Journal

Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency

by Major Matthew R. Modarelli, Small Wars Journal

Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), each service is assigned military police officers, special investigators, and special agents charged with countering every kind of criminal activity. These personnel are highly skilled in obtaining evidence (i.e. actionable intelligence) to disrupt and neutralize criminals and their illicit networks. It is precisely this skill set that when applied to an insurgency simplifies the process of targeting and neutralizing insurgent leaders, subsequently leading to overall more effective security operations. Using current cultural training and linguist support, this DoD capability could be organized immediately and assigned to jurisdictions (i.e. battle space, province, or theater level) in a given occupied country. By adopting a military government and law enforcement (LE) command and control (C2) structure, military forces would be able to focus on restoring security and justice to occupied areas using police techniques. Organized within a proper military government C2 structure, security operations could be kept in lock-step with local, provincial and theater-level counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. With no interagency support available for the foreseeable future, the DoD must turn to its own organic capabilities immediately and organize appropriately to support the functions needed to maintain security while properly identifying and neutralizing insurgent leaders and groups.

Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing

by Lieutenant Colonel (P) William Stevenson, Major Marshall Ecklund, Major Hun Soo Kim and Major Robert Billings, Small Wars Journal

Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing (Full PDF Article)

September 11, 2001 the Global War on Terror began. This global war has brought to life a timeless tactic called irregular warfare (IW). IW is difficult to define, explain, and employ. Yet, with no firm understanding or consensus on what IW actually means, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) on 11 September 2007. Version 1.0 of the IW JOC proposes that IW is a protracted form of warfare, on a global or regional scale, that will require new capability development. Fortunately, for the Joint Warfighter, the intent of the IW JOC was only to further IW discussion, debate, and experimentation intended to influence future IW concepts and capability development. As presented, the definitions and concepts in the IW JOC have unnecessarily created confusion within the DoD by ignoring more than fifty years of experience and doctrine related to the challenges faced by the post-Cold War world and after the events of September 11, 2001.

The history of IW needs closer examination to capture those lessons learned to advance the IW discussion beyond the IW JOC. Given the significance and long-term DoD investments in the concepts presented in the IW JOC, this paper will analyze whether DoD has presented an appropriate definition of IW based on a doctrinal review of IW's roots. The paper will also look at the doctrinal relationship between Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and IW. If necessary, the authors will propose a more fitting definition for IW that is aligned with its doctrinal characterization.

Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing (Full PDF Article)

Smarter, Not Harsher

by Matthew Alexander, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Smarter, Not Harsher (Full PDF Article)

TV shows like 24 incorporate interrogations and the use of torture under the "ticking bomb" scenario because it is dramatic and entertaining. The myriad of cop shows on TV (including NYPD Blue, CSI, Law & Order, and The Shield) consistently use harsh and forceful interrogation scenes to build excitement, it is a favorite topic of talking head political shows, and was a major topic in the recent presidential debates.

What's interesting to me is that the debate over torture in interrogations is morally important, but pragmatically irrelevant. Politicians and bureaucrats supporting the current administration have put in Herculean efforts to legalize harsh techniques, labeled "enhanced interrogation techniques," and to keep them classified. These methods are in complete contradiction to the standards that we expect our own troops, when captured, to be afforded and they are incompatible with American principles. Enhanced interrogation techniques are torture by the standards of the Geneva Conventions which we proclaim to uphold. What's most important, they are neither the most efficient nor reliable methods of achieving cooperation.

Smarter, Not Harsher (Full PDF Article)

U.S. Special Operations

Personal Opinions

by Colonel John M. Collins, Small Wars Journal

U.S. Special Operations: Personal Opinions (Full PDF Article)

Many true believers throughout USSOCOM have memorized SOF Truths, here are the first four of five bullets that I conceived and Congressman Earl Hutto signed in the Foreword to U.S. and Soviet Special Operations on 28 April 1987:

- Humans are more important than hardware

- Their quality is more important than quantities

- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced

- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur

When General Stiner sent me on a Cook's tour of his subordinate commands in 1993 the first stop was Fort Bragg, where USASOC commander Lieutenant General Wayne Downing proudly concluded his formal presentation with a slide that displayed SOF Truths. He did a double take when I told him "they're wonderful," then said, "I wrote 'em."

If asked to start over from scratch, I would add one word to the fourth bullet so it would read "Competent SOF cannot be created RAPIDLY after emergencies occur." Otherwise, I believe they are still solid as bricks, but wish that whoever enshrined the first four had retained Number 5, which says "Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance." That oversight was a serious mistake in my opinion, because its omission encourages unrealistic expectations by poorly tutored employers and perpetuates a counterproductive "us versus everybody else" attitude by excessively gung ho members of the SOF community.

U.S. Special Operations: Personal Opinions (Full PDF Article)

Building Adaptive Leaders

The Army Can Adapt Its Institution (Pt. 1)

by Major Donald E. Vandergriff, Small Wars Journal

Building Adaptive Leaders (Full PDF Article)

Warfare has evolved to the point that the central idea is that small unit leaders in direct contact with the enemy can see and react to situational changes much faster than could the more senior leaders in the rear. This occurs despite the advent of information technology. This technology laid over an Industrial age hierarchal force structure confined with leaders developed through an industrial age personnel system can make it tempting for leaders to micromanage. Thus, the decision cycle slows down. But, warfare now demands something different. Small unit leaders who were once only concerned with choosing which battle drill now make decisions which have strategic implications. The question arises, how can we evolve the current way of developing leaders and Soldiers (Marines as well) that prepares them earlier to be complex problem solvers?

The Army acknowledges the need for change. The Army has begun an evolution in the way we develop—train, educate, access, promote and select—leaders, specifically how do we evolve adaptability. It is now implementing two training and leadership development models. In part I, I will discuss the Adaptive Leader Methodology (ALM) as an approach to develop adaptability and decision making skills. In part II, I will discuss Outcomes Based Training & Education (OBT&E).

Building Adaptive Leaders (Full PDF Article)

Distinguishing Between Security Force Assistance & Foreign Internal Defense

Determining A Doctrine Road-Ahead

by Major Derek C. Jenkins, Small Wars Journal

Distinguishing Between SFA and FID (Full PDF Article)

There is confusion and a disconnect between Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). It is unclear how or if they support an overarching theme. For years the US Armed Forces have used the FID construct to describe how the military element of US foreign policy supports internal security assistance to friendly nations. Recently, the Secretary of Defense (SecDEF) promulgated a newer, larger construct called SFA. Many in the military view SFA as when U.S. and partner forces rebuild security infrastructure during stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.

The new paradigm comes from a realization as spelled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), that the U.S. must train partner forces rather than just provide security for them. This grew out of a void in our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. No secret here, the QDR states that we need "multipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise" and "deploy and engage with partner nations" . As a result the SecDEF created the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) in 2006. This center is the U.S. Armed Forces focal point for SFA.

This paper will frame the basics for comparison between the current paradigm (FID) and the new one (SFA). Then it will describe why both of these elements fit under a Building Partnership (BP) framework. This framework should be clearly and appropriately described in one doctrinal theme.

Distinguishing Between SFA and FID (Full PDF Article)

Southern European Task Force Transformation Ceremony

by Major General William B. Garrett III

Southern European Task Force Transformation Ceremony (Full PDF Article)

On behalf of the entire SETAF team, I would like to thank the leadership at U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Army Europe, who have been instrumental in helping us transform to assume our new role.

We are honored and privileged to be the first members of U.S. Army Africa. This is a huge responsibility, as our decisions and actions will establish the foundation that others will build upon in the years ahead.

In Africa, we face a set of security challenges that may be unprecedented in complexity and scope -- presenting dilemmas that do not lend themselves to a simple choice between use of force or diplomacy.

Members of the international community have long asked for increased global attention to African issues -- particularly since genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, acts of terror, and crimes against humanity have come to symbolize modern conflict in Africa.

The creation of Africa Command, and now U.S. Army Africa, reflects our Nation's determination to commit to a lasting security relationship with Africa -- a long neglected continent whose impoverished people remain vulnerable to the ideology of violent extremism.

Southern European Task Force Transformation Ceremony (Full PDF Article)

Joint, Interagency, and International Organization Economic Planning Integration

by Dr. David Anderson and Major Lawrence Walton, Small Wars Journal

Economic Planning Integration (Full PDF Article)

Objective, mass, and unity of effort have long been used as Principles of War. An objective is a clear obtainable goal, and mass refers to merging the efforts of different organizations to achieve decisive effects. However, it is only possible to gain the necessary mass towards achieving an objective through unity of effort (JP 3-0, 2006).

The President and the National Security Council are responsible for insuring that the whole of government is unified toward achieving national strategic objectives. However, unity of effort at the national strategic level does not always translate into unity of effort at the operational and tactical levels.

The economic instrument of national power requires unity of effort between the military, Other Government Agencies (OGAs), and International Organizations (IOs) to achieve contingency operational objectives. There is a growing volume of evidence from current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that suggests that these organizations have not been effectively integrated towards achieving economic contingency operational objectives creating operational risk. Unity of effort and decisively massing the institutional capabilities of the military, OGAs, and IOs are essential to achieving contingency operational planning objectives.

This paper examines how well integrated the Military, Other Government Agencies (OGA), and International Organizations (IO) economic functions are in contingency planning, and how well this integration reduces the operational risks in achieving contingency operational objectives. It will do so by first assessing current U.S. policy/directives and military doctrine addressing economics-related activities, and then by comparing/analyzing the military operational planning process with OGA/IO economic-related functions and widely accepted economic factors that influence economic development.

Economic Planning Integration (Full PDF Article)

Reconstruction in South Baghdad

by Captain Steve McGregor, Small Wars Journal

Reconstruction in South Baghdad (Full PDF Article)

Humanitarian aid is increasingly becoming more important to US military operations—not only because the military works more closely with aid agencies than ever before but because the military now implements great amounts of aid. According to a recent study by the Washington Post in August of this year, the US military has spent over 2.8 billion dollars on aid projects through the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) .

As military commanders deal with how to properly implement aid the aid community is struggling to redefine itself. Many strategists and writers believe aid needs reform. David Rieff, when speaking before the Carnegie Council in support of his book "A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis," argues that in Sudan aid organizations were "logisticians to the war effort of the belligerents, that in effect what Operation Lifeline Sudan was doing, whilst doing a great deal of good by saving lives, the humanitarians were in effect allowing the war to continue." In another article, anthropologist Alex de Waal charges the aid community with over-estimating damage, creating false need, and unnecessarily complex programs.

On the other hand, humanitarian aid implemented by the US military in Iraq is reinforcing stability and quickening the peace. One area of Iraq this is particularly noticeable is Yusufiya, where Task Force 3-187 was able to completely transfer their area of responsibility back to Iraqi control.

Reconstruction in South Baghdad (Full PDF Article)

An Irregular Focus on What Has Been

by Sam Brannen, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

With the release of its new directive on irregular warfare (IW) the Pentagon has demonstrated seriousness of purpose to fight the last war. The directive (3000.07) comes more than 7 years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and over 5 years after the invasion of Iraq, and it argues that the Department of Defense (DoD) should recognize that "IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare" and deserves similar preparedness and development of capabilities.

Beyond the statement of the obvious a day late and a dollar short, the directive incorrectly characterizes the future of warfare. Leading defense analysts—most notably Frank Hoffman and Steve Biddle—have argued in convincing fashion that the next wars the United States fight will be an undifferentiated blend of what the Pentagon has now formally parsed as irregular warfare and traditional warfare. In an analysis of the 2006 Lebanon campaign, Biddle and Jeffrey Friedman found that "Hezbollah's methods were...somewhere between the popular conceptions of guerilla and conventional warfare—but so are most military actors', whether state or nonstate." Hezbollah blended tactics and even strategic end goals of conventional and irregular warfare. The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly recognizes that "These modes of warfare [traditional and irregular] may appear individually or in combination, spanning the spectrum of warfare and intertwining hard and soft power." So why does the IW directive—which should be derived from the NDS—make no mention of this reality?

The IW directive is further contradictory to existing Department guidance in its categorization of stabilization operations as a subset of IW. For example, the Army's new Field Manual 3-07 on Stabilization Operations places stability operations on an equal footing with traditional warfare. FM 3-07 is in turn derived from DoD directive 3000.05 on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, which declared that stability operations "shall be given priority comparable to combat operations."

In his recent monograph on how to account for inevitable surprise in defense planning Nate Freier argues, "Senior defense and military leadership naturally err on the side of what is known and practiced at the expense of preparing for what is less well-known but perhaps more dangerous." Institutional change already underway, Freier observes, is pursued by the defense establishment despite research and analysis of the future security environment that may make a compelling case to prepare for something else entirely.

There is also the institutional issue of where the IW directive places most of the impetus for change related to irregular warfare: at the newly-established U.S. Joint Forces Command Irregular Warfare Center (JFCOM IWC) and with the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). These Combatant Commands have little actual influence over how the Services—and in particular, the Army—go about training and equipping their general purpose forces. Overall U.S. preparedness for this new strategic environment will hinge almost entirely on the commitment of regional Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs to the process.

Sam Brannen is a fellow with the CSIS International Security Program, where he works on projects related to defense strategy and policy, Middle East security (especially U.S.-Turkey and U.S.-Turkey-Iraq issues), and U.S. national security reform.

HUMINT Nature and the Jim Thyne Theory

by Dalton Fury, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

HUMINT Nature and the Jim Thyne Theory (Full PDF Article)

For the past several months I've had the great opportunity to insert my voice into the public debate about what in the world we should do about UBL. This question arose during a 6 hour interview taping for a 13 minute 60 Minutes episode, again during a short stint on Hannity's America, some time with Brain Kilmeade and Geraldo Rivera on FOX's The Strategy Room, during The Rachel Maddow Show, and again on CNN. Moreover, in between tapings, a half dozen print media interviews, and scores of radio stations that air across the nation, most recently The Laura Ingraham Show, asked the same question. All this because I was simply the guy who couldn't get the job done back at the beginning of the GWOT. So, my opinion and analysis is as good or bad as the next guys as we are all painfully aware -- UBL still thumbs his nose at us every day.

From my very far removed perspective of the battlefield where all assumptions are taken from open source developments, three key themes are at the top of my "to do list" to turn the tide on the war in Afghanistan. The first two are no-brainers and have been called for by numerous Think Tanks and dedicated analysts who are more talented and more "in the know" than I presently am. Negotiating with moderate Taliban and focusing US funding for Pakistan on the COIN fight even appears at the top of Secretary Gates' personal way ahead.

HUMINT Nature and the Jim Thyne Theory (Full PDF Article)

Security Force Assistance Case Study: Mosul, Iraq

by Major Rob Thornton, Dr. John Fishel and Dr. Marc Tyrrell

SFA Case Study: Mosul, Iraq (Full PDF Article)

Major Rob Thornton of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) in coordination with Dr. John Fishel of the University of Oklahoma, Dr. Marc Tyrrell of Carleton University, and Mr. Mark Lauber also of JCISFA sat down to write the Mosul Case study with the goals of considering the requirements generated in the pursuit of policy and military objectives in complex conditions, and making some observations and recommendations about how DoD might better address those requirements. To this end the Case Study is built around a specific place, Mosul, Iraq over a short period of time, 2006-2007. The Case Study is designed to give the reader both an understanding of content and context of the environment, and of the objective and the subjective nature of the participants.

Within the study we found there are areas across DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development and Education, Personnel and Facilities) that might be adapted in such a way that reduces risk at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, as well as risk to the institutions which must consider the broad range of roles, missions and capabilities required of them. Principal to this is the understanding that you can not improve our capabilities to conduct these types of missions by simply addressing one aspect of DOTMLPF. In fact, to attempt to do so usually results in unintended consequences in other areas, some of which may not be known until they have manifested themselves as critical deficits.

The Mosul Case Study raises some questions about the nature of how we see ourselves as an institution, what we value, and how those values translate into enabling capabilities. One of the questions the study considers is the value of individual personalities and skills apart from context of collective leadership. The Case Study and the interviews show that one size does not fit all, cookie cutter solutions and approaches generally produce problems not solve them, and that personality may matter as much or more than other skills and attributes.

SFA Case Study: Mosul, Iraq (Full PDF Article)

A Wicked Brew

Piracy and Islamism in the Horn of Africa

by Tim Sullivan, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

A Wicked Brew (Full PDF Article)

The recent surge in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia has again revealed the vulnerability of U.S. and allied interests to transnational, unconventional security threats—and demonstrated just how confounded we remain in determining the appropriate responses to these challenges. Somali piracy has now become more than simply a nuisance: the explosion in attacks has the potential to disrupt international trade (at least one major international shipping firm has announced plans to shift its transit routes), and further destabilize the volatile Horn of Africa region. The audacity of recent hijackings, combined with an uncoordinated and anemic international response, portends a growing threat. In reaction to the news that the pirates had seized the Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker, 450 miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed the sentiments of many analysts and observers when he said that he was "stunned" by the Somali pirates' range of operations.

A more disturbing element of the Somali piracy phenomenon is the apparent connection between the pirates and the country's militant Islamist movement. Though it hasn't been making the front pages, Somalia is in the throes of a protracted insurgency. The country's primary Islamist militant group, al-Shabaab, was recently added to the State Department's list of terrorist organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda. The group has emerged as the successor (and was the former militia) of Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which in the summer of 2006 came close to unseating the country's Transitional Federal Government (TFG); the ICU was eventually defeated by the TFG with the help of the Ethiopian military.

A Wicked Brew (Full PDF Article)

COIN Perspectives From On Point

Lessons Learned in Iraq

by Sergeant Michael Hanson, Small Wars Journal

COIN Perspectives From On Point (Full PDF Article)

Tanks and artillery don't defeat Insurgents, nor do warships, fighters, or bombers. Infantry defeats insurgents. These weapons can help the infantry man, but in the end it is the soldier on point that will locate, close with and destroy the enemy either by direct action or by denying the enemy the ability to operate against him. American infantry are outstanding troops, but there are simple ways to make them even more effective. If our infantry forces are restructured and reequipped, they can be better tailored to the fight they are currently engaged in. American infantrymen are equipped with a vast array of "force multipliers" and "battlefield dominators".

This is equipment that essentially gives an American Soldier the combat power of several enemy combatants. Devices like night vision goggles, PEQ2 infrared laser aiming devices, ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight - a 4 power rifle scope) and advanced body armor. The United States outfits its warriors with the best gear it can afford. "The best equipment for our troops" is a universal ideal that the vast majority of Americans support.

So then how have small groups of rag tag insurgents with no complex war machines of their own confounded American efforts in Iraq for over four years? How have these bands of unrelated rebels armed with Soviet-era small arms and home made weapons managed to hold on beneath massive American military might for as long as they have?

COIN Perspectives From On Point (Full PDF Article)

A Quick Review of Combat Outposts

by Captain Timothy Hsia, Small Wars Journal

A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (Full PDF Article)

The construction of Combat Outposts (COPs) by the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq has been almost unanimously described in positive terms by defense analysts and military officers as a means through which to carry out its counterinsurgency efforts. Despite the existence of hundreds of COPs on today's battlefields, the term Combat Outpost is not even doctrinally defined in any military field manual. Soldiers in today's battlefields routinely reference COPs as anything from a patrol base to anything smaller then a Forward Operating Base. Doctrine notwithstanding, countless Soldiers and Marines today currently operate out of COPs.

No two COPs are alike. The most significant difference between any two COPs is its relation to an urban center. Urban COPs require much greater security requirements and oftentimes less infrastructure development, whereas COPs established in rural locations often have better natural defensive measures (stand off distance) while requiring more logistical and engineering support in order to sustain forces occupying the COP. COPs do not materialize overnight and this paper seeks to cover several aspects of COP building and establishment.

A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (Full PDF Article)

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility

by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal Book Review

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility (Full PDF Article)

Mark Ethan Grotelueschen. The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

The newspapers today are filled with references to evolving Army doctrine in support of our national security interests. Very recently, the Army unveiled a new doctrinal publication highlighting the requirement for "nation-building" missions as well as conventional combat. This new field manual on Stability Operations comes on the heels of the groundbreaking counterinsurgency manual co-authored with the Marine Corps in 2006. Mired in Iraq, the Army jump-started its doctrine process under the leadership of forward thinkers like General David Petraeus. However, both documents have their critics arguing that the Army is headed in the wrong direction. Claiming the Army is guilty of losing focus of its "core warfighting" skills, these critics stress that the Army must be preparing for major ground combat operations. Spending too much time on non-traditional skills is, in their view, a "dangerous distraction."

This is not the first time the Army has wrestled with doctrinal controversy. In a well-written book on the First World War, author Mark Ethan Grotelueschen addresses the competing views about the nature of war within the US Army at the dawn of the 20th Century. Although there are many books on American operations in France, they are generally memoires or unit histories, all falling short of true campaign studies that tell us why the Americans fought the way they did. Mr. Grotelueschen provides us with an extensively researched book on how the Army actually prepared for the war and how it adapted its doctrine during the war to take advantage of lessons learned. It is highly recommended.

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility (Full PDF Article)

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan?

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, Lieutenant Colonel Lee K. Grubbs, Commander Brian J. Malloy and Lieutenant Colonel Craig R. Wonson, Small Wars Journal

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan? (Full PDF Article)

In the fall of 2006, the security situation in Iraq had deteriorated to a level worse than at any other period during the previous three years of U.S. occupation. Violence was on the rise and attacks by insurgents continued to increase even after the top Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, was killed by U.S. forces. Calls for a drawdown of U.S. troops gained considerable support in Washington as policymakers questioned whether long-term stability in Iraq was achievable or if continued U.S. presence would merely add to the growing number of casualties. Reinforcing the perception that U.S. forces were not making sufficient gains was the release of a Marine Corps intelligence report stating that the struggle against Sunni insurgents in Al Anbar Province could not be won militarily.

U.S. military commanders concluded that the best way to improve the security situation in Iraq was to adopt a more proactive "clear-hold-build" strategy supported by a significant increase in the number of ground combat units. This increase in forces, often referred to simply as "the surge", introduced five additional combat brigades into Iraq that provided the means to wrest the initiative from the enemy. It allowed U.S. forces to simultaneously conduct large-scale operations to clear enemy safe havens, train Iraqi security forces, and disrupt insurgent lines of communication without having to leave key urban areas unprotected. In less than a year, the surge helped reduce the number of enemy attacks, increased the support of the Iraqi people, improved the security situation throughout the country, and all but defeated the insurgency.

The security situation in Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated since 2006 largely due to the lack of forces required to execute an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. As the U.S. struggles to find a viable solution to this problem, calls for an Iraq-type surge of forces to help stabilize security and set conditions for political and economic improvement in Afghanistan have increased. President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have both acknowledged that additional forces are needed in Afghanistan but have not specifically outlined how many or what type. Although the goal of executing a surge in Afghanistan would be similar in nature to that of Iraq, the challenges presented by a larger, rural-based population with unique tribal dynamics, a harsher geography, and an enemy operating from bases outside the country will require a different focus and force structure.

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan? (Full PDF Article)

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right

So What Do We Do Now?

by Robert Haddick, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right (Full PDF Article)

Small Wars Journal readers are no doubt familiar with the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile about the kinds of threats the U.S. will face in the period ahead and how U.S. ground forces should prepare for those threats. (See Shawn Brimley's excellent summary of the argument for a refresher.)

I have concluded that both men are right; their arguments are not mutually exclusive. But if both men are right, how should the U.S. organize, train, and employ its ground forces?

The purpose of this paper is to explain how to succeed against irregular adversaries, while restoring a more credible deterrence against conventional high-intensity threats.

Main Points

1. The Long War, characterized by persistent tribal and ethnic conflicts, is a reality. Some of these conflicts will threaten U.S. interests. John Nagl is correct when he argues that the U.S. needs military forces that are specially adapted for success in persistent irregular warfare.

2. But Gian Gentile is also right -- the U.S. has an interest in maintaining its military resource commitment low and its strategic flexibility high. The U.S. should not drain away its limited endurance, prestige, and resources on open-ended medium-intensity engagements in the Islamic world or anywhere else.

3. The answer is to create Nagl's Combat Advisor Corps and use it to for Phase 0 and 1 operations -- prevention, shaping, and deterrence. The more attention the U.S. gives to Phase 0-1 operations, the fewer Phase 2-4 operations America's general purpose forces will have to fight.

4. Making a greater commitment to Phase 0-1 operations will allow the U.S. to seize the initiative in the irregular warfare domain, control US operational tempo, and regulate U.S. military resource usage.

5. Advisor Corps Phase 0-1 operations are an economy-of-force mission. When successful, they will allow the rest of the U.S. military, including the large majority of U.S. ground combat power, to prepare for major combat contingencies, thus enhancing strategic deterrence.

6. A professional and well-trained Advisor Corps will also have the mission of establishing relationships with sub-national ethnic and tribal groupings. These relationships will provide U.S. decision-makers with greater flexibility when dealing with future irregular conflicts.

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right (Full PDF Article)

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Getting the Basics Right

A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan

by Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott and Colonel John Agoglia, Small Wars Journal

Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article)

This paper has been prepared by the Counterinsurgency Training Center -- Afghanistan. The purpose of the paper is generate discussion and analysis on whether we are not only doing things right here in Afghanistan, but indeed whether we are doing the right things. This analysis and requisite change is essential if we are to employ additional incoming ISAF units in the most effective manner. Comments/objections/counter-arguments can be sent to trent.scott@us.army.mil or john.agoglia@us.army.mil.

Events in Afghanistan are not going according to plan. There is a growing perception among local Afghans and within the international community that the insurgency in Afghanistan is growing stronger and more influential by the day. A spate of recent Western media reporting decrying the killing of innocent Afghans and Pakistanis as a result of the alleged over-judicious use of ISAF/OEF-controlled air power, the very public death of nine US soldiers in eastern Afghanistan followed almost immediately by the killing of just under a dozen French soldiers in central Afghanistan, and the widespread public belief that the central Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) under Hamid Karzai is institutionally corrupt, have contributed to the groundswell of local and international voices calling for a radical change to the way things are currently done in Afghanistan. Change is required, it must begin at the tactical level, and it needs to be led by ISAF. This is our war just as much as it is the Afghan's war.

Although there is much to do at the strategic level in Afghanistan, such as developing a comprehensive border strategy, eliminating corruption, developing an effective and functioning government, defining the role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) -- the list goes on -- it is at the tactical level, at Regional Commands (RC), Task Forces (TF), Battlegroups, Companies and Coalition mentoring teams that the most immediate and tangible change for good can be made. Tactical actions resonate throughout the local communities ISAF troops are supposed to protect and influence audiences across the world. And, because insurgency is a violent political competition, tactical actions can have significant political impact. Conducting comprehensive, best practice operations designed to defeat the insurgency from the grass roots up is imperative if ISAF is to halt the consolidation of the insurgent's influence in rural Afghanistan, establish the legitimate rule of law, and contribute to the development of a stable Afghanistan. Cumulative success at the tactical level will provide time and space -- literally and figuratively -- for the key stakeholders at the strategic level to make the necessary institutional changes required to ensure long term stability.

Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article)

Editor's note: we're pleased to publish this Veterans Day reflection by Colonel David Sutherland. To his thoughtful words, we would merely add here's also to the many Iraqi patriots shaping their country, and the countless others making do as best they can amidst the bravery of their countrymen and ours.

One year ago today, November 11, 2007, our Brigade Combat Team began its redeployment from Diyala province, Iraq, back to Fort Hood, Texas. As we remember our veterans, I think about those brave men and women who participated in the surge operations that led to improvements seen in Iraq today.

The Greywolf Brigade began its deployment to Iraq in October 2006. Our formation consisted of approximately 5,000 of our nation's finest men and women from all branches of our Armed Services, Department of Defense civilians, Department of State, and other interagency and Coalition partners. For 14 months, they poured their hearts and souls into the mission -- a mission that required we bind-up the wounds of the innocent and reestablish rule of law, while at the same time combating a depraved enemy, devoid of human decency.

No one, to include myself, was able to fathom the reality we were about to face as we deployed to Diyala province -- a complex area of Sunni, Shia and Kurd, that quickly became the primary battleground of the fight faced in Iraq. Reality, however, struck quickly at my base's aid station during the first week of our deployment.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Collection Management in the Brigade Combat Team during COIN

Three Assumptions and Ten "A-Ha!" Moments on the Path to Battlefield Awareness

by Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Downey and Captain Zehra T. Guvendiren, Small Wars Journal

ISR Collection Management in the BCT during COIN (Full PDF Article)

We found traditional CM and subsequent analytical methods inapplicable to our fight, but realized that we had to develop systems which met CM needs within counterinsurgency (COIN) to maintain our relevance to our lower and higher echelons.... Our most unconventional initiative was to have our PIR span the full spectrum of BCT Operations, essential when fighting in a COIN environment.

Collection Management (CM) has long been considered the bane of any intelligence officer's existence, even in the days of force-on-force doctrine when intelligence operations were much simpler than they are today. Those of us in the S2 section of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division operating in the Karkh Security District (KSD) of Baghdad, Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08, felt no differently about CM when we took over our area of operations (AO). We began those operations with three basic assumptions:

That CM was somehow an irrelevant, if not exactly a dinosaur of Cold War intelligence art.

That enemy focused priority intelligence requirements (PIR) would drive our knowledge management (KM) system.

That after five years of war we would find a KM system in place that met the commander's needs in counter-insurgency (COIN).

War like life is a journey of discovery and the flaws in those assumptions revealed themselves in ten "A Ha!" moments during our journey. We found traditional CM and subsequent analytical methods inapplicable to our fight, but realized that we had to develop systems, which met CM needs within a COIN environment to maintain our relevance to our lower and higher echelons. After six months of development, we implemented an improved CM cycle that optimized our unit capabilities and mitigated our weaknesses - one that supported our balanced lethal and non-lethal operational tempo. Improving our CM cycle compounded our successes within our unique, high-density, urban AO. We combined doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches to ensure our PIR were linked directly to the BCT Commander's decision points, and his desired effects. Our most unconventional initiative was to have our PIR span the full spectrum of BCT Operations, essential when fighting in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Even though our experience was highly specific, the lessons we learned are universal and can be applied to any operational environment.

ISR Collection Management in the BCT during COIN (Full PDF Article)

The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Counterinsurgency Operations

Khost Province, Afghanistan

by Ensign Robert J. Bebber, Ph.D., Small Wars Journal

The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in COIN - (Full PDF Article)

The counterinsurgency (or COIN) in Khost province was supposed to represent the "crown jewel" in American COIN doctrine and tactics. Afghan President Hamid Karzai called Khost a "provincial model of success," and former CENTCOM commander ADM William J. Fallon described it as "a wonderful example" for the entire country. (Armed Forces Press Service 2007) Anne Marlow (2008) wrote a glowing review of recent efforts in the province in 2008 for The Weekly Standard, suggesting that the forward positioning of small platoons at "Force Protection Facilities" or FPFs, which are located in the district centers of the province, along with the substantial increase in the number and scope of projects such as road, schools, wells and diversion dams through the provincial reconstruction team, had cracked the code for American counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Within a couple months, as the security situation continued to deteriorate, she was backtracking on her assessment of why American counterinsurgency strategy was "successful" in Khost province by suggesting that that it had more to do with the "role of commanders' personalities may be larger than we want to acknowledge." The previous commanders were "brilliant and personable," leading one to conclude that the individuals who replaced them were less so.

If only it were that easy, then we could merely charm our way to victory. But any knowledgeable assessment of the counterinsurgency effort in Khost would not conclude that the war was going well. Hype and publicity cannot hide the fact that the situation was growing dire, both in Khost and throughout the country.

The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in COIN - (Full PDF Article)

New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams

by Commander Michael Hallett, Small Wars Journal

New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Full PDF Article)

The promulgation of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) as the overarching reconstruction and development policy guidance in conjunction with the development of Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GOIRA) capabilities over the past 6 years, (as seen in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the 2007 creation of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)) has significantly influenced the Afghan environmental dynamics and has thus created new opportunities for PRTs to engage in governance support activities.

Responding to this situation, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Strategic Vision issued at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 said the following on PRTs: "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) play a significant role in enabling security, governance and development. We pledge to provide all the PRTs need, enhance their unity of effort, strengthen their civilian component and further align their development strategies with Afghan Government priorities until such a time as Afghan Government institutions are strong enough to render PRTs unnecessary." Enabling this ultimate transition requires that PRTs shift from helping the people of Afghanistan directly through activities like project, funding, medical assistance and disaster relief materials provision to supporting the government of Afghanistan in executing these activities. Or, as some have put it, Afghan government capabilities have advanced to the point that it is "time to take off the training wheels".

New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Full PDF Article)

The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism

Clash of Icon Worship

by Colonel William M. Darley, Small Wars Journal

The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism (Full PDF Article)

In its January/February 2006 edition, Foreign Affairs published a rather odd article (for a journal that otherwise specializes in political analysis and commentary) that appeared to get much less attention than it really deserved. In the article, titled "A Natural History of Peace," Stanford Professor Robert M. Sapolsky compares and contrasts human aggressive tendencies with well-documented propensities for violence among several species of primates, and develops a case suggesting that human aggression of the kind that produces warfare mainly stems from the genetic impulses rooted in humans as primates (not a new suggestion of itself). But more significantly, he offers proof extracted from a now robust body of field work that even strong genetic tendencies for violence in certain species of primates can be mitigated by exposure to the equivalent of "cultural" forces. He singles out from the body of such observations the case history of one group of baboons (a particularly aggressive and violent species of primate) that he calls the Forest Troop, the intensely aggressive behavior of which was ameliorated after exposure to the more peaceful and tolerant "mores" of another baboon troop of an identical species with which the Forest Troop had come in contact. He concludes by asserting that "some primate species can make peace despite violent traits that seem built into their natures." He goes on to muse, "The challenge now is to figure out under what conditions that can happen, and whether humans can manage the trick themselves."

Sapolsky's argument frames the issues associated with the current global conflict in which the United States is now engaged in a potentially very useful light: as a biological problem best understood and dealt with using means specifically tailored to deal with human genetic tendencies in order to promote cooperation and tolerance instead of competitive violence. This stands in contrast to the current approach which appears to assume that the conflict mainly results from a combination of cultural and economic factors that can be dealt with by a strategy that combines selected violence, targeted monetary investments mixed, and cross cultural messages through so called strategic communications. However, understanding the problem as having its roots in primordial genetic urges would focus the search for solutions in a somewhat different way. The first step would be exploring in detail root biological causes for aggressive behaviors in the human species as a member of the family of primates, and then formulating specific measures (not just confined to persuasion or economic investment) needed to channel such biologically behaviors in ways that are conducive to peaceful social co-existence.

The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism (Full PDF Article)

Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency

by Colonel Robert C. Jones, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Currently there are many voices speaking at once, all competing for attention as to their unique perspective as to what is causing the current unrest in the world. Far too much focus is placed on the tactic of "terrorism," and many are far too quick to simply label those who apply that tactic as "terrorists." While certainly this characterization is true, it is not particularly helpful. Instead, I believe it is best to look at the purpose for a man's actions rather than his actions themselves in order to best judge, and thereby label him. Most that we are so quick to label as terrorists are actually insurgents. Bin Laden, however, is no insurgent. Mr. Bin Laden is in fact a terrorist. He is using his Al Qaeda network to wage a regional unconventional warfare campaign to leverage many nationalist insurgent movements that lay within Muslim populaces in states where those populaces are experiencing poor governance, from the Philippines in the East, to England in the West.

Some who speak on this topic have expertise born of years of engagement at the tactical level, and their perspective reflects that experience. Others who speak have little to no direct experience, but have read and studied the problem in great detail based upon the experience of others. The principles I offer below are my own, and are born of (and limited by) my own experience and studies. They are intended to be neither too tactical, nor too theoretical. They are intended instead to provide what I like to call "pure strategy." These are not insights that are deemed strategic based upon the level of command to which they apply; but are instead intended to be strategic in that they offer fundamental truths on the nature of insurgency that can be applied at every level of command. Hopefully these can guide squad leaders and presidents alike, and help them all to be a little more successful in their endeavors.

Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Character and the Special Forces Soldier

by Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Character and the Special Forces Soldier (Full PDF Article)

On a recent Friday I had the opportunity to address some of the finest Soldiers in the United States Army. These young men were graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course -- not an easy feat. Having spent 27 years in the special operations arena, I understood their excitement and how proud they felt during the ceremony; I had sat in a similar chair myself. However, it was important to me that their families understand exactly what their loved ones signed on for. And, in further thinking, it's also important to me that the citizens of this country know the dedication and professionalism that is embodied in the men of Special Forces. It is to that end, that I share my graduation remarks with you.

Intuitively, I think we all know how hard our graduates work for the privilege of wearing a Green Beret. But did you know that some of these young men have been in training for more than two, maybe three years? This doesn't count the months they spent just physically preparing themselves before the course began or the countless hours spent with rucksacks on their back in total solitude, usually very early in the morning or very late at night but almost always on their own time because they had other obligations that filled their day. Appreciate the fact that 75 percent of the Soldiers, mostly airborne Soldiers and many with combat experience who began the course, are no longer here today. This is the Army's most physically demanding course. Scholastically, each Soldier must master more than 1,000 critical tasks, specific to his assigned specialty and hundreds of advanced war-fighting tasks, plus demonstrate a proficiency in a foreign language before they graduate. There is simply not a more demanding school in the entire U.S. Army.

Character and the Special Forces Soldier (Full PDF Article)

America's Financial Crisis

Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq

by Captain Timothy Hsia, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq (Full PDF Article)

News coverage of the 700 billion dollar bailout of Wall Street by the government have briefly mentioned that the government's bill for rebuilding Wall Street will turn out to be monetarily equivalent to the costs associated with the Iraq War. To alleviate credit concerns, the Treasury Department has established a troubled asset relief program (TARP). Ideally, TARP and the financial bailout will prevent a broadening of the credit crisis from imperiling America's long term growth while also fueling the global economy. Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury Secretary, will be hard pressed to find any historical financial incident of today's magnitude when examining our nation's history which can serve as a historical waypoint. Nonetheless, he should perhaps reflect upon the immediate past as America's endeavors to reconstruct Iraq proffer vital lessons which can greatly assist today's financial mandarins as they seek to unwind the country's financial Gordian knot. The lessons learned from the government's ongoing reconstruction of Iraq apply in many cases to the current credit restoration, and it would be foolhardy for government officials to ignore these parallels.

Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq (Full PDF Article)

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan

Al Qaeda Propaganda

by Major Matthew Orris, Small Wars Journal

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan (Full PDF Article)

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the myth that Al Qaeda is a far more superior practitioner of the war of ideas because it has proven that it knows far less about the "American street" than supposedly the U.S. does about the "Arab street." This is highlighted by Al Qaeda's use of an American convert to be their voice to the U.S. The question that is open to interpretation is of what use is such a person at all to Al Qaeda given that it is doubtful that he is able to gather any significant following amongst Muslims in the Arab world and is considered nothing more than a "bloated buffoon" in the United States?

Al Qaeda's use of Adam Gadahn is little more than an opportunistic publicity stunt designed to garner as much media exposure as possible because the spokesman is an American. So who is this Adam Gadahn? He is not a mystery. He is not an enigma. Rather Adam Yahiye Gadahn is really Adam Pearlman born in Oregon and raised in Orange County, California. Phil Pearlman (Adam's father) was a 1960's radical who suffered an identity crisis (much like Adam) that resulted in the change of the Pearlman surname to "Gadahn".

To understand the message one must understand the messenger and his motivations. The scientific community has yet to create a standard profile of a "typical" terrorist because there is doubt that a single arch-type exists. However, when terrorism is viewed with other serial predatory crimes (murder, rape, sexual assault) the common thread shared by the perpetrators is exhaustive dreaming and planning of executing such an event and those engrossed in such mental exercises are prone in their late teens/early twenties to escalate from fantasy to reality. Adam Gadahn's own history paints a life of failure, wanting to be important while surrounding himself with violent images and messages. Gadahn's own writings described having a "yawning emptiness" and seeking ways "to fill that void" by turning away from Death Metal to studying Islam at the Islamic Society of Orange County where he fell in with a group of young fundamentalists.

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan (Full PDF Article)

To Further Afghan Reconciliation

Fight Harder

by Joseph Collins

To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article)

It's official. Everyone from the Pentagon to Saudi Arabia thinks that reconciliation between the Taliban and the Karzai government is a good idea and a step toward settling the conflict in Afghanistan. A few deluded analysts even see dealing with the Taliban as the Afghan equivalent of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. One wonders whether war weariness, success with reconciliation in Iraq, and a lack of familiarity with the Afghan context may not be pushing us toward a tactical error or worse, an endless round of talking with an illegitimate adversary that believes it has the upper hand.

Reconciliation in Afghanistan is fraught with complications. For one, there is no Taliban per se. In the south we have Mullah Omar's "old" Taliban, but in the East, the toughest fighters come from the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbi Islami, both of which work closely with Al Qaeda. Complicating the issue even more, there is now a multi-branch Pakistani Taliban, some of whom operate in both countries. Ironically, the Afghan Taliban and its friends seem to be well tolerated by Pakistani authorities who are now in conflict with their own Taliban.

To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article)

Populace-Centric Engagement

A Positive Change of Strategic Perspective for Winning the Long War

by Colonel Robert C. Jones, Small Wars Journal

Populace-Centric Engagement (Full PDF Article)

How one looks at a problem shapes the solution sets that are developed to resolve it. To date U.S. engagement for the Long War has focused on the defeat of Al Qaeda and a growing number of affiliate non-state Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO). This strategy recognizes that populaces are important, but places that importance below that of efforts to capture or kill senior VEO leadership and the development of counterterrorist capacity in the existing governments of the countries where these VEOs reside. This strategy naturally lends itself to a family of engagement that requires a Department of Defense lead, with Department of State in support. Populace-Centric Engagement shifts the focus to understanding and supporting populaces around the world, and assisting them in attaining good governance on their own terms, and produces positive secondary effects.

Populace-Centric Engagement (Full PDF Article)

Framing a Problem

The Problem with Sound Advice Prepared in Advance

by Tom Clark and Brian Blew, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Framing a Problem (Full PDF Article)

We often create conditions to receive good advice. Sometimes, advice comes in advance. For example, "when in doubt do the right thing" or "do good and don't bunch up." In a recent blog entry, Dr Jack recounted that the Director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate has defined doctrine as "sound military advice prepared in advance."

Accordingly, FM-3-0, Operations, offers some sage advice -- frame and reframe the problem. Framing the problem -- what does this mean? Perhaps framing the advice will be helpful.

Framing a Problem (Full PDF Article)

The Denial of Failure in Afghanistan

by Noureddine Jebnoun, Small Wars Journal

The Denial of Failure in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

The Afghan geopolitical terrain, which historically never had the reputation of being easy to negotiate, has made life particularly difficult for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its allies, which have witnessed internal political quarrels being added to the tactical military failures.

The Taliban guerrilla and the Arab fighters who joined them had no chance to militarily defeat the modern Western armies deployed in Afghanistan. But in contemporary asymmetrical warfare, an unvanquished guerrilla is a victorious guerrilla. However, in the seven years of NATO's deployment, the Taliban have not ceased extending their influence over Afghan territory. Far from being confined in the South, they have multiplied their attacks, reaching Jalalabad, the largest city in eastern region of the country, and even the capital, Kabul, which lived in relative peace until a year ago.

At the root of this failure are several mistakes of analysis, mostly but not limited to American origin. The European allies are not absolved from the same mistakes. Western public opinion conflates al-Qaeda and Taliban, thinking of them as one organization. This confusion, when wanting to justify war leads to rejection of any negotiation with the Taliban.

The Denial of Failure in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Manhunting...from the Sea (Full PDF Article)

Although once considered little more than a nuisance and a force protection issue for overseas troops, terrorism will remain the top priority of our national security strategy for the foreseeable future. Regardless of the form in which a terrorist threat manifest itself, be it a state-sponsored global group, decentralized extremist cells, or just rogue individuals, Americans can no longer ignore stateless actors who have the ability to inflict serious harm on our citizens and economy. As the lethality and effectiveness of individual terrorist attacks grows, the ability to take down individual leaders or their networks becomes an increasingly urgent mission set for the military. Manhunting -- finding and neutralizing high value individual targets -- is now an integral part of irregular warfare operations supporting the Global War on Terrorism. These types of precision terrorist targeting operations, combined with sound counterinsurgency techniques, have proven effective in ongoing campaigns against the FARC in Colombia, Islamic insurgents in the Philippines, and Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Terrorists seek refuge in terrain that allows them to stay undercover from conventional targeting methods. These under-governed areas may include rugged mountainous, jungle, and coastal environments, or urban terrain where they can hide among the population. Over half of the terrorist safe havens listed in the 2008 State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Country Reports are in coastal countries or littoral areas. The Sinjar Records, a declassified database of Al-Qa'ida documents captured by coalition forces in October 2007 in Iraq provide another data set indicating terrorist proximity to the sea. All of the 328 individuals in those records who traveled to Iraq to fight against coalition forces or engage in suicide bombing missions originated from just seven different Middle East countries with coastlines of various lengths. Given the nomadic nature of terrorists and the proximity of many potential targets to the sea, distributed maritime forces are a natural player in manhunting efforts...

Manhunting...from the Sea (Full PDF Article)

Inside the Surge

1-5 Cavalry in Ameriyah

by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, Small Wars Journal

Inside the Surge: 1-5 Cavalry in Ameriyah (Full PDF Article)

I had the privilege of commanding the 1st Battalion, 5th US Cavalry in Ameriyah from November 2006 until January of 2008. I have watched a debate on our actions unfold since last summer as we started having success in Ameriyah, but have refrained from jumping into the middle of it up to now. I acknowledge that I am not an unbiased observer, which is why I have avoided this debate. However, since the operations of 1-5 CAV under my command have become a part of the discussion I believe it is time that I jump in and try to clarify some of the facts about our operations and also offer some thoughts.

I start by emphasizing that I appreciate the efforts of 8-10 CAV and the other units in Baghdad that preceded us. My comments are in no way intended to question their dedication or valor, nor suggest that they did not conduct COIN operations. I fully appreciate the sacrifices made by Col. Gian Gentile and his battalion. However, I disagree with Gian's position on the importance of the surge and the change in operational focus that accompanied it.

Inside the Surge: 1-5 Cavalry in Ameriyah (Full PDF Article)

Applying Ends, Ways, & Means to the Spectrum of Conflict

by Tom Clark and Bruce Stanley, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Applying Ends, Ways, & Means to the Spectrum of Conflict (Full PDF Article)

Can we have a meaningful discussion of full spectrum operations in one dimension? If we take the 2008 edition of FM 3-0, Operations, spectrum of conflict at face value the answer is yes. As depicted, full spectrum operations consist of a "ways" based framework. Such a framework stands in stark contrast to the remainder of FM 3-0 as well as other new doctrine manuals such as FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations.

All good models clarify complex topics. In using a simple model there is a danger of losing the clarity and completeness necessary to gain understanding. This is the problem with a one-dimension model to explain full spectrum operations -- we traded clarity and completeness for simplicity.

FM 3-0, Operations, tells us that military operations occur within a complex framework of environmental factors. A contributing factor to complexity is the integration of activities of government and non-government entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve a desired end state. Full spectrum operations involves more than simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, tells us counterinsurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict. Political power is the central issue as each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. Counterinsurgents use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations, tells us that our military history is one of stability operations punctuated by episodes of major combat. Conflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change. Conflict transformation is the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations.

In the Fall 2006 Air and Space Power Journal, Dr Jack Kem wrote that transformation effects are difficult to assess under a one-dimension model. He proposes that effective transformation involves four specific considerations: the strategic context, the ends or purpose for transformation, ways or methods to achieve the ends, and means or resources to accomplish the ways.

Applying Ends, Ways, & Means to the Spectrum of Conflict (Full PDF Article)

The Personnel System at War

A View from the Generation at the Tip of the Spear

by Robert Goldich, Small Wars Journal

The Personnel System at War (Full PDF Article)

Five junior officers, all veterans of combat, recently came together for a day-long dialogue with current and former senior manpower and personnel officials from the Department of Defense. Their major assessment was that an "industrial age" personnel system is being used to fight an "information age" war.

This frank assessment was sponsored by Anita K. Blair, the acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). Ms. Blair's purpose in bringing the two groups together was twofold. First, it provided an opportunity for senior manpower and personnel officials, both active duty and retired, from the military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to hear, first-hand, the experiences of a group of five young officers who had served in Iraq, and their views of how personnel issues affected operations. Second, it also afforded the young officers, all of whom have published and commented on their wartime experiences in various electronic and print media, a chance to gain knowledge about current policies and practices from the perspectives of current senior defense leadership.

The five officers came from a variety of backgrounds. Four were Army, one Marine Corps; one was a woman; ages varied, approximately, from 27 to 39. One was an active Army major in the Aviation Branch, currently transitioning to a Strategist MOS; he commanded an aviation unit in Iraq as a captain. Another was an Army Reserve captain commissioned in Military Intelligence, who served as an operations planner and intelligence officer in an infantry brigade in Iraq. A third remains in the Army Reserve as a captain, also in Military Intelligence; she spent two tours in Iraq, one as a supply officer for an MI brigade and her second as commander of a tactical human intelligence team, and has also returned twice to Iraq for shorter tours as a contractor working on intelligence matters. A fourth has recently left the Army Reserve as a captain; a Military Police officer and a lawyer (although not a JAG officer), he spent a year in Iraq as an adviser to the Iraqi Police. The final officer, a Marine Corps Reserve infantry major, served in a Force Reconnaissance unit in the initial Iraq invasion in 2003 and as an adviser to the Iraqi Army in 2006-2007.

The Personnel System at War (Full PDF Article)

A Soldier's View

by Colonel Gian Gentile, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

A Soldier's View (Full PDF Article)

Since Andrew Bacevich placed me in the "Conservative" camp in his Atlantic article and based on the two outstanding pieces just penned in SWJ by Shawn Brimley and Tom Donnelly I thought I would add a few comments of my own. As Joint Force Quarterly editor Colonel (retired) David Gurney has stated publicly on this blog, myself and John Nagl have a set of point-counterpoint articles due out in the next edition of JFQ that address the Bacevich Atlantic article and the issues involved.

First, I thought that Shawn Brimley's SWJ oped, "Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives" drew out very well and accurately the points that Bacevich only touched on and did not develop in his Atlantic piece.

I also found much to agree with in Tom Donnelly's "One Crusader's View." I especially liked his points at the end of the article where he articulated that the future of war is not just more Iraqs and Afghanistans but potentially conflicts that will require the American Army to have competencies at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. And Tom's acknowledgment that there is still a need in the American army for armor platforms that he states are still (and implicitly in the future) "powerful formations" warmed the cockles of my cavalryman's heart. I do, however, take issue in degree with what Tom said about current American Army doctrine. He said that "conventional force operational doctrine [did not] disappear with the publication of the counterinsurgency manual." True, but not in sprit since the organizing principle of the current three American Army doctrinal manuals (FM 3-24, FM 3-0, and FM 3-24) has become nation building and not fighting has in a sense eclipsed the "conventional" side of the Army. I develop this argument much more in the upcoming JFQ piece.

A Soldier's View (Full PDF Article)

One Crusader's View

by Thomas Donnelly, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

One Crusader's View (Full PDF Article)

We have a great duty to perform and we shall show ourselves a weak and poor-spirited people if we fail to set about doing it, or if we fail to do it aright.

--Theodore Roosevelt

America's Part of the World's Work

Lincoln Club Dinner

February 1899

A century later and with the painful costs of Iraq and Afghanistan ever in our minds, TR's call to American greatness can seem hubristic, jingoistic, anachronistic and its unguarded moments (and to a politically correct sensibility) outright racist. But Shawn Brimley's recent "Mediating between Crusaders and Conservatives" called this quote to my mind. Brimley's piece advances the original future-land-force-structure argument to its ultimate and proper point: what do we think about America's employment of its military, and most particularly the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, over the next generation? At its indivisible core, this is a debate about American purposes in the world.

Brimley's crusaders-or-conservatives taxonomy is likewise not a bad way to frame the landscape of debate; simplicity and clarity are indeed virtues and certainly ones that Roosevelt would have approved of. Yes, there many nuances among observers on all sides and indeed many points of analysis that those with profoundly divergent conclusions can agree upon. But let me offer an unreconstructed "crusader's" view, meant to explain more fully several issues than Brimley glossed over. Most of what follows will focus on the purposes of U.S. land forces in the Middle East, but I will also end with a few observations about force structure and size.

One Crusader's View (Full PDF Article)

Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives

by Shawn Brimley, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives (Full PDF Article)

The long simmering debate over American defense strategy, re-ignited by Andrew Bacevich's article in The Atlantic (and usefully stoked by Small Wars Journal), is perhaps the most important facing America's defense community. Mere weeks from the election of a new President, the debate over whether Iraq and Afghanistan are harbingers of why, where, and how America will fight its next wars helps to frame the context within which the next administration will decide how to construct a defense budget during a deepening economic downturn. The debate is real and the stakes are high.

In his article, Bacevich framed the debate as one between the crusaders, those who believe that Iraq and Afghanistan are but opening salvos in a generational long war, and those he labels the conservatives, who believe that organizing America's military to transform entire societies is a fool's errand. An oversimplified summary of each view might read as follows:

Crusaders: If 9/11 and the subsequent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us anything, it is that America's 21st century enemies are likely to exploit weak and failing states to export terrorism, instability, and extremism. The era of episodic or periodic conflict is over, and America's military had better get prepared for an era of persistent conflict, one in which instability anywhere can pose threats to America's interests anywhere. In the conflicts of the 21st century, the U.S. military will not be able to kill its way to victory, but must instead focus on transforming societies in order to address the grievances that manifest into powerful threats against America's interests. The types of capabilities most in demand for success in Iraq and Afghanistan -- linguists, trainers, combat advisors, civil affairs and intelligence experts -- are exactly the capabilities we will need in the future. Simply expanding so-called "white" special operations forces or marginal improvements in Army and Marine Corps capabilities will not prove sufficient. America's ground forces need to transform for a future of small wars and insurgencies, and if that means taking risk in more conventional capabilities like field artillery or armor, so be it.

Conservatives: If 9/11 and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have taught us anything, it is that American power has limits. We cannot transform entire societies, and the notion that America needs to be persistently deployed as part of a generational long war is exactly what our enemies most desire. The most important variables in Iraq and Afghanistan are the actions of the various political actors -- we are not in control of the outcomes and never have been. Yes, weak and failing states can play host to those that may threaten us, but the answer is not to engage U.S. ground forces in a global Manichean counterinsurgency or pacification campaign in the quicksand of the Muslim world, because to do so would permanently mire America in a series of unwinnable wars. America's Army and Marine Corps as currently organized are more than sufficient to wage the counterinsurgencies we find ourselves in today, and the attempt to dramatically retool our ground forces for a never-ending long war imposes great risks to America's ability to defend against an uncertain future. With rising powers such as India, China and Russia poised to challenge American dominance, to embrace an era of persistent conflict is a recipe for a kind of permanent strategic distraction that will prove corrosive to America's power and global prestige...

Mediating Between Crusaders and Conservatives (Full PDF Article)

Reviving OSS Methodology for 21st Century Military Operations

by Myrtle Vacirca-Quinn, M.D. Sternfeld and Luis Carlos Montalván

Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Reviving OSS Methodology for 21st Century Military Operations (Full PDF Article)

The endemic problem of not having enough highly skilled and capable Civil Affairs personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan has negatively affected the Post 9/11 era of US military operations. The Civil Affairs (CA) problems of post-invasion Iraq should not have led our senior defense policy makers to move CA into the Regular Army as Secretary Rumsfeld directed. Rather, CA and Psychological Operations (colloquially known as PSYOP) should have been kept in the Special Operations Community.

In the first Gulf War, Civil Affairs (CA) worked well because it was part of US Special Operations Command. CA operators, specifically men and women of the Kuwait Task Force, planned post-combat reconstitution and reconstruction of Kuwait almost 6 months prior to the allied liberation. Indeed, post-combat planning began during the pre-combat phase called Operation Desert Shield.

This advanced detailed planning was very much in keeping with the tradition of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's first overseas intelligence and military special operations agency. In Italy during World War II, OSS operations began with detailed plans produced beforehand at Camp Lee, Virginia.

Reviving OSS Methodology for 21st Century Military Operations (Full PDF Article)

Between Clausewitz and Mao

Dynamic Evolutions of the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2008)

by Thomas Renard and Stéphane Taillat, Small Wars Journal

Between Clausewitz and Mao (Full PDF Article)

Insurgencies are dynamic, not static. The idea of dynamic insurgencies was previously developed by Mao Zadong. In his book, Mao described guerrilla warfare as a pyramidal process divided into three linear but not definitive phases - from propaganda to conventional warfare - which means that the guerrilla must follow the order of the different phases, but maintains the possibility to move back and forth between them.

Mao's dynamic guerrilla, due to its linearity, explains only partly the tactical shifts adopted by insurgents. Therefore, in order to mirror the real dynamism of modern insurgencies, we propose a second model of dynamic insurgencies based on three operational poles: the terror pole, the guerrilla pole, and the conventional warfare pole. The three poles create a triangle of tactical possibilities, in which every insurgent action takes place.

Concretely, this means that a group closer to the terror pole will mainly rely on acts of terrorism, while maintaining a more or less pronounced aspect of guerrilla warfare, or even of conventional warfare, depending on its proximity to the other poles. This is to say - most groups do not rely on a single pole.

Between Clausewitz and Mao (Full PDF Article)

Winning the War of Ideas

by Major Gabriel C. Lajeunesse, Small Wars Journal

Winning the War of Ideas (Full PDF Article)

Day after day the global airwaves are filled with entertainment and sports, humor and drama - each program telling its own subtle story. Our ever-ready media is also filled with more serious fare, documentaries and news, debate and commentary, often delivered with substantial spin or half-truths designed to convincingly sell the proponent's themes and messages. In the mass of this media, those able to master the news cycle have an advantage. The same is true in the realm of new media, where the internet, blogs, instant messages, and streaming video provide a constant and on-demand barrage of messages from anywhere, to anywhere. In a world that is flat, ideologues of all kinds have increased capacity to communicate their messages at a very low cost through the use of these technologies. Al-Qa'ida, Wahhabists and Iran, along with their proxies, have made extensive use of these new tools, along with tried and tested techniques for distributing propaganda materials to individuals through person to person contact in Islamic Centers, radical madrasahs, and mosques. They are working hard to further propagate their message of enmity and compulsion. The US and its partners, the standard bearers of liberty and freedom, are struggling to compete with these themes and messages - with many calling for an increased emphasis on the battle for hearts and minds, the war of ideas.

The very idea of a war of ideas is contentious. What is this "war"? If it is a war, who are we fighting? Why a war; why not a competition - after all, in a marketplace of ideas shouldn't the concept of an inalienable right to freedom of conscience win out every time over repression and compulsion? Further, if we are competing in a marketplace of ideas what are we selling?

Winning the War of Ideas (Full PDF Article)

Meeting Lt. Col. David Galula - April 1962

by Rufus Phillips, Small Wars Journal Retrospective

Meeting Lt. Col. David Galula - April 1962 (Full PDF Article)

In April 1962, I participated in a RAND Symposium on Counterinsurgency held in Washington, D.C, along with my old boss from the 1954--56 days in South Vietnam, General Edward G. Lansdale, and a number of others. Lansdale had been the key advisor to Ramon Magsaysay in the successful campaign against the communist Huks in the Philippines and then in the successful birth of the Republic of South Vietnam in 1954--56. I had worked under him advising the Vietnamese Army in its occupation and pacification of large areas in South Vietnam previously controlled by the communist controlled Vietminh (predecessors to the Vietcong), and I had moved on to Laos to try to help that government counter Pathet Lao subversion in the villages through civic action.

I did not participate in the first few symposium sessions, but heard from Lansdale that there was a very unusual French officer named David Galula present, who had a lot of good ideas that sounded very much like our own. As I got involved in discussions with Col. Galula, I discovered he wasn't anything like the vast majority of the French officers I had tried to work with as part of a joint American-French military advisory mission (called TRIM) in the 1954--55 days in Vietnam. Most had a colonial attitude toward the Vietnamese and saw them as lesser beings. Col. Galula, however, was different. He didn't maintain an attitude of superiority. Rather, his mission involved trying to help the local Algerian population as their friend, and he imbued his troops with that attitude.

Meeting Lt. Col. David Galula - April 1962 (Full PDF Article)

Understanding the al-Qaeda Enemy in Three Volumes

by Dr. Donald J. Hanle, Small Wars Journal Book Review

Understanding the al-Qaeda Enemy in Three Volumes (Full PDF Article)

Sun Tzu's admonition to the general that in order to defeat his enemy, he must know his enemy as well as he knows himself was never more true than in the current struggle between the West and the Salafi jihadist organization known as al-Qaida and its allies -- hereafter referred to as the al-Qaida Associated Movements (AQAM). Although the war had most certainly begun not later than Osama bin Laden's 23 February 1998 declaration of war on the United States, and probably much sooner, it took the events of 9/11 to ensure the American population and their government were fully aware of their status as a co-belligerent in an armed struggle between the last remaining superpower and a small, fringe element of the Islamic faith. It has been seven years since that fateful attack and many -- to include many who are in the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security -- are still struggling to understand this enemy and devise a coherent strategy to defeat them.

Three works recently published by the Naval Institute Press provide an outstanding compendium examining AQAM ideology, strategy and doctrine. The first two works, The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists' Strategy for Defeating America and A Terrorist's Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab Al-Suri's Islamic Jihad Manifesto, both edited by Jim Lacey, afford a superb view of not only who these Salafi jihadists are, but what makes them tick. What makes these works so important in the war against AQAM is that it affords the West a means to understand our enemy by examining the evolution of their own ideology and strategic thought through their own words. The third work, entitled The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al-Qaida and Associated Movements, edited by Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey and John R. Schindler with assistance of Jim Lacey, is an assessment of AQAM ideology and strategic/ operational views with recommended countervailing strategies for the U.S. and the West to adopt to defeat AQAM in the cognitive domain of war.

Understanding the al-Qaeda Enemy in Three Volumes (Full PDF Article)

A View of Irregular Warfare

A Work in Progress (Draft)

by Colonel Daniel Kelly, Small Wars Journal

A View of Irregular Warfare (Full PDF Article)

SWJ Editors Note: We present this draft (work in progress) essay to encourage feedback by Small Wars Journal readership. The author welcomes comments and suggestions that add to our understanding of the complex operational environments of today -- and -- tomorrow.

In June 2007, I reported aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico to establish the USMC Center for Irregular Warfare. A Director with no staff, I jumped right into the maelstrom of the challenging environment called Irregular Warfare (IW). Armed with the new tools of my trade, the Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, a draft version of the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, the Small Wars Manual and several articles by Frank Hoffman I was ready to do my duty for the Marine Corps.

It did not take long to see that this thing called Irregular Warfare had taken on a life of its own as an untamable monster. My initial journey through Pentagon hallways to countless seminars, workshops and war games was marked by acquaintances with "duty experts" whose views on IW were as numerous as they were varied.

A View of Irregular Warfare (Full PDF Article)

Africom Stands Up

by Colonel Robert Killebrew, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Africom Stands Up (Full PDF Article)

On the first day of October, the new United States Africa Command (Africom) became fully operational. The last major action proposed by former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the new command is chartered to support U.S. military and diplomatic initiatives across a huge continent and among an enormously diverse population. It's no secret that the decision to establish the command was controversial in Africa, and that reception initially ranged from cool to frosty, though that is said to be warming slightly.

Certainly the new command is making every effort to appear helpful and collaborative. The four-star command has two deputy commanders, one three-star for military operations and one ambassador for civil-military relations; its mission statement and other supporting guidance focus on "soft" activities like conflict prevention, consultation and aid. Signally, the title "combatant command," another holdover from the Rumsfeld era, does not appear, replaced instead by "regional military command" and the more historic "unified command." Considering the state of affairs on the African continent, this is all to the good.

Africom Stands Up (Full PDF Article)

Transitions While Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations

by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Alexander, Small Wars Journal

Transitions While Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

Transitioning is critical to the success of any operation. However within a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation where the interaction between military and inter-agency efforts intertwine with Host Nation dynamics managing transition takes on a degree of complexity that far out paces the conduct of conventional operations on a linear battlefield. Counterinsurgents do not manage transition in a linear fashion like their conventional partners during the conduct of offensive and defensive operations; there is a great deal of doctrine available describing phasing for these actions. Unfortunately we have very few resources or studies that go into any detail on the methodology a COIN force (the military and civil elements deployed to the HN) uses for determining what comprises the conditions that determine a transition under non-linear conditions. Those in the field are left to determine where they are conceptually and what conditions, if adequately accomplished, would allow them to transition responsibility and authority to the Host Nation (HN)-the endstate of most contemporary counterinsurgent efforts. Based on his experiences in Algeria and the Far East David Galula also indentified the challenge of transition in a COIN environment:

The army officer has learned in military academies that combat is divided into distinct phases...For each phase he is taught that there is a standard deployment and maneuver in accordance with the current doctrine. Therefore the intellectual problem of the field officer in conventional combat consists in identifying which phase in which he finds himself and then applying the standard answer to his situation. Such a process does not exist in counterinsurgency warfare. How much time and means to devote to tracking guerillas or, instead, to working the population, by what specific actions and in what order the population could be controlled and led to co-operate, these were questions that the sous-quatier commander had to answer by himself. One can imagine the variety of answers arrived at and the effects on the pacification effort as a whole. (Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, 1963).

There are several external factors that impact on transition such as political will, coalition partner's agenda, and world opinion. This article will not focus on those issues but rather on the COIN force's action internal to the HN. There are three areas in which transitions must occur with a degree of predictability and control for counterinsurgents to be successful: security (to include Host Nation forces), legitimacy of the provincial/regional government (with respect to providing essential services), and the strength of the local economy. This article explores the inter-dynamics of non-linear transition within these three areas and their importance in successfully establishing the legitimacy of the HN government.

Transitions While Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

Provincial Reconstruction in Afghanistan

An Examination of the Problems of Integrating the Military, Political and Development Dimensions with Reference to the US Experience in Vietnam

by Colonel Ian Westerman, Small Wars Journal Exclusive

Provincial Reconstruction in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

The conflict in Afghanistan has been running now for more than six years but, after some early successes, the situation appears to have developed into a classic insurgency with the prospect of it becoming a long-term commitment for the coalition forces. Since taking the lead of the UN established International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003, NATO has pinned a lot of its hopes on the ability of its multi-agency Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to deliver stabilization to the country. The PRTs try to bring together the three strands of security, governance, and development through the contribution made by the military, political and economic elements of the teams. This paper considers how NATO is tackling the particular difficulties of managing the PRTs, and how it is attempting to harmonise the potentially disparate aims of their three separate dimensions.

In examining the problems faced by ISAF the dissertation looks back to the US experience in Vietnam where a similar situation existed in the late 1960s with their pacification programme. Robert Komer's mandate from President Johnson was to determine where the problems lay, and to come up with proposals for solving them. Komer's eventual recommendation was for a single civil-military command structure, which he later went on to help implement by establishing the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support programme, or CORDS, in Vietnam. The dissertation takes a close look at how Komer went about this, and consideration is made of whether there are any lessons from Komer's work with CORDS that could be usefully employed by ISAF today.

In the conclusion some of the current problems that the coalition faces in Afghanistan are identified, and the specific areas where the lessons from CORDS might be helpful are discussed. Recognition is made of the additional problems that ISAF faces over those the US had to manage in Vietnam, and considers whether a military alliance such as NATO is actually capable of establishing the robust, unified command structure necessary to succeed in Afghanistan. It also poses the wider question of the suitability of broad-based coalitions for waging counterinsurgency campaigns at all.

Provincial Reconstruction in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

The Limits of American Power and Civil-Military Relations

A Framework for Discussion

by Thomas Donnelly

Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

It has been fascinating to follow the discussion sparked by Andy Bacevich's short but incisive piece on "The Petraeus Doctrine" in the Atlantic. However, two elements of the essay have been overlooked. Bacevich's core complaints are less about the structure of the U.S. Army (or the military more broadly) or its operational doctrine than they are about the underlying issues of the limits of American power and civil-military relations. The analysis of the John-Nagl-versus-Gian-Gentile debate is merely a framework for these larger questions.

Take the second question first. Bacevich concludes with what he rightly describes as "the biggest question of all." That is, in the American democracy, do the essential choices about war rest with soldiers or civilians? The presumption he makes, however, that the decision to prosecute the Long War has been delegated to the military, isn't correct: rather, it's been the military (with top-cover from former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) that's been trying to dodge the decision. One may well argue that the Bush Administration has made unwise choices, but they are undeniably choices that have been validated by the American political process. Bacevich has elsewhere argued that the course of events since the 2006 election has disregarded the democratic process, but that's not right, either. The Democrats victories in the 2006 elections gave them a congressional majority, but not a large enough majority to override the Constitution's presumptions in favor of the commander-in-chief.

Bacevich similarly disparages at the quality of the war-policy debate, and it's hard to disagree. But quality is no more the measure of democratic legitimacy than is any particular outcome. As a matter of the historical record, America's domestic debates about war have generated more heat than light. And, when it came to Iraq, what is remarkable in retrospect is how long it took to translate civilian guidance -- President's Bush's oft-stated goals of a stable and representative government in Baghdad -- into military policy. The Decider decided; alas, the commander-in-chief did not sufficiently command, and the uniforms, too frequently, shirked.

So it is the new civilian leadership -- in the form of a chastened, post-2006 President Bush and current Defense Secretary Robert Gates -- that finally is dragging a still-reluctant military into embracing the irregular warfare mission. Just this Monday, Gates continued his jeremiad against "Next-War-It is" and "the defense bureaucracy's priorities and lack of urgency opposed to a wartime footing and a wartime mentality." This may be a strategic error, but it's his civilian job to make the call. If anyone's outside our norms of civil-military relations, it's those in the Gentile-Bacevich camp.

And so to the second question. It's hard to avoid the conclusion that the conventional-force advocates are looking for ways to constrain what they see as an unhealthy American, exceptionalist tendency to meddle in other peoples' political affairs. Bacevich has long made this argument and makes it again in the Atlantic article, though by proxy. He approvingly quotes Gentile's critique of Nagl's "breathtaking" assertion about "the efficacy of American military power to shape events."

Realism -- that is, a cold-blooded assessment of costs and benefits -- is no small virtue in the exercise of power. But this, along with realism about the limits of technology, was a central theme of Gates' speech at National Defense University. And he allowed as how "we are unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan anytime soon." Yet he went on to say "that doesn't mean we may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales." This is not, as Bacevich portrays it, of "inescapable eventuality" of wars to come, or America's predestined strategic fate, it's an overdue recognition that we don't just get to fight the wars that are congenial to generals.

Nor is Gates attempting to re-fight the last war. (This trope should be banished forever, but let it be noted that irregular warfare was America's "first way of war;" Small Wars Journal readers would do well to read John Grenier's -- and he was an Air Force officer! -- book by that title.) It's the conventional-force school that is attempting to accomplish what Bacevich claims is Nagl's goal: reducing and precluding U.S. strategic options.

It was a reasonable decision, as Bacevich points out, to refocus the Army on conventional combat after Vietnam; the Soviet 8th Guards Army had its engines idling in East Germany. It's much harder to come up with a similar land-force threat today; Chinese military modernization is focused on the maritime, air, space and electromagnetic realms and the Russian army's performance in Georgia was underwhelming. Invading Iran would call for lots of tanks, but if we're precluding options, that would be high on my list.

By all means, let's continue the debate on the purpose of America's land forces, but let's take the mission -- as defined by the Constitutional civilian authority -- as the point of departure. And yes, let's not disguise a strategy and policy agenda in force-structure clothing. Let's just also not claim all purity on one side.

Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow in defense and security policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, he served as policy group director and professional staff member for the House Armed Services Committee.

Surging Statecraft to Save Afghanistan

by Vikram J. Singh and Nathaniel C. Fick

Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

We looked down into Pakistan in August from the Afghan border outpost of Torkham, high in the legendary Khyber Pass. Invaders have carved violent paths across this border in both directions since the time of Alexander the Great. Today, an invasion by proxy from Pakistan continues that bloody tradition.

Fighters flowing into Afghanistan from remote and rebellious western Pakistan have helped drive violence to its highest levels since U.S. forces ousted the Taliban in 2001, sparking concern in NATO capitals and anger from many Afghans who think Pakistan diverts U.S. aid dollars to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. "If you Americans are serious," one tribal elder in Kandahar told us in frustration, "then take care of Pakistan."

If only it were so simple. Stabilizing Afghanistan is going to require one of the most complicated exercises in statecraft undertaken by the United States in years. The next U.S. President must grasp both Pakistani and Indian motivations in Afghanistan, for these regional dynamics drive the "proxy invasion" that is undermining the coalition's efforts there. A sound regional approach should lead the United States to re-evaluate blank-check security assistance to Pakistan; increase investment in non-military aspects of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship; and actively try to build confidence between New Delhi, Islamabad, and Kabul.

The heart of the regional dysfunction is Pakistan, a nation that has always feared two things: an Indian invasion and its own disintegration along ethnic lines. Pakistani leaders view Afghanistan not as part of the "war on terror," but as an Islamic rear echelon in which Pakistani forces would join long-nurtured proxies to repel any Indian invasion and occupation. Pakistan's dominant Punjabis also fear that the British-imposed Afghan--Pakistan border, which splits ethnic-Pashtun lands and has never been accepted by Pashtun people or any modern Afghan government, will become a crack in Pakistan's foundation. Bangladesh split from Pakistan with Indian support in 1971 and Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, has supported radical Islamists who could undermine traditional (and potentially separatist) ethnic-Pashtun power structures ever since.

To the east, India seeks to deter Pakistan from supporting extremists who set off bombs in Indian cities. India enjoys provoking uncertainty in Islamabad through diplomatic activity in Afghanistan, stoking Pakistani fears that India will use Afghan territory as a base of support not just for Pashtuns, but also for the Baluchi and Sindhi separatists who have long agitated for independence in western Pakistan.

This Indo-Pak competition in Afghanistan explains why hundreds of millions of dollars in monthly U.S. military assistance for Islamabad has produced only greater instability, growing sanctuary for extremists, and a haven for those plotting global terrorism. Both nations meddle actively in the border areas, and for Pakistan in particular, the incentives are perverse. As one U.S. official explained to us, "Pakistan gets over a billion dollars per year for poor cooperation and is quite certain that improved cooperation or any success against Al Qaeda would result in less, not more, U.S. support."

Only a genuine U.S. offer of long-term cooperation can make fighting al Qaeda more worthwhile to Pakistan than the status quo. The first component of such an offer must be ending blank-check security assistance to Pakistan. The next U.S. president needs Congressional support to send a new message and offer a new bargain to Pakistan's military and fractious civilian leaders: "Pakistan's progress as a modern state is at real risk either from Al Qaeda extremists or from any major international terrorist attack getting traced back to Pakistani territory, forcing western military action. We are ready to discuss a ten-year aid package, significant infrastructure investment, and security agreements in exchange for measurable progress along the border, concrete steps to address the grievances of minority populations, and investment in education, health, and basic infrastructure. The alternative is a drawing down of U.S. security assistance and additional unilateral military action inside your territory."

Such a message would help the U.S. with the second facet of a truly regional strategy: moving beyond Pakistan's military to rebuild trust with the Pakistani people who now see us as friends of a dictator, rather than friends of average citizens. The U.S. should engage the academic elite on the possibility of opening an American University in Islamabad, and engage the business elite on the possibility of a bilateral investment treaty. America has initiatives underway to provide $750 million in assistance to local populations in Pakistan, and to build up the Pakistani Frontier Corps, irregular forces that we hope will counter extremists. These efforts should be continued. Pakistan's new democratic government needs to be pressured to focus beyond infighting and look to the well-being of its people. If it fails to support schools, clinics and political rights, then the U.S. should threaten to refuse to transfer items such as spare parts for the F-16s that really matter to Pakistani leaders.

Finally, a regional strategy requires the U.S. to begin confidence-building initiatives that encourage New Delhi and Islamabad to stop using Afghanistan as a weapon in their own bilateral struggle. Even if it is unsympathetic to Pakistan's concerns about India and separatists, the U.S. should offer Islamabad long-term strategic support. This could include commitments from New Delhi not to support its own proxy invasion from Afghanistan into Pakistan and from Islamabad to end terrorist infiltration of Kashmir and Afghanistan. The place to start is with regular shuttle diplomacy between New Delhi, Islamabad and Kabul to discuss the concerns playing out in each capital. Only increased regional confidence and a real U.S. commitment to stick with Pakistan even after defeating al Qaeda can enable Pakistan's leaders to tackle the extremist elements within the ISI who equate peace with a loss of power.

These are hard steps that offer no instant gratification. For now, the real leader in Pakistan remains the military. The recently revived civilian government has already brought political chaos and disunity. Without good partners in Pakistan, however, U.S. leaders will continue to be tempted by the two supposedly "simple solutions" we heard from many Afghans: sealing the border or expanding military operations into Pakistan without Pakistani consent. But neither credible border security nor unilateral western (or Afghan) military action against extremists in Pakistan has much hope of success.

The border, stretching 1,640 miles (equivalent to the distance from Washington D.C. to Albuquerque) through some of the most rugged territory on earth, will never be sealed. Locals pass back and forth without papers even at official crossings like Torkham. Many live on one side and work in fields on the other, and almost all have family on both sides of the line. Insurgents can easily cross through the open spaces between checkpoints, or blend into the scores of people we watched traverse the border on foot, in busses and atop the Technicolor "jingle trucks" carrying goods between countries.

Without Pakistani support, anything beyond limited covert military action to hunt militants in Pakistan is unworkable for two reasons. First, the U.S. does not and will not have enough forces to support a major counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, let alone in Pakistan. Second, coalition forces in Afghanistan depend on Pakistan for the delivery of virtually all their vital supplies. More than half of the goods passing through Torkham each day are destined for U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the only alternate routes from the sea are through Iran or through the Caucasus via Russia and Georgia. If Pakistan were to shut down access to its territory and airspace in response to any unilateral invasion, then coalition forces in Afghanistan would face strangulation.

Frustrating though it is, the United States is far from all-powerful in Afghanistan. The proxy war being waged from terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan can only be stopped with cooperation from Islamabad to fight the militants on Pakistani soil, cultivate and support local tribal allies —to fight Al Qaeda, and bring hope to the local populations with development and political rights. The extremist threat to Pakistan is seen by Islamabad as more bearable than Indian encirclement from Afghanistan. This is a foolish miscalculation given that the bigger threat to Pakistan is really from Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, who likely killed former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and have driven suicide bombings like that at the Marriot hotel last month to intolerable levels. But perception too often becomes reality, and despite their promises, Pakistani leaders will only really cooperate when their concerns about Indian meddling are addressed.

A failed Pakistan helps no one. This is the one theater on earth where terrorism, radical Islam, traditional nation-state conflict, and confirmed weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, really come together. Given the overriding imperative to keep dangerous weapons out of dangerous hands, it is up to Washington to find the strategic interests common to the U.S., India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and to craft the necessary bargains to protect those interests. This is the essence of statecraft. While they think about more troops for Afghanistan and keeping America's military relationship with Pakistan sound, U.S. leaders must start down the diplomatic road to stability in Afghanistan. It runs through New Delhi, Islamabad, and Kabul.

Mr. Singh is a former Pentagon official who worked on counterinsurgency and stability operations. Mr. Fick is a former Marine officer who served in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2001-2002. They are Fellows at the Center for a New American Security.