19th Century Strategy and its Applicability to Insurgent Warfare

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Irregular warfare (insurgency, low intensity conflict, etc.) is said to have a generally different character than conventional, maneuver warfare. So be it, but it does not necessarily follow that classic military strategic principles are inapplicable. One of the best statements of classic strategy comes from a British barrister writing before the advent of airpower. His expression reminds us that the important lines in linear warfare are not the fronts, but the lines of communication. This considered, the notion of ‘non-linear warfare’ can mislead. The line of retreat is especially highlighted, helping us place Mao’s teaching more closely to Jomini’s.

British barrister T. Miller Maguire was a prolific author and commentator on military subjects at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Well read among British military students, his name all but disappeared from the bookshelf after his death in 1920. In Outlines of Military Geography (1899), in order to arm his readers with a working concept of strategy, Maguire makes the following assertion:

Once the reader understands that soldiering and fighting are far from synonymous—that in a campaign combats are occasional while marching is constant—that before entering into battle a general must be most careful to secure his line or lines of retreat; he understands the leading principles of strategy, whether he can define the phrase to his satisfaction or not. He sees that a general whose road homeward or to his base is threatened or cut by a superior force must, if he loses a decisive battle, be ruined as well as defeated; while a general who has secured his line of communication will not be ruined even if defeated, but can fall back, procure recruits, replenish his wagons, and begin to fight again with a fair prospect of success.

The paragraph is useful for understanding the practical inter-relationship of operational strategic variables. With it Maguire tosses us a lost key that could improve American military doctrine in the 21st century.

By what logic does Maguire’s shorthand unlock military strategy? Who was T. Miller Maguire and how did he arrive at his matter-of-fact assertions? Exactly how might his encapsulations be relevant to us now? The answers, abbreviated, are as follows: 1. Maguire’s statement weaves together traditional considerations of movement, concentration, surprise, speed, risk management, position, and morale in a manner that considers their interrelated effect in competitive time and space; 2. Maguire was an educated, somewhat eccentric advocate of British
military power who compiled and competently synthesized the lessons of other strategists and past wars. His syntheses are the product of avocation, study, legalistic logic and economy; 3. If we use Maguire’s syntheses to cross-examine current American doctrine, the latter appears relatively inefficient.

Maguire’s syntheses observe that physically weaker contenders must be most careful to secure their movement from places of tactical events back to places of sanctuary. That insight regarding the imperative of secure lines of retreat is as relevant in 2009 as it was in 1809, and as obvious to Mao as it was to Marlborough. To Maguire and his contemporaries, disproportionate strength (asymmetry) was the normal engine of strategy. A general facing a stronger force has to craft his attacks carefully and assure that, whatever their result, he will fight again. This was, then, the central principle of competent generalship. It was understood that the great captains know when to risk violating a principle; and even sloppy disobedience doesn’t always mean disaster. After all, the enemy might be just as clumsy as we are.

**By what logic does Maguire’s shorthand unlock military strategy?**

Maguire’s synthesis of the operational problem, with its assertion about the line of withdrawal, is an expression of military math. It doesn’t artificially advocate or diminish any one variable, create perspective from only one side of a competitive ledger, or presuppose moral advantage. Another of his formulations reads as follows:

> The object of the strategist in drawing up his plan is so to arrange his marches and his lines of operations that, on the one hand, if he wins the battle he will not only defeat the enemy on the field but place him in a situation of much perplexity as to his future action, his line of retreat, and his supplies; and, on the other hand, if the battle be lost, he will have secured for himself a safe line of retreat, and an opportunity of recuperating his strength.  

There is no space for doubt in this thinking about the importance of battle. In this Maguire shares with many military theorists a belief that the battle is no less than the event around which strategic contemplation is built. In Maguire’s writing, however, battles are not inevitable; the analysis focuses on the outlooks of opposing generals regarding their prospects of success in relation to potential battle. The theory is not just about geometry or geography, distance and time, firepower or tactical expertise--even while these things are critical environmental elements. Maguire the teacher, in love with History and Geography, a voracious reader, and arm-chair general, was first a lawyer. His thought process was about argument and argumentation. The argument calculated and organized knowledge of the myriad factors affecting military success. These factors (mass, surprise, economy of force, etc.) were just raw concepts until placed within a relational logic. Only then did the considerations fulfill their status as principles of war, with their relative weight determined by circumstances. The argumentation part was about what the calculus of factors did inside the minds of contending generals. The ultimate question for this barrister-turned-strategist was the decision state of the judges (in the case of strategy, generals). Geography and history are about actual places and events; Maguire’s formulas are not metaphysical. They are about time, placement, strength and speed, but ultimately Maguire’s observation is about decisions, not numbers. In current strategic parlance, the principles are
typically stated as ‘objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.’ However, these qualities are not woven together in any expressed relational logic. They are variables proffered to the wise, but a reader must infer a sense of their interdependent consequence.

Maguire groused in a 1912 pamphlet that Napoleon’s Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of 1805 should have filled more attention space than did the battle of Borodino in terms of its military lessons, and cited von Clausewitz for support. Maguire presented Ulm and Austerlitz together as a single lesson. Austrian General Mack, Napoleon’s opponent at Ulm, could see no possibility of victory in battle. His army was trapped physically and, more importantly, Napoleon had trapped Mack psychologically. Mack surrendered his army almost without a fight. Napoleon then went on to win the historic battle at Austerlitz. One might say that battle was central to the campaign. One could also assert that calculated avoidance of battle was a central feature, or that flanking and indirect attack was key, or that celerity, deception, and resolve were…or…etc. If, instead of Mack’s surrender, there had been a great battle at Ulm, even a resounding French victory might have left Napoleon with a less promising set of options for advance. In such an alternative history, time and distance might have favored the concentration of the remaining Austro-Hungarian/Russian armies, and Austerlitz might have ended differently.

For Maguire, Ulm underlined the consequences of an unsecured line of withdrawal from an unwanted battle. Conversely, and significantly, Austerlitz offers us the consequence of a relatively secured line of withdrawal. Although Napoleon achieves a tremendous tactical victory there, his enemy successfully retreats, ultimately to defeat him.

For Maguire, the pivot point of strategic design is the potential fact of decisive battle. A threat may exist of being drawn into an unwinnable battle, or a promise of luring the enemy into a battle likely to be won. In the face of ambiguous potential, responsible generalship means offering battle at a place and time which will leave a resolvable overall result even if the battle is lost. Without all the ‘if’s and ‘or’s, however, the math is incomplete. Without a conjoining logic, any list of ‘principles’ remains a dull mnemonic device. Ultimately, operational strategy is about the positioning of force to cause victory, fail safe, perplex the opponent, or lead him to commit some fatal disobedience to the same principle. Strategy is about geographic mechanics combined with the psychology of competition: how one might create, change or falsify the physical environment so as to change human resolve, enforce hope or impose hopelessness.

Returning to the primacy of the battle, note another of Maguire’s comments.

Some wars are decided at once by great victories. Sadowa practically disposed of the issues of 1866, and Marengo of the Austrians in the north-west of Italy in 1800, while Austria yielded after Austerlitz in 1805, but frequently the defeated troops avoid tactics and resort to strategy.

What is interesting about the above quote is the syntactical demotion of strategy in relation to tactics. Strategy is what the weaker contender is obliged to do well, while the stronger party would prefer major tactical events if they could be arranged. A contender with relative overall deficiency in physical power resorts to strategy in order to successfully prosecute tactical events while managing the risk inherent in decisive engagement with a superior force. A physically advantaged contender has less necessity of strategy, and often therefore seeks battle or tactical
opportunity with less creativity or sense of urgency. The essence of strategy remains the same: If a weaker force is brought to battle without having sufficiently secured its route of withdrawal, it risks being ruined as well as defeated. Like the Napoleonic generals, a guerrilla leader must assure the security of lines of retreat to sanctuary when he risks engagement with a potentially stronger force. This truth implies that the counterinsurgent be most mindful of the insurgent’s routes of movement after contact, as well as the actions likely taken by the insurgent to secure those routes.

Who was T. Miller Maguire and how did he arrive at his matter-of-fact assertions?

Little record of Maguire’s childhood is available; we pick up the track of his life with his first significant published work, a survey of military history published in 1887. From about 1890, the frequency of his published titles increased in response to market demand for his brief, clear, and historically supported explanations. Maguire faced some scholarly derision for having been a ‘crammer’ (in reference to students who were purportedly learning only enough and remembering long enough to pass entrance exams), a categorization that he publicly rejected as an insult, but perhaps admitted at home. He described himself as a mere ‘compiler’ and on occasion extolled the virtues of being able to simplify what he termed the metaphysical density of other, more famous students of strategy.

Maguire never announced a theoretical device or coined a phrase. Perhaps as a result, and unlike geographer and parliamentarian Halford McKinder or naval historian Julian Corbett, Maguire’s influence dissipated soon after his training aids ceased active publication. His work may nevertheless be taken as representative of turn-of-the-century British corporate understanding of the principles of strategy. That school of strategy has no ‘rock-stars,’ as does 19th century continental strategic thought (Rüstow, Jomini, Clausewitz). Not until Basil Liddle Hart did Britain produce a pop-strategist, and Liddle Hart’s writing did little justice to the studied, comprehensive, and usefully summarized teachings of the British crammers.

Maguire was in his teens and early twenties when the American Civil War and the great German campaigns of 1866 and 1870 were the talk of Europe. These were the historic elements most immediately influencing Maguire’s writing. In his later works, the Second Boer War, ominous military escalations on the European continent, early 20th century wars in the Far East, and the Balkan Wars all occupied Maguire’s attention.

Of the authors who influenced Maguire’s synthetic understanding of strategy, Jomini may be the greatest, although indirectly. Maguire occasionally cites Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War (1837) and mentions with admiration the works of William Napier, another prominent early English translator, reviewer, and proponent of Jomini’s work. Maguire admired and took from those whom he considered the best teachers at the British Army professional schools. These teachers were in turn notably Jominian in the execution of their didactic responsibilities. Maguire actually cited Wilhelm Rüstow (1821-1878) more than he did Jomini, but as Azar Gat points out, Rüstow drew heavily on Jomini’s Summary. Although Maguire studied On War and nodded to Clausewitz’ genius, he rarely cited Clausewitz in his summaries. In his heavily annotated translation of On War, Maguire rolled past Clausewitzian staples as being interesting but obvious. Maguire’s preference for Jomini thus exposed, British military historians had
previous centuries of their own military traditions and writing from which to draw. Maguire’s 1887 book of modern military history begins with a lengthy description of the campaigns of Marlborough, which in themselves provided historical material sufficient to complete the strategic logic which Maguire ultimately taught. As befit the age, Maguire’s intellectual enterprise was eclectic, and so a categorization such as Jominian vice Clausewitzian would shortchange.

Although not an historian, Maguire was a fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and judging from the number of his published titles, his military analyses were widely accepted. For that matter, he was not a geographer either, yet he authored one of the most recognized books on military geography at the turn of the century.

At the peak of his writing energies, when the barrister was in his mid 50’s, Britain was entering and then coming out of the Second Boer War. One of Maguire’s more interesting pieces is a 59-page booklet titled Our Art of War as Made in Germany. The pamphlet is an expression of frustration and accusation within the immediate historical context of British inefficiency in southern Africa. It begins with a trademark scolding on the importance of the study of military history and on the decadence and priggishness of the officer class, but then settles into a reasoned complaint about the unwarranted influence of German ideas and expressions in British military doctrine and educational materials. In this and several other works, including Partisan and Guerrilla Warfare and Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges, Maguire criticizes what he calls the ‘One War’ theorists (referring to the War of 1870, that preoccupied European military thinking for three decades).

On the subject of small or guerrilla war, Maguire was influenced by descriptions (especially Napier’s) of the Peninsular Wars. He also learned from personal acquaintances returned from Victorian imperial engagements of his day, especially C. E. Callwell. The first edition of Callwell’s historical survey Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice came out in 1896, with enlarged reprints in 1899 and 1906. In 1902, Maguire published a 23-page ‘analysis’ of Callwell’s 1899 version. Maguire’s Analysis was part of his organized course materials using Callwell’s book as a backbone reference.

Maguire’s insights were at first the product of vocation and enthusiasm, then a hobby turned profitable as his speaking and writing met a demand among aspirants seeking to pass military exams. His syntheses of strategic principles were not derived from personal experience, but from the application of his legal education, careful study of campaigns, disinterested consideration of other strategists’ writings and a need to encapsulate and impart lessons efficiently.

How might Maguire’s encapsulations be relevant and important to us now?

Explaining the utility of the Maguire strategic synthesis in the context of today’s military operational challenge requires a brief preparatory detour into the nature of that challenge. American forces (like the British forces of the late 19th century) may face numerous enemies whose support bases are broadly dispersed. More important than dispersion is the commonly encountered fact that the bases, and lines of movement to and from them, are difficult to detect. Consider that wide differential in the strength of the contenders is not the definitive characteristic
of insurgent warfare, but rather that the weaker opponent is more obliged maintain anonymity and secrecy. Devotion to the preservation of anonymity is a response to intuitive, experiential and educated understandings of the strategic variables. The weaker opponent must seek whatever battles (even to the level of a single explosive detonation) he can win without assuming foolish risk. Since he has insufficient physical force to protect overt routes, his movement is heavily dependent on obscurity. In light of this necessity, the wealthy insurgent especially finds the innovations of globalization (electronic funds transfers, Internet communications, franchise business models, etc.) helpful. With these aids, the need for physical movement from sanctuary is greatly reduced, as is the need for creating long-term resolve on the part of individual insurgent foot soldiers. Some insurgent leaders need only motivate the latter for the duration of single missions; by so doing they maintain anonymity between these tactical perpetrators and themselves.

The US Army manual *Counterinsurgency* is a doctrinal response to American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The document lightly addresses enemy lines of communication and barely mentions the terms or logic of classic strategy, and therewith implicitly rejects the notion of universal principles. There are at least two assumptions regarding insurgent war that the authors of *Counterinsurgency* apparently internalized and that contribute to the above-noted rejection. One is the idea that insurgent wars are inherently prolonged. That interpretation of the conflict environment may be prejudicial to understanding. An insurgent’s care to avoid poor-prospect engagements prolongs a war, but we should assume that most insurgent generals would win quickly if they thought they could. The weaker contender prolongs in the active tense; insurgent war is not desultory by nature. From the weak insurgent’s need to protract a war it does not logically follow that the stronger side should expect and prepare for a long war unless it despairs of being able to find insurgent leaders and their movement routes. If the counterinsurgent cannot anticipate insurgent whereabouts and movement, then of course the insurgent will be able to protract the conflict so that he might build comparative physical or moral advantage. The classic strategists unanimously recognized the purpose of generalship attending the question of correlation of force in time and space. Avoiding defeat is hardly a new idea. If prolonging a war helps the insurgent avoid defeat, it is no help to the counterinsurgent that he or she concedes the length of the war by way of doctrine.

A second assumption heavily present in *Counterinsurgency* is that the center of gravity of insurgent war is the people. If the relevant population maintains secrecy regarding routes of movement, safe houses, financial sources, and the identity of insurgent leaders, then, yes, it is appropriate to consider the population a central entity for attention. However, by despairing of finding insurgent lines of communication to sanctuary, American strategists may have denied what nevertheless remains universal military truth. An insurgent who remains obedient to the classic military principles will use whatever time is given him to maintain his lines of communication and seek battle where it suits him. To counter, the United States should put the question of enemy lines of communication back at the center of operational military strategic planning, and revisit ways by which anonymity can be denied the insurgent enemy. It may be crucial to take measures to convince a population to deny anonymity to the insurgent.

What the US Army and Marine Corps seem to have done in their counterinsurgent doctrine is to turn despair of finding enemy’s lines of communication into a doctrinal escape from the strategic
principles that focus on those lines. The new doctrine displays a sort of psychological displacement behavior in the face of failure.\textsuperscript{41} For instance, because the lines are hard to find, descriptions of the type of combat begin to include the expression ‘non-linear.’ Once accepted that a war is non-linear by nature, any need to look for the lines collapses, and any principles constructed on the basis of their existence are rendered inapplicable.\textsuperscript{42} Bad result. Little logic then remains for checking the assertion that prolongation is an inherent characteristic of the war as well. Since the guerrilla prolongs the war by timely retreat, counterinsurgent doctrine suits the insurgent enterprise if prolonged becomes a descriptor of the war rather than a descriptor of insurgent need and intermediate success. Maguire’s formulas imply that the counterinsurgent should do everything to bring the insurgent foe into decisive battles as soon as practicable. Doing so depends inevitably on ending insurgent anonymity and thereby the obscurity of insurgent movement routes. Accordingly, the calculation of resources should be heavily weighted toward that end from the outset of operational strategic planning. To the extent enemy lines of movement and sanctuaries are made transparent, the insurgent will, by imposition of the timeless strategic truth, be put at risk. Even if insurgent operational movement is ‘net-centric,’ it leaves a trail, beginning and ending at points of physical geography. However virtual an insurgent’s communications, his success depends on resource concentration to put foot soldiers, weapons, targets, training and resolve in the right place at the right time.

Maguire had no experience, example, concept, or vision aimed specifically at revolutionary war outside of its Napoleonic meaning, but reading Mao would likely have reconfirmed him in his summary of strategy.\textsuperscript{43} Mao’s teachings are in no way inconsistent or irreconcilable with Maguire’s.\textsuperscript{44} While it is true that Mao distinguished guerrilla warfare from conventional warfare, his advice was one of balance in what he saw as hybrid situations, and in all cases was supremely cognizant of lines of communication. The idea was to do battle, to avoid defeat, to retreat as necessary, and to attack whenever possible within manageable risk. Mao respected strategy as proposed by the 19th century masters. He cited Russian success against Napoleon.\textsuperscript{45} He taught the requirement of movement, and of creating a broad accessible base that is resistant to enemy maneuver.\textsuperscript{46} What he did not do was suggest that because the wise guerrilla seeks to make his opponents’ use of maneuver ineffective, that maneuver and position disappear as values.

Maguire’s synthesis of strategy is simple, but not simplistic. He backed his summaries with an ever-expanding set of historical references, exceptions, disclaimers, counters, and cross-examinations as would befit a careful barrister. The two paragraphs quoted in this paper as exemplary of late 19th century British strategic thought are integral if we interpret them generously, look into the whole logic and at all corners of the language. Maguire nowhere suggested that competent leaders might not assume risk by tempting the calculus of strategic principles, perhaps by temporarily extending or abandoning supply lines or routes of withdrawal, or even confronting a more powerful force in battle. Maguire barely contemplated the slower and more subtle technique of warfare that seeks small battles while servicing the psychological conditions of a population base from which to recruit adherents or draw supplies. Nevertheless, this latter insurgent formula observes the same strategic math when it seeks to attack piecemeal while retaining the anonymity of insurgent lines of communication.

Classic operational strategy announces the critical requirement that a general find where his enemies’ lines of communication are physically located. If the assumption prevails unchallenged
that in an irregular war the enemy has no such lines, or that they are so short or invisible that no amount of effort can efficiently expose them, then there will be no interposing on or constricting them; and the classic lessons of 19th century strategy are obviated. Experience with low-intensity war, however, is not one in which the insurgent, partisan or revolutionary forces have been without physical form or the need to protect their movements and sanctuaries. In their own doctrine, insurgents almost universally express the need to strike at their enemy, but in a way that avoids negatively decisive engagements. It is curious in the face of insurgent acceptance of the calculus inherent in late 19th century strategic syntheses, that American counterinsurgent doctrine would so easily overlook it. An update of the Maguire formula might read as follows: As the broadest common fundamental for winning, our object should be to so arrange our movement and placement of force that, on the one hand, if we win an engagement we will not only defeat our enemy, but we will confound him as to his future action, his line of retreat and his supplies; on the other hand, if we lose an engagement, we will have a safe line of withdrawal and a valid probability of recuperating our strength.47

The statement offered immediately above is neither Clausewitzian nor Jominian. It applies to military contests irrespective of the amount of force symmetry and is valid for all contenders. It applies alike to conflicts in which detonation of a single explosive in a marketplace constitutes battle or to wars in which army corps might be usefully deployed in depth. As a unifying statement of strategic variables, it tells us that physical geography is always important and that knowledge of the enemy lines of movement and sanctuary is an overarching concern.48 It does not meanwhile diminish the need to correctly calculate the correlations of force in prospective battle. The statement does not deny the timeless advantage of decisive victory in battle or the opportunity for victory through battle avoidance, and it admits that many little battles can displace the decisiveness of a few large ones. Perhaps most importantly, it is a statement of operational strategic purpose unlikely to endanger tactical success or misguide higher levels of strategic preparation and direction.

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Endnotes

1 This article is an adaptation of a student research project, ‘T. Miller Maguire and the Lost Essence of Strategy,’ submitted as a requirement for graduation from the US Army War College in 2008. The author thanks project advisor Dr. J. Boone Bartholomewes for his editorial assistance, Professor Ian Beckett for azimuth correction, and the New York Public Library, Yale University Library and the US Army Heritage and Education Center for their assistance with rare books and manuscripts. See also, Geoffrey Demarest, Property and Peace: Insurgency, Strategy and the Statute of Frauds (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2008), 251.

2 There remain available today at least sixty of his titles, although most are short pamphlets, lecture summaries, narratives, and editorials. His longer works include A Summary of Modern Military History, with comments on the leading operations (London: Simpkin, 1887); The Campaigns in Virginia (1891); Outlines of Military Geography (London: C.J. Clay & Sons, 1899); Notes on the Outlines of Strategy (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, 1902); Guerilla or Partisan Warfare (London: Hugh Rees, 1904); Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1904); and Carl von Clausewitz, General Von Clausewitz On War translation by A. M. E. Maguire and notes by T. Miller Maguire (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1909). Many of Maguire’s later titles are compilations of articles previously published in one of the service journals, usually the United Services Magazine. See, The United Service Magazine: with which are incorporated The Army and Navy Magazine and Naval and Military Journal (London: H. Colburn, [etc.], 1829-1920).

3 Maguire, Outlines of Military Geography, 21, 22.
“Whatever the plans and preparations for any military enterprise, the result depends on THE BATTLE; our own success, or at least the diminution of the enemy’s success in a campaign are determined by the battle,” 22. [emphasis in original].

Although this point needs no citation, see as sufficient argument the introduction to Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), xi-xvii. A general’s search for decisive victory in battle should not be confused with the political consequence of the battle as an historical event. As Weigley points out, even in the age of battles that brought Maguire the historical fodder for his strategic formulae, the political consequences of the events themselves were generally ephemeral.

Among Maguire’s favorite teaching points was the need for more dedication to the study of geography. Jomini’s definition of strategy as ‘art of making war upon the map’ was a significant determinant in Maguire’s insistence regarding the consequential link between knowledge of geography and competent generalship. Maguire noted, “Sherman felt so keenly the necessity for a knowledge of geography that he wrote to his friend Ewing in 1844:-- ‘Every day I feel more and more in need of an atlas, as the knowledge of geography in its minutest details is essential to a true military education.’” (*Military Geography*, 9.) While geographic knowledge was indispensable, the study of history was the single most emphasized preparation. In this obsession Maguire called on testimony from seemingly every successful general in every age. Caesar and Napoleon, any American officer whose surname was at hand, Marlborough, Moltke, Wellington -- everyone militarily worthy was, according to Maguire, a devourer of history, and a better leader for it.


Maguire, *The Campaign of 1805, Ulm and Austerlitz*, 39. The battle of Borodino, during Napoleon’s Russian campaign in 1812, was a popular battle for consideration early in the 20th century, a result of the Napoleonic events’ centennial character and probably of Tolstoy’s immortalizations in *War and Peace*, new translations into English becoming available in 1904. On Borodino see Vincent J. Esposito and John R. Elting, *A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars* (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), maps 115-118. The authors assert that ‘Borodino has been magnified--largely through Tolstoy’s fiction--into an apocalyptic struggle….but actually Wagram was a greater and more sternly contested battle.’ Ibid., map 118.

To summarize briefly the plot of the 1805 campaign: Napoleon marched a huge army from the coast of France to the upper Danube, trapping a smaller Austrian army outside the town of Ulm. Mass surrender of an Austrian army at Ulm reset the possible correlations of forces as operations moved down the Danube and then northeast toward Austerlitz. There, Napoleon, through a series of brilliant tactical moves, defeated a larger Russian-Austrian force. The defeat left the Austrians with no strong ally, a dispersed and weakened army, and an occupied capital. As a single campaign of two major pieces, this six month event from the Napoleonic wars provides many of
the ingredients for, or at least vivid testimony in favor of, Maguire’s synthetic statement regarding the principles of military strategy.

11However, see also Maude, F. N., *The Ulm Campaign* (London: George Allen, 1912) for a similar but more Ulm-emphasizing analysis from one of Maguire’s contemporary crammers and acquaintances; Weigley is generous with Mack, arguing that he did as well as could be expected given the situation and the position he had been put in by his own leaders. See, *The Age of Battles*, 378-382.


14Thomas Miller Maguire, *The Campaign of 1805, Ulm and Austerlitz* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1912). ‘This pamphlet repudiates the idea of ‘Cram,’ which preposterous term only sums up the silly jealousy of teachers in embryo and of pedants, who read little and can neither write nor instruct.’ Ibid., v.; See also, T. Miller Maguire, ‘The Preliminary Education of Officers,’ *The Times*, 15 January 1901; col. C, issue 36352, p. 5. In this letter to the editor, Miller defends the contribution of private tutoring schools (crammers), of which his was apparently the most prominent.

15See B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Penguin Group, 1967). At least as concerns operational strategy, nowhere does Liddell Hart propose a synthesis of the generals’ problematic as does Maguire. A list of Maguire’s contemporaries in the business and profession of military and strategic instruction at the ‘fin de siècle’ can be pieced together from Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: the reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). These include Frederick Maude, Stewart Murray, Henry Spencer Wilkinson, C.E. Callwell and others. Maguire may be the only name among these to which the tag ‘crammer’ might have been applied.

16See, for instance, T. Miller Maguire, *The new Pacific in 1899 and 1909*: a study in international strategy (Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution Printing House, 1910); *The strategic features of the operations in Manchuria* as illustrated by European and American campaigns (London: E. Stanford, 1896); *Strategical questions in connection with India, further India, and China* (London: E. Stanford, 1896). Maguire’s intellectual pleasure appears to have been greatest when studying and commenting on the American Civil War, a hobby that garnered speaking invitations. See, for instance, T. Miller Maguire, ‘Synopsis of Lecture on the Importance of the American War of 1861-65 as a Strategical Study,’ in *Lecture at the Aldershot Military Society, Tuesday November 1, 1892* (London: Gale & Polden, 1892), 1. He was especially drawn to the Confederate campaigns in Virginia. See, for instance, *Jackson’s campaigns in Virginia, 1861-62* (London: W. Clowes & Sons, 1913).

military strategic principles of the day by the time he began to translate and review Jomini’s work. The intellectual transmission from Napier to Maguire seems as much another line of admiration from Bacon and Wellington of Lord Marlborough’s 18th century exploits as it is of Jominian admiration of Napoleon’s exploits.


19 Among his favorite instructors was General Sir Edward Hamley. Edward Bruce Hamley, *The Operations of War* (London: n.p., 1866). Typical as precursor to Maguire’s syntheses: ‘…the reader may accept Hamley’s definitions that “the theatre of war is the province of Strategy, the field of battle is the province of Tactics. The object of Strategy is so to direct the movements on an army that, when decisive collisions occur, it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage.”’ Maguire, *Military Geography*, 28.

20 But Rüstow’s creative work should not be attributed too narrowly to an intellectual behest from earlier writers. See, Gat, 44. ‘Writing in 1857, Rüstow maintained that the principles of the art of war were eternal, varying only in the forms they took, and that the rifle would make no fundamental change in tactics and certainly not in strategy, where Napoleonic principles could not be superseded.’ Ibid., 45. Maguire fed off Rüstow for confidence in asserting strategic principles. Rüstow was an outsider politically, militarily and academically, and this no doubt appealed to Maguire. Gat describes Rüstow (1821-78) as ‘the most prolific and diverse military scholar after 1850….’ Ibid., 43.

21 The now famous ‘culminating points’ Maguire translates as ‘the ultimate limit of the offense’ and ‘the limit point of victory: when to stop.’ He offers numerous historical examples and agrees to the importance of the concept, but as to some of Clausewitz he professes to be unimpressed. Ibid.,108, 109. In another entry Maguire notes, ‘The mere word ‘Clausewitz’ seems to have fascination for some authors, but I confess that I find nothing that would justify me in adding to the bulk and expense of this treatise by translating or even making a précis of the chapters of our author on ‘Summary of Instruction for the Crown Prince 1810-12’….’ *General Carl Von Clausewitz On War*, ibid., 148.

22 It is worth noting, however, that in his 1887 work Maguire did not deliver the final comprehensive paragraphs that summed his lessons on land strategy. That would not occur for another decade.


24 His pamphlet bylines list at least some his degrees and titles, as was customary. See *Lecture at the Aldershot Military Society, Tuesday November 1, 1892* (London: Gale & Polden, 1892), cover. ‘By T. Miller Maguire, Esq., M.A., LL.D., F.R. Hist. Soc…..,’ Ibid.
25See note 1. A separate observation should be made about Maguire’s *Military Geography*, an observation supported by comments of a military book review from 1900. ‘Setting the widest possible definition to the term ‘Military Geography’ Mr. Maguire’s book deals with the relations that exist between the geography of the World at large--the form and disposition of its seas and continents--to those strategical developments which have shaped the World’s history in the past, and may shape it again in the future. Consequently, it is rather an epitome of historical examples to illustrate various phases of continental strategy than a geographical treatise.’ Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich, ‘Military Geography,’ *The Geographical Journal* 15, no. 3 (March 1900): 239-243. In 1900, Maguire could not yet have been a Geopolitician *per se*, but his work and its similars can be seen as precursors to Geopolitics in that they extended the principles and observations of Geography beyond tactical and operational considerations to the grand strategic/international political level.

26On British failure in the Second Boer War see, for instance, Denis Judd, ‘Part IV The Second Boer War 1899-1902’ in *Someone Has Blundered: Calamities of the British Army in the Victorian Age* (Gloucestershire: Windrush Press, 1999) 135-165. British military failings in that war, as well as a curiously self-congratulatory attitude of some senior British leaders, became a nearly constant sub-theme in Maguire’s commentaries. Typical of Maguire’s editorial comments regarding the Boer War experience is the following: ‘One of the principle doctrines of political and military wisdom is that no possible enemy can ever be safely ignored or despised, yet we despised the Boers almost as much as they despised us. I fear from recent comments on foreign manoeuvres, that we are beginning to affect airs of military superiority simply because our Regular Army of 1899 has been practically annihilated by our few South African foes.’ Maguire, *Notes on the Outlines of Strategy*, 1.

27T. Miller Maguire, *Our Art of War as Made in Germany* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1900). Maguire begins by quoting part of an editorial published in *The Times* that derided book education and formal preparation of officers. Of that editorial Maguire includes, ‘How many corps have the Boers? Have they any corps artillery? How many of their commandants and field cornets have passed through a Staff College course? Does anyone in his senses believe that if they had had all those aids to pedantry they would have done as well as they have done?’ Ibid., 5. Maguire agrees with the editorialist that the Boers did too well against the British Army, but is bemused by the editorialist’s derision of formal military education.

28For a brief description of that blunder, see Judd,135-165.

29‘We are overwhelmed with translations of the literary labours of German generals; our tables groan beneath the ponderous and dreadfully dull tomes of a generation of writers who seem to thrive on a knowledge of the minutest details of two campaigns--1866 and 1870-1--and of these only.’ *Our Art of War as Made in Germany*, 2.

30T. Miller Maguire, Guerrilla or Partisan Warfare, 46. ‘In many respects, servile attention to the details of the Franco-German War, 1870-1, led to false ideas being promulgated. We were dosed to death with this war, 1875 to 1984, when I ventured to begin publishing essays to show that there were other wars in very different zones of operations, and requiring different methods. So we are in great danger of another “one war” set of theorists, in spite of the fact that the conditions
of the South African War can scarcely be repeated, and are not now being repeated in the East.’
Ibid.

31 C. E. Callwell was already considered somewhat of an expert on the subject of ‘small wars’
when a Captain, being invited to give a public lecture on the subject in 1895. Callwell, C.E.
‘Lessons to be Learnt from Small Wars Since 1870’ in Lecture given at the Aldershot Military
Society, Tuesday, March 26, 1895 (London: Gale & Polden, 1895), 1.

32 Callwell, C. E. (Charles Edward) Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln;
University of Nebraska Press, 1996). This edition is a reprint of the original Third Edition
printed in 1906 by His Majesty’s Stationery Office. Callwell points out that the small wars of
which he writes are those fought by regular against non-regular forces, and that the regular forces
are almost always dependent on long lines of supply to base. Callwell, ‘Lessons to be Learnt…,’
2.

33 T. Miller Maguire, Analysis of Callwell’s Small Wars (London: Harmsworth, 1902). The
analysis is given in the form of an annotated concept index, showing its obvious use as a shortcut
for readers facing exams. For instance, it contains lines such as ‘Write a short essay on Bush
Warfare, with historical illustrations, how it resembles hill fighting, 304.’, 46. Note that the page
numbers in this Analysis do not match the pagination in the 2006 University of Nebraska Press
reprint of the 1906 version of Small Wars.

34 Apparently it was not a common read among British military students generally. In a book
published in 1904, Maguire observes, ‘It appeared to me very strange, before the late war in
South Africa, that the operations of guerillas were not part of the curriculum for the education of
military officers in England: because, from the very nature of our Empire, British officers are
more frequently engaged, in what might be called guerrilla wars--small wars, savage wars,
irregular wars--than any other officers. Indeed, I pointed out, a year before the war, the value of
this branch of study; and yet in January, 1900, there was not one work on the subject in any
London shop.’ Maguire, Guerrilla or Partisan Warfare, 1.

35 Maguire infused his military writing with poetry from Chaucer, Keats, Byron, Tennyson and
Rudyard Kipling. In 1902, The Times printed a batch of letters to the editor, including one by
Maguire, that were sent in response to the publication by The Times of Kipling’s controversial
poem ‘The Islanders.’ That poem laments the treatment of veterans from Britain’s imperial
wars and the indecent inadequacy of preparations, a pair of constant themes in Maguire’s often
vituperative essays. T. Miller Maguire, A. Irving Muntz, A Volunteer Officer, A.P. H., X., ‘The
Islanders’ in Letters to the Editor, The Times, 7 January 1902, col. D, issue 36658, p. 10. Kipling
was more than the quintessential late Victorian poet. He was a member of the community of
military reformists to which Maguire was a noisier if less literarily gifted member. See ‘Rudyard
Kipling’s Poem on Army Needs: British Nation Rebuked for Its Self-Complacency,’ Special
abstract.html?res=9506E6DA103DE32A25756C0A9679C946397D6CF; Internet; accessed
January 5, 2008.
The following quote from Maguire’s 1902 Outlines of Strategy causes doubt: ‘The principles of strategy, as relating to bases and lines of communication, cannot apply to savage warfare or to the operations of guerrillas. These cannot have a regular base or a regular methodical system of supply; but the value of surprise and the direction and security of marches and effective combinations and concentrations apply to this kind of warfare to the fullest extent--indeed surprise, ambushes, raids, are its principle features.’ Maguire, Notes on the outlines of strategy, 30. This quote is a confusing retreat by Maguire from his own insistence of enduring principles of war. The damaging effect of Maguire’s doubt on a central argument of this paper (that Maguire’s synthesis of strategic principles indeed applies universally) can be contained. Maguire wrote Outlines of Strategy in 1902. In his 1904 books Partisan and Guerrilla Warfare and Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges, he does not repeat the same uncertainty. We can attribute some of Maguire’s own education on the subject matter to careful reading of the work of someone who probably studied Maguire, C.E. Callwell.


A speaker on insurgent war at the Army War College, who was an author of FM 3-24, did not address insurgent lines of communication or sanctuary, and was dismissive of classic strategy as it might apply.

Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, ‘Insurgencies are protracted by nature.’ Ibid, para. 1-134.

Nothing in this argument suggests it is not a good idea to convince a local population to fight its own fight, or that psychological operations aimed at reversing or lessening a tendency toward enlistment in the insurgent cause are not inherently good measures. The argument is about not losing sight of the need to find, fix and destroy the organizational elements that give lethal effect to an insurgent leadership’s will. Note that the manual Counterinsurgency underlines the people as a center of gravity, but one has to wonder to what end if the manual barely mentions enemy lines of communication.

By displacement I allude to the illogical behaviors that often accompany stress and dilemma.

This may also be a product of not identifying a satisfactory ‘front.’ The front, however, is not the consequential line in classic strategic formulation. Not finding the front seems to lead to the same dysfunctional result. ‘Frontless’ war seems to convey a ‘non-linear’ character, but they are not coincident.

Maguire’s writings do not offer the advice of Sun Tzu, although he frequently professes to admire Asian cultures and accomplishments. At least by 1909, Maguire adds ‘Member of the Order of the Rising Sun of Japan’ to his publication byline. See Summary of a Lecture on Our Military Resources, cover.
Beyond the contribution of Mao, Chinese strategic thought is both ancient and complex. If there is a best test of the validity of the proposition in this paper regarding the Maguire synthesis, it would be in light of the angles and nuances of Chinese strategic theory. See Timothy Thomas, ‘The Chinese Military’s Strategic Mindset,’ Military Review, November-December 2007, pp. 47-55.


Che Guevara, repeatedly unsuccessful as a commander, and who died result of a short counterinsurgency because he failed to protect his line of withdrawal, should probably not be cited for anything. He, too, however, wrote in terms of creating internal lines of communication and the need to maintain their anonymity. Harries-Clichy Peterson, *Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961) 12, 52.

‘[A] little knowledge of Go will take U.S. leaders a long way in understanding the essence of the Chinese way of war and diplomacy.’ David Lai, *Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), v. Go is a board game said by Professor Lai to reflect Chinese strategic thinking. Successful placement of the game pieces is achieved by mastery of the physical math, combined with insight regarding the opponent’s psychological dispositions. Considering that this combination of geophysical with psychological logics is so similar to Maguire’s explanation of successful generalship, maybe a better knowledge of European strategic thinking would take U.S. leaders a long way to understanding why the Western way of war is not quite so far removed from that of the Chinese.

From Iraq comes a formula of insurgent success in which the insurgent leadership is able to effect violent action by appealing to any of thousands of potential perpetrators with the offering of modest quantities of money, which can be delivered secretly. To this is added an ability to identify persons in third countries pre-prepared psychologically to commit violent crimes (even including homicidal suicide). Moving these individuals into Iraq and linking them at safe locations to appropriate explosives or other weaponry has evidently been economical in financial, political and personal terms for the insurgent hierarchy. While such a situation argues for a counter-strategy that includes broad psychological encouragement that the population oppose the insurgent, it still speaks on its face of insurgent dependence on the movement of resources, even if in some cases mostly financial. Moreover, the definition of insurgent comes into question when what can reasonably be considered an occupation army is so heavily engaged.