



## **Back to the Future: A Study of Post Partisan Warfare Reconstruction**

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In 1780, British Redcoats decimated the Continental Army in the South following the siege of Charleston and the subsequent battle at Camden. Afterward, all that remained were civilian guerilla fighters to pick up the torch and sustain the American cause for freedom. From here grew a bitter partisan war pitting neighbor against neighbor as the British Redcoats, with the aid of American Loyalists, maneuvered to remain in control.

Historically, the violent overthrow of an autocratic rule creates a governmental void, with the victorious insurgent army filling the void and imposing their brand of autocracy over the state.<sup>1</sup> Examples include the French Revolution, Russian Revolution, Chinese Revolution, and more recently the Cuban and Somali Revolutions. The cycle has rarely led to the successful formation of a democracy; however, the United States of America is arguably the sole exception. How is it then that following the violent irregular warfighting of the American Revolution the factions, both Patriot and Loyalist, were able to put aside their differences, unite for the popular common good?

This article analyzes the events that led to the American uncommon unification following the bitter partisan fighting of the American Revolution. From this study, the author identified common threads in events, commonality of thought, or ideals that fostered the birth of a united nation following guerilla warfare within. The focus did not center on a model for construction of a Constitutional Republic, but instead the focus was on gleaning the basis for popular unity following irregular conflict. From these insights into the historic experiences of the partisan fighters in the American Revolution, a framework for present day and future rebuilding nations was collected.

To narrow the scope for this article, attention focuses on the irregular style of fighting in South Carolina with the violent theme of Britain's Southern Campaign and the unification following. In the end, the study of the rebuilding effort of South Carolina provides a roadmap from conflict to peace following irregular warfighting. Can the historical study of Britain's missteps in the Americas acted out over 200 years ago find relevance today? Today's era of persistent conflict and uncertainty mirrors the measures for success realized by American colonists over 200 years ago. The capitulation of a massed enemy army is no longer the measure of mission accomplishment. Now, the establishment of popular unity towards a common good is the goal

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<sup>1</sup> Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* Volume 2, No. 2 (2005): 96.

for successful extended peace following conflict. Further, irregular or guerrilla warfare is historically among the most common forms of warfighting.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the establishment of peace following irregular warfighting should be an emphasized area of study for the professional soldier. The establishment of popular unity towards a common good is a bedrock component of extended peace following revolution. The successful founding of the United States following the violent guerilla warfighting of the American Revolution stands as a unique example for study of how longstanding peace via popular unity is accomplished. The U.S. military has not utilized the full potential that can be gleaned from the historic study of the failures of the superior British Army against the guerilla tactics of the American Patriots.

Until recently, with the revision of the Department of the Army's field manual entitled, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, FM 3-07, February 2003, the U.S. military has not taken advantage of this history. A search of the entire document turned up no mention of any of the key actors, events, or ideals that drove the stability of the new American nation following war.<sup>3</sup> More uncommon than the successful use of guerilla tactics against a superior force is the unification of the two warring factions following the end of violent conflict. Similarly to above, of the twenty-one vignettes in the Department of the Army's field manual entitled, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24, December 2006, not one covers the failures of the British Crown when dealing with the American insurgents.<sup>4</sup> If the events or shared ideals, which forged the exceptional reunification following the violent irregular conflict of the American Revolution, can be collected, they may serve as a foundation for the U.S. Military's operational scheme in future clashes. To understand how it happened that the world's mightiest military could surrender in defeat at the hands of insurgent American Patriots, one has to understand who the American Colonists were.

Revolutionary South Carolina is a story of two distinctly separate regions. The coastal "lowcountry" extends approximately 50 miles inland from the Atlantic and follows local waterways. Elite of British ancestry extensively settled the area, which was highly fertile and prized for its agricultural production. A vast majority of the colonies wealth resided in the lowcountry. In sharp contrast, the backcountry region stretched from the coastal piedmont to the mountains in the west. Backcountry settlers brought with them diverse backgrounds. Unlike the lowcountry elite, they were an ethnic hodgepodge of vast European immigrants in search of prosperity. The hands of rugged frontiersmen and their families working to the limit of human endurance, clearing heavily timbered land and planting crops shaped backcountry South Carolina.<sup>5</sup> The soft hands of lowcountry elite did not venture into the region.

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<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006), 1-2.

<sup>3</sup> Conducted document search for: American Revolution, Patriot, Loyalist, British Redcoat, George Washington, Nathanael Greene, Cornwallis, Clinton, Yorktown, and Constitution. Constitution was found in six instances but all spoke of the American legal considerations of going to war, not the formation of a governing document following revolution. From US Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2003).

<sup>4</sup> MAJ Todd J. Johnson, "Nathanael Greene's Implementation of Compound Warfare During the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution" (Monograph School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007): 1.

<sup>5</sup> Robert D. Bass, *Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion* (Columbia, SC: Sandlapper Press, Inc., 1972), 5.

Conflict between the competing interests of the two regions, overwhelmingly governed by the elite plantocracy, brought the colony to the brink of civil hostilities even prior to the beginning of the Revolutionary War. In the eleventh hour, to promote solidarity in the colony on the verge of war with England, lowcountry leaders passed meaningful concessions, which worked to fuse the two regions. Although, they did not fix the rift deepened by decades of animosity between the two factions, they were steps in the right direction. However, before they had time to mend their differences, it would be time to choose sides, Patriot/Whig or Loyalist/Tory, with the beginning of the Revolutionary War.

For years, turmoil between the lowcountry oligarchy and the competing interests of backcountry frontiersman had the colony on the cusp of civil war. With this background, one would think the lines that divided Patriot from Loyalist would be predictable and easily identified, but this is not the case. It is true, the Patriot cause in South Carolina grew from the lowcountry elite and for many in the backcountry, who distrusted anything the lowcountry did, this was cause enough to take the opposite side with the British. South Carolinians, however, also divided along a vast spectrum of political, religious, ethnic, and geographic lines.<sup>6</sup> Some families even divided with brothers or fathers and sons taking opposite sides. As a result, South Carolina became a patchwork of hostile districts. Citizens were set to fight their opposing faction, or in reprisal of past grievances, ravage and plunder their neighbors, whoever they may have been.<sup>7</sup>

As the factions stewed in South Carolina, British troops concentrated their efforts against Northern Patriots. The Royal Navy and Redcoats executed their battle plan with ease, devastating ninety percent of General Washington's fighting force. Miraculously, in seemingly a last ditch effort, Washington maneuvered his remaining fighting force across the Delaware River to victory at Trenton, and then again at Princeton the following day. This coupled with the surprising British surrender of 5000 men to General Gates at Saratoga stole the offensive advantage. The news of the American victory made its way back to Europe and helped sway the French to sign a treaty of alliance in official support of the American cause.

The threat of French entry into the war forced Britain to consolidate positions in a more defensive posture to defend against French invasion. Americans immediately recovered their capital city, Philadelphia, and the Rhode Island colony as British troops withdrew.<sup>8</sup> War in the North slowed to a stalemate. The idea of a decisive victory for the Crown over the Americans was slipping away. With both sides now dug in deep, the war in the North was increasingly costly in both men and treasure. The English strategy needed to change. They set their sights on the southern colonies.

With Britain's attention now turned to the South, Charleston South Carolina's fortified defense finally collapsed under the applied pressure. In April 1780, Charleston fell into British hands, a devastating blow to the southern resistance. American fighting men numbering 5000 were

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<sup>6</sup> John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 99.

<sup>7</sup> John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 100.

<sup>8</sup> Ian R. Christie, *Crisis of Empire: Great Britain and the American colonies, 1754-1783* (New York, NY: Norton, 1966), 104.

forced to capitulate, allowing English forces relative freedom of movement through the South. The fall of Charleston was Britain's most decisive victory of the war. Now, all that remained to fight for the American cause were hard fighting backcountry guerillas and their will to continue. News of the victory traveled quickly to England and was especially timely in silencing growing English protests over the course of the war.<sup>9</sup>

General Clinton, as Commander-in-Chief of the British Force, was anxious to return to New York and planned to leave the southern affair to General Cornwallis. Before his departure, he made a critical error. He proclaimed each South Carolinian had to swear an allegiance to the Crown and fight for the Royal flag beside their English brothers, or be considered rebels to the Crown and available for harsh reprisal.<sup>10</sup> The proclamation intended to be a show of strength to loyalist and a measure to discourage rebellious uprising, but it had undesired effects. With the "Jewel of the South" seemingly in hand, Clinton returned to New York victorious.

Following Clinton's departure, numerous South Carolinians retook the field for the Patriot Cause. The southern resistance might have disappeared if Clinton had given authority to accept neutrality.<sup>11</sup> Clinton's call for allegiance effectively removed the middle ground available for fence sitters or rebels who felt it violated their previously offered parole. The idea of pledging allegiance to the Crown and possibly being called upon to fight against fellow Americans did not sit well with many. For the second time in the war, the British unknowingly had the American resistance at the brink of annihilation but did not continue through to finish the task. By the close of 1780, South Carolina was in the midst of a fratricidal partisan civil war. As the guerilla resistance grew British forces looked for additional forces to task with the problem. The flawed recruitment strategies of the Redcoats would have dire consequences to their aspirations for the colonies.

Both sides, Patriot and English, attracted its share of objectionable individuals who would become damaging to their goals, but the British attracted particularly bad characters in their search for support. Men identified years earlier as outlaws, when internal colonial turmoil was at its highest, sided with the English. The outlaws saw an opportunity to pillage and revenge past "injustice" they had received.<sup>12</sup> To the backcountrymen, Britain now appeared to sponsor the outlaw transgressions, which strengthened the Patriot resolve and drove fence sitters to their cause.

At the war's onset, one of the main motivators that recruited Loyalist support was the need for British protection from the surrounding Indians. Though both Loyalists and Patriots tried to win the Cherokee as an ally, mainly to keep the additional fighters from the other side, the Cherokee

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<sup>9</sup> John S. Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in Carolina 1780-1783* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1985), 67.

<sup>10</sup> John Morgan Dederer, *Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign and Mao Tse-tung's Mobile War* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1983), 29.

<sup>11</sup> Allan Nevins, *The American States During and After the Revolution 1775-1789* (New York, NY: The Macmillan, 1924), 376.

<sup>12</sup> John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 103.

sided with the English, to their detriment.<sup>13</sup> Britain, although they benefitted greatly from the increased trade in pelts available in the expanded American frontier, had long been sympathetic to the uncontrolled expansion of Americans into Indian Territory. The Cherokee saw the possibility of alliance with the British as a means to curtail the expansion of the land-hungry Americans.<sup>14</sup> The perception of a British-Cherokee alliance did substantial harm to British goals. Frontiersmen flooded into the Patriot camps. It was evident they no longer could turn to the British as their protector from Indian attack on the frontier.

Worse than England's ability to recruit support to their ranks was their ability to keep the support they had. The American Loyalists would expose their passionate support for the crown after receiving British assurances of their safety against Patriot reprisal. However, the British repeatedly abandoned their allies, and left them to the retribution of their bitter enemies.<sup>15</sup> Notably, General Howe evacuated Boston in 1776, after assurances he would not, and the South Carolina Loyalists were abandoned for years after the first failed attempt to invade Charleston.

Another ill-fated tactic based on a misunderstanding of Loyalist support was the strategy theorists identify as "economy of force". In the South, once British troops won a province they would turn over security of the area to American Loyalist as soon as possible. The idea was to free up redcoats to move on to the next province extending their operational reach with less troops. This tactic misunderstood Loyalist motivation. Loyalists sought revenge for Patriot atrocities, and were not motivated to risk all in defense of the Crown. The British tactic put unprotected Loyalists repeatedly in the sights of rebel vengeance. The Loyalists quickly folded in retreat, which drew the ire of the redcoats. This clearly demonstrated too many fence sitters that it was better to side with the Patriots than die a loyalist death.<sup>16</sup>

Besides the other factors, war atrocities went a long way towards undermining England's strategic objectives. It is true both sides committed horrible acts of war, but England was further burdened by their status as the Royal mother country and protector. English strategy should have placed emphasis on restoring "beams of Royal government". Not doing so was a catalyst for resistance.<sup>17</sup> Instead of promoting security and prosperity for the Loyalists, Redcoats, sanctioned by leadership, would often take counterproductive actions to their ends.

One of the most notorious incidents of British atrocities happened in the spring of 1780 at the hands of British Colonel Banastre Tarleton. After the fall of Charleston, Tarleton notoriously pillaged the city to resupply and gather horses for his "Green Dragoons". His men, mostly Tories from the North, wore green jackets to set them apart from British regulars. This fact was

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<sup>13</sup> Rachel N. Klein, "Frontier Planters and the American Revolution: The South Carolina Backcountry, 1775-1782." In *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution*, by Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate and Peter J. Albert, 37-69 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1985), 52.

<sup>14</sup> John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 32.

<sup>15</sup> Russell F. Weigley, *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782* (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 59.

<sup>16</sup> Ian R. Christie, *Crisis of Empire: Great Britain and the American colonies, 1754-1783* (New York, NY: Norton, 1966), 106.

<sup>17</sup> John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 104.

not lost on the Patriots and Southern Tories, who had to live with the retribution Tarleton's dragoons brought. Tarleton had built a reputation on the relentlessly paced movement of his men and his ruthlessness when they overtook their prey. Tarleton quickly took these supplies and men to Waxhaws Creek, near the border of the two Carolinas. There he made contact with Patriot Colonel Alexander Buford and his Virginia regiment. On horseback, Tarleton's men overtook the regiment. As the Virginians raised their hands in surrender, instead of offering them quarter, Tarleton's men cut down the regiment in a barbarous massacre.

Tarleton's tactics were effective on the battlefield, but his methods turned into a rallying cry for the Patriot cause. It can be argued that Tarleton took rogue action at Waxhaws, but Cornwallis's lack of condemnation to this and other routine Patriot executions set the tone for the times. In fact, subsequent to the fall of 1780, Cornwallis ordered his officers to "take the most vigorous measures to extinguish the rebellion".<sup>18</sup> His men had little doubt as to what the order meant as their reign of terror raged on. Tories fighting under the British flag got their hands mercilessly bloody as well. William Cunningham, known as "Bloody Bill", led a raid of several hundred horsemen into the backcountry. On 17 November 1781 at Cloud's Creek, his men took a group of thirty Whigs by surprise. After the thirty had capitulated to the stronger force, twenty-eight were hacked to death, leaving only two remaining to tell the tale.<sup>19</sup>

The brutal method by which the Redcoats and their hired German mercenaries waged war eroded their credibility with both the "Rebels" and those remaining loyal to the Crown. Taking a page from the U.S. Army's field manual on counterinsurgency, a potentially more productive strategy for the British Army should have been in promoting a secure environment from which the Loyalists could thrive. A complementary strategy of portraying Patriots as lawless rebels, bent on undermining the established peace, could have isolated them from popular support. Contrarily, the British neglected the security of the Loyalists and instead committed their own savage lawless acts in pursuit of the Patriots. In South Carolina, war atrocities collapsed all governmental processes and dismantled society to the point of a savage state.<sup>20</sup> These brutal actions strengthened the resolve of the Rebels, convinced fence sitters to fight British oppression, and drew increasing violent revenge against the Loyalists. Support from the Loyalists wavered as increased demands for protection and stability were not realized. In the end, Rebels and Loyalists could point to Britain as the cause of their fratricidal conflict.

The Patriots under the command of General Nathanael Greene, though not immune to their own brand of wanton violence, found opposite fortunes from the British. Greene had an innovative ability to coordinate undisciplined guerilla units with his remaining small band of disheartened

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<sup>18</sup> John Morgan Dederer, *Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign and Mao Tse-tung's Mobile War* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1983), 32.

<sup>19</sup> Robert M. Weir, "The Violent Spirit, the Reestablishment of Order, and the Continuity of Leadership in Post-Revolutionary South Carolina." In *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution*, by Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate and Peter J. Albert, 70-98 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1985), 72.

<sup>20</sup> Robert M. Weir, "The Violent Spirit, the Reestablishment of Order, and the Continuity of Leadership in Post-Revolutionary South Carolina," in *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution*, by Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1985), 71.

Continental and militia.<sup>21</sup> He was able to continue the defense of the cause for freedom by slowly driving a wedge between the British and their potential recruit base of undecided Americans and Loyalists. The struggle was not easy as Greene inherited his share of brutally violent combatants. Following the battle at Fort Mott in May 1781, Lieutenant Colonel "Light Horse Harry" Lee endorsed the execution of captured prisoners. Francis Marion, however, ended the executions when he intervened. Marion, with a reputation for violence himself, had a hard time controlling his men from whipping the remaining prisoners "almost to death".<sup>22</sup>

For his part, Greene deliberately sought to stop the wanton violence. He believed the destructive force of revenge in his men's actions undermined his war efforts. He took his design on the conduct of war to the point of threatening the imposition of the death penalty for his men caught marauding. Greene's design worked well with his hit and run guerilla tactics, for the population was soon working in support of his men to the detriment of the raiding Redcoats. When Greene ran in retreat, the people of South Carolina selflessly supported his armies with what little supplies they had and hid his men from the enemy Redcoats. It allowed Greene to wage the successful war of attrition he called the "fugitive war" and is best summed as, "fight, get beat, rise and fight again".<sup>23</sup>

In 1781, militia volunteers began to flock to Greene's camps while Cornwallis was having little luck finding loyalists to strengthen his numbers. Greene, whose army now outnumbered Cornwallis two to one, had the upper hand and started to maneuver in search of a decisive battle. Cornwallis gave him his wish at Guilford Courthouse on 15 March 1781. Cornwallis, in spite of his waning numbers, maintained his confidence that his men were disciplined professionals while Greene had very few "regulars". At Guilford Courthouse, Greene's men fought valiantly and imposed a heavy toll on Cornwallis' army. When they moved in to lock Cornwallis' men into hand-to-hand fighting, Cornwallis turned his artillery on the battlefield, full of his own men and Patriots alike, forcing Greene to retreat. For the British, the battle simultaneously ended as a tactical victory, but a strategic loss due to the high cost in personnel and material losses the American forces had inflicted upon them. Greene had turned the tide. The British surrender at Yorktown all but ended the hostilities between England and America.

As stated, the expected outcome of the overthrow of the autocratic British rule would be for the Continental Army to fill the void with their version of autocracy led by George Washington. The Americans avoided this trap when Washington turned down the position of despot over the colonies.<sup>24</sup> Patriot leaders conceded portions of their garnered political power, and shared their

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<sup>21</sup> John Morgan Dederer, *Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign and Mao Tse-Tung's Mobile War* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1983), 35.

<sup>22</sup> Robert M. Weir, "The Violent Spirit, the Reestablishment of Order, and the Continuity of Leadership in Post-Revolutionary South Carolina." In *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution*, by Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate and Peter J. Albert, 70-98 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1985), 72.

<sup>23</sup> Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution 1763-1789* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 495.

<sup>24</sup> Evidence points to the fact George Washington was vehemently opposed to the notion of a single person holding as much power as a King in the American government following the Revolution. When questioned about the possibility, Washington writes in response, as quoted from Higginbotham in *War and Society in Revolution*, "It was 'with a mixture of great surprise and astonishment' that Washington responded to Nicola, whose screed left the commander in chief with 'painful sensations' that were truly unmatched 'in the course of the War'." He was "much

limited rebuilding funds for the popular common good and the promotion of peace. All but the most fervent of Loyalists accepted the post-fighting provisions, put aside their differences, and accepted the relative peace and security reunification offered.

The rebuilding process was difficult but the colonists methodically worked through the problem. The first task was to restore security by defeating the opposition. In this regard, they were no different from the English, but Patriot military leadership always kept an eye on the nurturing of civil morale. The establishment of an American-led civil government and the reestablishment of law and order were of the highest priority for American civil leadership. Lastly, the commercial opportunities that came in the rebuilding following hostilities aided in the stability. With the rebuilding framework in place, over the next years, the remaining Americans who sympathized with the Crown were able to re-assimilate into the fabric of society created by the victorious Patriots.

For the Patriots, the importance placed on the rebuilding process started before the fighting finished. Showing great insight, both Generals Greene and Washington understood the importance of civil morale on shaping the outcome of the war. It was not an easy task for either man to take on the superior British forces all while maintaining an eye on the end of the conflict. General Washington was a master at this. He spent countless hours maintaining civil morale, while coping with the personnel issues of his men, and securing equipment for his army.<sup>25</sup> When Congress was unable to provide for the army, Washington ensured that the men sent out to forage for supplies from the population did so with benevolent intent.<sup>26</sup>

Whether Washington, while he commanded General Greene, purposefully passed on these traits is not known, but when Greene took command of the Continental Southern Army he recognized the need to restore order and followed the same mold. Nathanael Greene said of reprisal on the Tories, “[W]e have great reason to hate them, and vengeance would dictate universal slaughter”, but to do so would be a “fatal practice.” Instead, he wanted to “detach the disaffected from the British interest...” which “...can be done by gentle means only.”<sup>27</sup> He knew if he could stop the affliction of war atrocities by his men, he could win the sentiment of the populous. In doing so, he hoped to strengthen his base of support, cut off the Redcoats’ ability to find support, and potentially win the war with the aid of the American people.

The American legislators also played an important role in the rebuilding. South Carolina Governor John Rutledge called for the legislature to meet in December 1781, while British troops still occupied Charleston. The meeting took place in Jacksonborough, a small town thirty-

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at a loss to conceive what part of my conduct could have given encouragement to an address which... seems big with mischiefs that can befall my Country... you could not have found a person to whom your schemes are more disagreeable.” Even, towards the end of the war, when many in his beloved Army worried if they would be compensated for their service or forgotten, Washington vowed he would remain respectful of the Congress and work for his men’s payment in a “constitutional way”. Don Higginbotham, *War and Society in Revolutionary America: The Wider Dimensions of the Conflict* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 198-200.

<sup>25</sup> John Freling, *Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 570.

<sup>26</sup> David Hackett Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 276.

<sup>27</sup> John Freling, *Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 518.



five miles from Charleston. Though the representation from the lowcountry remained dominant, the backcountry's men of influence attended and represented them well.<sup>28</sup> What set the meeting apart was not its timing or location, but the work negotiated. The men passed a series of acts, known as the Confiscation Acts, which banished the area's most aggressive Tories, or confiscated and heavily taxed their properties. On the surface, this may seem a contrarian move, which further inhibits the establishment of long-term peace; instead, this is where the South Carolina healing process for the war began. Though flawed the confiscation laws were the first steps toward rebuilding the state under the rule of law.

First, the law took power away from Patriot mobs and marauders, bent on revenge of Tory actions, and placed the burden on the government. For Governor Rutledge, this important first step was to be executed "with lenity".<sup>29</sup> Prior to his call for the confiscation laws, the governor had offered pardon to Loyalists who surrendered their allegiance to the Crown and pledged to serve a six-month term in the state's militia. Next, he reopened the court system as quickly as possible to further legitimize the re-establishment of the state's government. Private retribution and crimes against Tories were not tolerated. South Carolina's leaders knew the populace would quickly render their tenure irrelevant and take the reins of law and order into their own hands if the public felt wrongdoers were going unpunished.<sup>30</sup>

For those Tories who remained in South Carolina, many with broken homes and pillaged farms, the opportunities to rebuild were more attractive than leaving with the British to start over anew. In fact, from the destruction, pillaging of slaves, war shortages, and post conflict rebuilding effort, new opportunities emerged for new sets of industrious people.<sup>31</sup> The war seemed to level the playing field for many to take advantage of the opportunity, and "there was no discounting the effect of opportunity"<sup>32</sup> on the rebuilding process.

What South Carolina accomplished after the severe brutality of the war was astonishing, but the underlying message of the rebuilding was simple. South Carolina's leaders aspired to no greater cause than the reestablishment of the land of opportunity via law and order, which they had striven to build before the hostilities with Britain. The Department of the Army's field manual, *Stability Operations*, FM 3-07, revised October 2008, captures this simple message well. Chapter two in the field manual lays out the "Primary Stability Tasks", which chapter three further expands, of: 1) Establish Civil Security; 2) Establish Civil Control; 3) Restore Essential Services; 4) Support the Governance; and 5) Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development. This mirrors the strategy South Carolinian leaders used for unification after the American Revolutionary war. Refreshingly, the revised *Stability Operations* field manual takes

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<sup>28</sup> Allan Nevins, *The American States During and After the Revolution 1775-1789* (New York, NY: The Macmillan, 1924), 389.

<sup>29</sup> Allan Nevins, *The American States During and After the Revolution 1775-1789* (New York, NY: The Macmillan, 1924), 393.

<sup>30</sup> Robert M. Weir, "The Violent Spirit, the Reestablishment of Order, and the Continuity of Leadership in Post-Revolutionary South Carolina." In *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution*, by Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate and Peter J. Albert, 70-98 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1985), 87.

<sup>31</sup> Oscar and Lilian Handlin, *A Restless People: Americans in Rebellion 1770-1787* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1982), 234.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 234.

a different stance from its predecessor. Upfront it acknowledges how the American experience shaped the American Strategy concerning stability, and places an emphasis on the American Revolution.<sup>33</sup>

In contrast, FM 3-07 before its revision was outdated and lacked historical perspective. The February 2003 version of FM 3-07 reads like a maneuver manual intent on the domination of an enemy rather than a guide for the promotion of stability following combat operations. Its tone is set from the overview with statements like, “The Army commands the respect of belligerents by the threat of force, or, if that fails, the use of force to compel compliance”<sup>34</sup>, and from calls for “engagement and response” in its description of stability operations. The superseded version states, “Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war, as well as some smaller scale contingencies.”<sup>35</sup> Further, subchapters early in the manual like: battlefield organization, maneuver, intelligence, fire support, air defense, etc. are better served elsewhere. The manual misses the mark regarding the importance of stability operations following war. Rightly, the margin of victory in war has evolved from the measure of body counts or seeking the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Victory in today’s protracted conflicts is measured by the creation of extended peace through popular unity in belligerent states or regions via stability operations.<sup>36</sup> In this regard, the American Revolution was unique for its time<sup>37</sup> and remains a model for learning in modern military affairs. As highlighted, the Americans worked on the reestablishment of the rule of law, paid mind to the fostering of civil governance, and longed for the return of their economic prosperity before security was even assured.

The ultimate goal of the Patriots was the reestablishment of what they built before the war; another important factor in their success was that they did not out reach their grasp. The issue of slavery in the colonies is an example of this. Slavery was contrary to the enlightened philosophy that drove the revolution. This fact weighed heavily on many during their effort to rebuild.<sup>38</sup> These wise leaders reluctantly made the decision to allow the new nation to heal from its war wounds by compromising on the issue of slavery and not condemning it at that time. Ultimately, the enlightened ideology of free men following the Revolution would grip the country in civil

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<sup>33</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Department of the Army, 2008), 1-1.

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2003), 1-1 and 1-2.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-1.

<sup>36</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Department of the Army, 2008), vi.

<sup>37</sup> As an example, though the beginnings of the American and French Revolutions are only separated by thirteen years, and both draw their philosophical ideals from similar origins in the age of enlightenment, the two revolutions are profoundly different. Friedrich von Gentz, in his 1810 work entitled, “French and American Revolutions Compared”, summarizes the differences into four categories, which include lawlessness of the origin, character of the conduct, quality of the object, and the compass of resistance.<sup>37</sup> Gentz’s argument structured around the four categories works to show the defensive nature of the American Revolution in sharp contrast to the offensive struggle of the French to maintain their revolution for the revolutions sake. Freidrich von Gentz, “The French and American Revolutions Compared,” In *Three Revolutions*, 3-95 (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1976).

<sup>38</sup> The issues of slavery and taxation of the slave trade were used as heated leverage points between Northern and Southern leaders at the Constitutional Convention of May 1787. Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution 1763-1789* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 643-646.

war over the institution of slavery.<sup>39</sup> How the circumstances would have changed if a compromise could not have been reached is left for further study.

In the end, this article serves as a validation of the strides the United States Military has made in response to the increasing challenge irregular warfighting and stability operations holds on the future. As stated in the introduction, the US Army field manual on counterinsurgency, revised December 2006, lacks anecdotal evidence that the Revolutionary American experience influenced the doctrine. It reads slightly nearsighted, like a “how to manual” for the War in Iraq. With the difficulties from the Iraq War looming large in the Army’s consciousness at the time of the manual’s publication, it is probably folly to hope for more. More importantly, however, its content marries well with the content in the Stability Operations manual, which is heavily influenced by the experience of the American Revolution. As the military continues to improve its understanding of future conflicts and conflict resolution, it is encouraging to see the doctrine shaped by the timeless lessons of the unique American experience. Based on the study of South Carolina in the American Revolution and its rebuilding afterward, the US military is making great strides in the right direction. The framework for the rebuilding operations in Iraq and the marriage of counterinsurgency and stability operations that the revised military doctrine will take to Afghanistan are based on sound principles from the American past.

Future American involvement in world conflict or revolution will become an increasingly difficult affair. The recent revisions of the Army doctrine cited in this paper revealed that the US military is open to the study of the past to help shape the future. The way ahead for the American military should continue to follow four categories, which demonstrated the uniqueness of the American Revolution.<sup>40</sup> The four categories include the lawfulness of the origin, character of the conduct, quality of the object, and the compass of resistance. That is, before sides are drawn in future conflict, as the world’s hyper-power, the United States has to guard against the perception it is engaging in internationally unlawful acts as potential unilateral decisions in the support of national interests are made. Again, as the world’s hyper-power, from the onset of conflict the quality of the U.S. objectives must be clear and open so they do not come into question. Further, the U.S. character of conduct must not waiver from well-advertised U.S. values, or the effort will be undermined. Together these points, taken from the past, can strengthen the compass of the resolve of the U.S. and its international allies against any future resistance.

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<sup>39</sup> Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 187.

<sup>40</sup> Four categories from Freidrich von Gentz, "The French and American Revolutions Compared," In *Three Revolutions*, 3-95 (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1976), 95.

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