Journal

A Strategic Imperative on the 21st Century Battlefield

by Nick Masellis, Small Wars Journal

Human Terrain A Strategic Imperative (Full PDF Article)

Six months into a one-year deployment, my unit was shifting its area of operation from the southeastern Tigris River city of Al-Kut, to one of the main centers of adherents to the Shia sect of Islam -- Karbala. The city of Karbala, and particularly the twin mosques that tower over it, is central to the Shia Islamic faith. The significance of these structures is embedded in the culture, economy and faith of the over half a million residents, as well as of the millions of people who pilgrimage every year to visit the sacred, ancient metropolis.

However when I first arrived to the city and noticed the massive golden domes, I knew nothing of their significance; I knew nothing of the story behind the shrines and the history behind them; and I was still ignorant of the general cultural milieu. I was not at all unique -- we all were mesmerized by the mosques and the culture around us, but had no clue where to begin in order to understand what they meant in the context of our presence among the people apart from: 1. do not get near the mosques; and 2. do not fire on them if fired upon from its vicinity. But more importantly, the prevailing attitude at the time seemed to be that we didn't really have to understand anything beyond the latter. That seemed to be a reasonable tenant; after all, why would it be necessary to know such things about any given area, people or buildings? How, if at all, is it pertinent to the mission?

Well, one of the gravest shortfalls in the early years of Iraq stabilization" was the lack of such understanding. That the tribes and religious sheiks had, in the midst of the political vacuum that developed after the fall of Saddam's regime, assumed control and influence. The majority of military and civilian leadership in Iraq did not understand these religious and ethnic nuances, which heavily contributed to the sectarian violence and militias that developed in areas like Najaf and Karbala. Moreover, corruption in the country ran rampant, especially through the local police, who had a long history as a force of subversion and brutality. Even the interpreters were at times influenced by their own biases; to include the fear for their own lives and those of their families. As a result, this depreciated the value of effective translation, actionable intelligence and serious engagement with the population -- essential components in counterinsurgency operations.

Human Terrain A Strategic Imperative (Full PDF Article)

Operation Storm in the Middle East

reviewed by Travis Weinger, Small Wars Journal

SAS Secret War (Full PDF Article)

SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East. By Major General Tony Jeapes. London: Greenhill Books, first published 1980, this edition published 2005. 253 pages. $22.95. Reviewed by Travis Weinger.

A fanatical group, playing upon political and economic grievances in an isolated province, develops a base of support among the local tribes and launches a full-blown insurgency against the government and foreign power supporting it. The group violently attempts to break the traditional power structures and elites of the tribes and imposes a brutal and foreign ideology in their place. Realizing their mistake, the tribes begin, fitfully, to fight back against the outsiders, slowly reconciling with the counterinsurgents. The counterinsurgents partner with these tribal fighters to great effect, and the back of the insurgency is largely broken.

This could be a description of the course of the modern insurgency in Anbar province. Instead, it is the picture we get of the Dhofar insurgency in Oman in SAS Secret War, written by Major General Tony Jeapes, commander of the first full Special Air Service (SAS) squadron in Oman and SAS Commanding Officer from 1974 until the end of the war in 1975. Republished in 2005 (originally written in 1977), doubtless to cash in on the interest in counterinsurgency generated by the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, General Jeapes' first-hand account of the successful British campaign in Oman during the 1970s is a fascinating read, both on its own merits as a story of war and in light of present-day discussions and debates about the nature and best practices of COIN.

SAS Secret War (Full PDF Article)

Future Conflict

Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence

by John P. Sullivan, Small Wars Journal

Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

Gangs dominate the intersection between crime and war. Traditionally viewed as criminal enterprises of varying degrees of sophistication and reach, some gangs have evolved into potentially more dangerous and destabilizing actors. In many areas across the world—especially in 'criminal enclaves' or 'lawless zones' where civil governance, traditional security structures, and community or social bonds have eroded—gangs thrive. This essay briefly examines the dynamics of crime and war in these contested regions. Specifically, it provides a framework for understanding 'criminal insurgencies' where acute and endemic crime and gang violence challenge the solvency of state political control.

Criminal gangs come in many forms. They challenge the rule of law and employ violence to dominate local communities. In some cases they are expanding their reach and morphing into a new warmaking entities capable of challenging the legitimacy and even the solvency of nation-states. This potential brings life to the prediction made by Martin van Creveld who noted, "In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit upon more formal titles to describe themselves."

Some advanced gangs—known as 'third generation gangs' and/or maras—are waging 'wars" and changing the dynamics of crime. In some extreme cases they are waging a de facto criminal insurgency. As Adam Elkus and I recently noted: Criminal insurgency is haunting the police stations and barracks of North America. Powerful criminal networks increasingly challenge the state's monopoly on force, creating new threats to national security." Mexico is currently challenged by extreme criminal violence, but it is by no means the only state in the Americas suffering from criminal insurgency. Transnational criminal organizations ranging from the transnational street collective Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) to the powerful Mexican drug cartels are steadily increasing in both power and reach. Even some American street gangs are evolving into 'third generation' gangs: large, networked, transnational bodies that may yet develop true political consciousness.

Criminal insurgency presents a challenge to national security analysts used to creating simulations and analytical models for terrorism and conventional military operations. Criminal insurgency is different from regular" terrorism and insurgency because the criminal insurgents' sole political motive is to gain autonomy economic control over territory. They do so by hollowing out the state and creating criminal enclaves to maneuver.

Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

by Clint Watts, Small Wars Journal

Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)

Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, which ended in early 1989, created a glut of foreign fighters, who found themselves unwanted by their home/source countries and restless for another Jihadi campaign. This First Foreign Fighter Glut" spawned al-Qa'ida (AQ) and a decade of increasingly lethal terrorist attacks leading up to September 11, 2001.

Today, Western nations face a smaller, more lethal threat resulting from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut." As major conflicts in Iraq and later Afghanistan diminish in scale, a new generation of former foreign fighters will sit idle in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The future success of AQ hinges on its recruitment process in which former foreign fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan guide the recruitment and production of future foreign fighters who will conduct regional and global terrorist attacks. Left unchecked, the Second Foreign Fighter Glut will produce the next generation of terrorist organizations and attacks much as the First Foreign Fighter Glut fueled AQ.

Current Western counterterrorism (CT) strategies, largely overshadowed by counterinsurgencies (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan, place great emphasis on eliminating the supply of foreign fighters at their intended targets. These strategies fail to adequately mitigate the demand for jihad by young recruits in foreign fighter source countries.

Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)

Counterinsurgency in Sacred Places

reviewed by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal

Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)

C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, eds. Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York: 2008.

A common tactic used by Shi'ite militias and rogue elements during Operation Iraqi Freedom has been the use of holy shrines for sanctuary and logistics. In 2004, for example, the US military fought members of Moqtada al-Sadr's militia in Najaf, one of Shi'ia Islam holiest cities. On two occasions that year, followers of al-Sadr used the grounds of the most sacred Iman Ali shrine to conduct military operations and terrorist attacks. These operations posed particularly thorny issues for responding forces who were very sensitive to possible repercussions resulting from any damage to the shrine.

Obviously, the use of force against holy sites can antagonize and deeply affect religious communities. Any desecration, whether perceived or real, can generate a back-lash of local sentiment against the counterinsurgency force. The potential for a positive outcome in the eyes of the insurgent forces means that we can expect them in future security environments to continue to use this tactic. Thanks to this book, however, we can now identify some valuable lessons learned that warrant our attention. When responding to insurgents using sacred sites, counterinsurgent forces often failed to achieve desired outcomes due to several critical shortcomings: poor or faulty intelligence, the absence of a deft public relations strategy" and a lack of restraint on the use of force.

Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)

How Army Special Forces Can Use Existing Systems within the Operational Environment

by Major Michael Longacre, Small Wars Journal

Perspective on the Systems Perspective (Full PDF Article)

The purpose of this article is to articulate how Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) can use existing elements of the Operational Environment (OE) to accomplish desired military endstates. SOF assets gain marked advantages by indentifying and making use of pre-existing structures within the EO and ensuring the roles these systems play within the EO support our objectives. As a military, we would not ignore or destroy a country's entire road systems and then create a new road network on which to operate our vehicles. Nor would we attempt to conduct a lodgment without using existing sea and air ports. However, as a nation we attempted to support a fledging state in Iraq by disbanding its existing security apparatus and the Ba'ath party that had previously ran the daily functioning of the government. In contrast, preserving, influencing, and strengthening the social, political, and economic infrastructure better allows us to achieve our aims and fully embraces the by, with, and through" approach that has made ARSOF so successful.

In order to discuss how ARSOF may use these pre-existing components of the OE, this article first discusses the nature of these components, then explores some specific ways in which ARSOF and existing elements of the OE may support each other.

Perspective on the Systems Perspective (Full PDF Article)

A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army

reviewed by Major Niel Smith, Small Wars Journal

Embedded (Full PDF Article)

Embedded: A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army by Wesley Gray, Naval Institute Press, 2009, 256 pages.

Embedded presents a tale not often told among the growing collection of memoirs by former company grade officers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Marine Capt. Wesley Gray served as an embedded combat adviser with an Iraqi battalion in Haditha, Iraq, during 2006. Gray deserves great credit for shining the spotlight the critical effort to develop competent Iraqi security forces. For those who have never had the pleasure of closely working as an embed, Gray's narrative reveals the herculean challenges that most combat advisers face.

Although limited in scope to his location and time in Iraq, the situations he encounters are common to most advisers in Iraq. Gray's account of his learning curve is the strongest aspect of the book.

Embedded (Full PDF Article)

by Dalton Fury, Small Wars Journal

The Pope (Full PDF Article)

Behind his back we referred to him simply as SAM or Stan the Man. Always with reverence and respect of course. Later on, about the time he started to wear shiny silver stars, we started to refer to him as The Pope.

LTG Stanley McChrystal's meteoric rise through the ranks is no surprise to anyone that has ever had the opportunity to work for or with him. I was fortunate, from a subordinate officer perspective, on numerous occasions.

Few know the facts just yet as to why GEN McKeirnan was moved out of command in Afghanistan. Regardless of the reasons, and I'm certainly not read on to the scuttlebutt, I do know that America's interests, America's warriors, and America's mission in Afghanistan couldn't be in better hands under LTG McChrystal. My biggest concern is that I hope the senior officers in Afghanistan soon to be under LTG McChrystal's command are well rested.

The Pope (Full PDF Article)

by Colonel Gary Anderson, Small Wars Journal

The Taliban Can Be Stopped (Full PDF Article)

The Taliban are not ten feet tall, and there is no horde of Taliban supermen overrunning either Afghanistan or Pakistan. That is not how they operate. We and the Pakistanis tend to try to put their offensives" in our frame of reference, and then are continually surprised when massive applications of force fail to stop them, and only result in increased negative publicity and civilian casualties.

The reality of Taliban offensives is that they largely consist of their fighters walking into an undefended village, and announcing to the population that, there is going to be a war here, if you don't want to be part of it, leave." Those who don't want to be part of the war do depart and become internally displaced persons or refugees (in the case of those who flee across borders). Those who stay can either assist the Taliban or dig in and hope that they do not get caught in the crossfire.

The Taliban do bring a rough sense of law and order and swift justice that contrasts with the cumbersome and corrupt governance that all too often characterizes governance in the hinterlands of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lack of security and poor governance, not the Taliban are the real enemies in both nations.

The Taliban Can Be Stopped (Full PDF Article)

Technology, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Lure of Limited War

by Dr. Douglas Peifer, Small Wars Journal

Riskless War (Full PDF Article)

Just when critics have consigned the Revolution in Military Affairs and Transformation to the dustbin of clichéd phrases, a fresh buzz of excitement is stirring among technophiles. Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and his evangelists of network-centric warfare failed to come to grips with the realities of small wars, counterinsurgency, and urban warfare, but a younger cadre of writers, operators, and analysts is emerging who insist that we are indeed in the midst of a Revolution in Military Affairs, only one that centers on robots, unmanned vehicles, and artificial intelligence. They claim that unmanned systems and robots are changing the calculus of war, and will allow the United States to threaten military intervention and the use of force without substantial risk to ourselves.

Will robots, UAVs and precision-guided munitions be as strategically effective as their advocates proclaim? Do they provide a future, high tech solution to the challenges of small wars? More specifically, will technological dominance enable the United States to threaten and wage limited wars that compel the enemy to do our will, as the more exuberant unmanned and robotic system advocates assert? The historic record indicates that even in times of technological disparity, the promise of waging war from afar was elusive and uncertain.

Riskless War (Full PDF Article)

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bateman, Small Wars Journal

On Pirates and Strategies (Full PDF Article)

Let us talk about pirates, and piracy and viable options. But first, and most importantly, let us consider the ways to think about the problem. At least, from a military perspective. What follows is a brief primer that may help each of you form your own opinions about the various options offered by pundits left, right, center, military, political and everything in between.

For starters, lets get really basic. There are a lot of people now who read Small Wars Journal, and not all of them are professional military. Moreover, despite the existence of some damned fine doctrinal definitions, we have all seen examples where the same word means different things to different people. So to remove that area of potential error let me start by pointing out that no matter what Joint Publication 1-02 says, there are not just three levels of war, there are four levels of war. These levels are: Tactical, Operational, Strategic, (the only three the military acknowledges) and the highest, the Political level of war. That's easy, right? So that we all understand each other, let's do a quick hash of what these levels mean.

On Pirates and Strategies (Full PDF Article)

A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing and Understanding the Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

by James A. Gavrilis, Small Wars Journal

A Model for Population-Centered Warfare (Full PDF Article)

One of the most profound changes the U.S. military must make to be effective at countering insurgency is to shift strategic centers of gravity from the physical to the human aspects of warfare.

The nature of counterinsurgency, or unconventional warfare, differs from conventional warfare in a very important way: the population is the center of gravity. We say this, but what does it mean? How does it change operations? How do we implement this idea? Many of our military leaders are still trying to answer these questions. Our military has a predisposition to focus on enemy forces and capabilities and the confrontation between friendly and enemy forces, with little emphasis on the social or political context within which the confrontation takes place.

The change to seeing the population as the center of gravity is a major shift for conventional forces. It is a serious adjustment from our current and predominantly conventional military thinking about warfare. Although this idea has been discussed and debated in military and academic circles for at least a decade, the shift has not been made by all. However, this critical re-focusing is required for successful counterinsurgency campaigns, for countering terrorism in the long term, and for successful conduct of stability operations, or any form of irregular, hybrid, or population-centered warfare.

This focus on human factors in warfare has major implications for how the U.S. trains, organizes, and equips its forces, as well as where resources are allocated in order to better prepare for and conduct counterinsurgency. And this shift runs counter to the thinking that military hardware and high technology can solve military problems, which may be true if the military problems are kinetic. But technological and physically-defined solutions can be void of human factors, factors which underpin successful counterinsurgency. I have found that technology can enable counterinsurgency operations, but population-centered operations are not dependent on technology. The recent demands for increasing the number of U.S. Civil Affairs units are an indicator that some operational leaders recognize that a population-centered approach has merit.

A Model for Population-Centered Warfare (Full PDF Article)

by Master Gunnery Sergeant John Ubaldi

Small Wars Journal

Why Civilian Integration is Essential in Post-Stability Operations (Full PDF Article)

After the euphoria of the removal of Saddam Hussein from power had abated in April of 2003, disorder and chaos became the order of the day. It became apparent that the United States had failed to plan for the restoration of the political and economic order after major combat operations had ended. U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have amply shown that America's national security structure is still engrained in the Cold War mind set and not adequately prepared to meet the challenges of a post Cold War environment. Civilian and defense leaders failed to understand that combat operations and governance are integral parts of warfare and do not end on a set timetable. The result was a strategic failure on their part to effectively plan for the reconstitution of the Iraqi governmental structure. The current national security strategy is badly flawed and a total reorganization of how the U.S uses its immense power is long overdue. The U.S. will face many types of contingencies in the future, and how we respond will have repercussions beyond the region that the U.S is engaged. For the U.S. to avoid a repeat of Iraqi Freedom it must reform its national security structure, have a designated unity of command in the initial post stability operations, and finally integration of civilian agencies into the military command structure.

Since the end of the Second World War, the nature of warfare has evolved to 4th generation warfare or irregular operations. Unfortunately the U.S. national security apparatus is deeply embedded in the bygone era of the Cold War and not suited for the challenges that confront the U.S. in the 21st century. The root of Washington's failure to anticipate the political disorder in Iraq rests precisely in the characterization of these challenges as postwar problems, a characterization used by virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The Iraq situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance of civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to consider the establishment of political and economic order as part of war itself.

Why Civilian Integration is Essential in Post-Stability Operations (Full PDF Article)

by Dr. Nadia Schadlow, Small Wars Journal

A Backyard Challenge (Full PDF Article)

While President Barak Obama's meetings in Mexico in mid-April resulted in several promising agreements, the challenges presented by the increasing violence and instability in Mexico are serious and will take years to resolve. Despite the Administration's recent efforts to backtrack from statements that Mexico is on the verge of a collapse, many experts believe that the country is, at the very least, in a serious struggle to preserve the rule of law. Addressing the ongoing problems in Mexico will be a critical test of the U.S. government's ability to marshal all of its instruments of power to deal with a growing criminal insurgency on its border.

Over the past few years, criticisms about the militarization of American foreign policy have grown. In response, within the U.S. government a concerted effort has been made to develop new approaches that balance so-called hard power" with soft power" in order to maximize all of America's capabilities to shape circumstances on the ground. Some important strides were made with the publication of two Army field manuals: one on counterinsurgency and the other on stability operations. These are not just military manuals. They are the best existing descriptions of how to balance the select use of military force with economic and political initiatives. The synergies developed should then shape positive developments and stem violence fueled by relatively small groups of criminals, insurgents and non-state actors.

A Backyard Challenge (Full PDF Article)

Deception vs. Risk in War

by Bing West

Reprinted with Permission by Marine Corps Gazette

Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties (Full PDF Article)

This article addresses why assessments were poor in Iraq and what can be done to improve risk assessment in Afghanistan. Seven months after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, retired Marine Gen Anthony C. Tony" Zinni gave a blistering speech. My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam," he said, where we heard the garbage and lies, and we saw the sacrifice. I ask you, is it happening again?"1 The audience of Navy and Marine officers rose in applause, presumably cheering a criticism of civilian officials, and not of themselves.

That was a misleading illusion. In Vietnam, generals as well as policymakers and politicians contributed to failure. In 1966 President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered GEN William C. Westmoreland, the commander in South Vietnam, to undertake a strategy to attrit [sic]... [the Communist forces] at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field."2 Westmoreland enthusiastically championed the attrition strategy. Inside the military, only the Marines dissented. Overall, the U.S. military command agreed with a strategy that substituted physical for moral determination and led to body counts as the measure of progress. McNamara gradually came to disbelieve the military reports and quietly turned against the war.

Thus there was garbage" in the form of body counts inflated by the military and lies" (deception) by a Secretary of Defense who did not believe in his own strategy, plus a Joint Chiefs of Staff that did not demur in a flawed strategy. Generals and civilian officials alike shared responsibility for the conduct of the war.

Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties (Full PDF Article)

by Brigadier General Bennet S. Sacolick

Small Wars Journal

SOF vs. SOF-like (Full PDF Article)

Recently, there has been significant discussion regarding the need for America's conventional military forces to be more like Special Forces or SOF-like". I completely endorse this proposition, assuming it is not a knee-jerk reaction to our current conflicts but a conclusion drawn from our potential 21st century adversaries. There have been numerous forecasts describing our future environment- an environment without any peer, or near-peer competitors, one in which our most likely threats will resort to an alternative to conventional military confrontation such as irregular warfare.

Special Operations Forces are specifically trained and equipped to conduct irregular warfare, so I can't argue with our leadership when they propose the requirement for additional small combat and advisory teams along the Special Forces model. Neither can I quarrel with the need for additional troops who are culturally adept and comfortable working outside the conventional structures of the Army or Marine Corps. Joint Forces Command recently created a Joint Irregular Warfare Center, headed by a retired Special Operations officer (Navy SEAL), to guide their efforts in shifting general purpose force capabilities more towards a Special Operations Forces approach to fighting. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reinforced the necessity for more SOF-like forces when he said, "the one requirement that jumps off the page is the requirement for all services to be SOF-like--to be netted, to be much more flexible, adaptive, faster, lethal, and precise".

From my vantage point, that of a career Special Operations officer, I thought it would be helpful to describe the complexities associated with creating those Special Operation Forces and the unique role they are prepared to play in the execution of an American foreign policy predicated upon Global Engagement. I chose Special Forces, commonly referred to as Green Berets, as a representative example of SOF because they represent the largest single component assigned to the United States Special Operations Command.

SOF vs. SOF-like (Full PDF Article)

by Brian Hardesty, Small Wars Journal

Japanese Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: 1942-45 (Full PDF Article)

The first Japanese attack on the Philippines in World War II (WWII) was on December 8, 1941, only hours after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese occupied the islands from 1942 until 1945. Much of the conflict was a conventional war for territory, remembered for the Battles of Bataan, Corregidor, and the Bataan Death March much more than actions afterwards, at least until MacArthur's return. Yet one could argue that there was a nascent insurgency in the Philippines during this period: In fact, post war studies suggested that as many as 260,000 people were in guerrilla organizations. The fact that the fall of the Japanese occupation ultimately depended on returning American forces, rather than strategic victory through insurgency, might limit the insurgency's historical significance, but does not diminish its value as a case worthy of study.

The theory of counterinsurgency warfare that David Galula explained in his influential book Counterinsurgency Warfare provides a lens through which to view the internal conflict in the Philippines during WWII. In this way, one can analyze the Japanese successes and failures. I argue that the Japanese counterinsurgency methods in the Philippines were largely ineffective because of the excessive use of military force and political mistakes. This case may suggest that Galula's theory has some explanatory power for insurgency / counterinsurgency during a hot war between great powers.

Japanese Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: 1942-45 (Full PDF Article)

The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa

reviewed by Nick M. Masellis

Small Wars Journal

From Nightmares to Dreams (Full PDF Article)

While some have called the U.S. involvement in Iraq a nightmare, the authors of The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa used a series of dreams to discuss the adaptation of counterinsurgency in today's conflict environment. The book particularly exemplifies the lack of such thought in 2003, as well as consistent gaps in unit combat readiness that preside today. The book immediately brought back a personal account of the former, and encapsulates the latter.

Stowing all of the battle-worn rucksacks and bulky weapons on the commercial flight, there was a sense of disbelief that we were finally heading home. I turned to a couple of my friends and said, "what would you do if you took a nap on this flight, woke up, and realized that you were just arriving to Iraq -- that the whole past year was just a dream?" I received laughter and mixed responses of who would jump out of the plane first. Only after reading The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa do I realize that I wish that I would have had such dreams before serving my time in Iraq, where only persistent nightmares prevailed.

This captivating book brings to light the intricacies and imbroglios of counterinsurgency warfare for the tactical leader and soldiers on the ground. The authors, Army majors Michael Burgoyne and Albert Marckwardt, served tours in Iraq, observing the situation as it evolved from the dreams that they portray throughout their book. This novella is a contemporary reinterpretation of E.D. Swinton's account of the Boer War, a counterinsurgency campaign fought by the British in South Africa. In that account, Swinton describes the situation in a version of a dream in a tale called The Defense of Duffer's Drift, which has been long taught to infantrymen in learning the fundamentals of small unit tactics (Swinton's original work is included in the second half of the book).

From Nightmares to Dreams (Full PDF Article)

Three Challenges We Must Overcome to Succeed in Afghanistan

by Christopher Bluesteen

Small Wars Journal

Combat Advising in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Combat advising is central to successful counterinsurgency operations in existing U.S. conflicts around the world. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed, "The most important component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries." Similarly, in 2006 the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, identified the most critical task required to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations as, "...developing an effective host-nation security force." The importance of combat advising is not a new realization. In fact, major U.S. efforts in this area began in the early 1950s when U.S. forces provided training and assistance to Greece, the Philippines, China (Taiwan), Iran, and Japan. Since that time, protracted combat advising operations have occurred in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador. Perhaps because U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been primarily responsible for the conduct of this mission, the United States has never implemented permanent solutions to enable the general purpose force to execute combat advising operations. However, it is now critical to identify and implement these permanent solutions since the need for combat advisors is likely to exceed the limited capacity of SOF in current and future U.S. conflicts.

Combat Advising in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

A Study of Post Partisan Warfare Reconstruction

by Lieutenant Commander Larry H. Henke

Small Wars Journal

A Study of Post Partisan Warfare Reconstruction (Full PDF Article)

In 1780, British Redcoats decimated the Continental Army in the South following the siege of Charleston and the subsequent battle at Camden. Afterward, all that remained were civilian guerilla fighters to pick up the torch and sustain the American cause for freedom. From here grew a bitter partisan war pitting neighbor against neighbor as the British Redcoats, with the aid of American Loyalists, maneuvered to remain in control.

Historically, the violent overthrow of an autocratic rule creates a governmental void, with the victorious insurgent army filling the void and imposing their brand of autocracy over the state. Examples include the French Revolution, Russian Revolution, Chinese Revolution, and more recently the Cuban and Somali Revolutions. The cycle has rarely led to the successful formation of a democracy; however, the United States of America is arguably the sole exception. How is it then that following the violent irregular warfighting of the American Revolution the factions, both Patriot and Loyalist, were able to put aside their differences, unite for the popular common good?

This article analyzes the events that led to the American uncommon unification following the bitter partisan fighting of the American Revolution. From this study, the author identified common threads in events, commonality of thought, or ideals that fostered the birth of a united nation following guerilla warfare within. The focus did not center on a model for construction of a Constitutional Republic, but instead the focus was on gleaning the basis for popular unity following irregular conflict. From these insights into the historic experiences of the partisan fighters in the American Revolution, a framework for present day and future rebuilding nations was collected.

A Study of Post Partisan Warfare Reconstruction (Full PDF Article)

Plazas for Profit

Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Small Wars Journal

Plazas for Profit: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency (Full PDF Article)

In August 2008, we published an essay in Small Wars Journal called "State of Siege: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency." We were concerned at the lack of attention and policy discussion paid to the growing cartel violence in Mexico, which we called a "criminal insurgency." Now it is hard to escape discussion of Mexico's drug war. While we are heartened that security commentators are now focusing on Mexico, we feel that the "failed state" debate is at best a distraction that diverts discussion of the issue and a concrete discussion of the conflict's political-military dynamics would be more productive. We have updated our earlier assessment to include new events and trends in Mexico's criminal insurgency, and we will continue to periodically revise our assessment as the dynamics of the conflict evolve.

In broad scope, US policy should focus on helping Mexico rebuild the rule of law while hedging against cartel actions on the border. To do so, the US must engage both informal Mexican governing networks and help construct new cross-border partnerships that can act as policy shops for coordinating policy response and military/law enforcement cooperation against the cartels. At the same time, revamping of domestic security approaches also are needed to guard against overflow of drug war violence.

Plazas for Profit: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency (Full PDF Article)

Deployed Soldiers and Social Science Academics

(Part 5 of 5)

edited by Rob W. Kurz, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

Small Wars Journal

This is the fifth installment of a five-part series. Each article was co-authored by one Army soldier/civilian and one university professor/academic as part of a joint research project. This project and product responds to the Army's objectives regarding the integration of cultural social sciences into its training and operations.

Some Concluding Remarks on a New Era in Warfare

by Dr. Felix Moos

Some Concluding Remarks on a New Era in Warfare (Full PDF Article)

Like death and taxes, warfare has become a fact of life in the 21st Century, ranging from 15 major wars at the end of 2003 (the United Nations defines "major wars" as conflicts inflicting 1,000 battlefields deaths per year) to insurgencies in India (Naxalite Uprising since 1967), Peru (Shining Path, since 1970s) and Nepal (Maoists, since 1996). Although some have argued that the nature of war has not changed (Hew Strachan, Oxford Today, 2007), this is not necessarily so. Warfare has indeed evolved to become primarily asymmetric. What has stayed true however, is that war, as Clausewitz noted long ago, nevertheless remains "a serious means to a serious end. It is a political act. It always arises from political conditions and is called forth by political motive" (quoted in Anatol Rapoport's 1968 Clausewitz on War). This is certainly as true in India, Nepal and Peru as it is for the ongoing conflicts engaging the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Clausewitz thought that no war should happen if "people acted wisely." However, how often in real life do 'the people' act wisely? Thus, (traditional) war shouldn't break out suddenly, but asymmetric conflict apparently does.

Some Concluding Remarks on a New Era in Warfare (Full PDF Article)

A Counter View

by Colonel Robert M. Toguchi and Colonel Victor M. Rosello

Small Wars Journal

The Future of U.S. Ground Forces (Full PDF Article)

During recent testimony on 20 March 2009 before the Airland Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments provided an interesting perspective on the future of U.S. ground forces. In particular, he noted the declining quality of the U.S. Army, the need to create a bifurcated force or "Dual Surge" force, and criticized the Army as barely being a "jack-of- all- trades" and "master of none." Several of his characterizations of the Army are debatable and perhaps not taken within the whole context of the U.S. Army's challenges and experiences.

The Future of U.S. Ground Forces (Full PDF Article)

by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy D. Huening, Small Wars Journal

Advancing the Art and Science of Psychological Operations (Full PDF Article)

A pivotal question facing the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) career field over the next few years is whether PSYOP can overcome its previous Cold War paradigm and posture to become a more effective instrument of information and influence during this era of, as President Obama has stated, "Smart Power". Smart Power is the skillful use of all of our resources, both non-military and military, to meet the challenges America faces at the start of a new century. The PSYOP career field must adapt to this paradigm shift, whereby even the application of military power must temper a hard and soft approach. The recent establishment of PSYOP as a basic Branch in the Army is a significant development, signaling clear recognition of the profession and providing a unique opportunity to implement change. However, to meet the operational expectations of the Army's general purpose (GPF) and special operations (SOF) forces, several internal changes must be made to the PSYOP career field, force allocation, structure, training and doctrine in order to achieve the desired results.

Advancing the Art and Science of Psychological Operations (Full PDF Article)

by Dr. Bernard I. Finel, Small Wars Journal

Counterterrorism and Military Occupation (Full PDF Article)

The American presence in Afghanistan is sustained by a very straight-forward rationale. We were, after all, attacked on 9/11 by al Qaeda which at the time was operating with impunity under the protection of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Given that history, allowing the Taliban to reestablish itself in Afghanistan seems self-evidently unacceptable. After all, history suggests a direct linkage between Taliban control of Afghanistan and the most devastating terrorist attack on U.S. soil.

But, as with many seemingly straight-forward rationales, the logic of the argument dissipates under more careful scrutiny. While the lesson of 9/11 suggests that giving terrorist groups a safe haven is a recipe for disaster, the lesson of the military occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 demonstrates the inability of occupying forces to stamp out the kinds of networks that can support attacks on the scale of 9/11 or much worse.

The essay will make four interrelated points. First, the attacks of 9/11 though spectacular in consequence, were simple in execution. Second, the IED networks that have proliferated in Afghanistan and Iraq are orders of magnitude more complex than the portion of al Qaeda that planned and executed the 9/11 attacks. Third, there is no conceivable tactical or strategic approach to military occupation that could plausibly eradicate groups capable of attacks as unsophisticated as those of 9/11. Fourth, as a consequence, of all the possible rationales for a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan, the counterterrorism argument is demonstrably the weakest.

Counterterrorism and Military Occupation (Full PDF Article)

An Oil Spot Plus Strategy for Coalition Forces

by Dr. Karl A. Slaikeu, Small Wars Journal

Winning the War in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

While granting that Afghanistan is centuries behind Iraq in terms of infrastructure, the central question remains: can we build on the successes and lessons learned in Iraq and a half century of other counterinsurgency (COIN) wars to emerge victorious over the Taliban and al Qaeda? Or, will we go the way of Great Britain and Russia, who left Afghanistan in defeat? This paper offers a plan for victory that builds on classic COIN--the oil spot or ink spot strategy--customized to address the unique challenges of the Afghan area of operations (AO).

Winning the War in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

Deployed Soldiers and Social Science Academics

(Part 4 of 5)

edited by Rob W. Kurz, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS

Small Wars Journal

This is the fourth installment of a five-part series. Each article was co-authored by one Army soldier/civilian and one university professor/academic as part of a joint research project. This project and product responds to the Army's objectives regarding the integration of cultural social sciences into its training and operations.

An Advisor's Experience

C CO, 2/19th SFG (A) December '01 to September '02

by Master Sergeant Michael Coker and Dr. Pauletta Otis

An Advisor's Experience (Full PDF Article)

Interacting with indigenous civilians and indigenous militaries on a daily basis, and in a way that enhances mission success, force protection, and building democracy, is a role that is a new challenge for most soldiers. Training and preparing soldiers for this cultural interaction is as important as training for the kinetic piece.

Successful interaction between US military forces and the indigenous population is successful when it results in an indigenous citizenry that supports the country and its future. When it is not successful, there is an enhanced possibility that indigenous people will take the side of an insurgency with all of its destructive potential for the country, the region and even US interests in the AO.

The following essay provides valuable insight for the teaching and training of future soldiers who find themselves in advisory roles whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere. This knowledge and understanding is based on experience as well as formal on-the-job training provided by the US Army and other military teaching/ training experiences.

An Advisor's Experience (Full PDF Article)

reviewed by Commander Philip Kapusta

Small Wars Journal

A Review of Joker One by Donovan Campbell (Full PDF Article)

In brief, Joker One is a compelling story superbly told. Written by then First Lieutenant Donovan Campbell, the book chronicles his platoon's experiences in the cauldron that was Ramadi, Iraq in 2004. Ironically, Donovan and his platoon were afraid that they had missed the war, and when they first arrived in Ramadi, they were concerned about whether they would even qualify for Combat Action Ribbons. That worry was soon eclipsed by their struggle to stay alive, as the thinly stretched Marines found themselves in daily firefights against shadowy and surprisingly well armed insurgents. Campbell's platoon was a part of the single Marine Corps Company that prevented Ramadi from descending into the medieval chaos that enveloped the nearby city of Fallujah as the insurgency intensified throughout the country and in Al Anbar province in particular. Wisely, Campbell leaves the strategic and Washington-level analysis to others and concentrates on what he knows -- the street-level reality that was Iraq as the insurgency blossomed.

A Review of Joker One by Donovan Campbell (Full PDF Article)

by David Capezza, Small Wars Journal

Translating Russia's Military Reform (Full PDF Article)

Following Russia's incursion into Georgia and its energy standoff with Ukraine, there has been a rising perception that Russia's increased vigor is a stark reminder of the Cold War days of East-West competition. The BBC has exemplified this message running a special report titled "Resurgent Russia". Even during the US presidential campaign, the situation took center stage as the candidates debated on how to deal with the awakening of the old beast. This "Resurgent Russia" -- a term that has recently caught fire and has a line of rhetoric that has led the media to stroke old thoughts of the Soviet Union once again repainting the world red with its military might and autocratic agenda -- incorrectly defines Russia's actions as being irrational when, in fact, these actions are quite rational from the Russian perspective.

Further calls for speculation regarding Russia's intent are inflated given the fact that ties between the Washington and Moscow have grown colder over recent years, while many analysts have been focused on Russia's position in the world and the role that the "new" Russia will play militarily. This discussion has become increasingly vocalized since President Medvedev announced a renewed effort to overhaul and modernize the Russian military. In fact, if Medvedev's vision is realized, the future Russian military will be completely different from the military that is operating today. The question is why is the Russian Government proposing such an overhaul? What are its intentions? In answering these questions, we find that Russia is acting in support of her own national interests, whether it is protecting energy supplies to its south or thwarting internal threats from terrorists, and in doing so, acting in a rational manner.

Translating Russia's Military Reform (Full PDF Article)

by Colonel Michael F. Scotto and Jason S. Alexander

Small Wars Journal

The Role of PRTs on the Battlefield (Full PDF Article)

The role of the PRT on the Iraqi battlefield and in the immediate post-conflict phase is an interesting topic. As insurgency warfare took hold in the 20th century, the battlefield transformed from a strictly military-based operation focused on geographical terrain to one that employs civilians in the human terrain, for reasons of political expediency, economics, and tactics 'other than war'. This transformation has been challenging, not just for reasons derived from enemy actions, but also due to the challenges of various agencies' cultures and the bureaucracy of the US government. The article in the Foreign Service Journal by Captain Sean P. Walsh, Improving the PRT-Military Professional Relationship delves into the issue of how to make this interagency process work more effectively. Captain Walsh makes two very important points—that the PRT must closely coordinate with the military "battle-space" owners, and secondly, that PRT members must better understand DoD culture and lingo. Without these two points being closely adhered to, PRT members will be lost and unable to find their way. It is the purpose of this essay, which is directed at young military officers, is to discuss from the PRT perspective the value of civilians in modern conflict zones, using Captain Walsh's article as a jumping-off point. Small wars and counterinsurgencies are the way many wars are likely to be fought for the foreseeable future, and it is up to the DoD and DoS to arrive at solutions on how best to cooperate and coordinate efforts to stabilize struggling nations. Furthermore, it is critically important to prepare today's young leaders to meet the challenges of interagency operations for both today's and tomorrow's battlefields.

The Role of PRTs on the Battlefield (Full PDF Article)

by Claude Berube, Small Wars Journal

The Post Oceanic Navy (Full PDF Article)

For the past century, the United States Navy has grown from an emergent force among traditional colonial powers able to compete on a world stage to one able to act as a counterbalance in a bipolar environment. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. became the naval hegemon, able to assert national power as needed through the traditional application of a large force with comparably large capital ships. The nation's investment in smaller platforms to combat smaller threats, such as the deployment of gunboats on the Asiatic station or of riverine craft during the Vietnam War, has ebbed and flowed, a condition that remains true in the early twenty-first century. But the traditional U.S. naval paradigm may need to change due to changing political and fiscal realities and emerging asymmetric maritime threats. This essay examines the domestic and foreign conditions challenges to tomorrow's navy and how a changing force structure may be required.

The Post Oceanic Navy (Full PDF Article)

Deployed Soldiers and Social Science Academics

(Part 3 of 5)

edited by Rob W. Kurz, Small Wars Journal

This is the third installment of a five-part series. Each article was co-authored by one Army soldier/civilian and one university professor/academic as part of a joint research project. This project and product responds to the Army's objectives regarding the integration of cultural social sciences into its training and operations.

Fitting Into the Fight - An Engineer's Dream

From a Brigade Troops Battalion S3

by Major Alexander Fullerton and Dr. Garth Myers

Fitting Into the Fight - An Engineer's Dream (Full PDF Article)

The provision of infrastructure and services for Sewer, Water, Electricity and Trash (or SWET in its military acronym form) is boring to most people, or, more charitably, SWET belongs to a category of things people don't like to think about. In much of the urban United States for at least the last fifty years or more, most of the time, indeed, people don't have to think of these things. Most residents of US cities flush their toilets, turn on their taps, switch on their lights, computers, televisions, or microwaves, or take out their garbage without a thought. The trash might require some thought: is trash day on a Monday, or a Wednesday, maybe we should recycle, can I take the hazardous stuff to the special collection spot on Saturday or not. There are certainly professionals in all of these spheres who think about them all the time, because their companies or government offices are all about sewage, water supply, electricity, or solid waste management -- there are a lot of people who work for a living in these realms. But for most American urbanites and suburbanites -- even most rural dwellers - SWET just happens.

But there are a lot of places in the world where SWET doesn't happen at all. Urban geographers have often thought of cities like organisms, or spoken of the urban metabolism, the circuits and networks of a city's body. In the US, or in the Western world in general, SWET provision works like the respiratory system, it is like breathing, in, out -- this was the first time all day, as you read this, that you thought about breathing. But in many other places, when SWET does not happen (in other words when infrastructure and services are lacking for SWET), cities and the people in them must somehow find ways and means to get by. There is no getting by without water, but millions of people throughout the world go without the other components, or subsist with makeshift or even illegal service provision for them.

Fitting Into the Fight - An Engineer's Dream (Full PDF Article)

Deployed Soldiers and Social Science Academics

(Part 2 of 5)

edited by Rob W. Kurz, Small Wars Journal

This is the second installment of a five-part series. Each article was co-authored by one Army soldier/civilian and one university professor/academic as part of a joint research project. This project and product responds to the Army's objectives regarding the integration of cultural social sciences into its training and operations.

Civil-Affairs Confronts the "Weapon of the Weak"

Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq

by Dr. Bartholomew Dean, First Lieutenant Charles K. Bartles and Sergeant First Class Timothy B. Berger

Civil-Affairs Confronts the "Weapon of the Weak" (Full PDF Article)

In the elaboration of this essay, the authors have born in mind the need to inform Soldiers, scholars, policy makers, and the broader public at large, about a non-lethal military tactic that responded to the threat of "weapons of the weak" in rural Iraq, namely improvised explosive devices, commonly called IED's. While we readily concede the inherent limitations of the anti-IED tactic described below, it is argued that anthropological insight is vital to understanding the nature of power, which is essential for formulating clear rules of engagement for civil-military operations (CMO). This point is of particular import given that significant sectors of the US public, as well as the international community, have persuasively brought into question the oversight and administration of security services in theaters of operation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, which many believe to be woefully inadequate. Anthropology provides us with the best vantage point for studying military operations in peacekeeping and in times of war, chaos and great human suffering.

A civil-military, non-lethal approach to the threat of IED activity (pre- and post-detonation) is, we posit, a viable strategy to responding to the changing character of contemporary armed conflict, including the multifaceted nature of terror. By no means a panacea for dealing with all IED activity, the tactic outlined below does provide us with useful clues to the complexities of armed conflict, as well as an actual case study that manifests the challenges posed by the US military's lack of cultural and linguistic skills necessary to sustain an effective, long-term anti-IED campaign in Iraq.

Civil-Affairs Confronts the "Weapon of the Weak" (Full PDF Article)

Deployed Soldiers and Social Science Academics

(Part 1 of 5)

edited by Rob W. Kurz, Small Wars Journal

This is the first installment of a five-part series. Each article was co-authored by one Army soldier/civilian and one university professor/academic as part of a joint research project. This project and product responds to the Army's objectives regarding the integration of cultural social sciences into its training and operations.

To Change an Army

The Establishment of the Iraqi Center for Military Values, Principles and Leadership

by Colonel Jack D. Kem and Aaron G. Kirby

The Establishment of the Iraqi Center for Military Values, Principles and Leadership (Full PDF Article)

Field Manual 3-24, the new U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency Manual, defines culture as a "web of meaning" shared by members of a particular society or group within a society. Culture (ideas, norms, rituals, codes of behavior) provides meaning to individuals within the society (Department of the Army 2006, 3-6). The Counterinsurgency Manual also states:

Culture might also be described as an "operational code" that is valid for an entire group of people. Culture conditions the individual's range of action and ideas, including what to do and not do, how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. Culture also includes under what circumstances the "rules" shift and change. Culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into existing categories... (Department of the Army 2006, 3-7).

The purpose for this article is to examine aspects of culture within Iraq. This examination is based on observations of Iraqi civilian translators and American contractors who worked together to develop classes for the Iraqi military in leadership and ethics studies. These classes were designed to change the Iraqi military into a professional organization that is "ethically based, competently led, loyal to the principles of the constitution and accountable to the civilian leadership and people of Iraq" (MNSTC-I 2006, 6). The preparation for this critically important mission provided the vehicle for observing the cultural differences between these two groups (Iraqi translators and American contractors) based on a "snapshot in time" during the summer of 2006.

The Establishment of the Iraqi Center for Military Values, Principles and Leadership (Full PDF Article)

by Dr. David A. Anderson and Major Richard Mogg

Small Wars Journal

Is There a Real Threat to Australia's National Security Posed by Sovereign Wealth Funds? (Full PDF Article)

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have existed since the 1950s. However, the size, quantity, and reach of SWFs have increased dramatically over the past 15 years. In 1990 sovereign funds held at most $500 billion, the current total of SWF investments is an estimated US$4.3 trillion , compared to a current global stock market capitalization of US$51 trillion . SWFs are expected to grow to US$12 trillion by 2015 , and are likely to be an enduring feature of global finance and geo-politics. Currently, more than 20 countries have SWFs, and half a dozen more have expressed an interest in establishing such a fund. The holdings remain quite concentrated, with the top five funds accounting for about 70 percent of total assets. Over half of these assets are in the hands of countries that export significant amounts of oil and gas. In the case of China and Singapore, these nations do not export oil or gas, but maintain massive trade surpluses from the export of manufactured goods. The top ten owners of SWFs listed in order of the size of funds include The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Norway, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, China, Libya, Qatar, Algeria, and the United States State (Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation). Many of these countries are not democracies, have unclear national strategic interests, and are not allies of Australia.

About one-third of the total assets of SWFs are invested in Asian and Pacific countries, including Australia. Investment in Australia has mainly come from China, Singapore, Dubai, Kuwait, and France and has been focused in energy, resources, infrastructure, utilities, and defense sectors. The risk raised by recent literature is that foreign ownership in such sectors may threaten national security. This paper investigates if SWFs pose a direct threat to Australia's national security or an indirect threat through its immediate area of interest (the Asia Pacific region).

Is There a Real Threat to Australia's National Security Posed by Sovereign Wealth Funds? (Full PDF Article)

by Major Timothy R. Kreuttner, Small Wars Journal

The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and US COIN Doctrine (Full PDF Article)

Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the US Army has wrestled with how to apply socio-cultural factors in counterinsurgency. The case of Nepal provides an example of a state that failed to adequately address socio-cultural problems in an ethnically diverse country and consequently lost power to a Maoist insurgency. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN(M)) gained power by way of free elections after a twelve-year insurgency starting in 1996. While the government of Nepal focused on a military solution, the Maoists grew in strength by out-governing the state and building a solid popular base. After achieving a military stalemate, the CPN(M) transitioned from violence to political maneuvering by exploiting fissures between the parliamentary parties and the monarchy. A key to Maoist success was its ability to mobilize dissatisfied classes and ethnic groups. The government of Nepal was unable to gain or maintain the support of the people because of political upheaval, repressive tactics, and failure to solve social issues among the different groups. US and other foreign training and material support to Nepal were helpful militarily, but insufficient because they did little to address the core political, social, and economic problems unique to Nepal. The Maoist insurgency has implications for US counterinsurgency doctrine that suggest a need for a better understanding of the socio-cultural and political factors that motivate insurgency.

The US military, like the Nepalese Army, faces challenges in understanding the cultures of host nations and adversaries. US counterinsurgency doctrine, as articulated in US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, stresses gaining legitimacy and gives cultural considerations at the tactical level, but still lacks a comprehensive explanation of how to apply cultural expertise operationally for strategic success. The preface of FM 3-24 warns that the manual "is not intended to be a standalone reference. Users should assess information from other sources to help them decide how to apply the doctrine...to the specific circumstances facing them." The writers acknowledge that given the complexity and changing characteristics of counterinsurgency operations, FM 3-24 is incomplete. Professional journals and blog sites serve as forums for updating counterinsurgency methods. A case such as Nepal, where insurgents adapted Maoist strategy to the conditions of their country, illustrates the difficulty of formulating a counterinsurgency strategy in a challenging political environment with limited means.

The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal and US COIN Doctrine (Full PDF Article)

PIR Development in a COIN Environment

by Ms. Z. Tenay Guvendiren and Lieutenant Colonel Scott Downey

Small Wars Journal

PIR Development in a COIN Environment (Full PDF Article)

Developing successful Priority Intelligence Requirements is the first, most important, and most difficult step of the ISR Synchronization Process. It is in this step that an Intelligence Section either establishes themselves as proactive, predictive, and relevant to the Commander's Decision Making Cycle or as passive news reporters, giving history lessons, and playing "Monday Night Quarterback" to the Commander and his staff.

PIR development is also what most units get wrong. The generally accepted tenets of PIR development, which most intelligence officers learned in the schoolhouse and most commanders grew up expecting, are not applicable within a counterinsurgency environment. In this article, we will explain how to write COIN PIR that are linked to Brigade or Regimental level decision points within a long-term counterinsurgency campaign plan. In addition, we will discuss how to write PIR Running Estimates, which will track your progress in answering your Commander's PIR.

The recommendations in this article are based on "A Way" that was successful for the authors' unit, as intelligence officers in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. In 2007, 2-1CAV was involved in the planning and execution of the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) in the Karkh Security District, which was a crucial part of the larger "surge". The BSP gave Coalition Forces the much needed opportunity to establish security in heart of Iraq's capital and the subsequent momentum to conduct wide-scale, full-spectrum operations necessary to stabilize the country. While every BCT's sector is unique, and those sectors change over time, we argue that there are certain new tenets of PIR Development in a COIN environment that will never change.

PIR Development in a COIN Environment (Full PDF Article)

by Major Matthew Orris, Small Wars Journal

Lexicon and Struggle (Full PDF Article)

Winners and losers of a war may already be known long before the first shot is ever fired if a belligerent has prepared or long term strategic information operations (IO). This is the one weapon of mass destruction we as a nation can ill afford to lose control of, but yet it seems it is the one 'weapon' that lacks a priority commensurate to its power. IO is, in theory, a continuous loop that runs the entire "spectrum from peace to war and back to peace and it involves all elements of the national government, not solely the military". It is supposed to be a sequential process in which guidance originates from the National Command Authorities (NCA), through the various departments within the government and performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels through public diplomacy, foreign aid, cultural exchanges, education, law enforcement, electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), deception, and operation security (OPSEC) to influence, disrupt, or usurp the adversary. So what does all of that have to do with warfare? In a word, everything.

Lexicon and Struggle (Full PDF Article)

The Saudi Model

by Dr. Lawrence E. Cline, Small Wars Journal

Changing Jihadist Behavior (Full PDF Article)

The US, together with most other countries, has begun paying considerably more attention to countering terrorist ideology. In many cases, this effort has been more theoretical than practical, and stress has been placed on changing attitudes among larger populations rather than terrorist group members. One program that has in fact focused on actually trying to change individual behaviors and attitudes of terrorist group members and supporters has been that conducted by Saudi Arabia over the last several years. Since the Saudi program is one of the few organized efforts to change terrorist attitudes at the grass root level, it is worth examining for its operations and results thus far.

Changing Jihadist Behavior (Full PDF Article)

Case Studies in Genocide

by Captain Matthew Orris, Small Wars Journal

Case Studies in Genocide (Full PDF Article)

No matter what system is emplaced to measure and gauge the "atmospherics" of a group of people (ethnic, religious, tribal etc) the most accurate is the one that can articulate their motives via deeds and words. If for instance a specific group has decided to move literally enmasse from one location to another, there are existing tools to provide a good mechanism for assessing in a specific area what is occurring and how that may lead to future events in the near term. The purpose of his paper is not to create another system for categorizing and tracking indicators but rather what can be done once it is apparent that there is a problem that ongoing and it is about to get far worse. There is a non-doctrinal term we can ascribe to such a unique mass migration of people: GETHOOD (GETting-The-Hell-Out-Of-Dodge).

Few things in life ever just occur spontaneously even though it may seem that way. The job of MI soldiers is not to be soothsayers, regardless how much commanders may want this, but rather to ensure that commander's and the soldiers on the ground are not surprised by what the enemy might do (i.e. identifying the operation an enemy is likely to take at a given time and place as opposed to the exact tactics he will use as that time and place). The goal is not just preventing the enemy from doing something, but assisting the commander in preparing and planning for all likely eventualities.

As an institution the trend is to think that humanitarian operations are a completely separate mission set that a unit could deploy in support of, when it actually should be addressed at the battalion level should such a mission suddenly appear in the middle of another ongoing operation (combat and peacekeeping). The scope being addressed here is not the opening of a bazaar, building a well or clinic but rather how to help a battalion staff start the initial planning of what to do if suddenly caught in the middle of a true humanitarian crisis --such as genocide or ethnic gerrymandering.

Case Studies in Genocide (Full PDF Article)

by Colonel Jeffrey D. Vordermark, Small Wars Journal

Words are Important (Full PDF Article)

Americans love to throw around foreign words, be it in casual conversation or while waxing eloquent on your favorite blog. I recall as a kid -- long before blogging was even a concept - the joke about being able to speak Japanese. "Sure I can, I know Suzuki, Kawasaki, karate, and a few other Japanese words." Then it was fun and games, but in today's era of transnational terrorism and globalism it does more than just point to cultural gullibility, is a dangerous predilection. It is time that our lexicon's level of sophistication matches our commitment to winning the Global War on Terror.

We have fallen into the "jihad" trap. The term is used in casual banter yet most remain clueless regarding its origin or meanings. We think, therefore we know. Pundits, academics, and laymen profess to know its meaning, and the term is daily news in the mouths of reporters and in the banners of headlines. Unfortunately, its very use assumes that Islam is simple and monolithic -- something we can easily grasp merely by purporting to understand the basic tenets of the religion and of course, we must use it because everyone else does. As a nation and society, we could not be more incorrect. A simple Google search for the term jihad yields over 15 million hits. Why not, as the perpetrators of international terror themselves often use "jihad" to describe the attributes and actions of their organizations. Face it, there is meaning in a name, and groups struggling for legitimacy will cling to what they can in order to sell their product.

Words are Important (Full PDF Article)

Clear, Hold and Build in Shulla, Baghdad

by First Lieutenant Matthew Valkovic, Small Wars Journal

Clear, Hold and Build in Shulla, Baghdad (Full PDF Article)

If there's one word to describe what is going here in Iraq right now, between all the parties involved--US forces, the Iraqi security forces, the government of Iraq, the insurgents/militias, and--lest we forget--the Iraqi people--it is transition. What makes it difficult is that while each these groups are going through their own separate transition, each of these transitions are inextricably linked together.

For my fellow troopers and me our transition, as our new commander in chief recently spoke about, will be the drawdown of combat brigades and the deployment of what are being called advisory and assistance brigades, units charged with training, advising and mentoring the Iraqi army and police over the next several years. The theory is that as our presence gradually reduces, the Iraqi army and police will take over providing security to the people of Iraq with the aid of US advisors, air support, intelligence and reconnaissance assets. State Department provincial reconstruction teams will stick around as well to help build the capacity of the Iraqi government and economy.

President Obama announced that "combat operations" would cease on Aug. 31, 2010 and that these new advisory brigades will start rotating into country over the next year, but "combat" itself will not cease here. To clarify, "combat" as we traditionally understand it (tactical fire and maneuver, shooting and killing the bad guy) doesn't really occur here anymore. Believe it or not, not one soldier in our battalion has fired a round with the intent to kill a positively identified target since we've been here--there've been no targets we've had to positively identify.

Clear, Hold and Build in Shulla, Baghdad (Full PDF Article)

How the Army Can Capitalize on Technologically Savvy Troops

by Nick M. Masellis, Small Wars Journal

The iSoldier (Full PDF Article)

Upon arriving in Iraq as a stout 18 year old in March 2003, I was well-versed in the tactics associated with being a Military Police (MP) soldier. I knew how to respond to ambushes and perform evasive maneuvers if caught in a skirmish. I could instantaneously react to any potential nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. And I knew the Rules of Engagement directed by the Army through and through.

Yet, I had no knowledge of Islam nor understood the difference between Shi'a, Sunnis and Kurds. I couldn't explain the significance of the twin mosques in Karbala. I had no idea that showing the heel of your shoe is considered to be very offensive in the Arab culture. The culture shock was indescribable. This not only made the task of providing local security and training to Iraqi police more difficult, but also inadvertently added to the growing resentment of the American presence. By now, the service men and women of the US military are privy to being on the ground. In lieu of the shifting strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, I wonder how better prepared and culturally competent the average soldier marine and sailor is today, than when I was on the ground nearly six years ago?

The iSoldier (Full PDF Article)

by Bill Van Horn, Small Wars Journal

The So-Called COIN Debate and Institutional Memory (Full PDF Article)

I've been following with some interest the debate between the "Nagl-ites" and the "Gentile-ites" (for lack of better terms) regarding the supposed future of the Army. Both sides make some good points and some weak points, but what really strikes me is the historical vacuum both sides have established for their discussion. Neither camp seems —to admit that there IS military history before Vietnam, or that we've seen this debate many times before. And in almost every case the debate ignores the reality that created it, preferring to seek refuge in what appears to be a distorted view of the past or a dream picture of the future.

I'd like to frame this discussion with two propositions. The first is that for the majority of its history, the U.S. Army has been a force that was used mainly for internal security or COIN-type missions. And the second proposition is that for the same majority of its history the Army has rejected that role; the amount of force in that rejection varying based on external considerations.

The So-Called COIN Debate and Institutional Memory (Full PDF Article)

Operational Theme or Full-Spectrum Operation?

by Colonel Richard Pedersen, Small Wars Journal

IW: Operational Theme or Full-Spectrum Operation? (Full PDF Article)

Irregular warfare needs to be an element of full spectrum operations co-equal to offense, defense, stability, and civil support operations. DOD Directive 3000.07 (Dec '08) states that irregular warfare is a strategically important as traditional warfare. It explicitly calls for the integration of irregular warfare concepts and capabilities across all activities including doctrine. FM 3-0 ('08), the Army's overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations, frames irregular warfare as an operational theme comprised of counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, support to insurgencies, and combating terrorism. From about 1975 to 2001, irregular warfare was pretty much the exclusive responsibility of special operating forces. The current reality is that for the past eight years virtually the entire conventional Army and Marine Corps have been leading and conducting irregular warfare in various forms of security force assistance, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, or foreign internal defense. This trend is likely to continue into the near and distant future. It is therefore critical to determine whether the Army's operational concept is broad enough to effectively describe operations in the near and distant future and whether it is flexible enough to effectively frame irregular warfare.

IW: Operational Theme or Full-Spectrum Operation? (Full PDF Article)

by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, Small Wars Journal

Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership (Full PDF Article)

First, I'd like to thank the leadership and staff of the Command and General Staff College for putting this event together. It's an honor to speak to this class; I'm told that 78% of you are veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before going further, I'd like to thank you for your service to our country and acknowledge the sacrifices your families have endured to make that service possible. I'd also like to acknowledge that your class is broadly representative of the war effort itself, including every service in the Department of Defense, as well as our allies and our interagency partners. I'll keep my comments short; given your experiences, your questions comments are likely to be far better than my responses.

I'd like to open our dialogue today on the subjects of irregular warfare and adaptive leadership. When I was a battalion XO in Iraq in 2003, I served with a company commander whose vehicle was struck by an early version of an IED. The fragmentation shattered his windshield and severed his antennas, the smoke and dust obscured his vision and the blast temporarily deafened him. In the first critical seconds after the blast, the commander saw the ubiquitous white pickup leaving the blast area, but didn't pursue it. His battalion commander was furious, and later harangued the captain for his failure to act. The company commander was crushed; he felt the battalion commander was questioning his courage, and in fact he was.

The battalion commander later complained to me about his company commander's inaction. He was right on the tactics -- in those rare moments when we make contact with insurgents, if indeed this truck contained insurgents -- we must capture or kill them. I was less certain about his methods of leader development, so I asked about the company commander's preparations for deployment. For example, prior to deployment, who had the authority to cancel PT in the event of an electrical storm? He answered, 'the brigade commander had that authority.' I then asked him, who had the authority to change the PT uniform, if for example it was warmer than expected? That decision was at the battalion level. This company commander, who only a few months ago lacked the authority to tell his troops to come in out of the rain or take off their hats, was now expected to pursue the enemy unto death.

Officers conditioned to conformity in peacetime cannot be expected to behave boldly and flexibly in combat. This phenomenon is not new.

Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership (Full PDF Article)

Parallel Governance and Modern Insurgencies

by Patrick Devenny, Small Wars Journal

Parallel Governance and Modern Insurgencies (Full PDF Article)

The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have energized a vibrant discussion of counterinsurgency (COIN) that will influence American military doctrine and strategy for years to come. A substantial portion of this dialogue has focused on the conduct of stability operations encompassing the provision of security to local populations, the facilitation of political development, resource allocation, and the training of indigenous forces. Given its self-inflicted absence from America's post-Vietnam strategic discussion, the revitalization of this particular strain of COIN theory is long-overdue. However, recent efforts designed to refine COIN practices within the American military have not been complimented by a commensurate initiative that seeks to better describe our "competition" -- namely, the methods, strategies, and structures the enemy utilizes to attract or transform local populations in the furtherance of their political and military goals. This is a critical oversight. Absent a comprehensive and precise understanding of insurgent efforts to garner influence within the population, American counterinsurgency strategy will remain incomplete, regardless of the talent and experience of its authors.

This article will not attempt to thoroughly describe parallel governance systems, frequently referred to as "shadow governments" operating today. Instead, it is simply intended to galvanize interest in the study of the population control measures of our current enemies, primarily Islamic extremists operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although some suggest these groups have failed to realize the importance of building the shadow government structures that attracted extensive American attention during the Cold War, this article casts some doubt on that proposition. Unfortunately, given the often covert nature of these activities and the surprising lack of institutional interest in them, my data points will raise more questions than answers. Rather than dissuading study, however, the "hard-target" nature of research into parallel governance should serve as a challenge to irregular warfare analysts. Additionally, the key role that shadow governments have historically played, as well as the critical roles they assume in our current battles with irregular actors, should further motivate research. We cannot claim lack of precedent as an excuse: throughout the Cold War, American military analysts as well as academics were directly engaged in the study of insurgent population control, giving rise to a fascinating body of research that aided the era's COIN practitioners.

Parallel Governance and Modern Insurgencies (Full PDF Article)

Assessing Prospects for U.S.-China-Afghanistan Cooperation

by Nirav Patel and David Capezza, Small Wars Journal

Assessing Prospects for U.S.-China-Afghanistan Cooperation (Full PDF Article)

The Cold War ended almost twenty years ago but American policymakers and national security strategists continue to apply a transatlantic centric model for complex global engagements. This is particularly true in regards to Afghanistan where combat operations and reconstruction assistance are primarily driven by Western actors. Clearly, it would be foolish to dismiss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -- after all, it is the most integrated and militarily capable organization in the world -- or the European Union which represents the pinnacle of a successful liberal regional order. Their members share similar strategic interests and values and have significant experience in complex contingency operations. However, many European nations continue to suffer from nostalgia of yesteryear where its troops and soldiers enjoyed the Cold War comforts of a "cold peace." What is becoming even more evident is that Western nations are facing significant financial limitations due to the economic recession and will unlikely be able to provide necessary economic assistance for reconstruction efforts.

Afghanistan is not only an Article 5 mission for NATO, but also represents a major test for the organization. Despite beliefs among many in the U.S. national security community that failure for NATO-members to take a lead in Afghanistan operations will sound the death knell for the Alliance; it seems more likely that Afghanistan will impel a major strategic reassessment of the function of NATO. Regardless, these debates often induce policy paralysis and are part of a condition that frames American strategic engagement through a transatlantic perspective. In many ways, cooperating with Europe has almost become an a priori issue of diplomatic protocol and a pillar of politically correct behavior. If America is to succeed in Afghanistan it must begin to think beyond how Europe fits into the equation and start a process of better integrating emerging powers, particularly China into its strategic process.

Assessing Prospects for U.S.-China-Afghanistan Cooperation (Full PDF Article)

Wicked Problems, Creative Thinking, and the Transcendentalist

by Major Michael Few, Small Wars Journal

Wicked Problems, Creative Thinking, and the Transcendentalist (Full PDF Article)

Eighteen months ago, I embarked on a journey to pursue an academic solution for Iraq. After redeploying from the Surge, I wanted to merge the gap between counter-insurgency and stabilization and reconstruction. I wanted to figure out how WE could fix Iraq's problems. I wanted to find a way to win. In truth, it was never simply about Iraq. I was trying to reconcile the world I knew as a boy with the world that I know as a man.

Initially, I began my research investigating the different perspectives of various compilations of social sciences. I examined Zaganiyah from the objective lens of the anthropologist, the economist, the historian, and the sociologist. Each lens provided a unique insight but no solution. At the end of every path, I felt like I was running into a brick wall. I searched past social sciences and attempted to merge economics with psychology. In this realm, I was able to devise a new way of thinking that I could understand.

Wicked Problems, Creative Thinking, and the Transcendentalist (Full PDF Article)

by Dr. Geoffrey Demarest, Small Wars Journal

19th Century Strategy and its Applicability to Insurgent Warfare (Full PDF Article)

Irregular warfare (insurgency, low intensity conflict, etc.) is said to have a generally different character than conventional, maneuver warfare. So be it, but it does not necessarily follow that classic military strategic principles are inapplicable. One of the best statements of classic strategy comes from a British barrister writing before the advent of airpower. His expression reminds us that the important lines in linear warfare are not the fronts, but the lines of communication. This considered, the notion of 'non-linear warfare' can mislead. The line of retreat is especially highlighted, helping us place Mao's teaching more closely to Jomini's.

19th Century Strategy and its Applicability to Insurgent Warfare (Full PDF Article)