Professors in the Trenches:
Deployed Soldiers and Social Science Academics
(Part 2 of 5)

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“How do I come to know what I didn’t know I needed to know?”

This is the second installment of a five-part series. Each article was co-authored by one Army soldier/civilian and one university professor/academic as part of a joint research project. This project and product responds to the Army’s objectives regarding the integration of cultural social sciences into its training and operations.

Introduction to the Series

The overarching goal of a “Military-Social Science Roundtable”, coupled with a related Delphi research process, is to boost, broaden, and render more viable the relationship between the military and academic fields of cultural studies in a way that benefits both communities. Specifically, the Roundtable and Delphi research process should foster a level of cooperation between these communities which assists tactical military units as well as military/political decision makers to ask the right questions in order to conduct full spectrum operations in unfamiliar cultural settings. The process and the venue of such cooperative roundtable conferences is intended to improve not only military long-term capabilities but also bring academic social science thinking into real world challenges.

The concept for the Military-Social Science roundtable and its associated Delphi process arose out of three common areas of interest. In the spring of 2007, the Command and General Staff College’s Center for Army Tactics (CGSC-CTAC) was seeking further perspectives and input from culturally-focused social science experts in order to enhance its training and research. CTAC was also engaged with many CGSC faculty members and students who had returned from Iraq, Afghanistan, or other combat zones, and who wanted a venue through which they could share unique observations regarding their deployment and interaction with foreign populations. Concurrently, the Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) was interested in further opportunities to leverage resources from its network of academics and foreign security specialists against the warfighter’s need for intercultural capabilities. A third impetus to hold such cooperative roundtables stemmed from academe -- specifically within the social science community -- where there are a number of very knowledgeable and experienced individuals who believe in applying their disciplines to prevent unnecessary casualties. This is especially important in an era where conflicts are raging in a number of different geographical as well as cultural environments, revealing a need to explore
areas where cultural, social science studies may benefit today’s decision makers from the tactical
to strategic level.

The confluence of these three areas of interest prompted CTAC and FMSO to jointly develop
and host a roundtable and Delphi process at Fort Leavenworth. CTAC found the military
participants and FMSO found the academic participants. The nearby University of Kansas –
particularly its military supporters with longstanding ties to FMSO and the Combined Arms
Center (CAC) – became a local partner in the event.

The primary objective of the roundtable was to publish one or more papers – written together by
the participants – that address two related topics:

Unique and/or common experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, or other areas of operations that may
help define the military’s need for culturally-related social science training, information, and/or
methodologies.

The possible way ahead for “military anthropology”, military and cultural geography, and related
culturally focused social science disciplines in terms of research, development, and cooperation
that could benefit the military at multiple levels; i.e., from the Soldier level to senior planning
staffs.

To meet this objective, four military personnel were each asked to write a paper on their – or
their unit’s – experience interfacing with a local population while deployed. The paper was to
focus on: mission challenges stemming from cultural differences between the Soldiers and the
indigenous population, how the Soldier or the unit adapted to those challenges, and whether
these adaptations were successful.

This marked the beginning of the Delphi portion of the event. The Delphi method is an iterative
process used to collect and distill the judgments of experts using a series of questions
interspersed with feedback. The questions are designed to focus on problems, opportunities,
solutions, or forecasts. Each subsequent set of questions is developed based on the results of the
previous ones. In this case, each Soldier shared his paper with one academic with whom he was
paired. Over a series of weeks or months, the academic asked the Soldier questions regarding
the experience about which the Soldier had written, with the intention of investigating the story
from a Social Science perspective. As these exchanges occurred, the academic gradually
integrated his or her observations into the paper, eventually co-authoring the final text with the
Soldier and forming the basis of this book.

On June 21st, 2007 – literally in the middle of the Delphi process -- all four teams (each
consisting of one Soldier and one academic) participated in a one-day “Military-Social Science
Roundtable during which they openly presented and discussed the Soldiers’ experiences and the
academics’ observations. This roundtable was open to the public and facilitated questions and
comments from additional attendees. The concept of social scientists and more specifically
anthropologists working closely with military veterans -- rather unlikely partners in today’s
environment -- drew a fair amount of attention from the academic and military communities, as
well as the national and local press.
While there have been numerous conferences and much discourse about “military anthropology” and related concepts, this was one of the first, focused symposiums on this issue with the direct objective to publish one or more substance-filled papers intended to move this field forward. Most conferences or similar events on this topic have focused on sharing ideas, sharing information, and networking; not on publication. Moreover, the papers stemming from this roundtable have the unique credibility of having been written by social scientists -- several of whom are directly affiliated with universities or other DoD services -- in conjunction with experienced military personnel at the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth.

These writings – which now comprise the chapters of this book – represent only the beginning of what is hopefully an ever growing appreciation for the extent to which social science and specifically Anthropology can substantially improve a soldier’s ability to stabilize a situation in a hostile environment as well as assist a unit’s capability to deal more viably with a culturally unknown, possibly uncooperative population. Furthermore, such culture-based knowledge will certainly contribute a great deal to a senior decision-maker’s ability to better understand second or third order effects of any course of action/non-action. Cultural fields of study will not provide tactical, operational, strategic, or political planners all the answers they need to know about the environment in question. On the contrary, cultural fields of study will provide these planners the foundation-level context necessary to ask the right questions from the outset rather than erring in their assumptions.

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**Part 2 of 5**

**Civil-Affairs Confronts the “Weapon of the Weak”: Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq**

**Bartholomew Dean, Charles K. Bartles and Timothy B. Berger**

*A bomber’s imagination is the only limiting factor in the use of explosives (FM 3-19.15, 11)*

In the elaboration of this essay, the authors have born in mind the need to inform Soldiers, scholars, policy makers, and the broader public at large, about a non-lethal military tactic that responded to the threat of “weapons of the weak” in rural Iraq, namely improvised explosive devices, commonly called IED’s. While we readily concede the inherent limitations of the anti-IED tactic described below, it is argued that anthropological insight is vital to understanding the
nature of power, which is essential for formulating clear rules of engagement for civil-military operations (CMO). This point is of particular import given that significant sectors of the US public, as well as the international community, have persuasively brought into question the oversight and administration of security services in theaters of operation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, which many believe to be woefully inadequate. Anthropology provides us with the best vantage point for studying military operations in peacekeeping and in times of war, chaos and great human suffering.

A civil-military, non-lethal approach to the threat of IED activity (pre- and post-detonation) is, we posit, a viable strategy to responding to the changing character of contemporary armed conflict, including the multifaceted nature of terror. By no means a panacea for dealing with all IED activity, the tactic outlined below does provide us with useful clues to the complexities of armed conflict, as well as an actual case study that manifests the challenges posed by the US military’s lack of cultural and linguistic skills necessary to sustain an effective, long-term anti-IED campaign in Iraq.

Like other scholars of the sciences of humanity, it is now customary for socio-cultural anthropologists to hold an opinion about “the war,” as Brown and Lutz (2007) have written, and to feel that their anthropological informed “view” is worthy of an audience. Brown and Lutz commendably exhort anthropological practitioners who hold an opinion on “the war” to recall that, “opinions are more informed, nuanced, and will carry further if they are shaped by the kind of close, yet open-minded, encounters with ground-level realities, and practice, whose importance we, and our disciplinary forebears, have worked so hard to promote” (2007:327). To understand is not to condone: rather than a polemical apology for “the war” we have drafted this essay precisely in the spirit of anthropological inquiry advocated by Brown and Lutz; we have striven to pay attention not only to “ground level realities,” but also to grapple with the tactical, ethical, and strategic implications of anti-IED measures through an analysis of a concrete civil-military operation in Iraq (Operation Turkey Stomp). With this in mind, we seek to provide insight useful for multiple audiences:--Soldiers, policy makers, scholars, and the public at large--in their efforts at clarifying the terms and actual consequences of vitally consequential issues before us all.

Civil Affairs & IEDs

Civil affairs (CA) special operations units are foundational to the U.S. Armed Forces’ capacity to effectively engage in civil-military operations (CMO, e.g. Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). CA responds directly to the varied challenges to US interests through conducting CMO. Civil Affairs units provide essential support to military commanders by collaborating with civil leaders and civilian populations in the commander’s arena of operations. In an effort to mitigate the unintended consequences of civil-military operations (e.g. collateral damage, political “blowback”, civil disturbances, reinforcement of factionalisms, exacerbation of local/regional rifts or lasting hostility to the military intervention) and to promote efforts oriented to the overall mission success, CA units serve as the primary interlocutors between the civilian inhabitants of a war zone, region of catastrophe, or occupied territory, and the prevailing military presence (multinational or otherwise).
The very character and key dynamics of specific CMOs are inevitably wrought by the specific circumstances of military intervention, and the very nature of the Area of Operations (AO), both in terms of the diversity of the geographic and human terrains. The experience of US military participation in an international peacekeeping initiative (which ostensibly functions as a neutral entity), is significantly different then when it participates in humanitarian intervention (such as in Somalia, where it has been perceived by some local sectors as a belligerent force), or directly as an occupying power, as in the case of Iraq. Because CA operations emphasize the fluid relationship between the civil and military environments, legitimacy and credibility are key aspects of the micro-politics of “glocalized” power. Therefore, “respect for the dignity, pride, and culture of the populace are fundamental to maintaining legitimacy and credibility” (FM 41-10 2000). In short, CA units must, “consider the perceptions of the local populace to military events” (FM 41-10 2000).

CAs are charged with keeping the local commander abreast of the dynamic, and ever changing status of the civilian populace, as well as help local representatives of civil society by coordinating military operations with state (including IGO's), and non-state actors (community authorities, regional leaders foreign forces, and NGOs), and through the distribution of humanitarian aid and basic or primary supplies necessary for communal well-being. Those units dedicated to formulate and implement CA actions are lead by Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) who incorporate civil affairs units with a plethora of other key military components (such as maneuver, military policing, provision of health service, engineering, transport of basic supplies, humanitarian aid, mobility operations, etc.), and the needs of USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and other civilian institutions in the region (both governmental and nongovernmental actors) in a concerted effort to provide the capabilities necessary for successful CMO. According to the U.S. Armed Forces’ manual on Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, “international law contains provisions as to the authorities of the occupying power and the obligations of the submitting government.” Moreover, “the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the occupying power will be determined by policy decisions at the highest level and may even involve an international policy making group” (Joint Publication 3-57, 2001).

Notwithstanding this clear assertion of the potential need for international participation in military operations of occupation, Joint Publication 3-57 unequivocally states that, “a sound local administration is developed, always subject to the authority of the occupying power.” Consistent with the Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, emphasis on CA actions has moved from measures intended to satisfy short-range goals to consider long-range plans designed to ensure successful CMO. Operation Turkey Stomp (OTS) is a manifestation of the doctrinal shift or “revolution” in the doctrinal articulation of current “counter insurgency” methods (Heuser 2007; Fowler 2005; Shultz and Dew 2006; Cassidy 2006; cf. Trinquier 1961; Galula 1964), whose efficacy can be interpreted from a number of scholarly frames: tactically, strategically, socially, legally--i.e., ethically.

In contrast to the Westphalian nation’s expression of peace and doctrines of “just war” (jus ad bellum–morally legitimate)–“He that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword”–as echoed by the Dutch philosopher Hugo Grotius in his 1625 text De jure belli ac pacis libri tres (On the Laws of War and Peace), postcolonial, post Cold war nation’s criteria for engaging in warfare have shifted to determinations of jus in bello (the moral conduct of war) and to
considerations of the legitimate use of force (Roberts and Guelff 2000). Two of the essential
conditions of the “just cause of war” theory are that the force used be “proportional” to the just
cause the war is supposed to be driven by, and that combatants be discriminated from
noncombatant civilians, who are not to be targeted or killed. Derivative of a long and illustrious
intellectual legacy--articulated in the nascent Christian Church; further elaborated by St.
Augustine; and crystallized in Grotius’ 17th century figurations, “just cause of war” theory has
remained central in the discursive architecture of debates over nuclear armaments (and other
WMD, including biological and chemical agents), as well as the contentious nature of
“humanitarian intervention” and “peace keeping missions” (e.g. the Balkans; Rwanda; Liberia;
Somalia; Haiti, etc.).

Consistent with U.S. Armed Forces’ Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations (which was
published before the events of 9/11/2001), “nations”--in the Westphalian sense--“may [now] be
required to conduct civil administration activities across the range of military operations, acting
on the authority of a nation, alliance, of nations, or the UN.” According to international law,
including: the four Geneva Conventions of 1949--and the Additional Protocols of 1977; the 1980
UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons--as well as customary international law (such
as the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, especially Conv. IV on Laws and Customs of War
on Land; Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning gas and bacteriological weapons, and the 1997
Ottawa Convention prohibiting anti-personal mines), the occupying military force has an
obligation to, “ensure public order and safety and the just and effective administration of, and
support to, a hostile or occupied territory.” As such, the occupying military force, “must maintain
an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation
of an effective civilian government” (Joint Publication 3-57, 2001). In this regard the CA’s JFC
is charged with determining which military operations are most likely to amplify tensions in the
occupied territory, while simultaneously ascertaining which actions are likely to promote and
accelerate the return to a civil administration of the occupied territory.

This is particularly crucial in “multi-cultural environments”, or pluri-ethnic theaters of
operations, “where a chosen COA [chief administrative officer] will almost invariably be seen as
partisan by one or more of the parties to a conflict” (Joint Publication 3-57, 2001). Moreover,
the vagaries of national (or sub-national) identities and contestations over citizenship (Dean and
Levi 2004) have exacerbated the complexities of CMO. Indeed, Anglo-Saxon notions of the
public welfare entitlements associated with the Marshallian concept of citizenship predicated on
labor, war and reproduction have been undermined by the multiplex impulses of globalization
(Marshall 1950; cf. Inda and Rosaldo), and the cacophonous languages of national belonging or
displacement (Anderson 1998; Meinhof and Galasinski 2007). The economic pillars of modern,
Occidental concepts of liberal citizenship were formulated in tandem with the Industrial
Revolution, yet the globalization of the world’s increasingly post-industrial economies has
created tensions for the apparently necessary relationships between national citizenship,
employment, and the nuclear family. As a result, migration, displacement, flexible notions of
citizenship--including long distance nationalism--radical transformations in reproduction,
demographic pressures, resource depletion, increased socio-economic inequities, and shifting
political allegiances, have all interacted to dramatically change the face of current armed
conflicts.
A globalized, digital modernity, marked by unprecedented and accelerated flows of people, things, capital, and ideas has led to incessant points of “glocalized” friction—both in the sense pondered by the classic theorist of war, the Prussian Karl von Clausewitz (2007), and intimated by contemporary anthropological commentator’s, such as Anna Tsing (2004:6) and Carolyn Nordstrom (2007), to name but just two. In contrast to those military conflicts fought two decades ago, (such as the US Operation URGENT FURY--Grenada 1983, or the British military campaign with Argentina to recapture the Falkland Islands in 1982) which were characterized by relatively short periods for planning, not just for the military actions but for the post-conflict CMO as well, today’s “small” wars can be measured not by months, but rather by decades. Temporal changes in the duration of post Cold war armed conflicts (many of which have roots preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall), have been matched by the global fluorescence of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside bombings.

Notwithstanding these changes in the nature of contemporary warfare, U.S. Army Civil-Affairs (CA) units have been very instrumental in theaters of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the CA missions of reconstruction and the oft repeated mantra of “winning the hearts and minds” of local inhabitants has led many supported maneuver unit commanders to believe that these are the only missions CA units are capable of conducting. This corresponds within a common misperception that CA units are ineffective in supporting the “bread and butter” mission of the maneuver commander--kinetic operations. If CA units are in fact to be used as force multipliers at the tactical and strategic levels, they must fulfill their traditional mission, while actively supporting combatant commanders fighting those forces hostile to Coalition Force interests, which have increasingly turned to IEDs as their weapon of choice. In the wake of the transformations of the nature of war, the Soldiers of one civil-affairs team believe they may have found an answer when it comes to addressing the threat of improvised explosive devices.

**Weapons of the Weak, IEDs & the Achilles Heel**

Following the fall of Baghdad, Anti-Coalition Forces (ACF) quickly realized that the tactic of direct confrontation with the U.S. and its allies would result in military defeat. If the ACF wanted to engage the Coalition, but not annihilate itself in the process of doing so, it would have to adopt different stratagems beyond direct engagement. Early on in its armed struggle with the occupying powers, the ACF began employing the conventional armaments of the guerilla: rockets, mines, mortars and, RPGs. At the outset of the Second World War, Margaret Mead asserted that, “warfare...is just an invention, older and more widespread than the jury system, but nonetheless an invention” (1940:404). The case of Iraq demonstrates this claim: ACF quickly morphed in their tactical approach to the awe inspiring technological might and fire-power of the Coalition Forces’ armature. To wit, they began a sustained and comparatively successful campaign of using remotely detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack one of the U.S. military’s Achilles heels—its supply columns and support traffic.

Incendiary bombs (Molotov Cocktails), roadside bombings, sophisticated “Barrack Buster” mortar bombs, and remotely activated IEDs have been common place in the ensuing post-World War Two armed conflicts in regions across the globe, as varied as Vietnam, Northern Ireland, Algeria, Peru, Bosnia and Indonesia. Current IED’s usually comprise an explosive charge, a
detonator, as well as an initiation system, which includes those components that initiate the charge responsible for detonating the IED. These include infra-red or magnetic triggers, remote control devices, and pressure sensitive trip wires.

The global proliferation of IEDs is matched by the diversity and ingenuity in their design and intended tactical use. Carrying a potentially large explosive payloads and the multiplied destructive impact of shrapnel and fuel as an incendiary weapon, Vehicle Borne IEDs (or VBIED) are typically used by “suicide bombers”, but these devices can also be remotely detonated. Those IEDs made for use against fortified targets often contain some type of armor piercing components, often a copper rod and shaft that is propelled by the explosive load. Similarly, antipersonnel IEDs usually contain shrapnel-producing items, like nails, wire, mechanical parts, metallic casings, or ball bearings. In Iraq, ACF have wired together multiple IEDs in a rosary-like chain, to disrupt, and in some instances, to effectively immobilize transport convoys.

In spite of the fact that the U.S. military is the most technologically advanced and professionally trained fighting force in the world, it simply has not been capable of effectively protecting its aforementioned logistics vulnerabilities. New physical force protection methods coupled with ad-hoc alterations to vehicles are, by themselves, proving insufficient in solving the ever present threat of IED attacks. Alternative approaches that rely on deep and nuanced understandings of the cultural dynamics of local populations are needed to engage the civilian population in efforts to reduce IED activity.

**Civilian Dimensions to the IED Challenge**

Soon after the occupation of Iraq, Coalition Forces realized that there is no one method, technique or measure that will effectively address the multiple threats posed by the proliferation of IED attacks. Clearly, solutions to the threat of IEDs require a more holistic and integrated approach. Accordingly, adequate solutions to the multiple threats posed by IED must have various components including: physical force protection; changing tactics; better intelligence; and above all, a civilian population actively willing to assist with anti-IED measures. In Iraq, a cooperative civilian population is certainly the most difficult aspect of implementing this holistic approach to effectively dealing with the challenges of IED attacks.

From the onset of the invasion of Iraq, Coalition Forces have long struggled to adequately engage the civilian populace, who by most accounts has been reluctant to provide information about the ACF in their local communities. Cultural repertoires differ across the globe. During civil protest or political disturbance, the behavior of peoples is not universal, but rather, “varies with the group and the culture” (2-8 FM 3-19.15, 2005). Clearly, cultural differences and linguistic barriers complicate obtaining relevant information from the Iraqi civilian populace regarding IED activity. Many of the Iraqi population perceive the US military and its allies as an occupying, “imperial force” incapable of restoring public order following the fall of Saddam’s regime. On this point, the US Armed Forces’ deficit in cultural and linguistic agility are surely the primary obstacles for obtaining credible and actionable information about the human terrain necessary to proactively respond to the threat of IEDs.
IED’s are, after all, often placed within the visual sight of non-combatants, yet the Iraqi civilian population seldom volunteers useful information to deter such attacks. Notwithstanding this Herculean “cultural” barrier, Civil-Affairs Team (CAT) A 25 of the 445th Civil-Affairs Battalion succeeded in acquiring substantive, useful information about IED activities from the local populace during its 2005 tour of duty in Iraq. This data provided invaluable in the development of a relatively successful anti-IED tactic, dubbed Operation Turkey Stomp.

Prologue: Anti-IED Operation Developed

CAT A 25 arrived at Forward Operating Base (FOB) O’Ryan in late May of 2005. The team promptly set up shop relieving CAT A 5 of the 411th Civil-Affairs Battalion, and began usual CA missions--conducting a civil-military operations (CMO) assessment, interacting with the local government officials and community representatives, providing election support, and facilitating contracts for infrastructure reconstruction and public works efforts. The birth of the CA anti-IED campaign was born when Major Winton, the S3 from the 1st Brigade 3rd Infantry Division, approached the team and solicited CMO support to try and minimize the area’s IED activity. In response, the team “brainstormed” and developed an approach that would become the most effective non-lethal counter IED operation during OIF III.

At the outset, the CA operation was pitched to a subordinate unit of 1st BDE 3rd ID, the 1/128th Field Artillery (Wisconsin National Guard). While the unit was receptive, it was uninterested in conducting new activities due to its obligations with the upcoming Relief in Place (RIP) operation. In early October 2005 at the CMO inbrief, CAT A 25 discussed the concept with the incoming unit, 3/320th Field Artillery (101st Airborne Division 3rd Brigade). The unit S-5, CPT Miesner, and the unit S-3, MAJ Hansbarger, liked the overall concept and arranged a follow-on brief later in the day with the unit commander LTC Inman. Likewise, LTC Inman agreed to the idea, and within a week the first iteration of Operation Turkey Stomp commenced.

Proactive Counter IED CMO: Operation Turkey Stomp

Operation Turkey Stomp was designed as a non-lethal preventative counter-IED civil-military operation (CMO) for the reduction of IED attacks in rural geographical areas of Iraq. It vested responsibility for IED attacks in those associated with commerce, requiring active civilian engagement in efforts at minimizing insurgent actions in their immediate vicinity. In short, this operation targeted IED placements in rural population centers along convoy routes where Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) experienced serious attacks.

Given the strongly knit social networks of kin and kith among Iraqi’s rural populace, many IED attackers are known to the community. Openly disclosing that a relative, neighbor, associate, or known “stranger” is responsible or involved in IED activity has profoundly high social costs for an informant, especially in light of the potential informant’s individual responsibilities and obligations, which are deeply embedded in broader networks of collective affiliations, multiple social attachments (civic, ethnic, religious, occupational, class, regional, gender, etc.) and social antagonisms (secular, ethnic, religious, etc.).
By sanctioning those shop keepers located in close proximity to IED activity, Operation Turkey Stomp vested the civilian population with tangible interests in preventing ongoing attacks. The basic methods underpinning Operation Turkey Stomp are by no means a novel concept in the annals of armed conflict. Yet in Iraq, the technique outlined below has proven difficult, especially in light of the high risks for non-combatant collaboration, which far outweigh the benefits of “sitting on the side lines”. Simply put, those (as well as their families and their associates) who collaborate with Coalition Forces are destined to live in a perpetual state of fear made real by the ongoing danger of violent retaliation.

Only small minorities of the Iraqi population firmly support either the Coalition or Anti-Coalition Forces. The overwhelming majority of Iraqi peoples fall somewhere in between, fatigued and traumatized by years of war that has brought ineffable suffering, wanton destruction, and a radicalized political climate that has failed to provide the institutional mechanisms for a peaceful, democratic transition to a civilian administered society (occupied or otherwise). The prototypical “middle-of-the-road” Iraqi civilian is concerned more with a return to “public order”, personal security, and socio-economic stability, than they are about ideologically and economically driven agendas of the warring parties. The vast majority of the Iraqi civilian population simply does not want to get involved in the armed conflict, which by some accounts has devolved into a series of intractable civil wars involving sectarian violence, extralegal competition for resources, scrambles for power, and access to symbolic capital.

In the fog of war, linguistic and cultural barriers have made it most challenging for Coalition Forces to determine who and what is “out of place.” For instance, without a basic understanding of Arabic, not to mention local culture and social organization, it is very difficult say for a Coalition patrol in a Sunni neighborhood to differentiate between a group of Sunni youths heading home from work and a group of Shia youth with potentially more malevolent motives (or vice versa). Keeping in mind that the, “fundamental characteristic of human culture is its endless diversity” (Leach 1982:51), the Coalition Forces’ lack of cultural and linguistic agility has hindered its comprehension of the fluid nature of the human terrain. This fault line has been widened by the structural constraints of mandated troop rotation, which undermines the ability of the US Armed Forces to effectively “develop a feel for the neighborhood” or AO necessary for successful CMO.

The complexities of Iraqi legal systems, forms of exchange, and cultural mechanisms underpinning notions of “property”, “rights” and “personhood” presents other significant challenges to Coalition Forces attempting to adjudicate in disputes over property in any given AO. Occidental, “Northern-Atlantic” systems of codified individual rights, surveys, land abstracts, deeds, property titles (and even street addresses) stipulating ownership and legal (customary or otherwise) claims to property are seemingly missing to the occupying forces in rural Iraq. While there is in fact an “officially” recognized property registration system in Iraq, there are significant popular disagreements about what is actually considered legitimate in terms of codified rights over property, commerce and other transactions. For instance, some Iraqis assert that any transactions conducted prior to the Saddam regime should be legally honored, while others think property rights affirmed during the Saddam regime should be honored. Some believe that anything occupied during and shortly after the invasion needs to be legally recognized. Further complicating the situation is the fact that most land offices based in the country’s cities have records reflecting conflicting claims to territory and rights to property,
especially in rural sectors of the country. As a result, Coalition Forces often have a hard time understanding the dominant property and exchange systems (customary and legal/formal) in a given geographical area. Sure enough, Coalition Forces have had great difficulty in determining the ownership of particular properties, not to mention who “should” or “should not” be residing/working in a given geographic locale (which is predicated on collective memories of people, ‘things’ and ‘place’).

Taking into consideration the multiple obstacles outlined above (be they cultural, linguistic, a polarized populace, the lack of understanding of contested property systems, blindness to the collective memories of people, ‘things’ and ‘place’, etc.), the US Army embraced Operation Turkey Stomp as a dynamic response to the grievous threat of IED attacks. As a military operation, Operation Turkey Stomp first involved conducting an in-depth reconnaissance of the targeted area plagued by high rates of IED activity. The target area of CMO, usually a group of store complexes within two or three kilometers of each other, was then cordoned off. Individual shop owners were subsequently separated to minimize communication and collaborating in ways that potentially subverted the IED reduction objectives of Operation Turkey Stomp. Each merchant was then assigned a number that was painted on their respective shop(s). Photos were taken of individuals next to their identification number, and information was collected about them, including: their name; tribal sheik and village affiliation; what they sold; GPS grid coordinates of their store; the shop’s owner name (if rented); names of employees who appeared to be working at the store; notes on who was cooperative; and any “suspicious” or unusual behavior was recorded. Obviously, for many Iraqi locals who were involved in the Operation Turkey Stomp interview process, the knowledge that the Coalition has their photograph and personal information was (and ostensibly still is) greatly unsettling. Needless to say, after the initial filming and cataloguing of information collected during the first phase of Operation Turkey Stomp, there invariably was, as expected, a high turnover among shop workers. Individuals leaving employment after the initial phase of the operation were presumed by CF to be involved (actively or passively) with anti-Coalition activities.

An important aspect of Operation Turkey Stomp was the collection of detailed shop inventories. This was useful in helping to identify the source(s) of materials used for the production of IEDs. Many IEDs are fabricated with parts obtained from conventional armaments (including explosive components of military equipment such as--ejection seats, explosive bolts, etc.) and standard consumer items from electronics goods, such as cellular telephones, pagers, electronic garage door openers, or timers scavenged from electric ovens, washing machines or the like. In one region with a high rate of IED attacks, four of the twenty shops had materials necessary for making IEDs. After initial inventories were conducted, those shops with IED materials were raided to temporarily seize materials suspected in the manufacture of IEDs, and to further question the vendor of the suspicious, confiscated materials. The inventory included photographing commercial goods, wares and material items in the shops, which may be of future import to CMO, particularly for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel to ascertain if materials in specific shops (or individuals) are or were related to components used in the production of IEDs in a circumscribed area of operation. Apropos, when photographs of narrow gauge copper wire from a local shop were shown to an EOD technician, he quickly surmised this was the likely source of an outbreak of IEDs that used thin copper wire--an anomaly in this AO. This provides us with a good illustration of the need for culturally agile CA units that are capable
of detecting ‘things’, people, or ‘ideas’ “out of place”--e.g. one needs to possess a deep and “thick” understanding of local, “indigenous” life-ways and worldviews.

All of the information collected during Operation Turkey Stomp was subsequently combined into what has been dubbed a “read book”, which is comprised of detailed information about centers of commerce: employees, shop inventories, shop owners, etc. The “read book” was then provided to patrols and units that were passing through a given surveyed area. Here it is worthy of mention that a “read book” did far more than simply connect geographical areas of responsibility to individuals, it enabled CF patrols to know exactly who to talk to during their missions in AOs. Not without its pitfalls and glaring gaps, the “read book” provides a skeletal understanding of key facets of the local human terrain, and helps to manage the ever uncertainty about who (and what) is and who (and what) is not “out of place” by connecting faces, names, things, and locations. The raw data collected from the preparatory phase of Operation Turkey Stomp revealed several interesting and unexpected findings about the human terrain of those regions with high rates of IED attacks. For instance, Sudanese immigrants in one area were often found working in the highest IED placement locations. Similarly, the CA operation found that Sunni communities living within larger Shia communities also had significantly more IED activity.

While providing critical local knowledge about the theater of operation, the so-called “read book” can serve as an indispensable tool for maintaining mission continuity when units transition in or out of the AO. By no means an ethnography, the “read book” does, however, serve as a repository for crucial information gathered by the previous unit, compiled into a standardized and easy-to-use format amenable to social network analysis, demography, and other forms of categorizing people and things (immovable and otherwise) necessary for post conflict operations, especially in terms of the process of reconciliation. The “read book” was used to sustain the effort when the 3/320th FA moved out of the AOR and the 3/29 FA moved in. Store owners were quickly aware that the SOP continued on when patrols stopped at each location with the “read book” in hand, and started asking to interview people by name.

The “Read Book” and Engaging the Civil Populace in Anti-IED Measures

After a coalition unit collected information, photographed locales, and conducted primary inventories, all local shop owners/managers were obliged to read the following prepared statement:

You need to paint the number I have given you on your store by tomorrow. If it is not painted on your store by tomorrow I will be back to deal with you individually. I want you to look down the road to your left and to the right. As far as you can see. If a roadside bomb goes off during daylight hours in line of sight of your store, we will shut your store down and you will have to come to the CMIC [Civil Military Information Center] on Saturdays to be screened. You are not allowed to reopen your store until you have come to the CMIC. If you reopen your store without our permission, the Iraqi Army will come to your store and take control of your stock and/or you will be detained.
From the Coalition Force’s perspective, this written declaration made two important points to those associated with commercial activities in areas with confirmed IED activity. First, it unequivocally indicated to merchants and their employees that they would bear direct consequences for the placement of IEDs in the vicinity of their shops. Secondly, it made clear that if there was an IED attack, their place of business would be closed until the store owner came to a Coalition base and personally spoke to Coalition Forces Counter Intelligence personnel (Army CI or Air Force OSI) to gain permission to reopen commercial activities. Facing the imminent closure of the very means of their livelihood, an IED blast in the (visual) vicinity of their shops took on significantly greater consequence for local inhabitants than an IED incident had in the past. Given the centrality of shops to the daily life of rural Iraqi communities, their closure has profound social costs and economic burdens. IED attacks now had the impact of wounding CF, combatants and civilians, but the local economy as well. Operation Turkey Stomp coupled shop owners and their community’s socio-economic interests with the Coalition’s desire to minimize IED attacks.

Operation Turkey Stomp’s post-IED attack interviews facilitated civilian cooperation with Coalition Forces. It obliged all shop keepers in the vicinity of an IED attack to meet personally with the Coalition in a confidential setting. Requiring all shop owners to meet individually with Coalition Forces functioned to reduce the shopkeeper’s risk of being singled out by Anti-Coalition Forces as a collaborator, and gave an opportunity for pro-Coalition or the so called “middle-of-the-road” portion of the population to relay relevant information in a discrete and confidential fashion. Post-IED attack interviews also helped determine which individuals were being candid, since responses were cross checked with other interviewee responses. Debriefing individuals in private also provided Coalition Force intelligence assets with a strategic opportunity to cover subjects they normally would not be able to in other venues. For example, during one post IED attack debriefing, the shopkeeper revealed the locations of several weapon caches, and the dumping site for several corpses of slain Iraqi policemen. Similarly, these post-IED attack debriefing interviews provide crucial information for EOD personnel tasked with rendering safe and disposing of IEDs in all of their permutations and shifting locales.

Case Study-AO Tampa

The first iteration of operation Turkey Stomp began on October 28, 2005. CAT A 25 chose AO Tampa since the area had heavy IED activity, and was located on a major Coalition supply route. AO Tampa proved an ideal location for implementing this CMO. The region in question had nineteen clusters of shops situated in two areas along a relatively straight stretch (17 km) of four lane roadway, with the added advantage that almost every commercial cluster was located within eyesight of the next group of shops. During a two-day period, the CA team and elements from the 3/320th FA (Field Artillery) cordoned off store groups, conducted preliminary interviews, and conducted detailed inventories of the merchant’s wares.

Following its implementation, Operation Turkey Stomp immediately began to bear fruit. In the ninety day period directly following the first operation, there were no IED events in AO Tampa, compared to almost daily IED attacks, which had previously been the norm in the region. The civil-affairs team returned to the area roughly three weeks after the start of Operation Turkey Stomp and discovered upon updating their “read books” that six individuals working in the area
had precipitously departed. Although never proven, Counter Intelligence had suspected all six of Anti-Coalition sympathies. In AO Tampa daylight attacks fell by 90% and night attacks fell by 70%. As predicted, many of the remaining attacks were concentrated at the far ends of AO Tampa, outside the shopkeepers’ visual line of sight.

**Shop Complexes A through E, in AO Tampa**

In many ways the first iteration of the Operation Turkey Stomp was the most successful demonstration of this CA tactic. In the first operation, the location of most store groupings were within eyesight of each other, which is atypical in many rural AOs. This in turn contributed to a relatively “safe” stretch of road throughout the length of AO Tampa’s primary transit route. The other iterations of Operation Turkey Stomp decreased IED events within sight of the store complexes, but the operation concentrated IED attacks in the “gaps” located in between the store groups. Although large stretches of relatively “safe” roads were the exception, and not the rule for the various iterations of Operation Turkey Stomp, this CA tactic, nevertheless, stands as a proven example of how a non-lethal, preventative counter-IED CMO can help shape the battle space.
The Measurements of Success: Operation Turkey Stomp in Retrospect

After Operation Turkey Stomp began, IED activity in the immediate vicinity of the local stores stopped or was reduced significantly in the AO. IED activity in the broader area--beyond the visual field of shops either stopped, or in some instances increased. In locations where there was a long chain or string of shops within eyesight, IED attacks occurred at the distant ends of the chain. Nevertheless, IEDs continued to be detonated in the spaces between shops that were not within view of shops.

Here one should ask: what is the advantage of stopping IEDs in one place, if those who resort to their use just move them a couple of hundred meters down the road? In simple terms, the military benefits lie in this tactics’ capacity to shape the human terrain by canalizing IED attacks into more manageable areas by closing segments of the battle space to forces hostile to US Armed Forces, Coalition partners, and civilian noncombatants. As with any military alliance, the Coalition Forces have a finite amount of resources; Operation Turkey Stomp helped focus assets (patrols, snipers, surveillance, air support) on rural locations with high IED activity. As a result, Operation Turkey Stomp stopped most IED attacks in the immediate vicinity of shops--and sometimes in the “vulnerable gaps”, now located between Iraqi points of local commerce.

In military terms, measuring the quantitative and qualitative successes (or failures) of Operation Turkey Stomp is difficult at best. There is simply no way of ascertaining the number of prevented IED events or aborted attacks one can attribute to this CMO. As such, the “deterrent” value of this civil-military operation must be observed in more impressionistic (though tangible) terms. Perhaps the most reliable measure of the operation’s efficacy is through comparing the number of IED attacks before and after conducting Operation Turkey Stomp.
In the three iterations where CAT A 25 used Operation Turkey Stomp in built up rural areas, attacks on Coalition Forces dropped by 60-70%. Day-time IED attacks dropped by about 90%, while night-time IED attacks dropped by roughly 60%.

Evaluating Efficacy: Military & Anthropological Optics

There are, as mentioned, a number of ways for determining the success of Operation Turkey Stomp. The ability to shape the field of battle by canalizing IED attacks, while also reducing the frequency of IED activity is a tangible benefit—in spite of the inevitable unintended consequences the operation created (e.g., increased IED attacks in other areas of the battlefield, promotion of illicit economic activity, ethical implications, etc.). For a Soldier, the advantage of Operation Turkey Stomp is that it brings individuals that potentially have some information about an IED attack into a controlled environment where they can be placed in the classical “prisoners dilemma.”

Individuals being interviewed know that their neighbors are being questioned. They have no way of determining what their neighbors said, or will say, and know that if they do not cooperate with the Coalition Forces, their shops will remain closed. An individual with potentially valuable information regarding IED activity must then make a choice between cooperating (“defecting” in the prisoner dilemma model) with the Coalition, or remaining quiet (“cooperating” in the prisoner dilemma model). The advantages of cooperating with the Coalition are compounded when monetary rewards are offered for relevant information. In sum, from a utilitarian, ego-centered perspective, this operation allows individuals who want to cooperate with an opportunity to do so anonymously. When relevant information about IED activities is obtained, this serves as leveraging cooperation from others, especially in light of the material benefits (or costs) in question. Non-lethal CMO approaches to anti-IED measures should be considered in the formulation of the TEP (Theater Engagement Plan), which serves as the explicit guidelines for the Military commands strategy to achieve both US short term security goals in AOs, as well as a vision or blue-print for the USG long term objectives for regional peace, reconciliation, socio-economic development, and overall prosperity. CMO activities, such as Operation Turkey Stomp, contribute to the continued development of Render Safe Procedures (RSP) designed to prevent unacceptable detonations of unexploded ordnance, including IEDs.

For a social anthropologist, the Operation Turkey Stomp’s efficacy can be determined through another optic, one tempered by sensitivity to individual motivations, themselves imbricated by the demands of biology as well as the complex interaction with “enculturation”—or learned, socialized behavior. Having said that—one must also recall, as Marcel Mauss noted long ago (1938), that personhood is itself a culturally constructed category that includes collective interests stemming from the individual’s multiple social attachments. As previously mentioned, the first iteration of Operation Turkey Stomp was the most successful example of this tactic, leading one to ask how effective such an approach will be over the long run given humanity’s propensity to adapt overtime to direct and indirect violence. As a tactic, Operation Turkey Stomp’s modicum of success in the reduction of IED activity invariably is a function of the rural, sparsely populated AO. Hence, this calls into question the tactical limitations of this CMO in densely populated urban areas plagued by civil strife, political violence, and warfare.
The transformation in armed conflict, and hence the nature of civil-military operations is manifest in recent United Nations’ declarations aimed at shaping the human terrain, particularly in so-called post-conflict regions: the Balkans, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, etc. Representing the input of more than 200 individuals with experience working with local, regional or international rule of law institutions in post-conflict zones, UN guidelines as expressed in the Partnership Program on Peace-building and Rule of Law emerged following several meetings that were held between March 2002 and May 2003. The UN’s guidelines pay explicit attention to the multicultural dimensions of CMO. In this respect, the UN guidelines assert that, “International personnel must be sensitive to local culture…be subject to continual review…reach out to the local citizenry, and be very conscious never to patronize them.”

In addition to ethical considerations, to wit, targeting a collective group for reprisal, and hence potentially ostracizing or scapegoating merchants; forced closure of civilian means of livelihood; interrogation of non-combatants, Operation Turkey Stomp is a tactic that has limited long-term appeal. While the non-lethal tactic did minimize the frequency of IED incidents, it does little in the way of understanding the cultural logic under-pinning IED activity in the first place (which is obviously necessary for preemptive and post-detonation actions). In terms of “winning the hearts and minds” of the local civilian populace, the tactics’ heavy-handed measures did little for engendering local goodwill—and surely provided symbolic fodder for those hostile to the Coalition Forces. Given the longue durée perspective of the anthropological gaze, which gives precedent to long term historical structure rather than simply the immediacy of lived events, Operation Turkey Stomp’s greatest limitation is its overwhelming reliance on sensitivity to “local culture”—a capability sadly missing from the impressive range of assets at the US Armed Forces’ disposal. Failure to recognize the human dimensions of this tactic (rather than say the military or operational aspects) leads to underestimating the unintended socio-political consequences of Operation Turkey Stomp’s socially aggressive approach to dealing with merchants (interviews/interrogations) and the use of painted numbers—which provided the image of a belligerent force embracing methods that runs painfully close to the dehumanizing techniques employed by the Nazi’s ghastly practice of visually enumerating civilian populaces.

Cultural agility, as noted previously, has not been a strong suit for current CMO in Iraq. As articulated in the recent, and somewhat polemical US Army and Marines counter-insurgency manual, what makes CMO actions like Operation Turkey Stomp so difficult, “is the amount of sociocultural information that must be gathered and understood” (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 3-35 2006). While there are no quick or simple “fixes” to this profound lacunae in the cultural and linguistic information gathering and analytic capacity of the US Armed Forces, and hence its ability to respond adequately to the terror and violence of the IED threat (real or perceived), Operation Turkey Stomp, nonetheless, represents a non-lethal approach to proactively facing the lethal armature of the “weapons of the weak.”

The 21st Century battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan evoke the terms of engagement noted in many armed conflicts currently raging across the globe. Operation Turkey Stomp, albeit with its many limitations, does provide a useful case study of the role CA units can play in shaping the human terrain, and hence the terms of war, peace, justice and reconciliation. Demonstrating by the archaeological and ethnographic record of the “long primal march” of humanity, wars appear to be a phenomenon that will far out live us. Yet the ethical and practical questions (in a military,
political and socio-economic sense) surrounding the actual terms and consequences of armed engagement, and what constitutes legitimate force have undergone dramatic changes—on the battlefield, in the halls of national policy makers, among international bodies charged with military oversight (such as the UN and the ITC), in scholarly debates, and in public understandings. While few anthropologists have directly addressed the Gordian knot of anti-IED measures, some have of late turned to engaging with military doctrine. Wax and Moos urge greater academic-military collaboration in understanding what they deem asymmetric warfare (2006:13). Whatever one does think about the evolving nature of warfare (and thus the term asymmetric warfare), Wax and Moos seem to be justified when they chide those who selectively choose when the US should intervene militarily across the globe.xv

Some anthropological commentators, such as Robert Gonzalez have rightly critiqued the recently drafted US Army’s counter-insurgency manual (FM-324) for failing to address whether or not military occupation is a proper course of action, or for that matter whether or not the “insurgent’s” grievances are legitimate. Yet Gonzalez is somewhat disingenuous by not underscoring the obvious fact that the manual’s target audience is the Soldier, not the politicians (or public they represent) that send Soldiers off to war. On this point, Gonzalez writes, “[b]ecause it (FM 3-24) ignores the broader context of US imperial power, it is incomplete, inadequate, and at times inane” (2007:17). While these charges may be naïve, overly reductive and seemingly ‘reactive’ in their sweeping generalizations regarding the imperial force of a putative Pax Americana, they should, nevertheless, be candidly addressed in the academic (or public) arena by Soldiers, policy makers, and qualified scholars of the nature of war and peace.

This frank, inclusive and academically rigorous debate provides one of the most useful mechanisms for influencing policy makers’ decisions, and more importantly their constituencies, regarding those existentially charged issues—life and death, oppression and justice, victory and defeat—surrounding armed conflict (Moos and Dean 2007).

In writing about the Peloponnesian Wars, Thucydides remarked that numerous unfounded ideas about the foe abounded. In this sense, Thucydides’ assertion rings true today: “So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand” (1.20.3). For those of us who deplore the militarization of society, we remain resolutely committed to the principal that debates over the ethical nature of military intervention and the legitimate use of force should be determined by civil sectors of US society—not by the Armed Forces, who after all are professionally trained to execute military orders that stem from policies approved by officials ostensibly elected through the central imaginary of contemporary politics, namely the process (albeit imperfect) of representative “democracy.” And it is here that we part company with those who argue for scholarly disengagement with the US military. From an operational and tactical level, cultural agility is an essential component in any CMO.

Anthropologically speaking, those in the US who argue for a “purist” discipline reflect not only a peculiarly “American” innocence regarding the conflictual nature of the world, but more importantly, a methodological “straight jacket” which pre-empts the understanding of power in its various manifestations in the actual, lived world, which unfortunately does not fit cozily with the binary ethics—good/evil—regnant in the US academy, not to mention popular media coverage on the ethics of anthropological engagement with the military (Canon 2007).
Some have voiced that participation in a misguided policy in order to mitigate its ill effects is a slippery slope, especially for those who have a choice not to participate in direct combat. That said, we must also question the price of not participating in what some have deemed bad policy. Total disengagement fits well with the general ethos of the discipline of socio-cultural anthropology, yet does it suit the challenges emanating for the increasingly militarized world? Without going beyond the academic “Green Zone” (or Ivory Tower if you like), we run the risk of fomenting an intellectual climate dominated by a bunker mentality that precludes the possibility of generating any sense of humanity in dreadful situations. An anthropological mandate to comprehend the variations in the human experience (Meirs, Dean and Erikson 2007) is negated when we prohibit collaboration with the military.

Defying the gray zones of social life, a Manichaean view is innocent, fits well with binary assessments of complex realities, and as such is woefully inadequate for grounding our discipline in what Carrithers (2005) has aptly called a “moral science of possibilities.” As the anthropologist travels between overlapping and at times discontinuous ethical worlds, a “moral science of possibilities” takes root. Transgressing a single moral world leads to zerreissen—a torn or fragmented postmodern world where one soon realizes that “things” could always be otherwise.xvi

Conclusion: the Changing Face of Civilian Engagement

Operation Turkey Stomp was a simple and somewhat effective way of temporarily deterring IED activity in a given area. The “pro-active” component assembled information about the civilian population and posed financial sanctions (shop closings) if IED’s occurred within eyesight of a given shop group or cluster. These actions allowed the Coalition to unify civilian Iraqi interests with the objectives of the Coalition Forces. The “reactive”, punitive component of the operation consisted of closing down shops in close vicinity of IED attacks, and obliging formal interviews of all merchants who wanted their shops reopened. In this sense, no one individual was publicly singled out as a collaborator with Coalition Forces, and intelligence personnel were provided with an opportunity to gather and verify actionable information for the CMO.

Technological countermeasures, including remote jamming systems, are by themselves ineffectual in dealing with the destructive challenges of IEDs. Judging by Iraqi’s continued and upward curve of IED related Coalition fatalities (see below), creative solutions must combine conventional military wisdom with innovative tactics that proactively deter attacks.
CA tactics, like Operation Turkey Stomp, highlight the requisite role of extensive field-experience, training, and above all, cultural agility needed to address the proliferation of IEDs. Technical information, such as patterns of brisance, or the shattering effect of IEDs (which depends upon the velocity of detonation), details about the incident (including interviews), and the inventories of the “social life” of the things and physical targets attacked should all be used in concert to comprehend the structural conditions triggering IED activity. Operation Turkey Stomp provided visual cues, actionable information, and a short-term tactic for reducing IED activity in a given AO. Operation Turkey Stomp illustrates the need to enhance the Armed Forces capacity to recognize telltale signs of IED activity (pre- and post-detonation), which is unquestionably the most valuable asset in the increasingly sophisticated repertoire of IED detection equipment and techniques now circulating throughout the world.

Perhaps, the most important impact of Operation Turkey Stomp is that it provided the civilian population with strong, tangible incentives to resist the use of IEDs by anti-Coalition Forces. Sadly, military commanders often view the local civilian populace as an obstacle to peace in the protracted wars now raging in Iraq and Afghanistan. We contend that non-lethal CMO actions, such as Operation Turkey Stomp, can encourage civilian cooperation by providing relevant information about IED activity, and thereby promote Coalition objectives. Writing in his magnum opus *Oriental Despotism*, Karl Witfogel asserted 50 years ago that “total terror” robs a people’s will for autonomy because it deprives them of the “desire for independent political action” (1957:137). The terror posed by the age old, yet digitally morphed, bomb--the IED--with its simple yet horrific capacity to unleash catastrophic military, political, and personal violence and trauma is a seductively enigmatic weapon. Adequate responses to the multifaceted dimensions to the threat of IEDs in any given AO dictate equally imaginative approaches.
grounded in an appreciation of the dynamic character of the human component in civil-military operations.

Since at least the nineteenth century, many modern military manuals have adhered to customary principles of military necessity, humanity and chivalry, as recently argued by Sir Adam Roberts (2007). While all these codified doctrines have implications for targeting, so too does the preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration on explosive bullets:

> Considering that the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war; That the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the enemy... (Cited by Rogers 2007).

In light of the transformed character of war, and the enduring and highly complex nature of the occupation of Iraq, is this foundational, “principle guiding the conduct of armed conflict now out of date” Rogers (2007)? Given the lack of clarity regarding the extent to which international law applies in occupied territories, not to mention the ability of the UN Security Council (or other multilateral agencies) to adequately implement international law, raises perplexing questions worthy of careful analysis for those concerned with the rules relating to armed engagement, particularly the Laws of War and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

While remaining savvy to the shifting tides in international jurisprudence and its impact on the ethical, or “humane” nature of warfare, a successful CMO should follow simple cues from contemporary (Military Review 2006) classical counterinsurgency and insurgency doctrines and techniques in order strive to minimize the use of lethal force, and ultimately actively engage in non-kinetic operations (e.g., diplomacy, civil affairs, reconstruction of infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, education and public health works, etc.). As such, these CA efforts will serve to amplify support for the occupying force and to undercut public acceptance for those opposed to it. Cultural agility will mitigate operational and tactical mistakes that invariably are made in any armed conflict. As we have illustrated, CA units do have a pivotal role in developing courses of action that reduce the use of fire power and increase the effectiveness of non-lethal actions, such as Operation Turkey Stomp, which was intentionally formulated to save civilian and combatant lives.

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As McLennan has recently noted, discourse about power and the quest for power “uniquely bridges the gap between academic and popular opinion concerning the way the world works” (2005). This sentiment regarding the centrality of power in any social analysis echoes the eminent British philosopher Bertrand Russell’s (1938) cogent observation that the concept of power is to social science what energy is to physics: our primary life impulse is the interminable “quest for power.”

While the intention of this essay is not a conceptual or definitional elaboration of terrorism, we concur with the UN General Assembly resolution 49/60 that explicitly asserts, “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable…” (1994).

The U.S. Armed Forces’ doctrinal concepts for the planning and conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces is outlined in the U.S. Armed Forces’ Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations Joint Publication 3-57 (8 February, 2001). Supplementary information on civil affairs (CA) and CA activities is provided in JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs. In his critical commentary, Grubbs (2003) notes that Joint CMO doctrine has improved following the issuance of Joint Publications 3-57 and 3-57.1, which draw from the numerous lessons learned from domestic and combat operations in which the United States engaged during the 1990s. Nevertheless, Grubbs identifies shortfalls in CMO doctrine necessary “for today's environment” (2003).

We use the term civilian following the meaning of the word spelled out in the United Nation’s Additional Protocol I (1977), and as reflected in customary law, to represent the fundamental distinction between civilians (who are legally protected from attack) on the one hand, and combatants and military targets on the other hand. Those who actively take part in hostilities are deemed combatants. Under international law, if noncombatants engage in the hostilities their legal protection from attack is rescinded.

On the unintended consequences of US wars, see Hagan and Bickerton (2007), who challenge von Clausewitz’s notion that armed conflict is a “rational” continuation of politics. Instead, they underscore that the unintended consequences of wars waged by the US have often been worse than the actual rationale for which the conflict was fought in the first place.

The term glocalization is used to encapsulate the amorphous process whereby global information and flows of things, people and capital interface with local socio-cultural interactions and material formations. Invariably unequal and volatile, this circulatory process is dynamic, and as such “the local” can and does take on “global proportions” or translocal strategic implications.

Rather than turning to the myriad anthropological figurations of the keyword culture, we intentionally draw from the recent US Armed Forces’ controversial counterinsurgency manual which benignly frames culture as that which, “influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into existing categories” (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 3-7 2006).

While consistent with the US Armed Forces’ capacity to succeed in a military sense in any given AO, the doctrine raises serious questions about the circumstances and very nature of the legitimate use of force, especially when it comes to a military intervention’s that are manifestly occupational in nature.

Among others, see Gross’s (1948) classic discussion of the peace established at Westphalia.

IEDs have been in use since at least the Second World War when delayed-fuse and command-detonated explosive devices were employed in 1943-44 by Allied Forces to disrupt Axis transport lines by derailing scores of German trains.
This point can also be made regarding the “social life of things” associated with those individuals of interest interviewed, especially following an IED incident.

The Prisoners Dilemma got its name from the following hypothetical situation: imagine two criminals arrested under the suspicion of having committed a crime together. However, the police do not have sufficient proof in order to have them convicted. The two prisoners are isolated from each other, and the police visit each of them and offer a deal: the one who offers evidence against the other one will be freed. If none of them accepts the offer, they are in fact cooperating against the police, and both of them will get only a small punishment because of lack of proof [cooperates]. They both gain. However, if one of them betrays [defects] the other one, by confessing to the police, the defector will gain more, since he is freed; the one who remained silent, on the other hand, will receive the full punishment, since he did not help the police, and there is sufficient proof. If both betray, both will be punished, but less severely than if they had refused to talk. The dilemma resides in the fact that each prisoner has a choice between only two options, but cannot make a good decision without knowing what the other one will do (see http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/PRISDII.html)

On this matter, Wax and Moos write, “[w]hat is strikingly paradoxical is for persons to advocate that the United States intervene militarily in situations of civil strife, like Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda, but who then dissociate themselves and their students from working with military or other pertinent agencies” (2006:13). Likewise, the IHR community is right to deplore the abuses committed in Iraq (and Afghanistan) in the name of the occupying Coalition Forces, yet many prominent human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, are calling for a military intervention in Darfur as part of a humanitarian and peace keeping efforts. Some commentators (e.g. Mamdani 2007) seem justified in pointing to the hypocrisy of this effort, which selectively emphasize human suffering say in Darfur, but are moot when it comes to the atrocities and scale of human suffering in other areas of Africa, such as is underway in the Western Sahara, or the Congo region.

For Carrithers, Zerrissenheit is best understood, not as an aspect of a fragmented “and fatally flawed world” as Hegel thought. Instead, it should be considered in the sense provided by Adorno, with Carrithers' caveat that this is “a natural condition of human life” not merely a pathological concomitant of global capitalism (2005:435).

The Iraqi Coalition Causality Count reports that over 1600 US fatalities have been caused by the burgeoning use of IEDs in Iraq since outbreak of the war. This does not include the IED fatalities among the more than one thousand slain private contractors who have had died in Iraq, nor the innumerable local casualties, and thousands of combatants and civilians alike who have been maimed or killed by these explosive devices since the outset of the war in Iraq.

The authors have no knowledge of the extent to which this type of CMO has been used since the departure of CAT A 25 in the Spring of 2006.

The US military published on counterinsurgency operations prior to its entry into World War II (see USMC1940) United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*.

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