Afghanistan

Throughout its existence beginning in the early 1990s, ASG has waffled back and forth between criminality and terrorism. 

Understanding the great paradox of the U.S. military: the better our conventional capabilities, the more likely we are to face increasingly irregular and asymmetric threats.

One of the reasons, if not THE reason, that we struggled to accomplish our objectives in Afghanistan is that we applied an industrial-era approach to the way we conceptualize planning and operations.

“Afghan Led” is a critical aspect of our counterinsurgency operations that we must grasp to enable ultimate mission success.

Often in warfare and business, the team that can adapt to the new reality fastest wins the next battle. 

The conventional approach taken by most aid programs has been a counterproductive disaster.

Developed to streamline and expedite the orders process, the CONOP has forced leaders to expend time, effort and energy to push the CONOP through the approval process from the lowest to the highest...

Could a conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan lead to tactical nuclear weapon use?

Observing how the Afghans develop intelligence and seek creative means to support their operations is vital to Afghans owning the security.

What role should attack aviation play on future battlefields to best support ground forces in achieving their objectives?

Our Western design and training programs are subtracting capability—by pushing adoption of an alien military culture.