Small Wars Journal

Sinaloa cartel

Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #32: Ultralight Aircraft and Border Drug Smuggling SWJED Wed, 04/19/2017 - 4:56am

Although a number of cartels may be utilizing ultralight aircraft, seizure locations and authority reports most often attribute the use of this technology to the Sinaloa Cartel.

Sinaloa Drug Cartel Can Continue

Sun, 03/02/2014 - 2:39pm

Sinaloa Drug Cartel Can Continue Without 'Chapo' Guzman, Experts Say by Diana Washington Valdez, El Paso Times

The capture of reputed Sinaloa drug cartel leader Joaquín "Chapo" Guzmán sent shockwaves throughout the drug-trafficking world but experts say it's too soon to predict what may happen next.

Guzmán, who became a household name, enjoys both celebrity status and the eagerness of U.S. prosecutors who want to take him to court on a variety of drug and arms-trafficking charges.

The apparent calm in Juárez - once the bloodiest Mexican battleground during the notorious cartel wars - continued this week following Guzmán's surprising arrest a week ago, said Victor Manjarrez, associate director of the National Center for Border Security and Immigration at the University of Texas at El Paso…

Read on.

Social Banditry and the Public Persona of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán

Mon, 04/29/2013 - 3:30am
This article reviews nine key insights into social banditry originally described by Eric Hobsbawm and examines their applicability regarding Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, leader of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel. Because some of Mexico’s organized crime leaders aim to be viewed as social bandits, and visit Guatemala and the Mexico-Guatemala border region to evade authorities, the article focuses on particularities of those culture zones in the potential application of three primary strategies of information operations to contest a social bandit’s prestige: emphasizing distance between the social bandit and the local poor, portraying collusion of the social bandit with local authorities and opposition to federal authorities, and emphasizing closeness between federal power and the local poor. A criminal organization leader who desires the prestige of social banditry would have cause to oppose each strategy. The analysis predicts that the first two strategies are more realistic, potentially more important strategically, and are more likely to become intensely contested through Information Operations, within culture areas of Guatemala and the Mexico-Guatemala border region.

About the Author(s)