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Yemen's Strategic Boxes

Lawrence E. Cline

As happens episodically, Yemen is once more in the news. The December 2009 raids on al Qaida with some level of US support – together with Saudi intervention in the north of Yemen and the abortive Delta flight bombing claimed by al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen – have re-emphasized Yemen's importance in regional and international security.

One problem with much of the analysis of Yemen is that it tends to emphasize the country's impact on external security. Particularly within the US, the stress has been on al Qaida's operations in and from Yemen. Although perhaps justified in terms of overall US strategy, this limited view of issues within Yemen that affect its internal security can create strategic myopia. Ultimately, these broader internal issues are crucial in how well and how willing the government of Yemen will cooperate with other countries.

From Sana'a's perspective, there are three critical ongoing threats to internal security. Al Qaida certainly is one, but the other two – the Houthi uprising in the north and political unrest in the south around Aden – probably are viewed with considerably more concern by the Yemen government. Although each threat is significant in its own right, the possibility of overlap among them in the future is even more worrisome. These specific threats are even further exacerbated by a long list of broader social, economic, and political stressors, all of which impact on Yemen's capability to respond adequately.

Al Qaida in Yemen

Al Qaida has had a long-standing presence in Yemen. Sympathizers for jihad pre-dated the actual formation of al Qaida, with Yemenis second only to Saudis as members of the international brigade in Afghanistan. The number of Yemeni mujahedeen continuing allegiance to al Qaida is unknown, but probably has been substantial. Some 40 percent of detainees in Guantanamo have been from Yemen, with several former Guantanamo detainees returning to al Qaida in Yemen. Also, some released from Saudi rehabilitation programs have entered Yemen and have re-joined to al Qaida. Al Qaida maintained training camps in Yemen until the late 1990's. Although several have been targeted by the Yemen government, it probably would be overly optimistic to conclude that training sites have been completely eliminated.

Yemen has been the scene of numerous al Qaida-associated operations. The term 'associated' is used since specific claims of responsibility have been episodic. These operations have included:

- October 2000: Attack on USS Cole
- June 2001: Eight arrested for plot to blow up US Embassy

- June 2002: Accidental explosion killed two al Qaida members; 650 pounds of explosives recovered.
- October 2002: Attack on French oil tanker Limburg
- December 2002: Three US missionaries killed; unsure if al Qaida responsible.
- July 2007: Attack on Spanish tourists
- January 2008: Killed two Belgian tourists.
- March 2008: U.S. Embassy attack; killing a school guard in an adjacent building.
- March 2008: Attacks on energy sector.
- Successive attacks on police headquarters in Sayoun, killing one policeman and wounding 17 others in July 2008.
- August/September 2008: Attacks on US Embassy, 16 killed
- March 2009: Four South Korean tourists killed and subsequent attack on investigating delegation
- August 2009 assassination attempt on Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia's top counterterrorism official

In February 2006, 23 al Qaida detainees tunneled out of prison. These escapees included Jamal Ahmad Badawi and Jaber al Banna, two of the most prominent al Qaida operatives in Yemen. Al Badawi had been a principal organizer of the Cole bombing. Subsequently, all but three of those who escaped have either been killed, recaptured, or surrendered. The case of al Badawi has been a running sore between Sana'a and Washington. He turned himself in to the Yemeni government in 2007 and promised to cooperate with authorities. Claiming that the Yemen constitution does not permit extradition, Sana'a essentially has allowed al Badawi free rein. Of these three still at large, Nassar al Wahishi and Qasim al Raimi have been the most significant. Al Wahishi became the chief of al Qaida in Yemen.

The formation of al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was announced in January 2009, representing a merger of the Yemeni and Saudi al Qaida branches. The leader of the group is al Wahishi, with the second in command Qasim al Raimi, who reportedly was a principal target of the first December 2009 raid, but who escaped. The Yemen government has suggested that al Wahishi and perhaps al Raimi were killed in the second raid, but as of the time of this writing, this has not been confirmed.

The Yemen government's response to al Qaida has been somewhat mixed over time. Previous detentions without trial for terrorist suspects were common, but it is far from clear that the right persons were detained. As noted earlier, even with detentions or convictions, actually holding prisoners was not particularly successful. Besides the high-profile escapes, the government also released a number of others "for good behavior." Nevertheless, al Qaida has faced a number of pressures from both the US and the Yemen government. In 2002, a CIA drone attack killed leader of al Qaida in Yemen abu Ali al Harthi. In late 2003, his replacement Muhammed Hamdi al Ahdal was arrested by Yemeni government. More recently, in July 2009 a Yemeni court sentenced 16 militants for attacks on the US Embassy and on the Belgian tourists; six were sentenced to death and the others imprisoned. The Yemenis also have begun a terrorist rehabilitation program akin to the ongoing Saudi program. It is too early to judge this program; an earlier variant was not well-resourced and had rather poor results.

The Houthi Rebellion

The Houthi (also transliterated as Huthi) uprising reportedly began as quasi-police operation to arrest a former parliament member, Husein al-Houthi. Although Husein al Houthi was killed early in the fighting, the struggle continued under the leadership of his relatives. From its inception, the Houthi claimed to be defending Zaidi Islam from a hostile Yemeni government, claiming that Sana'a was increasingly falling under the influence of Salafis. Also (and perhaps more importantly), it likely represents a clan/tribal attempt to preserve traditional power structures in the area. The fighting has centered in Saada Province in northwestern Yemen, but some operations have expanded beyond this area.¹

Ideologically, the Houthi movement is very difficult to nail down. In large measure, this is deliberate: "In a July 2008 interview, al-Houthi explained that he and his supporters refused to articulate any kind of political agenda because doing so would cause people to start fighting to see such demands satisfied -- contradicting what he sees as the reactive dimension of the war."² Although some of the rhetoric among some members of the rebellion is very militant – death to the US, death to Israel, etc., and the Houthi have condemned US activities in Yemen – there have been few if any indications thus far that they have any particular ties or sympathies with al Qaida. This of course has not stopped the Yemen or Saudi governments from trying to argue that the Houthi are aligned with al Qaida.

One observer argued that there are four components to the insurgents:

- a minority (Believing Youth) with a clear ideology and who maintain political ties with Iran
- a small percentage seeking to defend Zaidi identity
- groups of armed men with purely financial motivations
- a majority of tribesmen defending their families and villages³

Fighting began in 2003-2004. It has been marked by a series of battles, ceasefires and negotiations, followed by more fighting. Some areas have remained under consistent rebel control. Beyond the government-rebel fighting, the unrest has brought in some elements of tribal feuds, with for example the Hashid tribal federation fighting on the side of the government and the Bakil confederation supporting the rebels. The fighting has resulted in considerable destruction in its wake. In part, this has been a result of the use of heavy weapons by the government. For their part, the rebels have engaged in widespread use of looting. According to one source, in the areas of fighting, 7,180 houses, 1,412 farms, 267 mosques, 94 schools, eight medical centers, four police stations, three court buildings, three other government facilities and

¹ For details of the origins of the conflict, see International Crisis Group, *Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb* Middle East Report Number 86, 27 May 2009, pp. 2-5.

² Joost R. Hiltermann, "Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia's War Inside Yemen", Foreign Affairs Online at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border>

³ ICG, p. 5.

two religious centers had been destroyed in the fighting or by air bombardments. It also has resulted in at least 150,000 displaced persons.⁴

The situation with the Houthi rebellion became even more complicated on 5 November 2009. A reported Houthi attack on a Saudi border post that killed a border guard led to a major Saudi response. The Houthi have claimed that the Saudis have launched over 160 missiles against northern areas. Although specific operations are difficult to establish conclusively, independent reporters in the area have confirmed significant Saudi air and ground operations. The Saudi government has acknowledged suffering 73 killed and 26 missing to date in the fighting.⁵ The Houthi have claimed to have captured at least nine Saudi troops.

A major ongoing controversy in open sources is whether the Houthi are receiving practical support from Iran. Middle East media have claimed that the Houthi have received training and some equipment from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and there have been allegations of Iranian shipments of weapons to the group via Iranian ships.⁶ Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi recently stated that there are “indications” the rebels are getting support from religious groups in Iran and Shiite organizations in Arab countries and Europe. He said that, “Once the evidence mounts and it is made public, then I am sure Iran will rethink its position because they know the implications of it. Everybody will understand the danger of such a role.”⁷

If there is debate about Iranian covert support to the Houthi, Tehran has been very vocal on its diplomatic and propaganda efforts to signal its interest in the situation. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki warned that certain regional states seek to foment discord between the Yemeni government and its people by fueling violence. The Iranian government also has offered to “mediate” the dispute. Iranian official press has maintained a steady stream of propaganda in support of the Houthi, together with trying to tie the US directly to attacks against the area (given the Saudi use of US-made aircraft in their air strikes, this particular propaganda theme may resonate well in the area).⁸

As mentioned earlier, fighting between the government and the Houthi has been interspersed with negotiations. A number of approaches have been used. These have included indigenous mediation committees, building on traditional models, and the use of religious and local mediators. One recurring issue has been the apparent lack of coordination between the Yemeni military and government mediators; in some cases, mediators have had to postpone their efforts due to fresh military offensives.⁹ The government also has paid ‘compensation’ to tribal leaders associated with the Houthi, together with a series of amnesties. Although most efforts have been local, Qatar also has made significant efforts in pushing negotiations.

⁴ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Yemen – Sa’ada Emergency Situation Report #4, 08 September 2009”.

⁵ Associated Press, “Weeks of Fighting Yemen Rebels Killed 73 Saudis”, 22 December 2009.

⁶ For example, see Paul Salem, “Avoid the Trap of Escalation in Yemen”, *Al Hayat*, 26 November 2009.

⁷ Tony Czuczka and Henry Meyer, “Yemen Sees ‘Mounting Evidence’ Iran Is Arming Rebels”, Bloomberg, 25 November 2009.

⁸ For Iranian reports of the fighting, see <http://www.presstv.ir>

⁹ For details, see ICG, pp. 19-25.

Southern Unrest

The third area of internal unrest is in Aden, the former capital of South Yemen. Significant demonstrations and riots have erupted since May 2007. Both internal security forces and army troops have been used to quell unrest, with a number of demonstrators killed. Local political grievances have included job discrimination, equal rights, and purported punitive discharge of former South Yemen officers who putatively were covered by earlier amnesties. As the unrest has continued, there have been increasing calls for the “liberation of south.”

Much of the unrest has stemmed from issues still unresolved from the 1990 unification and the 1994 civil war. Sana’a replaced many of the former southern leaders with northern officials. According to Human Rights Watch, some 100,000 retired southern military officers and civil servants only sporadically receive their pensions, with “suspensions of pensions often appearing to be politically motivated, occurring after the individual participated in a political protest.”¹⁰ There also have been repeated charges that northerners close to the government have received preferential treatment on land and oil contracts in the south.

The first organized opposition movement in the south was the Society of Retired Military Officers, formed in 2007 and which organized protests. These marches and sit-ins were met with violence and widespread arrests.¹¹ These protests quickly broadened, incorporating many elements of southern society who felt marginalized by the north. The Yemeni Socialist Party, the main political party representing southern interests, was a significant mobilization agent for spreading the movement, which has become known as the Southern Movement or Movement of the South. Although there is a putative “Council for the Leadership of the Peaceful Revolution of the South”, this leadership council reportedly has little direct control over the large number of groups involved.¹² As the protests have escalated, so have the demands, with many southerners now calling for independence.

Most violence involving the protests thus far has been on the part of government security forces, but there has been scattered violence attributed to supporters of the Southern Movement. In most cases, opposition violence has consisted of isolated rock-throwing, Molotov cocktails, and the like, but there have been a few murders and attacks attributed to its supporters. Thus far, the unrest has been more political than violent, but the comments by one retired colonel in the Southern Movement may be representative of many in the south: “There will be war when the money runs out. President Saleh is a clever man – he knows how to play the tribes off one another, but this takes money...The people here will wait until he is weak enough and then they will strike.”¹³

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, *In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests*, New York, 2009, pp. 12-13.

¹¹ For details on governmental responses, see Human Rights Watch.

¹² HRW, p. 16.

¹³ Michael Horton, “Why Southern Yemen is Pushing for Secession”, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15 December 2009.

Political Background

Although now largely forgotten by most Western analysts, the 1962-1970 Civil War between the Republicans and Royalists in North Yemen emerged as one of the major regional conflicts, drawing in Egypt on the side of the Republicans and Saudi Arabia and Jordan on the side of the Royalists. The Egyptians committed up to 70,000 troops and took significant casualties. The Saudis tended to work much more behind the scenes, with minimal direct troop commitments, but were very active in other forms of support for their Royalist allies. The end of the war provided indicators of processes still existing in Yemen. Negotiations largely involved 'satisficing', with virtually all the major players on each side receiving some level of reward, either politically, financially, or both. Many of the issues driving the conflict essentially were finessed and continued to fester.

Yemen as a 'unified' country is even more recent. It was not until 1990 that the Marxist-led People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and the Republic of Yemen (North Yemen) merged into one state. Politics in South Yemen had been particularly convoluted; the two insurgent groups that had fought against British in Aden – the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF) – fought against each other after British withdrawal. The NLF won the struggle and took control of the new government in the south. It took some 18 years after an agreement in principle between the two Yemens, and flare ups in fighting in South Yemen in 1979 and 1986, for unification to come to fruition. Even then, in 1994 a civil war erupted between the north and south. Most of the fighting took place in the south. Although there was significant combat, Southern resistance collapsed rather quickly. Importantly for today's political climate, there were widespread, although incomplete, amnesties promised to the southern secessionist leaders.

The government of Yemen did not help its own cause by tilting toward Iraq in the lead up to the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia and other Arab supporters of the coalition forced at least 850,000 Yemeni expatriates home, further stressing the economy. Although Sana'a largely has reconciled with Riyadh since then, the results clearly set some limits on Sana'a's freedom of action in foreign affairs.

Saleh, who was first elected in 1978, continues to be elected President, almost always with a lopsided vote, together with his General People's Congress. The lopsided political system suggests a sham democracy such as is common in the Middle East, but official outside inspection observers have held that the elections generally have been "open and genuine".¹⁴ President Saleh is required constitutionally to step down in 2013; even if he were to want to try to change the constitution to run again, his age virtually ensures succession in the relatively near future. All this further complicates the regime's political stability because of already emerging stresses over leadership succession between over whether Saleh's son will continue the family business or whether other key players in the regime will replace him.

¹⁴ Yemen: Final Report. Presidential and Local Council Elections (European Union Election Observation Mission, September 2006), www.eueom-ye.org. Despite this overall positive finding, the EU observers noted that there was unfair use of state resources, together with bias by the state media, detention of opposition supporters, and problems in the ballot counting process.

In terms of regional issues, HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are legal organizations in Yemen and conduct fund raising there. HAMAS has formal offices in Yemen, and Yemeni governmental officials have participated in various ceremonies in support of the group. There also have been reports of camps in Yemen for Gaza fighters.

The Religious Component

Yemen divided into two major religious branches, the Shia Zaidi sect primarily followed in the North and Northwest and the Shafa'i school of Sunni Islam mostly in the South and Southeast. The Zaidi historically were ruled under theocratic leaders. Both schools of Islam historically have been generally moderate. As Ali al-Anissi, head of the Bureau of National Security stated with some justification: "Zaidism is a Shiite strain within Sunni Islam, and Shafatism is a Sunni strain within Shiite Islam".¹⁵ As a note in viewing the complications involved, President Saleh himself is a Zaidi.

One potentially important change to this balance in recent years has been inroads made by Salafism, particularly in southern and eastern Yemen. Wahabbis from Saudi Arabia have been increasingly active, and Salafi local ulema have been more vocal. A key question for Western observers has been the role of al Iman University in Sana'a. This has been portrayed (primarily by locals) as solely an institution of Islamic higher learning. A number of outside observers have charged al Iman as being akin to a terrorist ideological training camp. This view has been supported by the history of some of its alumni such as John Walker Lindh and a number of other foreign students who were subsequently arrested. The university also has been very reluctant to open itself to outside observers. President Saleh has publicly defended the school and has spoken there. As Gregory D. Johnsen has argued, the reality probably is somewhere in between the two arguments, with al Iman continuing "to straddle this divide as a legitimate religious institution and as a fundamentalist pipeline."¹⁶

Al Iman University is headed by Sheik Abdulmajid al Zindani (or Zandani) who is designated as a terrorist financier by the UN's 1267 committee and as a spiritual advisor to bin Laden by the US Treasury. He also is head of the Islah Party, a party in on-again, off-again opposition to the regime.¹⁷ In the convoluted world of Yemeni politics, however, Zindani reportedly is an ally of President Saleh, and focuses his main opposition to secular and socialist movements. Zindani also has condemned separatist movements in Yemen; blaming them on a "foreign conspiracy", he has stressed the need both for the unity of Yemen and for allegiance to the regime.¹⁸ Exactly how much influence he actually exerts on the regime is debated, but is cause of concern. It also should be noted, however, that although Zindani is the most prominent Salafi scholar in Yemen, the group of Salafi ulema certainly is not unitary, and there is significant variation as to their level of regime support.

¹⁵ ICG, p. 8.

¹⁶ Gregory D. Johnsen, "Yemen's Al-Iman University: A Pipeline for Fundamentalists?", *Terrorism Monitor* 4/22, Jamestown Foundation, 16 November 2006.

¹⁷ For a detailed examination of Islah's relations with the government, see Amr Hamzawy, *Between Government and Opposition: The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform*, Carnegie Papers, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009).

¹⁸ Nasser Arrabyee, "Foreign Conspiracy Behind Yemen's Unrest, Zandani", 27 May 2009, at <http://narrabyee-e.blogspot.com/2009/05/foreign-conspiracy-behind-yemens-unrest.html>.

Social and Economic Issues

Beyond the purely security issues, Yemen faces a host of broader problems. Perhaps the most salient is tribalism, which still exerts tremendous impact throughout much of Yemen. The country is marked by significant poverty, with a per capita income of about \$723. The literacy rate is very low. Large areas are sparsely inhabited, potentially providing multiple safe areas for bad actors. Both oil and water resources are dwindling.¹⁹ Interspersed with all these other issues is the virtually endemic use of qat, a mildly narcotic drug. Trying to assess the direct impact of qat use on other social and economic problems is virtually impossible, but any visitor to Sana'a would note how much of the male population essentially shuts things down in the afternoon to enjoy their chew.

Regionally, Yemen also has faced human trafficking from Somalia, and – perhaps desperation overtaking forethought – significant refugee flows from Somalia. According to the UNHCR, as of September 2009, there were over 153,000 registered Somali refugees in Yemen, and the rate of inflow has been increasing in recent months.²⁰ Yemen also traditionally has been a gateway for arms and drug smuggling, and this is unlikely to change. One analyst has claimed that Yemen has 60 million weapons for a population of 22 million people.²¹ Piracy in the Gulf also has impacted trade in and out of Yemen.

Strategic ‘Boxes’ for the Government of Yemen

Given limited resources, Yemen faces somewhat of a Rubik’s Cube in reacting to its three major internal security threats. Some broader initiatives – such as improved governance, lowering corruption, and improving economic conditions – can significantly address many of the issues driving internal unrest. However, the level of attention and resources devoted to each of major threats must be prioritized by the Yemeni government. Viewing it from Sana'a’s perspective, the following factors probably impact on allocating resources for the three major internal security threats.

Priority on al Qaida

Positives

- Under intense pressure from Western countries & Saudi Arabia to deal with al Qaida.
- Increased foreign assistance.
- Al Qaida operations can impact investments and tourism.
- Remove additional source of instability.

¹⁹ For a good overview of the major issues facing Yemen, see Christopher Boucek, *Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral*, Carnegie Papers, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2009).

²⁰ <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=86830>

²¹ Shari Villarosa, Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Conference “Al-Qaeda in Yemen”, 7 July 2009.

Negatives

- Some level of popular support (and potentially, support within elements of the government) for al Qaida.
- Thus far, minimal direct attacks on government.
- Distraction from more direct challenges to government legitimacy.
- Success could perversely impact Saudi Arabia by movements of al Qaida members back into Saudi Arabia.

Priority on al Houthi

Positives

- Reduces major direct armed challenge to government.
- Improves government control over border.
- Reduces impetus for Saudi direct involvement in Yemen.
- Can impact potential other tribal unrest.
- Some chance of resolving through talks.

Negatives

- Likely to be militarily costly.
- Can upset tribal balance.
- Geographically not central to country.
- Military operations are creating increased resistance.

Priority on Aden

Positives

- Still a possibility for resolution through political means.
- Aden important economic resource.
- Continued unrest can exacerbate other maritime issues.

Negatives

- Underlying grievances may be difficult to resolve.
- Resolving grievances could be economically costly.
- Unrest appears to be getting stronger.

The US-Yemen Minuet

Yemen-US relations over the last few years probably could be best described as prickly. Although generally reasonably cooperative, a number of issues have surfaced between the two countries. From Yemen's standpoint, many of the grievances have stemmed from what it has perceived as inconsistent US support, particularly financially. The US essentially ended the

USAID program in Yemen in mid-1990's, and did not re-open a USAID mission in Yemen until 2003. Even after 2003, funding remained inconsistent. In November 2005, for instance, the US government told Saleh who was in the US at the time that Yemen had been suspended from the USAID Program due to governmental corruption; the timing and manner of this notification had to be humiliating.

In recent years, US military assistance to Yemen has yo-yoed significantly. According to Congressional Research Service figures, in FY 2006, Department of Defense 1206 assistance to Yemen was \$4.3 million; in FY 2007, \$ 26 million; no 1206 assistance in FY 2008; and \$66.8 million in FY 2009.²² Likewise, non-military assistance also has increased significantly. According to open sources, US training efforts within Yemen for counterterrorism operations also have become more intense. Together with the US, the United Kingdom also is providing significant support and financial assistance.²³

In part, the variation in assistance has been the result of general governmental corruption, but in large measure it has resulted from US perceptions that the Yemen government has been less than cooperative on counterterrorism, particularly focused on al Qaida. Given the recent operations, this may be changing to at least some degree. At the same time, though, cooperation likely will remain subject to considerable stresses. A significant segment of the Yemeni population – and some members of the Yemen government and security services – view any problems experienced by the country as being due to foreign interference. Conspiratorial threads seem to be engrained in much of society and will likely always provide roadblocks. Likewise, some of al Qaida's rhetoric probably resonates well in a very stressed society such as Yemen's.

The other aspect of cooperation almost certainly will involve Sana'a trying to 'sell' al Qaida involvement in the other two security threats. There already have been statements by Yemen government officials suggesting (usually vague) connections with the Houthi and the Southern Movement. From the government's perspective, this approach makes sense in garnering foreign support for their efforts. Thus far, at least, such warnings seem to be largely bogus, particularly given the very different agendas of the various groups.

The issue becomes one of self-fulfilling prophecies. Some of these linkages might in fact be developing. According to al Jazeera reporting, suspected al Qaida commanders addressed a rally in southern Yemen, condemning the December raids; members of the Southern Movement reportedly participated in the rally. Two factors could increase the prospects of actual cooperation. The first is a series of Yemeni security operations that kill a significant number of civilians in areas that straddle the main zones of current conflict. The second would be too heavy a foreign footprint in Yemeni operations.

Yemen will likely continue to be a difficult partner in counterterrorism efforts. Although there clearly are some common interests, the strategic contexts will remain different. Sana'a will continue to focus on what it views as its major internal threats. Trying to decipher what is in fact

²² Jeremy M. Sharp, *Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service, 7 July 2009, p. 15.

²³ The British have not released monetary figures for their military assistance, but according to "DFID Yemen: Our Current Program", the civilian and humanitarian programs totaled 12 million pounds in 2007-2008, and 20 million pounds in 2008-2009, with expansion planned for the future.

the strategic calculus of the Yemen government in a very complicated internal environment is critical for long-term stability.

Lawrence E. Cline, PhD, is an associate professor with American Military University, and a contract instructor with the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School. He has worked in over 25 countries with this program in national counterterrorism strategy development. He is a retired Military Intelligence officer and Middle East Foreign Area Officer, with service in Lebanon, El Salvador, Desert Storm, Somalia, and OIF.

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