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View From the
Wolves' Den
The Chechens and
Urban Operations
David P. Dilegge
In 1998, the United States Marine Corps was presented
with an opportunity to conduct interviews with Chechen commanders and key
staff officers who participated in combat operations against Russian
forces in the 1994-1996 conflict. The Corps was particularly interested
in obtaining the Chechen view as it was then conducting a series of
experiments (Urban Warrior) designed to improve its capability to conduct
urban operations. Having studied the horrendous losses the Russians
experienced during its first incursion into Grozny, and faced with the
dilemma of finding solutions to the high casualty rate inherent to the
city fight, the Marines thought it prudent to gain the perspective of
those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern
conventional force.
Approximately 20 interviews were conducted during
June and July of 1999 in Chechnya by Dr. Marie Benningsen-Broxup, a
Central Asia expert who had close ties with the Chechens. Dr. Broxup
spent time with the Marines to include the author in preparation for the
interviews and after the fact for translation, transcription and
clarification. In February of 2000, the Marines also had the opportunity
to conduct an eight-hour seminar Q&A with another commander, Tourpal Ali-Kaimov,
who was visiting the US as part of a Chechen "government delegation".
While the interviews have seen wide distribution
through unofficial channels, these first hand accounts have not been
officially published or presented in any professional journal. Excerpts
from selected interviews are presented here and are intended to provide
insights on urban operations that pit conventional against irregular
forces. Though other environments and situations are included, the
primary focus of this article is on urban operations. These are the
recollections of some of the key Chechen personnel and as with all first
hand accounts of combat operations; the natural bias and limited
perspective of the participant, the overall military and political
situation at the time of occurrence and the possible agendas these
participants might harbor must be taken into consideration before drawing
definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, these are the words of those who
participated in operations that stunned not only the Russian military
establishment, but also many of the experts attempting to find solutions
to conducting operations in the complex and dangerous urban environment.
The Chechen Commanders
Space constraints preclude including the interviews
of each commander and staff officer. The following text contains excerpts
from the interviews of the Chechens (with their 1994-96 position) listed
below. Topics covered in this article include the first battle for Grozny,
the recapture of Grozny by the Chechens, urban ambush tactics, logistics
and intelligence.
Aslan Maskhadov - Chief of Staff of Chechen
forces
Husein Iskhanov - Mashadov's aide-de-camp
Said Iskhanov - General Staff Officer and
intelligence
Tourpal Ali-Kaimov - Chechen commander
Payzullah Nutsulkhanov - Head of logistics
Background
On 11 December 1994, a force of approximately 40,000
Russians attacked into Chechnya against a force of no more than
5,000-7,000 Chechens. After reaching the Chechen capital of Grozny, 6,000
Russian soldiers conducted a three-pronged mechanized attack into the city
following a 10 day aerial and artillery bombardment of the city against a
force of not more than 1,000 Chechens. Instead of the anticipated light
resistance, Russian forces encountered a determined enemy armed with
"massive amounts" of antitank weapons. The Russian attack was repulsed
with shockingly high losses and it took another 2 months of heavy fighting
and changing Russian tactics to capture Grozny. The estimated Russian
casualty count between January and May of 1995 totaled 2,805 killed,
10,319 wounded, 393 missing and another 133 captured.
The results of these catastrophic losses in the
initial battle for Grozny have been set as a text book example on how a
determined unconventional force can utilize the urban operational
environment to defeat a technologically and numerically superior force.
The First Battle for Grozny
Aslan Maskhadov: The Russians did not wage war
properly, they were just prepared to take enormous losses and destroy
everything that got in their way. While they did not value their
soldiers, we counted every man. Our first problem was to avoid retreat
and engage the Russians in combat. The first "battle" was literally
fought on the doorstep of the Presidential Palace in Grozny; my
headquarters (HQ) was in the basement. The 131st Motorized Brigade, the
31st Samara Tank Regiment and other units were able to enter Grozny
without opposition. We had no regular army to speak of to oppose the
Russians, only some small units defending various points within the city.
The Russians were able to ride into Grozny on their armored personnel
carriers (APCs) and tanks, without dismounted infantry support as if they
were on parade. After my HQ was surrounded by Russian tanks (they filled
the city) I decided that we must engage in battle. I gave the command to
all our small units to immediately descend on the Palace. They did not
know that I was surrounded but knew that once they did arrive, they would
be engaging the enemy.
As the Chechens arrived they saw the Russian
positions and immediately began the fight. The Russians did not know what
hit them. They were sitting ducks; again, all lined up as if on parade
around the Palace and on the square opposite the railway station. A
majority of their tanks and APCs were burned down in less than four
hours. What was left was on the run, hunted across Grozny by our rocket
propelled grenade (RPG) launcher teams, even by boys with Molotov
cocktails. This lasted for 3 days and in the end some 400 Russian tanks
and APCS were destroyed. The city was filled with Russian corpses.
A major factor in this success was the 26 November
"rehearsal" against Chechen units under "contract" to the Russians. As
they advanced on the Presidential Palace we were able to destroy the first
tank and after 3 hours we had destroyed or captured all of their vehicles
to include another 10 tanks. It was then that the Chechen resistance lost
all fear of Russian tanks as we realized that they were "match-boxes".
This first success gave confidence to our men and on 31 December when they
located a tank they considered it their duty to destroy it. In some cases
it became a competition - "leave this tank, it is mine."
After all the Russian vehicles were destroyed on the
31st I decided to stay and defend the Palace. As volunteers arrived from
every corner of Chechnya I registered them and relayed "here is a house,
you have so many men, defend it and do not move from there". Thus, little
by little, the defense was organized around the Palace.
We defended the Palace for 18 days and only the shell
of the building was left after constant mortar fire. As additional
Russian units, including a commando division, were deployed into Grozny
the battles raged for every house in every quarter of the city. Our units
behaved well and repelled most of the attacks. The Russians were
reluctant to use infantry and I had the impression that they were scared;
all they seemed to want to do is dig into defensive positions or hide in
their vehicles. This was impossible in these conditions, so the tanks and
APCs burned and the Russian soldiers perished. There was no attempt to
protect or camouflage the vehicles or accompany them with dismounted
infantry. They would just advance en mass and as they did they were
destroyed. One battle raged around the Council of Ministers where we had
12 fighters.
Tanks firing relentlessly surrounded the buildings they occupied.
They called for help but I could not provide it and told them so. One
hour later, they destroyed one tank, then another. Our fighters gained
confidence and the Russian soldiers' nerve broke and they retreated. That
is how we fought.
On 18 January Russian aviation dropped "depth" bombs
on my HQ. Three bombs hit the cellar, one landed in the adjacent
corridor, another in the infirmary and the other in a back room. We were
left with just the sky over our heads and the decision was made to abandon
the Palace and withdraw all our units across the Sunzha River which
divides Grozny in two. I planned the withdrawal at night, around 10 pm.
Those units on the outskirts or were surrounded in the city were the first
to retreat. Those covering the retreat and at the Palace were the last to
leave at 11 pm. Soon, all those who could manage to withdraw were across
the Sunzha where we set up another HQ. The Russians seemed unaware of
this development and continued to bomb the presidential Palace for an
additional 3 days, seemingly unwilling to advance their troops.
The next decision was to put all my available forces
in a defensive position along the Sunzha. While the Russians were still
bombing the Palace, we rapidly took up positions and built defenses on
every bridge consisting of every man we could spare - 5-10 men per
bridge. I set up my HQ in Town Hospital #2. As time passed we
strengthened our positions with new arrivals and we managed to hold our
ground there for another month with "attacks and retreats, attacks and
retreats." On the opposite side of the Sunzha the Russians razed every
building but could not drive their tanks across the bridges because of our
defenses. However, the Russians did manage to break through from the
direction of the tramway station, to attack us from the rear. We were
virtually surrounded.
It was then that we decided, against conventional
military logic, to counter-attack. We were in a dilemma, our fighters did
not want to dig defensive trenches as they considered it humiliating and
the buildings in this area were too small and fragile to withstand a tank
attack. So we made a line between the Sunzha and Minutka, dug trenches
and with approximately 40-50 men we advanced meter-by-meter digging more
trenches as we crawled forward. We did this until we reached the first
line of tanks and burned them. We pressed until the tanks retreated then
built additional trenches and advanced even further,
Meanwhile, other developments were taking place at
the Voykovo suspension bridge across the Sunzha. Russian tanks along the
river were providing covering fire to infantry troops who managed to cross
the bridge. They advanced within 200 meters of my HQ and though I threw
all my available forces against them we could not manage to stop the
offensive. It was at this point that we decided to move our HQs and
abandon our positions along the Sunzha. The withdrawal was organized in
the same manner as retreat from the Presidential Palace and each unit knew
in which order and at what time to conduct this operation. Soon, we had
all retreated to our third line of defense along the mountain ridges that
skirt Grozny.
When we held Grozny we had a feeling of exhilaration
and we also felt that if we left the city we would be vulnerable. It was
easier to fight in the city, so we fought for every house. That said,
because of Russian scorched-earth urban tactics we did not fight as we did
in Grozny later in Shali and Argun. We gave them up, as our determined
resistance would have condemned these towns to oblivion.
Husein Iskhanov: I was with Commander
Maskhadov in his cellar HQs at the Palace. We knew that we did not have
adequate forces to stop the Russian's initial advance. According to the
journal we kept there was an initial Chechen force of 350 fighters. This
was the number who registered with HQ, I estimate that we had an
additional 150 who did not register, men who came to shoot for a couple of
hours and then return home.
For us the numbers did not matter as much as our
knowledge of the Russians and the urban terrain. Most of us had
experience serving in the Soviet Armed forces and we knew their tactics,
habits and language. We also had the same communications system and
radios. Our head of communications at that time, Colonel Taimaskhanov,
knew his job perfectly. We had a special room in the Palace for our radio
operators and whenever we had a moment we would go there and "talk" to the
Russians. We listened to their transmissions and determined who was in
command and who subordinate commanders were. We waited for the moment
when they were giving their orders and then intervened, giving different
orders in a confident manner, providing false positions and so on. We
used these tactics throughout 1995 and they were very beneficial, more
often then not resulting in the Russians loosing troops to friendly fire
or units loosing their sense of direction in urban areas.
One of the units we faced in that first battle for
Grozny was the 131st Maiko Brigade. Practically the whole brigade was
annihilated in just one night on December 31st. The Russian claim that
100 soldiers survived but I do not believe it because we captured the crew
of the last remaining APC of the brigade. The brigade commander was
killed, and his second-in-command captured with that last APC.
Another unit we faced was the 81st Samarski
Regiment. They attacked from the direction of the airport and were
allowed to penetrate to a point near the Palace. Then we struck,
destroying the first APC of the column, then the last one and then a
couple in the middle. The Russians were squeezed because it was difficult
to maneuver tanks and APCs in the city, visibility was bad and the
buttoned-up drivers could not see were they were going. We then
surrounded the remaining vehicles and destroyed almost the entire
regiment.
Throughout January the Russians persisted with a
determined attack against the Palace and little by little they got nearer
our HQ. That success cost them dearly. Towards the middle of January,
there was heavy fighting within 100-200 meters of the HQ with the Russians
occupying a five-story building in front of the Palace and the National
Archives across the road.
In the first 2 weeks of January we used mostly
sniping as our main means of defense because we had an acute lack of
ammunition for most of our weapons. We also had another handicap in that
our men were reluctant to use tracer rounds because they feared that their
positions would be revealed to the Russians. While true, especially in
urban areas, we had to utilize every piece of ammunition we had. I
exhorted them to imagine the fear of the Russian soldier when he could
actually "see" the bullet that would kill him. Gradually our men got used
to the idea, we had little else and it indeed became true that the tracers
began to create more panic among the Russians than ordinary rounds. To
get back to the sniping tactic, we instructed our fighters to use single
shots and no automatic fire and the Russians came to believe that we had
snipers everywhere. In actuality, we had a few sniper rifles captured
from the Russians and few "trained" snipers.
Most of our resupply of arms and ammunition came from
the Russian vehicles we destroyed or captured. We even transformed the
guns from Russian tanks into individual hand-held weapons. Our dire
logistic situation also dictated many of the tactics we used in Grozny.
There was no point in forming large units because HQs was not in a
position to feed and supply them. Our initial formations averaged 10-20
men and as a rule there would be one RPG allocated to each group of 10.
Once we armed a unit with 12 RPGs and by our standard that was a very
powerful force.
Conditions were not easy at the Presidential Palace.
On 18 January our HQ suffered from a massive air and artillery attack. By
our estimation, a rocket was hitting the palace at a rate of one per
second. Our HQ was a very easy target as it stood well above the
surrounding buildings. One aviation "depth" bomb that hit the palace
penetrated 11 floors and destroyed the ceiling of the camp hospital in the
cellar. It was a "precision bomb" as it hit within 20 meters of
Maskhadov's HQ's area. We had made mistakes and the information on the
actual location of the HQ was well known. Many people were permitted to
come and go at the Palace; we let anybody in to include journalists, Duma
deputies, Russian soldiers' mothers and prisoners of war. This was stupid
but people were still very naďve then.
We abandoned the Palace on the night of the 18th in
small groups. Journalists have since written that we escaped in tunnels.
Believe me as I had explored the entire building and there were no
tunnels. Our next line of defense was beyond the Sunzha River. Though we
attempted to blow all the bridges as we crossed we lacked the explosives
to drop the one on the main road. The frontline was set along the river
with us controlling the right bank and the Russian the left. This lasted
for nearly a month, with no close combat and the Chechens conducting
sniping operations. The Sunzha afforded good protection, as the Russians
were afraid to cross the river with their APCs. Incidentally, the
Russians remained concentrated around the Palace, celebrating their
"victory". They only dared to enter the building 3 or 4 days after we had
left. Though they were positioned within 100 meters they had not realized
we had left.
The Recapture of Grozny
Tourpal Ali-Kaimov: On 6 August 1996 our
fighters recaptured Grozny from the Russians. Beginning on 3 August,
small, light foot-mobile Chechen groups began infiltrating the city in
preparation for the assault. By daylight on the 6th we had infiltrated
1,500 and proceeded to conduct a simultaneous offense at 0500 throughout
the city. We estimated that there were 15,000 Russian troops defending
Grozny at the time.
The four main Chechen objectives were the Russian
command and control assets at Khankala airfield, the northern airport, The
FSB (KGB successor) HQ, and the GRU (military intelligence) HQ. To
prevent reinforcement and/or relief of Russian forces in Grozny, we
conducted supporting attacks and manned blocking positions in four
surrounding urban areas, along the three main avenues of approach into
Grozny, and to the north of the city. These operations were conducted
simultaneously with the main attack in order to create maximum confusion
amongst the Russian military leadership. In this, we were very
successful.
The main attack in Grozny was over in three hours
with a total of 47 Chechen fighters killed in action. During the attack
and immediately after we had no problem with re-supply as the Russians
were so completely caught off-guard that we seized massive amounts of
weapons and ammunition as well as vehicles to transport the captured
material.
Aslan Maskhadov: By June 1996 we were under
attack on all fronts in a last desperate attempt by the Russians to gain
the upper hand. We were surrounded with our backs to the mountains and
under constant fire by artillery and aviation. On 9 June after a series
of harrowing escapes by many in the Chechen command structure it was clear
that there was no hope for a negotiated peace. It was then that we
decided to recapture Grozny.
I had been planning this operation for 6 months, as
we always believed that the war would end with the recapture of Grozny. I
thought about it constantly, even to the point of conducting radio
rehearsals to provoke a Russian reaction. I had studied the maps, the
Russian positions, the approaches, the routes of advance; I had everything
ready. We held meetings with our commanders who gave us their
intelligence reports. We had reconnoitered every inch, we knew the
disposition of every Russian position, the numbers, the roadblocks,
everything.
On 3 August I gave the order to move into the city.
At the time the Russians were everywhere so we moved between their
positions from every direction. Amazingly, on 5 August the Russian media
announced that the Chechens would enter that very same day. I was worried
as there were certain areas where it would be easy to ambush our troops,
but it was too late to stop the attack.
The attack began at 0500 on 6 August. Over 820 men
took part in the operations. I gave an order that every commander should
lead with his men, whether he had 20 or 200, they had to be in the
forefront. All our objectives were met and it was a huge success. The
Russian posts, bases, all of them were hit by surprise; then our forces
moved on to cut the roads and not let anyone through, leaving behind a few
snipers and machine gunners to cover the objectives. When Russian columns
tried to move into the city it was too late. All the bases were captured
or neutralized. As we could not take the government building or the MVD
we simply burned them.
Developing Chechen Tactics 1994-1996
Tourpal Ali-Kaimov: The Chechens made no
illusions about the Russians. We knew we could not meet them in the
conduct of conventional combat and win. However, we knew that if we met
them in the urban environment we might be able to “punish them.” This was
a lesson learned as we progressed through the Russian invasion from 1994
through 1996 – we now know that the city battlefield offers us distinct
advantages.
In the conduct of armor and personnel ambushes, we
configured our forces into 75-man groups. These were further broken down
into three 25-man groups (platoons). These platoons were further broken
down into three equal-sized teams of six to seven fighters each (squads).
Each squad had two RPG gunners and two PK (machinegun) gunners. The
75-man unit (company) had a mortar (82mm) crew in support with at least
two tubes per crew.
Each 25-man group also included one corpsman/medic,
three ammunition/supply personnel, three litter bearers and two snipers
armed with SVD sniper rifles. The snipers did not operate or co-locate
with the platoons but rather, set up in “hide” positions that supported
their respective platoons.
Again, our units did not move by flanking maneuvers
against the Russians but instead incorporated chess-like maneuvers to hit
them. They used buildings and other structures as navigation and signal
points for maneuvering or initiating ambushes/assaults against the
Russians.
We segregated Grozny into quadrants for ambush
purposes. Each 75-man ambush group set up in buildings along one street
block, and only on one side of the street – never on both sides of a
street because of the crossing fires a two-sided ambush would create. The
rationale for doing so was that we set up similar ambushes along
parallel-running streets. Our units would leave opposite facing buildings
vacant (no mines or booby traps either) – by doing so, they could use
those buildings as escape routes, or to reinforce less successful armor
ambushes on adjacent streets. This also was an incentive for the Russians
to abandon their vehicles for the relative safety of the unoccupied
buildings.
We only occupied the lower levels of multi-story
buildings to avoid casualties from rockets and air delivered munitions
coming through the upper levels. One 25-man platoon comprised the “killer
team” and set up in three positions along the target avenue. They had the
responsibility for destroying whatever column entered their site. The
other two 25-man platoons set up in the buildings at the assumed
entry-points to the ambush site. They had responsibility for sealing off
the ambush entry from escape by or reinforcement of the ambushed forces.
The killer platoon established a command point
(platoon HQ) with the center squad. As the intended target column entered
the site, the squad occupying the building nearest the entry point would
contact the other two squads occupying the center and far building
positions. Primary means of communications was by Motorola radio. Each
squad had one – lack of funding prevented us from providing every fighter
with a radio. Once the lead vehicle into the site reached the far squad
position, the far squad would contact the other two squads. The commander
at the central squad (platoon HQ) would initiate or signal to initiate the
ambush.
We also employed minefields along the edges of the
buildings leading into the ambush site to deter Russian infantry from
forcing entry into the end buildings. The task of the two 25-man platoons
in those end buildings was three fold. First, they were to cover the
minefields and take out any reinforcing armor and infantry. Second, they
were to reinforce to relieve the killer platoon in the event the ambush
got bogged down. And third, they were to reinforce ambushes on adjacent
streets if necessary.
Each 7-man squad had 2 or more RPG-7s, 2 or more PKs,
and the remainder with assault rifles. A support element with medic,
litter bearers and ammunition bearers usually occupied building with the
center squad (platoon HQ).
In addition to the value our fighters placed on the
RPG we found the PK an excellent weapon for urban warfare. The single
shot mode allowed for the conserving of ammunition while the ability to go
full automatic either slowed or quickly broke up Russian infantry
assaults.
Logistics
Payzullah Nutsulkhanov: I was Maskhadov's
deputy for logistics and responsible for the whole of Chechnya. I had
four men working for me at HQ and we were very active and visited all the
fronts during the war. Our neighbors from the other Republics helped us
and we had channels for humanitarian aid to include medicine.
I became logistics chief by chance as the original
commander was killed in the early days of the war. After his death our
logistics effort collapsed. In the beginning we had no need for logistics
as each unit brought their own supplies or found them on the spot. This
was especially true when we were fighting in Grozny. After the withdrawal
from the city the situation changed and we had to organize our logistics
starting from nothing. Except for the regular fighters, we did not even
know how many of our men required resupply. So we made charts and
required each commander to report how many men he had. We worked out what
each front needed down to the smallest detail. After the retreat from
Grozny, we had 3,000 men so I organized our logistics to support 6,000 to
be on the safe side. Our logistics became professional with each
battalion having a man responsible for supplies who would inform us of
their needs.
Tourpal Ali-Kaimov: While the drawdown of
Soviet/Russian military units in Chechnya after the break-up of the Soviet
Union allowed us to "inherit" certain amounts of military weapons and
equipment it certainly was not enough to prosecute the war.
This initial supply was augmented (at times greatly)
by the capture of Russian arms, ammunition and other military significant
equipment and supplies during combat. We could easily identify Russian
supply vehicles because they were usually open-bed trucks that did not
have any cover over the stacks of ammunition and provisions loaded in the
back. In the conduct of a convoy ambush our fighters would avoid hitting
the supply trucks, instead keeping them intact as "war trophies." This
became the our primary means of re-supply. Captured supplies were
immediately reported to the General Staff and they decided how it would be
distributed based on their knowledge of the overall logistic situation
among subordinate units.
We also had a constant
supply of fuel for vehicles. Chechnya sits on extensive oil reserves ("a
pool of oil"). The Chechens are very adept at refining this oil into
diesel through the use of "homemade" refineries at private residences and
small factories.
Food was normally procured from local farmers or
brought up from Georgia. The Russians avoid moving through passes between
Chechnya and Georgia. They prefer to use one main artery between the two
countries enabling the Chechens to move easily and unmolested between
Georgia and Chechnya.
Intelligence
Tourpal Ali-Kaimov: Know the territory – day
and night – that is what we did and we used this knowledge to our
advantage. Detailed reconnaissance is a must to be successful in the
conduct of urban operations and our normal routine included a map
reconnaissance, followed by a foot reconnaissance and then bringing the
reconnaissance asset back to headquarters with his map. Chechen scouts
briefed commanders and planners personally. Whenever possible, we ordered
another reconnaissance mission to confirm the results of the first.
Chechen reconnaissance personnel were not told why
they were performing a particular mission in case they were captured.
Traditional reconnaissance methods were augmented by human intelligence
and reconnaissance performed by elders, women and children. Virtually
every Chechen was an intelligence collector. Reconnaissance personnel to
include mobile patrols as well as women and children were provided
Motorola radios to enable timely reporting.
We learned that the scale of maps is very important –
key urban terrain is at the micro level. We never relied on streets,
signs, and most buildings as reference points. They can be altered in
such a way during urban combat as to be deceiving. We used cultural
landmarks, prominent buildings, and monuments as reference points – they
usually remain intact and are easily distinguishable. If they were
altered we annotated it on our maps. We had a good supply of maps and “to
scale” drawings and sketches of Grozny. This greatly facilitated our
command, control, and communications. The Russians did not possess the
same quality or quantity of maps, nor did they conduct effective
reconnaissance of the city to verify or validate the maps they did
possess. We did use captured Russian maps – but only after confirmation
and updates performed by reconnaissance personnel.
Counter-reconnaissance is also crucial. The Russians
performed reconnaissance during daylight hours and subsequently either
attacked during the day or employed indirect fire or air that night. Our
forces performed daylight reconnaissance in support of a night attack.
This counter-reconnaissance enabled our forces to conduct a night movement
closer to Russian positions or other pre-planned alternate sites in
anticipation of a Russian indirect fire or air attack based on the results
of the Russian daylight reconnaissance. Being well versed in Russian
reconnaissance doctrine, the we often let the Russians observe our daytime
positions as part of a deception plan.
Our commanders placed so much value on detailed
knowledge of the urban terrain that upon receiving 40 Ukrainian volunteers
with military backgrounds, they required them to perform extensive
reconnaissance with attached Chechens before entering combat. Only then,
were the Ukrainians deemed combat ready and as a result performed their
combat missions and tasks with great effectiveness.
The importance of detailed reconnaissance and
accurate intelligence cannot be understated in the conduct of urban
operations.
Said
Iskhanov:
After Budennovsk, I was sent to Grozny by Maskhadov to set up an
intelligence network. I was answerable to the General Staff and was
ordered to gather information on Russian positions in preparation for the
March 1996 attack against Grozny, although I did not know what was planned
at the time. I had to collect information on the Russians’ exact
positions, their numbers, the routes in and out of Grozny, the possible
ways of bringing weapons into the town, but I had few concrete
instructions from HQ. My brief was broad – to gather information
everywhere.
I began on
my own. I had no team, so I started by using friends and relatives. I had
no way of paying them so at first I tried to be casual and did not tell
them the real purpose of my inquiries. Throughout the remainder of the
war, my helpers were all volunteers. I had a map of Grozny and its
surroundings. I began by traveling to the districts where the Russians had
their bases and garrisons. I checked the people I knew in the area –
usually 5-6 people, and recruited them.
The first
task was to find the best route to reach the Russian bases. We had no
training in intelligence work - to find out the number of Russian troops
and equipment was pure improvisation at first. Each one tried his own
manner. I often used young women. When I traveled to report to HQ with
documents, I always took a young woman with me as it was a safeguard.
To gather
information around the capital, we had to walk. We explored routes through
woods and forests on foot - between Grozny and Urus Martan, the piedmont
and the escape routes to the southern mountains. Sometimes we walked as
far as the positions of our units in the pre-Alps. After we had explored a
district and verified that passage for our units was possible, we selected
some local people to watch and report any changes – for example a change
in the position of a road block, any movement of troops and weaponry, any
unusual movement or development. Once checked, these areas came under
constant surveillance. We knew that we had to update our information all
the time.
One of our
best sources of information was the market. People in the market were in
touch with traders who themselves were in contact with all the principal
Russian garrisons. These garrisons usually had small markets nearby which
provided them with goods, alcohol, narcotics and so on. The traders had
their “favorite” clients among the Russian soldiers who had plenty of
money stolen during clean-up operations. They chatted with the traders
who, naturally, got information. When we were organizing a special
operation it was essential that we knew when a Russian column would be on
the move. That was when the traders were useful.
Of course
between the time we gathered the information and the March 1996 operation,
changes inevitably occurred. One commander grumbled afterwards that some
of our numbers were not accurate. But we had no possibility to update
information every day. Passing on information was not easy. Our radio
communication was poor because priority was given to military operations.
Our radio did not reach all the mountain regions. We had to get to the
highest houses in Grozny to communicate and would waste 2 or 3 hours to
raise HQ. When we finally established communications they would often be
cut off. More often than not, we had to report in person, with all our
notes.
Our asset
was that we were able to melt among the civilian population. As a rule, we
did not bother with small posts of 20-30 men. They became useless as soon
as they were isolated among Chechens. But we always watched the larger
garrisons, looking for Russian soldiers wandering out through the
minefields surrounding them. Then we would capture and interrogate the
solider often resulting in information on their bases, their numbers,
weaponry, reserves of ammunitions, relations between officers and troops,
and so on.
Conclusion
This has
been but a sampling of the information contained in the original Chechen
Commander's interviews. The author fully intends on writing follow-on
pieces that will include the impact of Chechen culture on conduct of the
war, Chechen moral and leadership, command and control, communications,
weapons, and psychological operations. Moreover, I hope to also drill
down further into the topics covered here and to add commentary on the
implications this material may have on conventional forces operating in an
urban environment and facing an unconventional foe.
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