea of a paradigm shift from geopolitics to geo-economics had been expressed in the West a decade earlier by strategist Edward Luttwak and others, though without any explicit reference to what this shift meant for military strategy (51). Unconstrained by Western totems and taboos, our two colonels don't hesitate to proclaim that Clausewitz, who was never part of the Eastern tradition to begin with (*Vom Kriege* was translated only in 1910), is of no use in the case of financial warfare (p.97). By contrast, the Chinese found enough common ground with Liddell Hart instead to translate his *Strategy* in 1994.

As *analysts*, our two authors have done their homework, and show a fairly good grasp of the U.S. military debate of the 1990s (including the bureaucratic politics behind it). As *strategists*, they tend to be too exclusively focused on America and, as is usually the case with strategists the world over, their discussion takes place in an ill-defined geopolitical context. As *futurists*, they promote a resolutely "constructivist" conception of war and, in that respect, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui could be considered China's equivalent to Alvin and Heidi Toffler (whose work they freely draw upon).

Thus, two years before the publication of *Unrestricted Warfare*, the Tofflers had argued that, while the industrial era had been dominated by the alliances among nation-states, the information era would see the emergence of "deep coalitions" between states and non-state actors:

"A de facto deep coalition – instead of being limited to nation-states as in the Gulf War alliance – might consist, for example, of three nation-states, fourteen civil society organizations, a *narcotrafficante* here or there, a couple of private corporations with

their own self-interest at stake, an individual speculator, and who knows what other components. The deep coalition involves players at many levels of the system. It is multi-dimensional with all these groups operating all the time, in continuous flow – multiplying, fissioning, then fusing into others, and so on... Unlike the nation-state system that emerged in the wake of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, *the new system is based less on “balance of power” relations among major nations than on the ability to configure the right combination of players at every level. More important than the balance of power is the “power of balance” – the ability of a major state to keep its senses in the midst of this turbulence, and to match its economic and military capabilities with high-level knowledge resources.* The world, thus, is entering into a global order – or disorder, as the case may be – that is post-Westphalian, and post-Clausewitzian.” (52)

This idea of “deep coalition” is present in all but in name in *Unrestricted Warfare*, with its repeated references to the political role played by non-state actors ranging from credit rating agencies to narco-mafias, and its emphasis on the “civilianization of war” thesis:

“Precisely in the same way that modern technology is changing weapons and the battlefield, it is also at the same time blurring the concepts of who the war participants are... Non-professional warriors and non-state organizations are posing a greater and greater threat to sovereign nations. (p36). Faced with warfare in the broad sense that will unfold on a borderless battlefield, it is no longer possible to rely on military forces and weapons alone to achieve national security in the larger strategic sense, nor is it possible to protect these stratified national interests. Obviously, warfare is in the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units, and military affairs, and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians, scientists, and even bankers (p.221).”

For Qiao and Wang, “combination” is the key word, and our two authors do not hesitate to make the same hyperbolic claim for the importance of “combination” in military history as Liddell Hart did for the “indirect approach”: “Regardless of whether the war was 3,000 years ago or at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it seems that all of the victories display one common phenomenon: the winner is the one who combined well.” (p117)

Their main originality could well be in their emphasis on the need for a systematic “combination” of the various domains and/or Lines of Operation (legal, economic, psychological, etc.) with the various Levels of Operation (supra-national, inter-governmental, sub-national). It is this centrality of Combination that has led some Western officers to give *Unrestricted Warfare* the more accurate name of *Combination Warfare*. (53)

At the end of the day, though, *Unrestricted Warfare* is a rather uneven work. On the one hand, their distinction between “lethality” and “violence” has a very post-modern ring. The assertion that non-lethal warfare does not mean non-violent warfare, but a re-definition of violence itself (“while we are seeing a relative reduction of military violence, at the same time we are definitely seeing an increase in political, economic, and technological violence”) would deserve to be developed further. On the other hand, our two colonels’ claim to have found a “silver bullet” in

the form of the Golden Rule dear to Renaissance artists is likely to be met with massive incredulity on the part of military planners (modelize that!).

As an *intellectual* exercise in strategic theory, the main interest of *Unrestricted Warfare* resides in the fact that it stands at the intersection of the Western and Eastern traditions. Some will see in it an updated version of the concept of Total Strategy elaborated a generation earlier by General Beaufre, and expanded to include innovative strategies of non-state actors; others, a post-modern version of Sun-Tzu's Art of War, updated to take into account not only the digitalization of the battlefield, but the weaponization of law and the financialization of foreign policy. (54)

When it comes to its *institutional* significance in China proper, though, the status of *Unrestricted Warfare* is more uncertain. It has been argued that Unrestricted Warfare is only one of the four competing schools of thought in the Chinese military. The first school, it is said, is that of the Traditionalists, faithful to Mao's conception of a defensive People's War; the second is represented by the Neo-Traditionalists who favor regional power projection; the third school is that of the High-Tech Revolutionists, who are betting on network-centric warfare in a more distant future. In this view, Unrestricted Warfare (URW) is said to be the most recent addition competing with the other three. Such a characterization is convenient, though not convincing.

For one thing, as the authoritative Science of Military Strategy makes it clear, today's conception of People's War is not your grandfather's conception: "People's War is a form of organization of war, and its role has nothing to do with the level of military technology. The concept of People's War is not confined to the war of low technology only. . . . The great power of the People's War is released through comprehensive national power, the combination of peace time and war time, the combination of the military and the civilian, and *the combination of war actions and non-war actions.*" (55) In short, far from being synonymous with the old peasant guerrilla of lore, today's People's War resembles nothing more than the "civilianization of war" and the rise of cyber-patriots mentioned in Unrestricted Warfare, so the opposition between the first and third school is therefore artificial.

For another, ever since the promulgation by Hu Jintao in December 2004 of the "Historic Missions for Our Military in the New Phase of the New Century," the vocation of the PLA has been officially redefined as power projection rather than mere territorial defense - so that the opposition between the first and second schools is no longer topical either. (56)

Upon scrutiny, then, Unrestricted Warfare is not so much a later *addition* to the three existing schools of thought as a, well - *combination* of the three. As Charles Hawkins remarked in 2000: "The newly emerged unrestricted war concept has philosophical merit on several counts. Advertised as a means to let the "inferior defeat the superior" power, it borrows from each of the other schools of thought and adds its own dimension of greatly expanding the scope of war. Unrestricted warfare advocates borrow from the advanced technology agenda of the RMA enthusiasts, and at the same time propose to project power by any and all means available. For example, if missiles can not intimidate Taiwan, perhaps cyber attacks on critical infrastructure will; or perhaps both should be used in concert. Unrestricted war concepts are also rooted in traditional thinking. *It is People's War and active defense by other or additional means.* By

*expanding the scope of conflict and by using advanced technology there is room in the concept for greater involvement of larger segments of society.” (57)*

Yet, ascertaining the status of Unrestricted Warfare outside military circles is complicated by the state of civil-military relations. Some Western observers have stressed the existence of a three-way struggle between army, party and government, while others have raised the possibility of a “civil-military gap” between military and political elites. (58)

Western observers distinguish four generations of political and military leaders in Communist China: Mao Zedong (1949-76), Deng Xiaoping (1976-92), Jiang Zemin (1992-2003), and Hu Jintao (2003- ). One thing that should be clear by now is that, since the rise of the fourth generation in 2003, the contradiction between the official “Peaceful Rise” diplomatic doctrine and the unofficial Unrestricted Warfare military doctrine has been more apparent than real. As mentioned in the introduction, the fourth generation is making increasing uses of legal warfare, psychological warfare, media warfare, financial warfare, and cyber warfare. In that respect, Unrestricted Warfare could be called “Fourth Generation” Warfare, in both the Chinese and Western senses of the expression. (59)

### **DOD’s ‘Indirect Approach’ to URW**

Though in the aftermath of 9/11, Qiao and Wang’s book enjoyed its proverbial fifteen minutes of fame in the West, the Pentagon has been tip-toeing around Unrestricted Warfare for the past decade (in the unclassified literature at least).

Though mandated by Congress to report annually on the “probable development of Chinese *grand strategy*, security strategy, and military strategy, and military organizations and operational concepts,” the Pentagon’s annual report actually focuses on “kinetic” threats and, in its 2009 edition, devotes only two of its seventy-eight pages to the kind of non-kinetic threats associated with URW. (60)

To catch glimpses of the contours of China’s grand strategy, the best point of departure remains the annual report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (thereafter referred to as the USCC Report) and its various specialized reports on Chinese soft power, strategic deception, cyber capabilities, trade compliance, etc. (61)

One can only speculate as to why the Pentagon has remained relatively quiet about the Unrestricted Warfare manifesto.

The first reason that comes to mind is basic bureaucratic survival. No military institution will spontaneously condone the idea that the military has “lost its monopoly on war,” and/or that war can be waged more effectively through non-military means – which is essentially the message of Qiao and Wang. In that respect, nothing illustrates better the difference of mindset between strategists in revisionist countries and their counterparts in status quo countries than the initial reaction to *Unrestricted Warfare* by one military analyst associated with the U.S. Army War College:

“Many senior PLA leaders will not find the implications of Unrestricted Warfare terribly appealing. For one, it directly challenges the idea of the existence of a clearly identifiable body of expert knowledge for the Chinese soldier of the twenty-first century. If there are no boundaries in warfare then it becomes virtually impossible to train soldiers to master the entire spectrum of modern warfare. Consequently the task for China's institutions of professional military education becomes extremely daunting. Moreover, in unrestricted warfare traditional military hardware - tanks, armored cars, high performance aircraft, and warships - becomes largely peripheral and increasingly irrelevant. And conventional measures of military capability - manpower, firepower, etc. - also fall by the wayside. In an ancient civilization that can be said to have invented bureaucracy, bureaucratic politics tend to be particularly serious. Concepts discussed in Unrestricted Warfare, such as information warfare and economic warfare, may be appealing to China's political leaders because they offer the lure of defense policy on the cheap but generals will find it difficult to make the case on the need for new and expensive weapon systems. Most of China's soldiers are likely to be far less enchanted with these forms of warfare because they will tend to see it translating into smaller defense budgets, lower manpower, less bureaucratic clout, and declining prestige for the PLA.” (62)

This exercise in “mirror imaging,” which may be illustrative of the bureaucratic mindset of ‘Big Army’ in the pre-9/11 era, would in fact have been quite relevant, had the URW manifesto emanated from another status quo country. But it is of the essence of revisionist powers to precisely transcend this kind of corporatist mindset.

The second reason is that, by definition, a status quo power like America cares about its respectability, and does not want to give legitimacy to a concept as scabrous as Unrestricted Warfare (UWR) by including it in its own official doctrine. It is symptomatic that, even though Unconventional Warfare (UW), long part of U.S. doctrine, can easily be mistaken for Unrestricted Warfare Lite from a *conceptual* standpoint, the latest edition of the Unconventional Warfare Manual goes out of its way to stress that, from a *doctrinal* standpoint, UW and URW should not be confused:

“The first rule of [Qiao Liang’s] unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules. Strong countries would not use the same approach against weak countries because “strong countries make the rules, while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes.”... Whether or not the authors break any new ground or establish a new theory is debatable. Their monograph has generated interest in the West primarily for what it may signify in Peoples’ Republic of China strategic thinking— such ideas could not be published without some official sanction in the often inscrutable Chinese government. Army Special Forces Soldiers—and their joint, interagency, and multinational partners— should be aware of unrestricted warfare, but *they must understand that the term is not synonymous with the aforementioned terms, is not approved doctrine, and has a very specific international context and usage.* (63)

That said, at the same time as the Pentagon was downplaying the importance or novelty of Unrestricted Warfare, the U.S. military was quietly adopting some of its tenets. This low-key

revolution in strategic affairs has proceeded along two main axes. At the spatial level, by the broadening of the kinetic battlefield to include the non-kinetic battlesphere. At the temporal level, by the blurring of the distinction between wartime and peacetime through the adoption of the concept of “persistent conflict,” and the addition of the so-called “phase zero” (environment shaping) to the traditional four phases of military campaigns (64)

Three other “indirect approaches” to Unrestricted Warfare are worth mentioning here:

*The “Contested Commons” Agenda:* while U.S. academics frame the rising antagonism between America and China in terms of an old-fashioned power transition between two great powers, U.S. officials understandably prefer to highlight the fact that America is the main provider of “global public goods,” the main guarantor of the “global commons” and, as such, uniquely qualified to raise the problem of “contested commons” - a broad framework which includes the militarization of space and the territorialization of the seas, and put the growing sea, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities of China in proper perspective. (65)

*The Withering Away of Clausewitz:* At the doctrinal level, the past four years have seen a spectacular re-evaluation of the “indirect approach” promoted by Liddell Hart, and the demotion of the direct approach associated with Clausewitz. The old Prussian soldier, to be sure, will never die – but he will nonetheless fade away. Already, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review marked the rehabilitation in all but in name of Liddell Hart in official doctrine.(66) The 2007 edition of the Counterinsurgency Manual signals the return of Lawrence of Arabia (Liddell Hart’s alter ego), and the much-touted shift from an “enemy-centric” approach to a “population-centric” approach represents a further setback for Clausewitzology. Last but not least, the 2008 edition of the Unconventional Warfare Manual itself is the most explicit institutional acknowledgment to date that, when it comes to grand strategy, Sun-Tzu (Liddell Hart’s spiritual father) is more relevant than Clausewitz:

“Competition between contending groups using all their means of power has always characterized the international environment. In the modern era since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), this competition has generally been conceived as occurring between nation-states. Such competition involved all instruments of state power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) expanded in some recent policy documents to diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL)... Only when other instruments of national power were exhausted or proved inadequate was the military instrument of power wielded to settle international differences.... Clausewitz famously characterized such use of state military power as, “an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will.” This assertion has been profoundly influential. However, it is too constrained a vision for applying national power in today’s world. The ancient Sun Tzu is more relevant today; although battles should be won, “winning 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill; defeating the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

*The Hybrid Threat Debate:* If, in a revisionist power like China, the key word of strategists is the dynamic concept of “Combination,” the focus of their counterparts in a status quo power like

America is “Hybridity” - a more static concept, to be sure, but one on which an inter-service consensus can be reached, if only by default.

In a series of articles published in the past five years, Colonel Frank Hoffman has analyzed the “multi-modal” (conventional and irregular) and “multi-nodal” (state and non-state actors) aspects of Hybrid Threats and, with the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war in mind, emphasized the combination of “the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare.” For Hoffman, “Our greatest challenge in the future will not come from a state that selects one approach but from states or groups that select from the whole menu of tactics and technologies and blend them in innovative ways to meet their own strategic culture, geography, and aims.” (67)

Warning against too narrow a focus on “tactics-and-technology,” Colonel Nathan Freier has called on military analysts to go beyond the “defense-specific” (i.e. military) dimensions of hybrid threats and factor in the “defense-relevant” (civilian) aspects as well.

Unafraid of being labeled a heretic, Freier has actually gone so far as to hint that China’s conventional military build-up in recent years could well be just a diversion: “It might be useful to recognize that the purely military aspects of hybrid, high-end challenges, e.g., a hostile state’s armed forces, may be peripheral to the actual conflict or competition. Instead, these components might be diversions or foils employed by adversaries to increase U.S. risk calculations or capture U.S. attention while the real “war” occurs in other domains—politics, economics, social action, etc.” (68) And, in truth, a good case can be made that, just like academics are too obsessed with a conventional “major war,” military strategists may well be too focused on a high-tech “local war” (Taiwan) at the risk of missing the bigger picture.

Yet, as Freier himself acknowledges, there is considerable *institutional* resistance within the U.S. military to the concept of non-kinetic war: “Today, roughly half of the Defense Department focuses on the wars we have and is too exhausted by them to see anything but serial counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the future. The other half still focuses on high-tech war with archetypal rising powers, though states actually falling into this category increasingly see politics, economics and unconventional resistance as more effective tools against us.” (69)

There is much of value in the ongoing conversation on “hybridity.” More often than not, though, since it takes place in a geopolitical vacuum, this discussion remains limited to the elaboration of a *grammar of hybrid threats* and has yet to tackle the question of the *logic of hybrid wars*.

Since Unrestricted Warfare is best described as a stealth war (70), it is no surprise if it has remained something of an “unknown unknown” outside the Pentagon. The interagency bureaucracy has never heard of it, nor does the academic world ever make reference to it. The unclassified literature is not exactly user-friendly, and as such unlikely to raise the situational awareness of the civilian world.

Even within the military, URW does not have the visibility it deserves: with two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military debate since 2005 has predictably become trapped in “presentism.” The need to develop a coherent doctrine for Counterinsurgency warfare (COIN) –

then to elaborate a whole-of-government approach at the interagency level - has sucked the intellectual oxygen out of the broader strategic debate opened in 1999 by Unrestricted Warfare (URW).

According to Freier, one of the main drafters of the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), “There was a concern that introduction of the concept of “unrestricted warfare” into the defense strategy might add confusion. To senior leaders, it was important first for defense consumers to understand the most urgent manifestations of the irregular challenge—terrorism and insurgency. The exclusion of an explanation of concepts like “unrestricted warfare” likely artificially limited meaningful consideration of the irregular challenge and its implications to commonly recognized forms of “irregular warfare.” (71).

Five years later, though, it may be time for the Pentagon to acknowledge that, at the intellectual (if not operational) level, the difference between COIN and UWR is in fact more one of degree rather than one of kind. The main difference of course is that, while COIN deals with tactical and operational matters within an intra-state context, URW deals with strategic and grand-strategic matters in an inter-state context. But in both cases, the logical lines of operations (LLOOs) predominate over the physical lines of operations. In that respect, both COIN and URW can be said to be “eighty percent political, twenty percent military.”

There is no reason a priori why DOD cannot elaborate a whole-of-government approach to URW the way it did with COIN. If you can grasp the six LLOOs of COIN, surely you can grasp the twenty-four LLOOs of URW.

Writing in 1998, Qiao and Wang remarked about the sorry state of the U.S. interagency: “What is surprising is that such a large nation unexpectedly does not have a unified strategy and command structure to deal with the threat [of non-military warfare]. What makes one even more so wonder whether to laugh or cry is that they have 49 departments and offices responsible for anti-terrorist activities, but there is very little coordination and cooperation among them...[In addition, the U.S.] spends seven billion dollars in funds for anti-terrorism, which is only 1/25 of the U.S. \$250 billion military expenditure.” (p. 107).

A decade later, much progress has been made in fixing the interagency mess, yet much remains to be done. In the course of the 2009 Unrestricted Warfare Symposium, the director of Program Analysis and Evaluation at the Pentagon emphasized the need to “establish a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) similar to Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs), which have served as a useful framework for prioritization of DOD requirements... Effective response to national security challenges requires a whole-of- government approach; QNSR would allow consideration of these complex issues in a coordinated fashion.” (72).

Raising the situational awareness of the interagency through a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) has indeed become all the more necessary now that the Department of State has decided to come up with a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) – an exercise which, by definition, privileges the diplomacy-development nexus at the expense of the diplomacy-defense nexus. On URW as on so many issues, if the Pentagon does not take the interagency lead, nobody else will.

If better information is a top priority, better education is a close second. As the Pentagon's PA & E director pointed out, the need to close the academic-military gap has never been more urgent than today: "Much of warfare today—hybrid, irregular, unrestricted warfare- is mostly concerned with soft power and social issues, and we really do not know how to do that. For the last four or five years, we have spent an extensive amount of our energy trying to understand that. We have consulted with anthropologists, historians, and sociologists to try to understand their science and bring it into our analytic capability. We have made some progress, but I think we are still a few years away."

While military analysts, who are for the most part trained in operation research (OR), have not hesitated in recent years to reach out to social scientists for insights on the nature of the China Threat, this kind of outreach is not without its perils. Not to make too fine a point: academics are less likely to shed light on Unrestricted Warfare than to endorse what journalist James Mann, in a scathing critique of the China Fantasy of U.S. elites, has called the Soothing Scenario:

"The Soothing Scenario holds that China's economic development will lead inexorably to an opening of China's political system. While this is merely one of the possible outcomes one can envision for China's future, it is certainly the mainstream view of China in America today. The purveyors of the Soothing Scenario include leading academic experts on China, business executives who are eager to trade and invest in China, and the think-tanks and other elite organizations that depend on corporate contribution for their funding...Leading scholars on China...have discovered that they can make money on the side as consultants for companies doing business in China. When the academics write op-ed pieces, testify in Congress, or take part in seminars, they are identified by their jobs at universities: rarely are the additional financial stakes in China business or consulting disclosed." (73)

The problem won't be solved by avoiding China specialists and reaching out to IR generalists who, being only "accidental" China watchers, presumably do not have any particular incentive to "spin" the China challenge. For when ostensibly debating China, the main concern of mainstream IR generalists these days is not so much how to assess China's threat to America as to contain the threat of rising theories (in particular PTT) to their own pet theories, academic status, and "grant strategies." (74)

The net result is an endless series of confusing *faux debats* which generate more heat than light, and are often misleading from a policy standpoint. Liberal institutionalists, for instance, are prone to criticize PTT for the wrong reasons, by arguing *ad nauseam* that Beijing's spectacular increase in participation in IGOs in recent years constitutes the incontrovertible proof that China is becoming a "responsible stakeholder."

The truth is, upon scrutiny, this activism on the part of post-Maoist China awfully resembles, at times, a Trotskyite infiltration strategy ("entrism") or a Gramscian subversion strategy ("long march through the institutions"). Participation is one thing, "socialization" quite another. China's membership in the WTO in the past decade has neither led Beijing to put an end to massive piracy regarding intellectual property rights, nor – if the Doha Round is any indication – has it

led to an overall strengthening of the WTO. More importantly, while in 2001 China joined the Western-created institution called WTO, that very same year, China also created an anti-Western institution called the SCO which, in the long term, may well have a greater impact on the world order than the WTO itself (if only because the SCO deals with high politics while the WTO is confined to low politics).

Like the proverbial drunkard looking for his keys under the lamp post “because that’s where the light is,” liberal institutionalists – who have the ear of the current Administration - have been looking for the keys of the New World Order under the light of Western-created IGOs – because that’s the only “light” available when you can’t read anything other than English. For all their professed devotion to “global governance,” liberal institutionalists have produced hundreds of monographs on the EU, NATO and the WTO, and next to nothing on OPEC, the OIC or the SCO. Yet, there is a whole galaxy of non-Western IGOs out there, which China is increasingly interested in as potential force multipliers (e.g. the Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum created in 2004), and which should become a research priority for the Pentagon’s Minerva project. (75)

In short, while military analysts should continue to reach out to academe, they should always keep in mind that debates in academic circles never take place in an institutional vacuum, and that academic tribes are just as likely to cloak their institutional or ideological preferences in the language of science as do military tribes.

One thing is sure: As long as strategic education, strategic intelligence, strategic planning, and strategic communication remain at an all-time low (76), the formulation and implementation of an American grand strategy will remain a pipedream. And if the Pentagon does not take the initiative to bring a grand strategic mindset to the interagency, nobody else will.

### **From Elite ‘Protracted War’ to Mass ‘Cyber Blitzkrieg’?**

For at least three reasons, the U.S. military has been more inclined to view Unrestricted Warfare as some sort of ‘Shock-and-Awe with Chinese characteristics’ than as the continuation of Maoist Protracted War by other means. For one thing, the military establishment of a country whose historical experience has been shaped by traumatic episodes like Pearl Harbor and 9/11 cannot but be haunted by the question of “strategic surprise.” For another, the fascination with Clausewitzian decisive battles, combined with the worshipping of technological prowess, has made the U.S. military uniquely vulnerable to “the cult of the quick.”(77) Last but not least, some passages of *Unrestricted Warfare* itself actually encourage an interpretation in terms of Blitzkrieg.

While the book does a good job articulating the relations between Strategy and Space, its main shortcoming is that it has little to say about Strategy and Time. URW dismisses traditional military thinking in terms of “phases” and promotes “synchrony” yet, the authors tell us, “synchrony” should not be confused with “simultaneity.” That’s about all. This neglect is all the more curious as the main difference between a “Western” and “Eastern” way of war has always been the relation between Strategy and Time (78) and that, more than ever today, the temporal dimension constitutes the main vulnerability of this “empire with attention deficit disorder” (Nial Ferguson) called America.

One could argue that, if the *grammar* of Unrestricted Warfare is best described by the concept of Combination Warfare, the *logic* of Unrestricted Warfare remains that of Protracted War. As Colonel Kintner put it fifty years ago: “As conceived by Mao, the strategy of protracted conflict is the lever for effecting a gradual change in the relative strength of the two sides - the revolutionary and the status quo... Thus, unlike most Western strategists, who have traditionally equated war with the clash of arms, Communist leaders are trained to think of conflict in much larger dimensions. Military action for them is but one of the many forms of warfare. Other forms of conflict – political, psychological, sociological, technological and economic – are just as important or, under certain circumstances, even more important... *In order to survive or win this conflict, strategies must be planned to the scale of decades, not years.*” (79)

What cannot be overemphasized is the fact the overwhelming majority of the twenty-four logical lines of operations identified by *Unrestricted Warfare* are definitely *not* susceptible to a Blitzkrieg-like approach. Consider, for instance, the different timelines of legal warfare, financial warfare, and cyber-warfare.

*The timelines of legal warfare* are very long indeed. In 1971, the year when the People’s Republic of China became a member of the UN, political analyst Adda Bozeman warned that the Western-inspired international legal order embodied by the UN would eventually be undermined by the increase of non-Western nations in the wake of decolonization. But overturning this international order (or at least some parts of it) is not the kind of thing that can be achieved overnight, and the first significant challenge to the Western legal order only took place in 1990, with the OIC-sponsored Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. In the post-Cold War era, within the framework of the UN General Assembly, China has not hesitated to play the role of revisionist leader along with the OIC; within the UN Security Council, China has behaved by and large as a status quo power - though its foot-dragging on Iran and North Korea show that being a status quo power is not necessarily synonymous these days with being a “responsible stakeholder.”

Only in the past decade has China decided to add multilateral organizations as the “fourth pillar” of a diplomacy which, until then, had focused on three sets of bilateral relations (great powers, neighboring countries, developing countries). In that respect, liberal institutionalists are right to argue that, unlike previous international orders, the current one is “easier to join and harder to overturn.” When it comes to legal warfare, China’s offensive for now appears to be both limited and “laser-guided” - as in the case of “maritime lawfare.” At any rate, legal warfare calls for a protracted approach, unless it is part of a broader “swarming” offensive (e.g. the ‘Cartoon Jihad’ of 2006). (80)

*The timelines for financial warfare* are not nearly as long those of legal warfare, yet not nearly as short as those of cyberwarfare either. It is only in the past two years that Chinese officials have called for an end to the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, and it will probably take a decade or so for China to achieve this goal without shooting itself in the foot in the process (or less, if Russia, OPEC and/or the EU join in). In the meantime, China is making sure the yuan is informally becoming the common currency of East Asia, while increasing its outbound direct investments (ODI). (81)

*The timelines for cyber-warfare* are the shortest. Though one could argue that the cyber-offensives that have been going on nonstop since the 2003 Titan Rain offensive constitute a long war of attrition, the image that usually comes to mind about “cyber-warfare” is closer to shock-and-awe than to siege warfare. Just as the information revolution has led to an acceleration of History in general, the cyber weapon has the potential to lead to an acceleration of war. As former counterterrorist czar Richard Clarke points out, the similarity of the cyber age with the advent of the missile age is striking:

“As in the 1960s, the speed of war is rapidly accelerating. Then, long-range missiles could launch from the prairie of Wyoming and hit Moscow in only thirty-five minutes. Strikes in cyber war move at a rate approaching the speed of light. And this speed favors a strategy of preemption, which means the chances that people can become trigger-happy are high. This, in turn, makes cyber war all the more likely. If a cyber-war commander does not attack quickly, his network may be destroyed first. If a commander does not preempt an enemy, he may find that the target nation has suddenly raised new defenses or even disconnected from the worldwide Internet. There seems to be a premium in cyber war to making the first move.”

Today, the risks of miscalculation are even higher, enhancing the chances that what begins as a battle of computer programs ends in a shooting war. Cyber war, with its low risks to the cyber warriors, may be seen by a decision maker as a way of sending a signal, making a point without actually shooting. An attacker would likely think of a cyber offensive that knocked out an electric-power grid and even destroyed some of the grid’s key components (keeping the system down for weeks), as a somewhat antiseptic move; a way to keep tensions as low as possible. But for the millions of people thrown into the dark and perhaps the cold, unable to get food, without access to cash and dealing with social disorder, it would be in many ways the same as if bombs had been dropped on their cities. Thus, the nation attacked might well respond with “kinetic activity.”

Responding, however, assumes that you know who attacked you. And, one of the major differences between cyber war and conventional war—one that makes the battlefield more perilous—is what cyber warriors call “the attribution problem.” Put more simply, it is a matter of whodunit. In cyberspace, attackers can hide their identity, cover their tracks. Worse, they may be able to mislead, placing blame on others by spoofing the source.” (82)

In the academic world, a theory known as Offense-Defense Balance posits that, all things being equal, the state of military technology at any given time tends to favor either the offensive or the defensive, thus making war either more or less likely. With the advent of cyber-weapons, the balance has drastically tilted toward the offensive - a development all the more worrisome that a large-scale offensive can be the result of a spontaneous cyber *levee en masse*. (83)

In a seminal essay on “The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues” published in 2001, Gerritt Gong argued that the information revolution has given a *strategic* dimension to the question of collective memory in just about every corner of the globe: “Accelerated by the collision of information technology with concerns of the past, issues of “remembering and forgetting” are creating history. They are shaping the strategic alignments of

the future...Modern technologies, including digital technologies and the Internet, are bringing together images and sounds that give remembering and forgetting issues surprising intensity, speed, scope, and emotional resonance...Memory, history, and strategic alignment are inextricably linked.” (84)

As Gong points out, the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 triggered a chain reaction: “The news of the bombing traveled first by Internet, straight from Europe to China’s students, who angrily mobilized. Pro-Chinese hackers from Hong Kong ...shut down sites for the Department of the Interior, Department of Energy, National Park Service, and other official U.S. government agencies. ... The Chinese government was forced to react to nationalistic contentions that the United States had deliberately destroyed a sovereign diplomatic structure in a direct affront to China. ...This combination of globally sourced cyber news and multidimensional cyber attack underscores how unpredictable emotionally charged remembering and forgetting issues coupled with new technologies can become. Chinese citizens saw the accidental bombing in the context of the history of U.S.-China relations. In that past, some saw a history of gunboat diplomacy promoting Western commercial penetration and exploitation...The sharp divergence of U.S. and Chinese popular perceptions is a disturbing reminder that global movements of information, capital, and technology may knit us into one world, but one that still has fundamental misunderstandings and misperceptions at its core. *Indeed, the global speed of change combined with divergent historical prisms may in some cases accelerate international misunderstanding and crisis.*” (emphasis added)

In that respect, the most likely cyber-scenario may not be a PLA-sponsored, anti-U.S. ‘shock-and-awe’ offensive in the context of an invasion of Taiwan, so much as a spontaneous cyber *levee en masse* on whatever issue that happens to resonate with an increasingly nationalist Chinese public opinion.

Chinese strategic culture has traditionally been defensive, as Chinese General Li Jijun rightly reminded his American counterparts. Unlike Christopher Columbus and other Western discoverers, Admiral Zheng He never tried to establish colonies; and to this day, unlike the US, China does not have 761 military bases in 156 countries. (85) But as the examples of both Germany and Japan have shown, strategic cultures do change, sometimes drastically. For most of their history, Germans were perceived in Europe as a bunch of harmless pipe-smoking, beer-drinking, day-dreamers – except, that is, for that short 1870-1945 period. Similarly, Japan may have been the only country in the world that tried to “dis-invent” the gun by banning firearms in the 17th century, but it is also a country that managed to militarize something as peaceful as Zen in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. (86)

Deng Xiaoping was unquestionably the most talented statesmen the world has ever seen since Otto von Bismarck; but as is well-known, after Bismarck’s retirement in 1890, lesser talented leaders were unable to restrain an increasingly nationalist German public opinion. Meanwhile, the technological revolution between 1880 and 1914 created the same acceleration of history, and the same “short-war illusion,” that we are witnessing today. (87)

The national Patriotic Education Campaign put in place by Chinese leaders since 1991 has exacerbated the victimization narrative at the popular level.(88) Meanwhile, since the 1999

incident, the number of Chinese Internet users has gone from 20 to 400 million, and the number of “cyber-patriots” has presumably increased accordingly. Add to that the understandable overconfidence of elites that have managed the unprecedented feat in history of lifting 300 million people out of poverty in one generation, and one can only imagine what the chain reaction would be in the case of another accidental bombing, or of a major incident-at-sea. There is still, however, one major difference between Wilhelmine Germany and today’s China: while German elites knew that time was not on Germany’s side, most Chinese are hopefully smart enough to realize that the future belongs to them if only they keep on following Deng Xiaoping’s advice: “hide your strength, bide your time.”

### **The Long War Revisited**

Ever since 1979, the defining characteristic of the international environment has been the return of both China and Islam in History after a two-century-long eclipse. During the 1980s, the U.S. was too fixated on waging the Second Cold War to ponder the historical significance of the revolutions engineered by Deng Xiaoping and Khomeiny. During the 1990s, intoxicated by the prospects offered by the Asian markets, U.S. elites failed to recalibrate America’s policy vis-à-vis China, and came dangerously close to fulfilling Lenin’s prophecy: “the capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.”

Then, in the decade following 9/11, Washington singled-mindedly focused on Islam and, in a fit of absent-mindedness, ended up “borrowing money from China to give to Saudi Arabia” (as then-candidate Barak Obama put it in his 2008 campaign). By the end of the Bush administration, the Global Trends 2025 of the National Intelligence Council would announce: “In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the global shift in relative wealth and economic power now under way – roughly from West to East – is without precedent in modern history.” (89)

It is now time for U.S. elites to take a closer look at China and, to begin with, to realize that – in the felicitous expression of Lucian Pye - “China is not a nation: it is a civilization masquerading as a nation.” Hence the asymmetry between the American and Chinese visions of both history and geopolitics:

If you are American, your historical frame of reference is the past 60 years, and China cannot but come across as a “revisionist power” threatening the U.S.-created status quo. If you are Chinese, your historical frame of reference is the past 3,000 years, and the Middle Kingdom is simply regaining today its legitimate place under the sun after a “brief” (200 years) interruption. In short, one man’s revisionism is another man’s normalization. In addition, if you are American, you tend to assume that China, as the last multi-national empire on earth, is an anachronism bound to undergo significant retraction at some point. If you are Chinese, by contrast, you think that global economic and information networks will make it possible to build a “virtual” Greater China (91) that includes the diaspora from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific all the way to – America?

There is, at any rate, something terribly naïve in trying to reduce the future to the following alternative: “If the defining struggle of the twenty-first century is between China and the United States, China will have the advantage. If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will triumph.” (90) This belated interest in the “West” on the part of our academic globalists is commendable but, theirs is a false alternative. For one thing, there is such a thing as a China-Islam nexus; for another, there is no longer any such thing as an Atlantic West.

In the twentieth-century, every single rising power, from Imperial Germany to Imperial Japan, from the Soviet Union to the United States, has tried to enlist Islam as a force multiplier. There is no reason to think that China will decide to be the exception to the rule (especially given the magnitude of its energy needs), nor is there any reason to assume that Islam will not be happy to reciprocate. Already, as Kishore Mahbubani observed: “The rise of China is warmly welcome throughout the Islamic world. China is increasingly seen as the only card that the Islamic world can play to temper America’s unwise geopolitical policies.” (92)

While the absence of a “unity of command” makes the idea of a Sino-Islamic *Axis* (Huntington) rather hyperbolic, there is unquestionably - on some issues and in some fora - a “unity of effort” that justifies the notion of a Sino-Islamic *Nexus*. Oblivious of this fundamental truth, some strategists like Nathan Freier have argued that defining the challenge of our generation in terms of a “Long War” risks leading to too narrow a focus on the Islamic challenge alone at the expense the china challenge and other contingencies:

“It is true that the United States is at the front end of a long, irregular (and potentially catastrophic) conflict with a web of determined extremist opponents. In the author’s view, it is not true, however, that the “long war,” as it is narrowly described, constitutes by itself the totality of active, hostile competition and resistance to the United States... Indeed, the “long war” against radical jihadists, as it is conceived by security and defense leaders in and out of uniform, is only one aspect of a complex mosaic of non-state and state competition and resistance. Adherence to the “long war” concept artificially limits meaningful consideration of the full range of opponents certain to aggressively push back (politically, economically, socially, and at times quite violently) against American primacy.” (93)

While the concern is legitimate, Freier the strategist lets his “inner planner” get in the way and end up putting on the same level “threats” and “risks,” historical challenges and natural disasters. The job of the policy planner, to be sure, is to compile a laundry list of possible challenges and contingencies as comprehensive as possible. The job of the policy-maker, by contrast, is to set priorities and in that respect, the two generational priorities are clearly Islam and China, not tsunamis and pandemics. Rather than throw away the concept of Long War, what is needed is a redefinition of it that includes the China-Islam nexus.

Since the Muslim world is far from monolithic, the main difference between the Cold War and the Long War is that there is no such thing as a Sino-Islamic bloc similar to the former Sino-Soviet bloc. That said, not only is there a *unity of effort* (ends) for a selective rollback of the Western-inspired order, but there is also a *strategic isomorphy* (ways and means) which defense

analyst Robert Bunker, in a discussion on *Unrestricted Warfare*, expressed in a striking metaphor: “Many of the lessons learned are borrowed from non-state groups— terrorists, insurgents, and hackers—and, in this sense, *Unrestricted Warfare is akin in some ways to an al Qaeda manual for states*. However, while al Qaeda manuals are tactical and operational in focus, this work is operational and strategic, even grand strategic, in orientation.” (94)

In and of itself, the existence of this China-Islam Nexus does not make a “Clash of Civilizations” unavoidable (95). An equally plausible scenario – one that was the subject of a lively discussion in Washington in the summer of 2007 - is that of a “World without the West,” i.e. a consensus on the part of the Rest to organize its own affairs while simply ignoring the West. (96)

There is no such thing as an Atlantic West anymore. Outside official discourses, the West is a residual notion. For the optimists, what there is instead is a competition between three empires (America, Europe, and China) for influence in the “Second World.” In fact, on some issues, there is only a difference of degree between the Brussels Consensus and the Beijing Consensus, while there is a difference in kind between these two and the Washington Consensus. (97)

For the pessimists, there is, on the one hand, an America so obsessed with the *idea* of retaining “global leadership” as to be unable to concretely cope with the *realities* of a Post-American World; on the other hand, there is an energy-dependent Europe that seems to think that Finlandization by Russia is a lesser evil compared to Islamization by Arabia. In short, Europe’s default grand strategy boils down to that: “Better Eurasia than Eurabia.”

If a West is to be re-invented, it will have to take the form of a looser, Greater West, resting on three pillars: America, Europe, and Russia.(98) At the very least, just like winning the Cold War required at some point playing the China card, winning the Long War will require playing the Russia card.

### **Sun-Tzu Rules, OK ?: The Future Is the Past – with Chinese Characteristics**

In the post-Cold War era, at a time when every other book coming out of academic presses bore the title “The Social Construction of – fill the blank,” there was something immensely refreshing in the attempt by Clausewitzian theologians to reassert an unchanging “essence” of war. And in truth, given the amount of wishful thinking in the West at the time, there was even some pedagogical merit in leading strategist Colin Gray’s contention that “Clausewitz rules, OK? The Future is the Past – with GPS.” (99)

Las! The September 2001 events have reminded us that, like just about everything else in life - including Peace itself (100), War is, always has been, and always will be, a social construction. In the past decade, the evolution of the U.S. strategic discourse has taken the form of a gradual, reluctant acknowledgement of this fundamental truth.

War is socially constructed. English and French soldiers circa 1400 would have been greatly surprised to learn they were fighting the “Hundred Years War” (1373-1453): the expression was invented only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

War is socially constructed. If there is no chapter on “opium warfare” in Clausewitz’ *Vom Kriege*, it is because the social construction of war at the time made that concept unthinkable in Prussian military circles. That sure did not prevent a nation of 40 million people from subduing a much bigger country of 400 million people through the weaponization of opium.

War is socially constructed. For the professional soldier today, War is many things but, unless he does not mind standing accused of war crimes, War is first of all what the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) says War is. If the international conventions designed during the Clausewitzian era are no longer adequate for today’s wars, either you make it a priority to change the conventions – or chances are that, even with the bravest and smartest soldiers, you will lose your war. (111)

War is socially constructed. As they embark on the drafting of a new Strategic Concept since 1999, NATO Allies are currently debating whether a cyber-attack should be considered as an “act of war” calling for an Article 5 response (the U.S. position) or as something else falling under Article 4 contingencies (the German position).

War is socially constructed. Domestically at least, the fine distinction between “organized crime” and “irregular warfare” can be overturned in twenty-four’s time. The same U.S. lawmakers who talk about urban violence in terms of “third-generation gangs” can decide that the time has come to reframe the issue in terms of “fourth-generation warfare” – and goodbye *Posse Comitatus*.

War is socially constructed. Reduced to its simplest expression, the main problem with Clausewitzologists is their failure to realize that the Clausewitzian dictum, being always *reversible*, is at best a half-truth. In ordinary times, war can indeed be said to be “the continuation of politics by other means.” In extra-ordinary times, it is politics that becomes “the continuation of war by other means.” If the 20th Century has a good chance of going down in history as “The Age of Extremes” (112), it is because it was, for the most part, an extra-ordinary time.

In the first half of the century, domestic politics itself, in Europe at least, *was* the continuation of war by other means. That was the message of the two most influential Western political thinkers of the time: on the left, Antonio Gramsci, for whom politics unfolded along a spectrum ranging from “war of maneuver” to “war of position”; on the right, Carl Schmitt, for whom the essence of politics was the “friend-enemy” distinction, and the difference between politics and war not a matter of substance so much as a matter of *intensity*.

In the second half the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, politics continued to be “the continuation of war by other means,” though mostly at the international level - that’s why it was called the Cold War. When Walter Lippman in 1947 published the little book by that name, many contemporaries believed the concept to be too oxymoronic to ever endure. In truth, it was not any more exotic than the concept of Armed Peace in vogue in Europe between 1870 and 1914. It later turned out that, far from being a radical novelty, the concept of Cold War (*guerra fria*) had first been used in medieval Spain to designate the, well – Long War between Islam and Christendom (711-1683). (113)

Could the Long War be the Cold War of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? At the very least, it looks like we may – as the old Chinese curse has it “live in interesting times.” In September 1991, Deng Xiaoping’s claim that the U.S. and China were heading toward a Cold War went largely unnoticed in the West. Two decades later, fifty-five percent of the Chinese population (six hundred million people) appears to agree with Deng. Meanwhile, a plurality of Americans already thinks that the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will be the Chinese Century. (114)

War is socially constructed. Pay attention when Chinese strategists argue that Mao’s old definition “war is politics without bloodshed, politics is war without bloodshed” needs a “revision,” and declare that the clearest exponent of Unrestricted Warfare could well be Old Nick himself: “A chasm has already appeared between traditional soldiers and what we call modern soldiers. Although this gap is not unbridgeable, it does require a leap in terms of a complete military rethink...The method is to create a complete military Machiavelli...Even though Machiavelli was not the earlier source of an ‘an ideology of going beyond limits’ (China’s Han Feizi preceded him), he was its clearest exponent.” (115).

War is socially constructed. If Counterinsurgency Warfare can be said to be the “graduate level of war,” then Unrestricted Warfare deserves to be called the “post-graduate level of war.” Revisionist powers like China know it, which is why there are today more *Chinese* military officers studying in U.S. universities than American military officers. (116)

War is socially constructed. There is only *one* legitimate reason why the U.S. military should go on pretending there is such a thing as an “essence” of war: if they don’t define their job, in a self-deprecating manner, as “killing people and breaking things,” their civilian masters will not hesitate to use, misuse and abuse them for just about any conceivable task, from baby-sitting to garbage collecting. That said, to the extent that there is really such a thing as an essence of War, it resides in its *interactive* dimension. If your peer competitor decides to trade Clausewitz for Mahan, Liddell Hart and Sun-Tzu (117), drop Clausewitz and pick up Mahan, Liddell Hart and Sun-Tzu.

In short, in a status quo country like America, military strategists would do well to err on the side of caution and decide that, until further notice, War will be defined as “whatever the revisionist peer-competitor decides War is.” If you are searching for a “unified field theory” of war, then, look no further than *Unrestricted Warfare*.

In an ideal world, questions of grand strategy should not be at the center of attention of an already overburdened military. In post-modern America, though, the political class is too focused on the electoral “permanent campaign” to develop an interest in “grand strategy.” If the U.S. military is either unable or unwilling to deal with grand strategic questions, it will not necessarily end in a tragedy: but the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will sure go down in history as the Chinese Century.

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(1) See Aaron Friedberg's much-discussed "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?," *International Security*, Vol.30, No. 2, Fall 2005, [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3002\\_pp007-045\\_friedberg.pdf](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3002_pp007-045_friedberg.pdf).

(2) Raimo Vayrynen, ed., *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*, London: Routledge, 2006; Evan Luard, *The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1988, Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, 1991.

(3) "War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all around the world...and states still have armed forces which they use as a symbol of power. Nonetheless, war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists." Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York: Knopf, 2005.

(4) David W. Barno, "Military Adaptation in Complex Operations," *Prism*, Vol.1, No.1, 12/2009, [www.ndu.edu/inss/press/prism/1/4\\_prism\\_27-36\\_Barno.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/prism/1/4_prism_27-36_Barno.pdf). General Barno is the current director of the Near East Southeast Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University.

(5) For a concise tour d'horizon of the Hybrid War debate, see Dave Dilegge, "Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars? – Revisited," *Small Wars Journal*, August 24, 2008 <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/08/are-we-ready-for-hybrid-wars-r/>.

(6) Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999, pp.141-142. The FBIS translation is available at [www.cryptome.org/cuw.htm](http://www.cryptome.org/cuw.htm). According to Robert J. Bunker, only 110 pages out of the original 254 pages have been translated. "Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay I," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.11, No. 1, Spring 2000.

(7) In the sense used by Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.

(8) Dean Cheng, "Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.11, No 1, Spring 2000.

(9) Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005. On the intra-Chinese debate over "Peaceful Rise," see Bonnie S.

Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, "The Changing Ecology of Foreign-Policy Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of 'Peaceful Rise,'" *The China Quarterly*, 190, June 2007.

(10) Timothy Walton, "Treble Spyglass, Treble Spear: China's Three Warfares," *Defense Concepts*, Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Vol. 4, Winter 2010, [4www.c4ads.org/files/Three%20Warfare%202010.pdf](http://www.c4ads.org/files/Three%20Warfare%202010.pdf); Brian M. Mazanec, "The Art of (Cyber) War," *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, issue 16, spring 2009 [www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/mazanec.php](http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/mazanec.php).

(11) U.S. Department of State, China's Strategic Modernization: Report from the ISAB Task Force, International Security Advisory Board, Washington DC, 2008. [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ISAB2008.pdf](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ISAB2008.pdf).

(12) See Robert Gilpin's classic "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol.18, 4, 1988, [www.metu.edu.tr/~utuba/Gilpin.pdf](http://www.metu.edu.tr/~utuba/Gilpin.pdf).

(13) In a narrow sense, Power Transition Theory (PTT) is associated with the collective manifesto edited by Ronald L. Tammen and Douglas Lemke, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Chatham House, 2000. In a broader sense, it includes the variant known as Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), associated with Robert Gilpin (*War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1983) and George Modelski (*Long Cycles in World Politics*, University of Washington Press, 1987). The main disagreements center on whether the key variable is the differential rate of growth (HST) or the dissatisfaction with the status quo (PPT), and on whether war is initiated by the decline hegemon (HST) or the rising power (PTT).

(14) Ronald L. Tammen and Douglas Lemke, op. cit., p.6.

(15) Jack S. Levy, "Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China," in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

(16) Within the limits of this essay, it is not possible to discuss why this characterization of the 1870-1914 period, uncritically adopted by most American social scientists, would make most European historians cringe: "It's not right: it's not even wrong." For more on the subject, see Steve Chan, *China, the US, and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique*, Routledge, 2008.

(17) Joshua Cooper Ramos, *The Beijing Consensus*, London: The Foreign Policy Center, 2004, p.54.

(18) James Kraska and Brian Wilson, "China Wages Maritime Lawfare," *Foreign Policy*, March 12, 2009, [http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/11/china\\_wages\\_maritime\\_lawfare](http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/11/china_wages_maritime_lawfare).

(19) Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, p.6. This broad conception, which comes close to being synonymous with *statecraft* itself, is equivalent to the German conception of *Zivilmacht* articulated by Haans W. Maull in the early 1990s. See Sebastian Harnish and Hanns W. Maull,

eds. *Germany as a Civilian Power? : The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, Manchester University Press, 2001. In the American conception of soft power elaborated by Joseph Nye, by contrast, hard power include military and economic power, while soft power is mostly cultural. On the debate over soft power within China, see also Carola McGiffert, ed., *Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World*, A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative, CSIS, March 2009 [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305\\_mcgiffert\\_chinesesoftware\\_web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftware_web.pdf).

(20) This long-forgotten dimension is being rediscovered by historians today. See Fred Bridgham, ed., *The First World War as a Clash of Cultures*, Camden House, 2006.

(21) A confrontation between Huntington thesis and PTT proponents would seem all the more necessary that they stand diametrically opposed on the question of war initiation: for the former, the main danger is the global escalation of local and/or regional “fault-line” wars; for the latter, major wars are initiated by great powers and diffuse downwards from the global to the regional level.

(22) David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytic Frameworks,” *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4, Spring 2003, and “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,” *International Security*, Vol.28, No.3, Winter 2003/2004.

(23) For a critique, see Thomas J. Christensen’s remarkable “Posing Problems without catching up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” *International Security*, 25, 4, Spring 2001. [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\\_security/v025/25.4christensen.pdf](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v025/25.4christensen.pdf). The author later served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

(24) Since 2002, NATO has begun to “engage” China and, as the Alliance today redefines its new strategic concept, there are actually suggestions in some quarters to create a NATO-China Council on the pattern of the NATO-Russia Council. But engaging China is one thing; integrating China in NATO would be tantamount to “suicide by fear of death.” For the latest NATO thinking on China, see NATO Deputy Secretary-General Claudio Bisogniero’s speech at the China Institute for International Studies, Beijing, 10 November 2009, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_59185.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_59185.htm?selectedLocale=en).

(25) While Paul Kennedy’s masterful *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (Vintage: 1987) at times comes close to being as deterministic as PTT theorists, this determinism is more justified since his problematique is not “major wars,” but “imperial overextension” - a drawn-out process. Kennedy’s classic presumably inspired the decision of the Chinese Politburo in November 2003 to hold a study session on the history of the rise and fall of the great powers since the 15th century. CCTV then set out to produce a documentary on *The Rise of the Great Powers*, which took three years to complete and was aimed “at helping cadres and the public better understand the history of the rise of world powers since the 15th century and the causes behind their success. (Robert Hartman, “China Rising: Back to the future,” *Asia Times online*, March 16, 2007.) Not only was the focus on “successes” rather than on “major wars” but, instead of being fixated on the Anglo-German rivalry, the Chinese covered the case of nine great powers.

(26) See Francis Fukuyama's indictment, "How Academia Failed the Nation: the Decline of Regional Studies," SAISPHERE, Winter 2004 [www.sais-jhu.edu/pubaffairs/publications/saisphere/winter04/Fukuyama.html](http://www.sais-jhu.edu/pubaffairs/publications/saisphere/winter04/Fukuyama.html).

(27) The main works are Daniel Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007; Jeremy Black, *The Age of Total War, 1860-1945*, Praeger, 2006; and the four volumes edited by Sirg Forster: *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871* (1997); *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914* (1999); *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918* (2000); *The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919-1939* (2003); *A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-1945* (2005).

(28) On the Major War/Small War narrative, see Raimo Vayrynen, de., *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*, London: Routledge, 2006; see Sir Robert Thomson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969*, New York: Taplinger Publishing Co, 1970; Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, *Warfare and the Third World*, New York: Palgrave, 2001. On the National Security State and Total Cold War, the recent literature includes Douglas T. Stuart, *Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law That Transformed America*, Princeton University Press, 2008; Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006; and Shu Guang Zhang, *Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1943-1963*, Stanford University Press, 2001.

(29) While there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as a British way in war (a purely operational concept), there was unquestionably such a thing as a British Way in Grand Strategy – one that Admiral Mahan, in his celebrated *The Influence of Seapower Upon History* (1889), urged America to follow. In that respect, while Liddell Hart may be the father of the concept of Grand Strategy, Mahan can be said to be its godfather. See Jon Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. On Liddell and Kennan, see Azar Gat's indispensable *A History of Military Thought – From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 2001. One could argue of course that, from the 1950s on, Kennan's conception of "containment" came at times close to being synonymous with "appeasement."

(30) B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, second revised edition, London: Faber & Faber, 1967 (1954).

(31) Andre Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*, Preface by Liddell Hart, London: Faber & Faber, 1965 (1963) (emphasis added). Beaufre's concise analysis on the Algerian war has since been confirmed by Matthew Connelly's masterful *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*, Oxford University Press, 2003. On logistic strategy, see Stefan T. Possony and Jerry E. Pournelle, *The Strategy of Technology: Winning the Decisive War*, Cambridge: University Press of Cambridge, 1970 (Possony has been called "the intellectual father of Star Wars.").

(32) William R. Kintner and Joseph Z. Kornfeder, *The New Frontiers of War: Political Warfare, Present and Future*, Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962 (emphasis added). John M. Collins' little known *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973) – quoted by Qiao and Wang - builds on Beaufre and Kintner, and its emphasis on “combination” anticipates some of the themes developed in *Unrestricted Warfare*.

(33) Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. On the battle between numerates and literates, the classic account is Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” *Daedalus*, Summer 1977. On the decline of the study of grand strategy after WWII, see Richard Rosencrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds. *The Domestic Basis of Grand Strategy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.

(34) On the economic and technological fronts, see Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1996. On the public diplomacy/psychological warfare front, see Alvin A. Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning of the Cold War*, Arcade Publishing, 1995; on the instrumentalization of religion, George Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism*, Oxford University Press, 2003, etc.

(35) By contrast, the defensive strategy of Containment was conceptualized in terms of “measures short of war.” See Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maertz, eds., *Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-77*, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1991.

(36) John Arquilla, *The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of Communism to the War on Terror*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006, pp. x-xi.

(37) See Tony Corn, “Clausewitz in Wonderland,” *Policy Review*, web special, September 2006. <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/4268401.html>.

(38) Carl Builder, “Keeping the Strategic Flame,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 1996-97. [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/1034.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1034.pdf).

(39) Richard Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” *International Security* 25, No.2, Fall 2000; Jean-Marie Guehenno, “The Impact of Globalization on Strategy,” *Survival*, Vol.40, issue 4, 1998.

(40) For an assessment of *Unrestricted Warfare* from that standpoint, see Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

(41) Williamson Murray, “Clausewitz Out, Computers In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris,” *The National Interest*, June 1997.

(42) Michael Handel's "Conclusions: Towards a Unified Theory of War," in *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, third, revised and expanded edition, Frank Cass, 2001. Handel's book remains widely used in war colleges, and is still worth reading.

(43) For an early – and courageous - assessment of the asymmetry between China's Unrestricted Warfare and America's Shock and Awe, see USMC General Michael G. Dana's provocative thesis: *Shock and Awe: America's 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maginot Line*, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, 2003 ([www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA419824&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA419824&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)).

(44) Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*, New York: Harper Collins, 1999.

(45) "The sun has set on the age of unquestioned Western military dominance...Bluntly, the East has solved the riddle of the Western Way of War." Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Islamic Way of War," *The American Conservative*, September 11, 2006.

(46) Ralph D. Sawyer, "Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projection," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Summer 2006, Vol.8, issue 4. [www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/204/221](http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/204/221).

(47) Arthur Waldron, "China's Military Classics," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1994 [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/jfq1804.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq1804.pdf).

(48) The most notorious attempt is that of Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton University Press, 1995. Hailed in academic circles as "cutting-edge research," Johnston's book epitomizes just about everything that is wrong with IR theory today. See Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, 1999. Whatever its flaws, Johnston's book had the merit of sparking a renewed interest in strategic culture within the U.S. military. See Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future*, RAND, 2000; Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings*, RAND, 2000; and the special issue on strategic culture (October 2005) of *Strategic Insights* (Naval Postgraduate School).

(49) The relation between "history and memory," and between collective memory and collective action, has become something of a cottage industry among academic historians worldwide since Pierre Nora's seminal "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire," *Representations* 26, Spring 1989, [www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/classes/201/articles/89NoraLieuxIntroRepresentation.pdf](http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/classes/201/articles/89NoraLieuxIntroRepresentation.pdf). For a policy-relevant article on the issue, see Zheng Wang, "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China," *International Studies Quarterly*, 52, 2008, [www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/library/isq\\_Zheng\\_Wang\\_12-08.pdf](http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/library/isq_Zheng_Wang_12-08.pdf).

(50) W. Travis Hanes and Frank Sanello, *The Opium Wars: The Addiction of one Empire and the Corruption of Another*, New York: Barnes & Noble, 2002.

(51) Edward Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geo-economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce," *The National Interest*, 20, Summer 1990.

(52) Alvin and Heidi Toffler, "Foreword: The New Intangibles," in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1997 pp xix-xx (emphasis added). [www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR880/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR880/).

(53) James Callard and Peter Faber, "An Emerging Synthesis for a New Way of War: Combination Warfare and Future Innovation," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2002. See also Peter Faber et al, *Combination Warfare: A New NATO Strategy for the Asymmetric Risks and Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Rome: NATO Defense College, 2003.

(54) David Kennedy, "Law Has Become a Military Instrument," *Times Online*, October 25, 2006, [www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/article613078.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/article613078.ece); Douglas Rediker and Heidi Crebo-Reidiker, "The Financialization of Foreign Policy," *The National Interest online*, 10.17.2007. [www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/inside\\_track\\_financialization\\_foreign\\_policy\\_6151](http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/inside_track_financialization_foreign_policy_6151).

(55) Quoted in Dennis J. Blasko, "The 2007 report on the Chinese Military – The Top Ten List of Missing Topics," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 47, 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2007.

(56) Add to that the fact that China has a very flexible definition of "active defense." See Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2004.

(57) Charles F. Hawkins, "The Four Futures: Competing Schools of Military Thought Inside the PLA," *Taiwan Security Research*, March 2000 (emphasis added), <http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-0300-Hawkins.htm>.

(58) David Shambaugh, *Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?*, *Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 16, 2002. <http://ej.lib.cbs.dk/index.php/cjas/article/view/3/3>; Andrew Scobell, "Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China's Peaceful Rise?" *Parameters* 39 (Summer 2009): 4-22. [www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/09summer/scobell.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/09summer/scobell.pdf).

(59) On 4GW in the Western sense, see Thomas X. Hammes, *Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation*, Strategic Forum 214, Washington DC: National Defense University, January 2005, [www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF214/SF214.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF214/SF214.pdf).

(60) Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009*. [www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China\\_Military\\_Power\\_Report\\_2009.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf).

(61) U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009 Annual Report to Congress, [www.uscc.gov/index.php](http://www.uscc.gov/index.php). See also the Report on China's WTO Compliance, USTR, December 2009, [www.ustr.gov/webfm\\_send/1572](http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1572), and the Congressional Research Report on Comparing Global Influence: China's and U.S. Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment in the Developing World, RL34620, August 15, 2008, [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34620.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34620.pdf).

(62) Andrew Scobell, "Introduction to Review Essays on 'Unrestricted Warfare,'" *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 11, issue 1, Spring 2000. In fairness, both Big Army and Scobell have since moved on. See e.g. Andrew Scobell's insightful "Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory versus the Fortune Cookie?," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. IV, issue 10, October 2005 [www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Oct/ScobellOct05.pdf](http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Oct/ScobellOct05.pdf).

(63) Army Special Operations Forces, *Unconventional Warfare Field Manual 3.05-130*, September 2008, p.222. [www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf).

(64) See Michael Evans, "From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2003. [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0JIW/is\\_3\\_56/ai\\_105210224/pg\\_16/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_56/ai_105210224/pg_16/); General George W. Casey, "Persistent Conflict: The New Strategic Environment," Los Angeles World Affairs Council, September 2007, [www.lawac.org/speech/2007-08/Casey,Gen.George2007.pdf](http://www.lawac.org/speech/2007-08/Casey,Gen.George2007.pdf); and General Charles F. Wald, "The Phase Zero Campaign," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 43, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2006, [www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\\_pages/editions/i43/20%20JFQ43%20Wald.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i43/20%20JFQ43%20Wald.pdf).

(65) See Under-Secretary for Defense Michele Flournoy, "The Contested Commons," *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, July 2009, [www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY\\_ID=1950](http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1950); and Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon, eds., *Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World*, Washington DC: CNAS, January 2010, [www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested%20Commons\\_1.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested%20Commons_1.pdf). On NATO and China in the context of the ongoing "territorialization of the seas," see Tony Corn, "The Revolution in Transatlantic Affairs: Perils and Promises of a Global NATO," *Policy Review*, web special, August 2007, [www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/9179587.html](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/9179587.html).

(66) Shawn Brimley and Vikram Singh, "Stumbling into the Future? The Indirect Approach and American Strategy," *Orbis*, 52, 2, Spring 2008.

(67) Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 52, First Quarter 2009, [www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\\_pages/editions/i52/9.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i52/9.pdf). By the same author, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, [www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac\\_hybridwar\\_0108.pdf](http://www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf); *Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict*, Strategic Forum No. 240, Washington DC: National Defense University, April 2009, [www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF240/SF240.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF240/SF240.pdf).

(68) Nathan Freier, "The Defense Identity Crisis: It's a Hybrid World," *Parameters*, Autumn 2009, [www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/09autumn/freier.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/09autumn/freier.pdf).

(69) Nathan Freier, "Gates' Next Task: Planning for the Future," *Defense News*, Feb 7, 2010.

(70) Max Boot, "China's Stealth War on the U.S.," *Los Angeles Times*, July 20, 2005; and Robert Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2003.

(71) Nathan Freier, *Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context*, May 2007, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle: U.S. Army war College, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=782](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=782)).

(72) Eric Coulter, "Analysis Support for the Interagency," Ronald R. Luman, ed., *Proceedings on Combating the Unrestricted Warfare Threat: Terrorism, Resources, Economics, and Cyberspace*, 2009 Unrestricted Warfare Symposium, The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, [www.jhuapl.edu/urw\\_symposium/Proceedings/2009/Book/2009URWBook.pdf](http://www.jhuapl.edu/urw_symposium/Proceedings/2009/Book/2009URWBook.pdf). See also the recommendation of Major Joao Vicente, 'Beyond-the-Box' Thinking on Future War: The Art and Science of Unrestricted Warfare, Air Command and Staff College, April 2009, [https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q\\_mod.../display.aspx](https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod.../display.aspx).

(73) James Mann, *The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression*, Viking, 2005, pp.2 and 61. See also the 2009 USCC Report (pp. 299-300) for uncharacteristically candid testimonies on academic self-censorship.

(74) In his classic study of the military tribes, Carl Builder caustically remarked that "systems analysis," initially introduced by McNamara as a way to discipline the services' open-ended demands for resources, ended up within less than a decade being used by service analysts as a seemingly neutral scientific language for parochial advocacy (Carl Builder, *The Masks of War-American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, 1989, p.99). The same holds true in academe, where "research design," once initially introduced to foster greater scientific rigor in IR, has over the years become so instrumentalized in the service of parochial agendas that a Mark Twain today would reframe his famous quip on statistics as follows: "there are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and research designs."

(75) A decade after the creation of the SCO, there is only one English-language monograph on the subject (Bobo Lo, *Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics*, Washington DC: Brookings, 2008). Forty years after its creation, there is still no book-length study of the OIC by a Western author. The three existing English-language studies, though not uninteresting, should be handled with caution: Naveed S. Sheikh, *The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States*, Routledge, 2003; Shahnaz Akhtar, *The Organization of the Islamic Conference: Political and Economic Cooperation, 1974-1994*, Research Society of Pakistan, 2005, and Saad S. Khan, *Reasserting International Islam: A Focus*

on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2001.

(76) On strategic education, see Janet Breslin-Smith and Cliff Krieger's "Strategic Drift?: The Future of the National War College," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 55, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2009, [www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq\\_pages/editions/i55/3.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i55/3.pdf). On strategic intelligence, John Heidenrich, "The State of Strategic Intelligence: the Intelligence Community's Neglect of Strategic Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence*, Central Intelligence Agency vol.51, n.2, 2007, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/the-state-of-strategic-intelligence.html>. On strategic planning, Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, "Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, issue 41, 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter 2006, [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/4119.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4119.pdf). On strategic communication, see the particularly damning report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Getting the People Part Right, A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy*, 2008, [www.state.gov/documents/organization/106297.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/106297.pdf).

(77) Thomas Hughes, "The Cult of the Quick," *Aerospace Power Journal*, Winter 2001, [www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/hughes.html](http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/hughes.html).

(78) Laure Paquette, "Strategy and Time in Clausewitz' On War and Sun-Tzu's The Art of War," *Comparative Strategy*, 10, 1, January 1991; and Scott A. Boorman, *The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy*, Oxford University Press, 1969.

(79) William R. Kintner, ed., *Protracted Conflict: A Challenging Study of Communist Strategy*, New York: Harper & Row, 1959.

(80) Adda Bozeman, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World*, Oxford University Press, 1971. On the fourth pillar, see Yuan Peng, "A Harmonious World and China's New Diplomacy," *China International Relations*, Vol. 17 No. 3, May/June 2007, and Marc Lanteigne, *China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power*, London: Routledge, 2005.

(81) Be it in terms of players or activities, the "combinations" in financial warfare are infinite, ranging from intelligence gathering to diplomatic signaling. See Paul Bracken, "Financial Warfare," *E-Notes*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2007 ([www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.bracken.financialwarfare.html](http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.bracken.financialwarfare.html)). On Islamic financial warfare, see Rachel Ehrenfeld and Alyssa A. Lappen, "The Fifth Generation Warfare," *Front Page Magazine.com*, June 20, 2008, <http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=31374>.

(82) Richard Clarke, "War from Cyberspace," *The National Interest*, December 12, 2009, [www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22340](http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22340); see also Shane Harris, "China's Cyber-Militia," *National Journal Magazine*, 31 May 2008, [www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs\\_20080531\\_6948.php](http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20080531_6948.php). On Offense-Defense theory, see Michael Brown, ed., *Offense, Defense, and War*, The MIT Press, 2004.

(83) Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization: the New Levee en Masse," *Parameters*, Summers 2006, [www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/06summer/cronin.htm](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/06summer/cronin.htm).

(84) Gerrit Gong, "The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2001, [www.twq.com/01spring/gong.pdf](http://www.twq.com/01spring/gong.pdf).

(85) General Li Jijun, "Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China"- An Address at the United States War College, Letort Paper No. 1, August 1997  
[www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Display.Cfm?pubID=82](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Display.Cfm?pubID=82).

(86) Noel Perrin's *Giving Up the Gun: Japan's Reversion to the Sword 1543-1879*, David Godine, 1988; Brian Daizen Victoria, *Zen at War*, Weatherhill, 1998.

(87) While Chinese elites would do well to meditate Lancelo L. Farrar's *The Short-War Illusion: German Policy, Strategy and Domestic Affairs, August-December 1914*, Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1973, U.S. elites would do well to meditate Aaron Friedberg's *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905*, Princeton University Press, 1989.

(88) From the death of Mao in 1976 on, the national narrative gradually shifted from one highlighting Chinese heroism to one emphasizing Chinese victimization. Nowhere is this change better illustrated than in the evolution of the official casualty estimates of the Sino-Japanese war: "Immediately following the war, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party announced that Japan had killed 1,75 million Chinese. After it came to power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party declared that 9.32 million Chinese had been killed. That figure stood for many years, reflecting the Maoist suppression of victim-speak in favor of a heroic narrative. In 1995, however, Jiang Zemin raised the casualty estimate at 35 million, the current official figure." Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, University of California Press, 2005, p.80. For a useful (if at times excessive) corrective to the victimization narrative, see Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989*, London: Routledge, 2001.

(89) National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Washington, DC, 2008, [www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_2025\\_project.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html). In the old Western master narrative (which gave primacy to geo-political issues), the ascendancy of the West was said to date from around 1500; in the new Western master narrative (which focuses on socio-economic issues), the superiority of the West is said to date only from 1800. For a summary of the new academic orthodoxy, see Gale Stokes, "Why the West? The Unsettled Question of Europe's Ascendancy," *Lingua Franca*, Vol.11, issue 8, November 2001, <http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/print/0111/cover.html>.

(90) John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West," *New York Times*, January 28, 2008. [www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/20080101faessay\\_v87n1\\_ikenberry.html?\\_r=1&pagewanted=print](http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/20080101faessay_v87n1_ikenberry.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print).

(91) George T. Haley, *New Asian Emperors: The Business Strategies of the Overseas Chinese*, Wiley, 2009; Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in*

Contemporary China, Rowman & Littlefield, 2009; Gordon C.K. Cheung, “Chinese Diaspora as a Virtual Nation: Interactive Roles between Economic and Social Capital,” *Political Studies*, Vol.52, 2004.

(92) Jon B. Alterman, *The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East*, Washington DC: CSIS, 2008. Kishore Mahbubani, “Smart Power, Chinese Style,” *The American Interest*, March/April 2008, [www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Mahbubani\\_ChineseSmartPower.pdf](http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Mahbubani_ChineseSmartPower.pdf). On the attempt by Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan to instrumentalize Islam – two episodes largely forgotten in the West today - , see respectively Tilman Ludke, *Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War*, Lit Verlag, 2006, and Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

(93) Nathan Freier, *Strategic Competition and Resistance*, op. cit., p.69.

(94) Robert Bunker, “Beijing, Unrestricted Warfare, and Threat Potentials,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 29 March 2007. [www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/mar\\_29\\_30/bunker.pdf](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/mar_29_30/bunker.pdf).

(95) “If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntington Responds to His Critics,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1993, [www.foreignaffairs.com/print/49414](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/49414).

(96) Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, “A World Without the West,” *The National Interest*, July/August 2007, [www.carlisle.army.mil/ietcop/documents/TNI%20-%20A%20World%20Without%20the%20West%20July%202007.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ietcop/documents/TNI%20-%20A%20World%20Without%20the%20West%20July%202007.pdf).

(97) Parag Khanna, *The Second World – Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*, New York: Random House, 2008. Charles Grant and Katinka Barysch, *Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order?* Center for European Reform, London, 2008, [www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p\\_837.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p_837.pdf).

(98) Hence the recent call by German personalities to bring Russia in NATO. Volker Ruhe, Klaus Nauman, Frank Elber, Ulrich Weisser, “Open Letter: It’s Time to Invite Russia to Join NATO,” *Spiegel online*, March 8, 2010. [www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,682287,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,682287,00.html). While this is obviously a long-term project, but there is nothing radical in it. See former Secretary of State James A. Baker, “Russia in NATO?” *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002, [www.twq.com/02winter/baker.pdf](http://www.twq.com/02winter/baker.pdf).

(99) Colin Gray, “Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past –with GPS,” *Review of International Studies*, 25, 1999.

(100) Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and the International Order*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.

(111) On the weaponization of law and the judicialization of war, see Tony Corn, “From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats: The Coming Revolution in Civil-Military Relations,” *Small Wars Journal*, June 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/from-war-managers-to-soldier-d/>.

(112) Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, Vintage, 1996.

(113) In the meantime, historians will continue to characterize the Cold War indifferently as a Long Peace or a Long War. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiry into the History of the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 1989; Andrew Bacevich, ed., *The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy since WWII*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007.

(114) Michael Sheridan, “China’s hawks demand Cold War on the U.S.,” *The Times of London*, February 7, 2010. John Pomfret and Jon Cohen, “Poll shows concern about American influence waning as China’s grows,” *Washington Post*, Feb. 25, 2010. Meanwhile, senior officers from China’s National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences publicly called on their government to sell off U.S. debt securities in retaliation for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Bill Gertz, “Chinese see U.S. debt as weapon in Taiwan dispute,” *Washington Times*, Feb. 10, 2010.

(115) *Unrestricted Warfare*, p.154. Among U.S. military strategists today, only Nathan Freier seems to be willing to acknowledge the reversibility of the Clausewitzian dictum: “Thus, the choice between the battlefield and the ballot box in this hybrid environment might be a false one. As determined competitors opt out of meaningful military competition with the United States, they increasingly recognize new opportunities to manipulate local, regional, national, and international politics in their favor at much lower cost and without automatically incurring unacceptable levels of physical vulnerability to traditional U.S. advantages. They may simply choose to outflank American military might through politics, toxic populism, and the selective use of political violence. In this regard, the ballot box might be the battlefield—*war not as politics pursued by other means but rather politics as war*” (*Strategic Competition*, op. cit. pp. 49-50).

(116) *The 2008 Joint Operating Environment: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force*, United States Joint Forces Command, 2008, [www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf](http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf).

(117) James R. Holmes, Toshi Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Turn to Mahan*, London: Routledge, 2009.

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