Small Wars Journal

VSO

Interoperability: Merging the Organizational Cultures of Special Forces and the Infantry

Journal Article | April 22, 2013 02:30 AM | Comments(0)

Interoperability is a function of leadership, hardship, and time. To quickly achieve it, focus on individual personalities, understand that everyone has value, and exercise mission command.

Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality

by Stephen L. Melton

Journal Article | April 9, 2013 02:30 AM | Comments(26)

The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN approach usually fails where security force assistance could succeed.

Village Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective from Vietnam to Afghanistan

by Mark L. Brown, Jr.

Journal Article | March 28, 2013 02:30 AM | Comments(13)

The Civilian Irregular Defense Group was one of Special Forces’ greatest success stories and by far the greatest example of how to fight unconventional warfare with an economy of force approach.

VSO versus DSO

by Christopher Wilkerson

Journal Article | March 19, 2013 02:25 AM | Comments(1)

Do the terrain and the friendly and enemy situations allow stability operations at the village or district level?

Withdraw and Win: “Go” for Victory in Afghanistan

by Joshua Thiel and Douglas A. Borer

Journal Article | February 25, 2013 03:30 AM | Comments(11)

If the coalition consolidates on major bases along the ring road and attempts a Soviet-style hub and spoke concept, the result will be the same: defeat.

Innovation in Integration: Task Force Iron Ranger and Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan 2010-11

by Craig Whiteside

Journal Article | February 7, 2013 03:30 AM | Comments(1)

Times of crisis can be a brief window of opportunity for large institutional bureaucracies to overcome jurisdictional boundaries and make changes to business as usual.

Which Tribe Should We Engage? A Tribal Engagement Assessment Methodology

by David Bowers

Journal Article | January 25, 2013 03:30 AM | Comments(18)

Operators must understand local culture and must harness the power of local institutions to fight an irregular enemy. A proposed method to do so.

Back to Basics: Reenergizing Intelligence Operations

by John M. Ives

Journal Article | January 16, 2013 03:30 AM | Comments(0)

The most frustrating moment for the J2 occurs when the operations summary contains more useful intelligence-producing data than the official intelligence reporting.

VSO/ALP

by Lisa Saum-Manning

Journal Article | December 27, 2012 05:30 AM | Comments(22)

Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense.

Military Medical Assets as Counterinsurgency Force Multipliers: A Call to Action

by David S. Kauvar and Tucker A. Drury

Journal Article | November 28, 2012 05:30 AM | Comments(9)

It is time to rethink the role of conventional U.S. military medical assets in COIN operations.

The COiNventional Wisdom

by Grant Martin

Journal Article | August 9, 2012 05:03 PM | Comments(54)

Will we “learn” the same lessons we learned after Vietnam again? (…and, by the way, what were those lessons?)

Things I Learned from People Who Tried to Kill Me

by Reed Kitchen

Journal Article | June 19, 2012 05:30 AM | Comments(33)

Ultimately, our current strategy in Afghanistan will prove to be costly and unsustainable. Can we take a new approach molded by the careful study of our enemy?

Favoring Warlords: Afghan Local Police

by Ramin Shirzay

Journal Article | May 18, 2012 04:49 AM | Comments(6)

The perhaps-unsurprising second- and third-order effects of VSO and ALP.

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