Urban Operations

Doctrine / TTP

JP 3-06: Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (Joint)

Handbook for Joint Urban Operations (Stop-gap prior to publication of JP 3-06)

FM 3-06: Urban Operations (USA - 2006 update)

FM 3-06.11: Combined Arms Operations on Urban Terrain (USA)

MCWP 3-35.3: Military Operations on Urban Terrain (USMC)

Aviation Urban Operations (Multiservice)

Issues / Concepts / Lessons

Lessons Learned: Infantry Squad Tactics in Military Operations in Urban Terrain During Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, Iraq - Sgt. Catagnus, Jr. Earl. J., Cpl. Edison, Brad. Z., LCpl. Keeling, James. D., and LCpl. Moon, David. A., USMC.  Marine Corps Times article. Historically speaking, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) have created casualty figures that are extraordinary compared to similar operations conducted in different types of environments. The casualties in MOUT present a significant challenge to small unit leaders. Casualties hit Marine infantry squads and fire teams extremely hard because generally speaking they were already under the table of organization (T/O) standards.  Some squads in 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) commenced the assault on the Jolan with only six Marines. It is the small unit leaders’ duty to accomplish the mission with the least amount of casualties possible. In order for small unit leaders to complete the above task they need tactics and techniques that will prevent casualties.  Section 1 of the Scout/Sniper Platoon has attacked and cleared buildings with all the line companies in 3/5. The authors have observed nearly all the squads in the battalion and have “rolled in the stack” with many of them. This is an experience which few in the battalion have. Knowing this, the authors believe it is their duty to consolidate their observations, produce a comprehensive evaluation of squad tactics and techniques, and pass it onto the squad leaders. The authors’ intent is to give the squad leaders options in combat. It is by no means a “bible,” but it is a guideline. One squad or another has proved all the tactics and techniques in combat. Section 1 does not take any credit for the information contained within. The information was learned through the blood of the infantry squads in 3/5. The entire evaluation has one underlying theme: Accomplish the mission with the least amount of casualties possible.

Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations - Matt Matthews.  US Army Combat Studies Institute paper, September 2006.  The two battles for the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004 were turning points in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Elements of the US Marine Corps began an offensive in April to destroy enemy forces in the town, but the battle ended prematurely with the Marines being replaced by the “Fallujah Brigade,” followed soon after by a complete enemy takeover of the city. Some units of the new Iraqi Army were also committed to the first battle; they were found wanting and the entire Iraqi training program significantly changed in response. In November 2004, a combined USMC, US Army, and Iraqi Army offensive succeeded in eliminating the enemy in Fallujah in a destructive urban battle. In Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations, Mr. Matt Matthews focuses on the ways in which Army and Marine forces operated together in the second Battle of Fallujah.

Operation AL FAJR - Commander John Patch, US Navy. Marine Corps Gazette article, November 2006.  While the combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) reasserted American supremacy in a classic combined arms campaign on open terrain, success against the protracted insurgency in urban areas is more elusive. As a recent analysis argued, “The very success of American joint operations—and joint fires in particular—guarantee that a clever opponent will move into cities for protection.” While cautionary maxims oft-repeated since Sun Tzu’s time point to avoiding cities, the U.S. military must be prepared to defeat the urban adversary when war aims demand it. Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) are not new phenomena, but some pundits bemoaned coalition readiness prior to Operation AL FAJR (OAF) (also known as Operation PHANTOM FURY) in Fallujah. Though neither sterile nor quick, OAF proved not to be the feared bloody quagmire that other armies historically faced. In the tradition of Hue City, coalition forces under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) successfully breached Fallujah’s defenses and seized the city, eliminating a key insurgent stronghold. Several key factors contributed to rapid tactical/operational victory—the virtual absence of civilians; effective MOUT doctrine, tactics, and command and control (C²); and adherence to the laws of war, especially regarding joint fires. Extant joint and Service doctrine discusses MOUT characteristics and caveats in detail; many apply to this article but are not restated here.

Preparing for Future Joint Urban Operations: The Role of Simulations and the Urban Resolve Experiment - Dr. Peter Wielhouwer. Small Wars Journal article, July 2005. Operations in urban areas have long perplexed military planners, and military analyses predict extensive urban operations for the foreseeable future. Even analyses of the recent urban operations in Iraq recommend significant revision of future training efforts for the conduct of urban operations, emphasizing the need for improved modeling and simulation of urban terrain. While the historic approach has generally been to avoid cities or wage massive campaigns of attrition, it is clear that urban areas can not be avoided and that modern sensibilities chafe at widespread collateral damage. This paper discusses recent developments in the area of joint urban operations concept development and experimentation, arguing that initiatives under way at U.S. Joint Forces Command have great potential for improving preparation for urban conflict. The paper first discusses the context for new thinking and doctrine on joint urban operations, including analysis of recent data on patterns of global urbanization and U.S. troop deployment and responses. The strategies being used for assessing urban operations concepts are presented, including preliminary detailed results from the ongoing Urban Resolve experiment and its application of cutting-edge modeling and simulation technologies.

Military Operations in Urban Terrain: A Survey of Journal Articles - D. Robert Worley, Alec Wahlman and Dennis Gleeson Jr. Institute for Defense Analysis Joint Advanced Warfighting Program survey, October 2000. This documents summarizes over 50 articles - drawn from over 20 journals - published between 19995 and 2000.  The document also discusses the common themes and unresolved issues distilled from the abstracted articles.  Most of the articles take a rather grim view of current U.S. capabilities in the urban environment.  However, proposed solutions differ widely, ranging from major changes in equipment, organization, logistics and training to avoiding the urban fight altogether.

Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century's End - Roger Spiller. US Army Training and Doctrine Command study, 2000.  This study was directed by the Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, in the summer of 1999. NATO operations against Yugoslavia had just begun. Notwithstanding official announcements that ground forces would not be needed for the time being, expectations ran high that ground troops would ultimately have to be employed. The precise nature of the operations they would be called on to perform could not be foreseen, and consequently neither the size nor the precise character of the forces to be committed could be decided at the time. The range of possibilities was enough to give any commander or operational planner headaches: American ground forces could be engaged in direct combat within or beyond the province of Kosovo, then the focal point of NATO operations, against conventional forces or their surrogates. US troops could also be employed as an element of a peacekeeping operation confined to the province itself, or perhaps beyond, or any gradation of commitment between these extremes. No one with official responsibility could envision a scenario without ground troops of any sort.  Only one assumption could be made with any sort of confidence: once ground forces were introduced, a significant part of their duties would be performed not in the open countryside but in areas that could to some degree be characterized as urban. Some such areas might be very small, no more than a village perhaps, with a population numbering in the tens. Some might be towns with only a few thousand inhabitants. Others might be much larger municipalities, with populations running to the tens of thousands. The question naturally arose: to what degree was the US Army prepared for this mission, ill-defined as it was at that particular time?

From Three to One: Rethinking the "Three Block War" and Humanitarian Operations in Combat - Dr. Reuben E. Brigety II, American University. In the mid-1990's, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak conceived of the notion of the "three-block war" in which Marine forces engaged in urban combat would have to perform humanitarian and peacekeeping functions while simultaneously conducting combat operations. Recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest not only that Gen. Krulak's concept was prescient, but also that it may not have gone far enough. In Afghanistan and Iraq, both U.S. air and ground forces have had to deal with the tactical and doctrinal demands of providing humanitarian assistance in the course of active combat operations. Such endeavors have been undertaken for a variety of reasons: meeting humanitarian needs for civilians, complying with international legal obligations, and demonstrating American "good will" to a skeptical international audience. Regardless of the motives, these activities have sparked a debate about the appropriateness and implications of partisan military forces performing what should be impartial humanitarian activities. Yet the presence of civilians on the battlefield and the operational and political imperatives of caring for them are recurring features of modern warfare that demand study. This paper explores the implications of the emerging trend of U.S. military-humanitarian operations for the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid, for the civilian international humanitarian community, and for the military forces that will prepare for and execute such missions in the future.

Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation - Marine Corps Intelligence Activity study, 1999. In 1997, in light of the probability of future operations in urban environments, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) was tasked to provide a preliminary assessment of urban warfare lessons learned in support of the CSEEA Joint Wargame. Three scenarios across the spectrum of conflict from mid- to low-intensity were chosen to represent urban operations. The lessons are drawn from Russian operations in Chechnya, Israeli operations in Lebanon and British operations in Northern Ireland.  This study presents strategic, operational, tactical and technical lessons learned from each of those operations.

Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned - Timothy Thomas. Military Review article, July-August 2000. Today, Grozny is no more. The contrast between the damaged Grozny before the latest battle and the utter destruction afterwards could not be more pronounced. The literal leveling of the city points to lessons that the Russian Armed Forces learned from their earlier battles for Grozny. The January 2000 battle was the second major battle for Grozny in five years along with two minor battles in 1996. In fall 1994 Grozny was the scene of fighting between opposing Chechen forces, those of President Djokhar Dudayev versus the Dudayev opposition, which received covert support from President Boris Yeltsin's government in Moscow. In late November, the opposition attacked Grozny with a few tanks and armored vehicles and was quickly annihilated. A month later, the first major battle for Grozny took place. It involved Russia's armed forces and turned the city into a bloody battleground before the Russians drove Dudayev's forces from the city. In August 1996 the Chechens retook the city. In late 1999 and early 2000, after a very well planned advance to the Terek River, Russian forces again assaulted Grozny—this time with artillery fire and air power instead of tanks and infantry—turning the city into rubble. This battle for Grozny proved different from the infamous January 1995 battle in both the attackers' strategy and tactics. This article examines what lessons the Russian army learned from the 1995 battle for Grozny and applied to the January 2000 battle. It also examines what lessons the Russian army either failed to learn or chose not to apply.

Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations - Sean Edwards. Rand study, 2000. This monograph is a case study analysis of three recent urban operations. The objective of this research was to update lessons learned about military urban operations and determine the significance of recent changes. The three cases examined—Panama in 1989, Somalia in 1992–1993, and Chechnya in 1994–1996—captured the range of political constraints that military forces must operate under in urban environments.

Urban Operations: An Historical Casebook - US Army Combat Studies Institute compilation of articles, 2002.  Because of a resurgence of interest in urban operations within the U.S. military, the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, last year tasked the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) to research and write several in-depth case studies aimed at providing historical perspective on the subject.  The result is an anthology containing the chapters listed below.  Arranged chronologically, the studies cover a wide range of urban operations conducted by various countries from World War II to the present.  Each chapter contains a narrative account of the designated operation together with an identification and analysis of the lessons that remain relevant today.  It is hoped that today’s military professional, as well as interested parties within the general public, will find these studies stimulating and informative.

Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan - C. Christine Fair. Rand study, 2004. Military operations in urban areas are among the most complex challenges confronting the U.S. Army. Compared to a number of other nations, the Army has relatively less experience operating in this environment. To that end, this monograph analyzes sustained campaigns of urban terrorism in Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, identifying key innovations of the militant organizations. It also details the three states’ responses to the threats, noting successful as well as unsuccessful efforts.

Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations - Edited by William Robertson and Lawrence Yates. US Army Command and General Staff College Press article, 2003.  It is axiomatic in the military community that operations in an urban environment should be avoided if at all possible, given the costs they exact in time, personnel, casualties, and materiel. Yet, throughout history, cities have continuously been at the center of a variety of military undertakings: sieges, street fighting, coups de main, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, stability operations and support operations, and disaster and humanitarian relief. Moreover, this trend continues through the recent past and up to the present as headlines concerning Beirut, Sarajevo, Mogadishu, Grozny, Kabul, and Baghdad indicate.

The Human Terrain of Urban Operations - Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters, USA (Ret.). Link to Parameters article, Spring 2000.  Tasked with urban operations, soldiers think of buildings. The initial mental image is of physical forms--skyscrapers or huts, airports and harbors, size, construction density, streets, sewers, and so on. Planners certainly are interested in the population's attitudes and allegiances, but cities are more likely to be classified by their differences in construction than by the variety of their populations. This focus on "terrain" leads to the assumption that military operations would be more challenging in a Munich than in a Mogadishu. But the latter "primitive" city brutally foiled an international intervention launched with humanitarian intent, while "complex" Munich whimpered into submission at the end of the fiercest war in history. The difference lay not in the level of physical development, but in the human architecture.

Re-Examining Tomorrow's Battlefields: Taking the Fight Into the Cities - Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jones, USA. US Army Center for Strategic Leadership student issue paper, June 2003.  The U.S. Armed Forces are vulnerable on a number of fronts. Enemies are sure to exploit domestic sensitivities about friendly and enemy casualties, manipulate the media and world opinion when possible, and leverage political tensions within and outside multinational coalitions. Likewise, terrorism involving noncombatants is a vulnerability that is difficult to overcome, as illustrated by the 9-11 attacks, the use of human shields and guerrilla-style ambushes at checkpoints in Iraq, and the recent car bombings in Saudi Arabia and Casablanca. Similarly, the use (even the mere threat) of Weapons of Mass Destruction such as the U.S. anthrax attacks in 2001 will continue to pose a significant challenge to military forces. Beyond these tactics, however, is the broader medium for armed confrontation, the venue that will provide the greatest advantage to the enemy relative to U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities: Urban Warfare.

Shaping the Battlespace to Win the Street Fight - Major Norman Cooling, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 2000. The preponderance of recent national security studies all describe an emerging threat that will increasingly require regional Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) to meet challenges across the spectrum of conflict while operating within the world’s cities. Yet, all current doctrine concerning urban warfare deals almost exclusively with high intensity operations that are part of a “Fulda Gap style” major theater war. Moreover, this doctrine tends to address urban warfare solely at the tactical level, apparently assuming that no operational level differences exist between urban operations and those in other environments. Last year, the Department of Defense designated the Marine Corps as the lead service for the development of joint doctrine for urban operations. I began this monograph in hopes of assisting with this effort by identifying potential operational level considerations that are unique to, or are of enhanced importance in, the urban environment. I found that while many of the operational considerations for urban conflict are the same as those for other physical environments, the unique nature of cities requires joint force commanders to consider a number of special factors while planning and conducting urban operations. These factors are presented in the following treatise.

Systems Approach to Urban Operations - Lieutenant Colonel David Sutherland, USA. US Army School of Advanced Warfare monograph, 2003. This monograph describes a possible technique to allow military planners to identify key objectives that may be affected in gaining control of a city without destroying it. This technique involves viewing a city as a complex “system of systems” and offers the planner insights as to where to apply military means to achieve the desired ends. While much has been written on Effect Based Operations (EBO), this monograph attempts to “operationalize” the concept. It presents a planning technique to assist in identifying targets, understanding target interrelationships, and analyzing second and third order effects. This study uses the urban environment to present this planning technique.

Urban Operations: A Soldier's View - Major General Robert Scales, USA (Ret.). Link to Military Review article, January - February 2005.  The American defense establishment has grown up in a big-war culture where big threats were met with big-ticket programs. Yet, throughout the Cold War era in Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere real soldiers were compelled to fight unpleasantly real wars against enemies who watched the battles carefully. These enemies learned with each combat encounter that the surest way to gain advantage is to negate American bigwar technologies by moving the fight into complex terrain such as jungles, mountains, and most recently, cities. The enemy’s plan is simple and effective: lure American forces into terrain where Information-Age knowledge, speed, and precision give way to the more traditional warfighting advantages of mass, will, patience, and the willingness to die.

Guerrilla Warfare Tactics in Urban Environments - Major Patrick Marques, USA. US Army Command and General Staff College thesis, 2003.  Current Special Forces doctrine is very limited concerning the conduct of guerrilla warfare combat operations in urban environments. The focus of the current doctrine is on conducting combat operations in rural environments. The material available on urban environments is defined in broad terms primarily focused on the larger picture of unconventional warfare. Some considerations and characteristics of urban tactical operations are addressed but are so general they could be applied to a conventional infantry unit as easily as to a guerrilla force. Traditionally, Special Forces guerrilla warfare doctrine has focused on its conduct in a rural environment as historically, most guerrilla movements have formed, operated, and been supported outside of the cities. Increasing world urbanization is driving the “center of gravity” of the resistance, the populace and their will to resist, into urban settings.

Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency - Max Manwaring. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, March 2005.  Gang-related crime, in conjunction with the instability it wreaks upon governments, is now a serious national security and sovereignty problem in important parts of the global community.  Although differences between gangs and insurgents exist, in terms of original motives and modes of operation, this linkage infers that the gang phenomenon is a mutated form of urban insurgency. That is, these nonstate actors must eventually seize political power to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that clearly links gangs and insurgents is that the gangs’ and insurgents’ ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries.

The Urban Threat: Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations - Marine Corps Intelligence Activity study, 1999.  Urban guerrilla groups and terrorist organizations clearly constitute one of the greatest threats to our forces abroad. Because of the randomness and unpredictability of guerrilla offensive operations and terrorist acts, it is important that all service members, private through general, understand these organizations and the threat that they pose.  This paper examines the nature of urban warfare from the perspective of irregular paramilitary groups; i.e., the kinds of organizations that U.S. expeditionary forces are likely to encounter while engaged in peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and regional stabilization. More specifically, the paper profiles the nature and composition of such groups, identifies their most likely objectives, and discusses how they go about achieving those ends.

Urban Population Control in a Counterinsurgency - Mounir Elkhamri, Lester W. Grau, Laurie King-Irani, Amanda S. Mitchell and Lenny Tasa-Bennett.  Article, 2004.   Much of urban counter-insurgency resembles police work and consequently is alien and anathema to the military. Yet much of the police intelligence techniques, relationships with bureaucracy, and maintenance of law and order are central to successful urban counterinsurgency. How does the military adjust to police methods without assuming police missions and police restrictions? How does the military supplement police missions without supplanting police control and responsibility? How do police and military forces and leaders interact and cooperate to achieve common goals?

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain in Iraq: Population Dependent? - Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Thomas, USA (Ret.). US Army Foreign Military Studies Office article, December 2002.  Combat in cities has never been a good idea. Sun Tsu noted long ago “the worst strategy in war—attack walled cities.” Yet if combat erupts in Iraq, coalition forces may have no option but to fight in cities. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein witnessed the destruction of his force at the hands of an outnumbered coalition force during Desert Storm, and he appears to have learned from his armed forces’ mistake of taking on a high tech force in open terrain. Of course, Hussein is often unpredictable because he is blinded by his own propaganda.

Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City - Lieutenant Colonel Louis DiMarco, US Army. US Army Combat Studies Institute paper, 2004.  In July 2002 the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was reconstituted and given a new charter by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, General John Abrams. One of the three missions outlined in that charter is to conduct original, interpretive research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the US Army. Having published some 10 works in the intervening two years, CSI is now poised to initiate a new series addressing important facets of the Global War on Terrorism. Lieutenant Colonel Louis DiMarco’s Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City is the first in that series called Occasional Papers.The Middle East is one of the most urbanized regions of the world, and growth continues at an unprecedented rate. With operations ongoing in the Middle East today, it is fitting that this inaugural study should focus on mil­itary aspects of the urban areas of that region. There is an undoubted need for US military planners to possess a solid foundation of military history, cultural awareness, and an understanding of the intricacies of city design and function in this critical region. Each conflict brings its own challenges and dynamics. The challenges of a Middle Eastern fight require decisive involvement in that region’s cities. The enemy is adaptive—we must be adaptive as well. This call to study and understand history and culture is the first step along that road to critical thinking and adaptability.

Managing Complexity During Military Urban Operations - Dr. Russell Glenn. Link to Rand publication, January 2004. The massiveness of today’s largest cities and the complexity of even the smaller urban conglomerations makes the planning and execution of operations within them a significant challenge. There is a call for a construct that makes these tasks manageable. This document proposes such a construct based on two fundamental concepts introduced herein: critical points and density. The two are applicable to virtually any urban undertaking whether the focus is on combat, stability, or support. They pertain to both the tactical and operational levels of war.

In Search of a Joint Urban Operational Concept - Major Lee Grubbs, USA. US Army School of Advanced Warfare monograph, 2003. Combat operations in the urban area are not new to warfare. The United States’ military conducted large-scale urban operations in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. During the last sixty years, the United States’ Army approached the urban area by rubbling or isolating the city. The combination of the increasing potential for urban operations and political restraints on friendly and non-combatant casualties reduces the usefulness of these historical approaches. Joint forces need a new urban operational concept that achieves strategic aims without rubbling the city or causing politically unacceptable levels of non-combatant and friendly casualties. Current joint operational concepts such as Joint Vision 2020 do not provide a view of future warfare. Emerging operational concepts such as Rapid Decisive Operations depend on long-range surveillance and engagement of enemy forces to reduce the requirement of close combat.

Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts - Alan Vick, John Stillion, David Frelinger, Joel Kvitky, Benjamin Lambeth, Jeff Marquis and Matthew Waxman. Rand publication, 2000. The recent spate of urban operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia has motivated the Department of Defense to put considerable effort into identifying and correcting shortcomings in the United States' ability to successfully conduct urban military operations. Project AIR FORCE undertook a year-long investigation of the role that aerospace forces can play in joint urban military operations. This study sought to help the USAF better understand how the urban physical, social, and political environment constrains aerospace operations, to identify key operational tasks that aerospace forces can help accomplish, and to develop new concepts of operation, including enabling technologies, to enhance the contribution that aerospace forces make to joint urban operations.

Air Force Operations in Urban Environments - US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board report, August 2005. As cities increase in number and importance, the population of the world is rapidly gravitating toward these centers of commerce, culture and society. In addition, our adversaries have learned that urban environments diminish the effectiveness of our legacy systems, tactics, techniques, and procedures, resulting in extremely difficult challenges for US and coalition military forces that have traditionally focused on direct engagement of forces in open terrain. It is therefore logical to expect increasing numbers of military engagements in urban areas. To be ready for the future, the Air Force must fully understand the evolving urban operational environments and organize, train and equip its forces for these challenges. This study addresses the need to develop more effective Air Force Operations in Urban Environments. The study has been conducted in response to a request by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff. In response to the Terms of Reference, the Urban Operations Study Team conducted an extensive set of visits to Air Force, Army, Marine and Joint operating commands, centers and laboratories. The Team also reviewed numerous briefings from Air Force, Army, Marine and Joint organizations concerning current and future operations, systems and procedures. The assistance of these organizations was essential to the effort, since their insights, experience and vision led the Study Team to the findings, concepts, conclusions and recommendations incorporated in this study.

Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations in Urban Terrain - Edited by Michael Desch. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, October 2001. This compendium is the result of a conference on “Military Operations in an Urban Environment” cosponsored by the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce in conjunction with the Kentucky Commission on Military Affairs, the U.S. Army War College, and the Association of the United States Army. At the time of the conference, the concept of homeland defense was emerging as an increasingly important mission for the U.S. military. Now this mission has catapulted to prominence with the attacks of September 11 and the appointment of a Director of Homeland Defense—a Cabinet-level position.

Aviation Urban Operations: Are We Training Like We Fight? - Lieutenant Todd Kempler, USMC. Air War College Maxwell Paper, September 2004. In this study, Lt Col Todd Kemper, USMC, argues that aviation urban operations, particularly urban close air support, are no longer high-risk, low-probability missions left to academic discussions, but are proving to be high-risk, high-probability missions, as witnessed during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Furthermore, the author contends that urban terrain has become the preferred battlespace of US adversaries in the early twenty-first century. This environment poses unique challenges, especially to air and space warfare. The difficulty of sorting friendlies from enemy combatants, the latter intermingled with large numbers of noncombatants in very confined spaces, creates serious dilemmas for maneuver and aviation forces. Colonel Kemper believes that this mission, though well documented, has received neither the priority nor the resources necessary to ensure operational excellence and success on the modern battlefield. Thus, he not only inquires about whether we are training like we fight, but also seeks to determine what makes aviation urban operations so complicated and unique that they require stand-alone doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Marine Corps Assault Support and the Urban Century - Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hedelund, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 2000. This paper studies and explores the unique challenges, inherent difficulties and poses some possible solutions to the conduct of helicopterborne assault support operations in support of ground forces within an urban setting. First, the paper looks at the tenets behind, and requirements for, effective assault support. This includes a rationale as to why the Marine Corps would want to employ helicopters in the urban arena and how Marine assault support fits into the picture, especially in the future concepts of OMFTS and STOM. Secondly, an examination of two historical cases reveals some lessons from past urban assault support efforts. Cases studies of Task Force Ranger in Somalia and the Russian – Chechen conflict of 1994-1996 are reviewed from an assault support perspective.

Marine Aviation: Relevant in MOUT? - Major Mark Everman, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1997.  Throughout history, many nations (to include the US. and FSU) military doctrine sought to, and continue to avoid confrontations in urban areas.  Two big reasons include slow tempo of operations and high casualties.  Since World War II, there has been a steady shift from an agrarian based society to a service oriented society all over the world.  By the year 2015, 85% of the world's population will reside the littorals with over half living in urban areas.  Adversaries will attempt to negate superior US. firepower by seeking engagements in the confines of the urban environment.  Presently, Marine aviation is capable of providing adequate support in 5 of its 6 functions.  These 5 functions all have improvements on the board that will increase their effectiveness in the future.  Aviation's current shortfall is in providing offensive air support, and there are no initiatives underway to correct it.  To do so requires a change in the mindset of its leaders, the  procurement of weapons that are suitable for that environment, and the acquisition of training areas that allow truly tactical training.

The Strategic Corporal in the Three Block War - General Charles Krulak, USMC. Marines article, 1999.  The future battlefields on which Marines fight will be increasingly hostile, lethal, and chaotic. Our success will hinge, as it always has, on the leadership of our junior Marines. We must ensure that they are prepared to lead.

Urban Warfare: Options, Problems and the Future - Daryl Press. Conference summary, 1999. This paper addresses these questions by focusing on three issues that were raised at the conference on urban warfare hosted by the Security Studies Program at MIT on May 20, 1998. The first issue involves the inevitability of urban operations and the potential costs of preparing for urban operations. Advocates of increased efforts to prepare America's Marines and Soldiers for urban fighting point out that, regardless of the strategic wisdom of urban operations, U.S. leaders frequently order troops into cities. This trend is likely to continue, they argue, so the military must prepare itself to carry out these operations. Critics of this view counter that preparations for urban operations are futile and counterproductive. They are futile because the operations will always raise unacceptable risks to U.S. troops. They are counterproductive because American political leaders will wrongly conclude that urban operations are easy; this perception may, in turn, increase the likelihood of future U.S. deployments. The best approach, according to these critics, is less emphasis on preparing for urban operations and stronger efforts at educating policy makers about the risks of urban combat.

Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025 - Robert Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior. Parameters article, Summer 1999. Our overall thesis is that high-technology weapon systems will fundamentally alter the course of urban warfare in the future. While, like today, soldiers will continue to be the most important element of urban operations, we must radically change the way they fight. The sheer economics of creating the high-tech force of 2025 will preclude us from having the large numbers required to conduct urban warfare the old-fashioned way. Even if we did have large numbers of soldiers, we are unwilling to see them killed on the scale that has historically marked urban operations in large cities. Therefore, the requirement to conduct future military operations in large cities with smaller forces demands that we produce individual soldiers with a much greater range of capabilities than exists today. We believe that the transformation of the current infantry soldier into a truly lethal urban warrior requires the development of a "2025 Urban Warfighter System" that is equal parts man and machine. Given the right doctrine, equipment, training, and leadership, US military forces will become urban warfighters par excellence, enabling us to break the current urban warfare impasse.

Can New Technologies Transform Military Operations in Urban Terrain? - Aidan Harris. Lancaster University paper, March 2003. The technologies traditionally ascribed to the current RMA phenomenon will have negligible impact on MOUT. Nevertheless, a general shift in strategic thinking toward preparing for urban battles in which the US will largely be symmetrically opposed will force the better application of existing and emerging technologies into urban forces. Therefore, we could potentially witness a revolution in urban military affairs in the near-future, through a tailored approach to urban mission requirements. The greatest potential for this revolution lies in the increasing situational awareness of the infantry, made possible through extending the range and depth of urban sensors, and the means by which data is communicated. Tasks traditionally reserved for the foot-soldier will be passed on to machines, while soldiers gain increased autonomy from their commanders through enhanced situational awareness.  A similar and concurrent political revolution could be achieved through the proper allocation of non-lethal technologies, allowing forces to apply varying degrees of force, thereby reducing casualties and increasing political propensity to deploy. Nevertheless, a gulf will continue to exist between the effectiveness of forces in open and in urban battles, where the fog of war will remain densest. In some ways, the increasing prevalence of MOUT in the future of military affairs is welcome, as it will undoubtedly add impetus to its study, and boost the pace of innovation. Potential to revolutionise urban military affairs exists, but it may prove to be a painful route in getting there.

Urban Battle Command in the Twenty-First Century - Russell Glenn and Gina Kingston. Rand study, 2005. In every operation, the functions of command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications are all fundamental to success. But in cities, the dense population, many manmade structures, and other challenges act to severely impede these functions in several ways. This monograph contemplates the nature of those challenges and proposes several recommendations to surmount them in both the short and longer terms.

Urban Sunrise: AFRL-IF-RS-TR-2004-22 Final Technical Report - Air Force Research Laboratory report, February 2004.  The URBAN SUNRISE seedling has explored the potential to enhance military urban operations planning and execution, by providing new civil intelligence preparation analysis and effects based operations (EBO) planning capabilities to the urban warfighters and occupying civil administrations. The capability will provide a comprehensive capability for construction of urban civil intelligence and will allow dynamic effects-based operations analyses to coordinate administrative, information, and military security operations for greatest effects.

Diehard Buildings: Control Architecture - A Challenge for the Urban Warrior - Military Review article, September - October 2003. How do cities control their populations, and how can the military benefit (or suffer) from current technology? How does urban design affect military mobility, responsiveness, and effectiveness? How should planners identify and consider control architecture when planning urban activities? What aspects of control technology should the military adapt and incorporate for military purposes?

Running the Gauntlet - Force Protection for Tactical Penetration in MOUT - Lieutenant Colonel Charles Knight, Australian Army. Land Warfare Conference 2000 paper, 2000.  This paper argues that well protected AFV, the ability to impose and operate within obscuration and automation of some existing combat functions might synergistically reduce the risks of operating in complex terrain and enable a manouverist capability. These means offer capability that is potentially decisive at lower to mid threat levels and still potent in higher intensity combat.

War in the 21st Century: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly - Knowing and Finding the Adversary in the Three Block War - Commander Martin Adamson, Canadian Navy. Canadian Forces College seminar paper, October 2003. This paper will assert that modern land-based conflict is evolving to encompass the model of the “three block war,” one in which the full spectrum of conflict will arise within a few hours and within a few city blocks. Enhanced surveillance as well as a deep understanding of the adversary’s motivation and culture will be key factors in determining a coalition’s success in defeating an asymmetric opponent. To chart this course, an initial review of the changing nature of war will be conducted. Evolving technologies and techniques necessary for both knowing and identifying asymmetric adversaries will then be assessed. Finally, conclusions relevant to Canada’s ability to operate within the “three block war” will be rendered.

Analysis of Casualty Rates & Patterns Likely to Result from Military Operations in Urban Environments - Colonel (Retd) RA Leitch MBE RGN, Dr. HR Champion F.R.C.S (Edin) F.A.C.S. and Dr. JF Navein MB ChB M.RC.G.P.   US Marine Corps Study, 1997.  The study was conducted as part of the U.S. Marine Corps Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory’s initiatives to develop an  perational health care doctrine in support of the U.S. Marine Corps’ emerging tactical doctrine “From the Sea”. It was tasked specifically to examine the impact of casualty rates and wounding patterns in urban operations.

The City's Many Faces: Proceedings of the Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations Conference - Dr. Russell Glenn. On April 13–14, 1999, the RAND Arroyo Center, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL), and J8 Urban Working Group (UWG) cohosted a conference on military urban operations in the Joint Military Intelligence College auditorium, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. The conference sought to provide a forum for information exchange and debate on the complete range of possible operations in urban areas likely to challenge U.S. national interests in the next generation.  This summary of proceedings will be of interest to government and commercial sector personnel whose responsibilities include policy design, funding, planning, preparation, or the development of technologies for, or the conduct of operations in, urban environments.

Ready for Armageddon: Proceedings of the 2001 RAND Arroyo-Joint ACTD-CETO-USMC Nonlethal and Urban Operations Program Urban Operations Conference - Dr. Russell Glenn, etal. On March 22–23, 2001, four organizations co-hosted the fourth annual Urban Operations Conference overseen by RAND Arroyo Center. These organizations were the Military Operations in Urban Terrain Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration, the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, the United States Marine Corps Nonlethal and Urban Operations Program, and the Arroyo Center itself. Consistent with the first three Urban Operations conferences, the objective of this cooperative effort was to identify and investigate notably critical topics of concern to those responsible for making decisions on, preparing for, and conducting operations in urban areas anywhere in the world. This document summarizes the results of the two-day conference.

The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations - Scott Gerwehr and Russell Glenn.  Rand study, 2000.  Urban operations are a significant and enduring challenge by virtually any measure; but a battle on friendly urban terrain offers the weaker of combatants a chance to reduce the advantages of a stronger adversary. Something similar might be said of deception, historically a frequent resort of the underdog. Both the battle on friendly urban terrain and the employment of deception might be fairly characterized as asymmetric strategies, aimed at reducing an opponent’s strengths and exposing his weaknesses. The admixture of these two strategies—when deception is employed in the urban environment— presents a powerful synergy.

Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat - Dr. Russell Glenn. Rand study, 1998.  Contemporary international and domestic security environments increasingly demand United States armed services’ and unified commands’ commitment to military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT). The nation’s soldiers and marines have been fighting in cities for much of the nation’s history, but there is evidence that traditional definitions of success under such conditions may no longer apply. Success in accomplishing the assigned military mission can fall short of national political objectives if the cost of that accomplishment includes too great a loss of American or noncombatant life. This report provides an analysis of the U.S. Army’s readiness to undertake modern MOUT missions; it also notes shortfalls in the nation’s other armed services’ urban operations readiness as appropriate.

Combat Stress Reactions and Their Implications for Urban Warfare - Todd Helmus and Russell Glenn. Rand study, 2005. Combat stress casualties are not necessarily higher in city operations than operations on other types of terrain. Commanders and NCOs need to have the skills to treat and prevent stress casualties and understand their implications for urban operations. The authors review the known precipitants of combat stress reaction, its battlefield treatment, and the preventive steps commanders can take to limit its extent and severity.

Corralling the Trojan Horse: A Proposal for Improving U.S. Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period 2000-2025 - Russell Glenn, Randall Steeb and John Matsumura. Rand study, 2000.  The challenges of today’s urban operations arise from the vast expanses of man-made structures, the tens of thousands of innocent civilians, and the need to preserve friendly force and noncombatant lives as well as physical infrastructure. Successfully addressing these challenges requires moving away from a reliance on the predominantly firepower-based doctrines of the past. This document provides one such alternative.

The Battle for Fallujah: The Underlying Military Issues - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2004. Urban warfare can be highly unpredictable. There is a tendency to assume that because some of the bloodiest battles in history have occurred in cities, all such battles are bloody.  In practice, many urban defenses collapse almost immediately, partly through inexperience but more often because the defender is not committed to an almost suicidal form of last ditch combat. The rapid fall of Baghdad in 2003 is a good example of a rapid collapse caused by both military incompetence on the part of defender (and high confidence on the part of the attacker) and a lack of commitment to final combat. Fallujah seems far more likely to have a determined set of defenders, although this is not certain. It certainly has enough armed Islamists and potential diehards, and Zarqawi and others have already promised a bitter battle.

Rules of Engagement in Military Operations Other Than War: From Beirut to Bosnia - Major Herman Broadstone, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1996.  With the end of the Cold War and a break up of world order Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) have been on the increase. In these operations it is often difficult to define an enemy and an exact mission. There is also a strong desire to limit the use of military force to prevent an escalation of the situation beyond a politically acceptable means. The measure used to control this are the rules of engagement (ROE). They define guidelines for the commander and forces committed concerning when the use of force is authorized and to what extent. Of primacy within the ROE is the right to self-defense which can never be denied regardless of the situation. The uncertainty of the mission and a changing political environment often cause the mission to change or creep. As this happens the ROE must be changed to match the mission. This has failed to happen on many occasions. The ROE must be in concert with the mission.

Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and Operation Rio - William Mendel. US Army Foreign Military Studies Office paper, July 1996. The U.S. military experience during the 1992 Los Angeles Riots and the 1995 experience of the Brazilian Armed Forces in countering criminals in Rio de Janeiro offer insights for civilian and military leaders. These kinds of domestic support operations have made the military-law enforcement nexus an important dimension of today's national security environment. They underscore the importance of up-to-date procedures for interagency coordination, and renewed military doctrine and training. Lawlessness and organized crime are increasingly necessary components of national security analysis and military planning.2 For example, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1996 has identified international crime as a national security threat requiring the same military mission support previously extended to countering terrorism and illicit drugs. The Strategy projects an increasing linkage of military and law enforcement establishments in counter-crime missions. Criminal activity is woven into many security threats. Examples are weapons proliferation (including black market trading of nuclear material), the linkages of drug trafficking and other crime to terrorism and insurgency, illegal immigration, and areas in megacities where government control and services have eroded. Countering unlawful activities is not a new army mission, as remembered by President George Washington's response to the Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. Contemporary events demonstrate that crime is increasingly threatening democratic governments as they try to cope with various dangers described above. In this paper, military support to domestic civil authorities is seen from the perspective of the American and Brazilian military leaders involved. These comparative experiences from two different environments offer some ideas about the roles of armed forces.

Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots - Christopher Schnaubelt. Parameters article, Summer 1997.  This article examines two attributes of operations other than war that are likely to influence command and control and thus affect directly the outcome of the mission: the absence of an obvious continuum or linear relationship between the strategic, operational, and tactical consequences of action, and the requirement for interagency coordination even at relatively low echelons. The article uses the 1992 Los Angeles riots to illustrate some of the unique characteristics of this type of mission: the situation was "amorphous and ambiguous," the use of force was greatly restrained, coordination with nonmilitary entities was often required at battalion and lower echelons, and political considerations governed military actions at even the individual level.

My Clan Against the World” - US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994 - Robert Baumann, Lawrence Yates and Versalle Washington. US Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004. “My Clan Against the World”: US and Coalition Operations in Somalia, 1992-94 represents another in a series of military case studies published by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The impetus for this project came from the commanding general, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, who directed CSI to examine the American military’s experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. That original focus can be found in the following pages, but the authors address other, broader issues as well, to include planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand. This case study also cautions against the misuse and overuse of “lessons” learned from any given military undertaking. As with the lessons of Vietnam, one of which dictated that conventional units should not engage in unconventional warfare, the US experience in Somalia left many military analysts and policymakers convinced that the United States should eschew any undertaking that smacked of nation building. Yet, as this book is published, just ten years after the US exit from Somalia, American forces are engaged in several locations against an unconventional foe and are involved in nation building in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps the first lesson to be learned about extracting lessons is, in the words of a once-popular motion picture, “Never Say Never Again.”

Task Force Ranger: A Case Study Examining the Application of Advanced Technologies in Modern Urban Warfare - Frank Akers, Jr. Department of Energy study, November 2000.  The purpose of this case study is to review the events surrounding the firefight that took place on October 3, 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, from a technology perspective. The focus is on how current technology could influence a similar incident and how technology could be used in a similar operation to reduce the number of causalities and to mitigate collateral damage in future combat situations.

Hue, the Mirror on the Pole View Around the Corner to Future Urban Combat - Major Jonathan Hull, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis. The United States Marine Corps has adopted Operational Maneuver From the Sea, and in conjunction with this revolutionized means of power projection, is evaluating small, highly mobile "Killer Team" organizations, heavily reliant on technology and indirect firepower, as the executor of operations ashore. The preponderance of the world's population, cities, and market centers are located on the littorals, where naval forces will find themselves engaged. This being the case, Marines must expect to fight in urban areas. An examination of the Battle for Hue in the Republic of Vietnam during the Tet Offensive of 1968, serves to illustrate that these small conceptual Killer Teams would be greatly pressed, and most likely fail in urban combat.

Armor Evens the Odds in Two Urban Battles: A Tale of Two Cities - Hue and Khorramshahr - Lieutenant Colonel Robert Lamont, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, 1999.  This article reviews the role of armor in the urban battlespace with an eye toward how history can assist in charting the way ahead. In looking at areas around the globe, beyond the confines of the former Warsaw Pact, 75 percent of politically significant urban areas are located within 150 miles of the sea. These Key factors, proximity to the littoral battlespace and frequency of conflict, coupled with continued economic growing pains of a global marketplace, make the Third World urban setting a dangerous place well into the next century.

View From the Wolves' Den - The Chechens and Urban Operations - David Dilegge. Small Wars and Insurgencies article, 2001.  In 1998, the United States Marine Corps was presented with an opportunity to conduct interviews with Chechen commanders and key staff officers who participated in combat operations against Russian forces in the 1994-1996 conflict.  The Corps was particularly interested in obtaining the Chechen view as it was then conducting a series of experiments (Urban Warrior) designed to improve its capability to conduct urban operations. Having studied the horrendous losses the Russians experienced during its first incursion into Grozny, and faced with the dilemma of finding solutions to the high casualty rate inherent to the city fight, the Marines thought it prudent to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.

David Slays Goliath: A Chechen Perspective on the War in Chechnya (1994 - 1996) - Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Jackson, USMC.  Marine Corps Wargaming Division paper, 2000.  On 11 December 1994, 40,000 troops of the Russian Army attacked into the breakaway republic of Chechnya, with the intent of removing Chechen separatist leader, Jokhar Dudayev, and replacing his government with one more favorable to Moscow. Two years later, the last units of the Russian force withdrew from Chechnya, culminating two years of humiliation at the hands of a much smaller and far more modestly equipped foe.

General-Major Tourpal-Ali Kaimov - On Urban Warfare in Chechnya - David Dilegge. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity paper, 2000.  In 1998, the United States Marine Corps was presented with an opportunity to conduct interviews with Chechen commanders and key staff officers who participated in combat operations against Russian forces in the 1994-1996 conflict. The Corps was particularly interested in obtaining the Chechen view as it was then conducting a series of experiments (Urban Warrior) designed to improve its capability to conduct urban operations. Having studied the horrendous losses the Russians experienced during its first incursion into Grozny, and faced with the dilemma of finding solutions to the high casualty rate inherent to the city fight, the Marines thought it prudent to gain the perspective of those who had planned and conducted an urban insurgency against a modern conventional force.

Tactical Observations from the Grozny Combat Experience - Major Brett Jenkinson, USA. US Army Command and General Staff College thesis, 2002.  The Russian battles for Grozny, Chechnya provide relevant contemporary examples for the study of urban combat involving modern, conventional forces on one side and a guerrilla force on the other. The first and fourth battles for Grozny, a city of nearly a half million people, were the major Russian assaults to seize the city from the Chechens during the latter’s struggle for secession from the Russian Federation. This thesis provides an explanation of the historical method used, a history of the Chechen-Russian relations leading to the battles, a description of the first and fourth battles, their lessons learned, and an analysis of the value of those lessons learned. This thesis provides a frame of reference for future urban combat and highlights valuable techniques to improve urban combat military theory.

The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat - Timothy Thomas. Parameters article, Summer 1999. The battle for Grozny, the capital of the small Russian Republic of Chechnya, took place in January 1995. It pitted a hastily assembled and unprepared Russian force against a Chechen force of regulars and guerrillas equipped with Russian weapons and a belief in their cause. The Chechens held their own for three weeks but eventually lost the city to the Russian armed forces in late January (the Chechens retook the city in August 1996). Both sides learned or relearned many lessons of urban combat, most of them the hard way. This article examines the most important of those lessons, the interesting and perhaps surprising conclusions drawn by the Russians about modern urban warfare, and their implications for US soldiers and urban warfare theory.

Lessons Learned from the Battle of Grozny, 1994-1995 - Cadet Sean McCafferty. US Military Academy paper, May 2000. Historically, MOUT has always been the bloodiest type of battle, from the Peloponnesian War over two thousand years ago to the first Battle of Grozny, only five years ago. MOUT is not a mission, nor is it simply a type of terrain. Instead, MOUT is an entirely different environment. Military Operations in Urban Terrain are going to be unavoidable in the future: the world’s cities are going to be the battleground. First, cities are naturally strategically key terrain. Cities are usually the economic, political, and psychological centers of gravity of states. Cities are where the nation keeps its treasured possessions, museums, banks, and businesses.

Echoes of Chechnya Warfare Resound in Moscow, Quantico - Robert Ackerman. Link to Signal Magazine article, 2000.  Several months of Russian attacks have shifted the balance of power in Chechnya and changed U.S. thinking about urban warfare. After suffering stunning public defeats just a few years ago, Russian forces applied painful lessons learned then to drive Chechen forces out of their capital city, Grozny, this year. Yet, according to U.S. analysts, this may have merely altered the thrust of battle, not resolved it. And, the tactics employed by both sides are forcing U.S. experts to take another look at the concept of urban warfare.

Russia's Chechen Wars 1994 - 2000: Lessons from Urban Combat - Olga Oliker. Rand study, 2001.An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planning and carrying out urban operations in Chechnya. Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city of Grozny in the winters of 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing in smaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why the combatants' approaches changed over time.

Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny - Lester Grau. INSS Strategic Forum article, July 1995. Combat in cities is not an easy option for any army and makes inordinate demands on logistics and available manpower. Soviet urban tactics were designed to complement large-scale high-tempo offensive operations on the territory of a foreign country. Undefended enemy cities would be captured from the march. Defended cities would be bypassed. The enemy was a foreign professional soldier who had no desire to participate in the destruction of his own cities and would prefer declaring an open city instead of seeing it reduced to rubble. Today's political and military reality no longer fit the underlying Soviet assumptions of urban combat. Now, irregular forces, whose political agenda is strengthened by the destruction of cities, fight Russian forces on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Recent fighting for Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, led to the revision of Russian urban tactics. While the initial Russian attack was a debacle, the Russian Army pulled itself together and eventually captured the city. Since then, the Russian Army has been slowly improving on its performance, refitting its forces and concentrating on finishing the fight. Since much went wrong, the Russians are studying the lessons from that combat and updating their urban tactics.

Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles For Grozny - Lester Grau and Timothy Thomas. Marine Corps Gazette article, April 2000. Two years ago, Mr. Thomas gave a conference briefing on the Russian lessons learned from the first battle for Grozny (January 1995). Apparently, a conference participant put his notes of the briefing on the Internet and these notes have enjoyed a long run. However, some of the notes were slightly exaggerated from the original presentation. With the third battle of Grozny just concluded (second battle was August 1996, third battle January 2000), The Marine Corps Gazette decided to reprint the original lessons learned with minor adjustments from Mr. Thomas, and add FMSO's Russian lessons learned from their subsequent battles for Grozny. The latter represents the joint work of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Grau.

Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict - Major Robert Cassidy, USA. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, February 2003. Asymmetric warfare poses some of the most pressing and complex challenges faced by the United States today. As American defense leaders and strategic thinkers adapt to this era of asymmetry, it is important that we learn both from our own experience and from that of other nations which have faced asymmetric enemies. In this monograph, Major Robert Cassidy uses a detailed assessment of the Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya to draw important conclusions about asymmetric warfare. He then uses this to provide recommendations for the U.S. military, particularly the Army. Major Cassidy points out that small wars are difficult for every great power, yet are the most common kind. Even in this era of asymmetry, the U.S. Army exhibits a cultural preference for the “big war” paradigm. He suggests that the U.S. military in general, including the Army, needs a cultural transformation to master the challenge of asymmetry fully. From this will grow doctrine and organizational change.

Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas - Ali Jalali and Lester Grau. Infantry article, January-April 1999. Urban guerrilla combat is difficult for the urban guerrilla and the regular force. Throughout the war, the Soviets and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) forces were never able to completely control the major cities of Kandahar and Herat. Finally, the Soviets bombed 75% of Herat and virtually the entire Kandahar suburb into rubble. That still failed to stop the urban guerrillas. The DRA and Soviets had more success in controlling the capital city of Kabul--but still were unable to stop the rocket attacks and guerrilla actions. Surviving urban guerrillas are harder to find to interview than guerrillas who fought in the country. Urban guerrillas are surrounded by potential informants and government spies. They must frequently move around unarmed and the government can usually react to their actions much faster than they can in the countryside. The urban guerrilla must be anonymous and ruthless to survive. For this reason, urban guerrilla groups were usually small and fought back with short-duration actions. Many urban guerrillas lived in the countryside or suburbs and only entered the cities for combat. The Soviets and DRA devoted a great deal of effort to finding and eliminating the urban guerrilla. Many innocent civilians were victims of this hunt. The authors are grateful to the urban guerrillas who provided these candid interviews.

A 'Crushing' Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 2000 - Lester Grau. Marine Corps Gazette article, August 2000. Following a deliberate advance across the northern Chechen plains in October through December 1999, the Russian Army closed on the Chechen capital city of Grozny and the foothills of the imposing Caucasus mountains. There, the advance stopped. The Russians began the new century with a renewed assault on Grozny. The Russians continued their deliberate urban advance and, after forty days of fighting, the smoking ruins of Grozny were theirs. Unlike the first battle for Grozny (in late 1994-early 1995) or the recapture of the city by the Chechens (in 1996), the Russians now used quantities of fuel-air weapons, along with iron bombs, surface-to-surface missiles with high-explosive warheads, massed artillery and tank fire. These flattened large sections of the city and crushed the opposing force.

Urban Warfare Communications: A Contemporary Russian View - Lester Grau. Red Thrust Star article, July 1996. Russian combat experience in urban warfare includes World War II, fighting in Budapest during the 1956 Hungarian revolution, and fighting in Herat and Kandahar during the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan War. In December 1994, the Russian Army entered the breakaway Republic of Chechnya and attempted to capture the capital city of Grozny from the march. After this attempt failed, the Russian Army spent two months in deliberate house-to-house fighting before they finally captured the city. Fighting still occurs sporadically in Grozny. During the battle for Grozny, Russian forces experienced difficulty in communicating within the city. Russian ground forces, like other ground forces, did not train for communicating on urban terrain in their training centers, since the training centers are never big enough to replicate the special communication problems of a city. Furthermore, they did not replicate the need for units to share identical frequencies in urban combat. Additionally, their unit training emphasized the use of FM and UHF radio, whereas the modern urban landscape already contains cellular phones, computer nets, fiber optic cable and other modern communications systems. Once a fighting force enters a city, communications pose distinct problems. The force fragments and loses sight of flanking elements. Radios often don't work or work sporadically. If the civilian telephone system is inoperable, senior commanders may initially be unable to control the battle. In this case, the battle quickly becomes a platoon leader's fight. The Russian Army is conducting a self-appraisal of its on-going performance in the fighting in Chechnya. Russian military theoreticians are paying close attention to the conduct of urban combat.

“Soft Log” and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny - Lester Grau and Timothy Thomas. Marine Corps Gasette article, October 1999. Although logistics is a major concern of warfare, comparatively little has been written about logistics when compared to writings about the tactical and strategic aspects of various wars. As a subset, very little has been written about logistical support of urban combat. One historic precept of urban combat logistics is that ammunition expenditure increases dramatically when fighting in cities. Recent Russian experience in fighting for the Chechen capital city of Grozny in January/February 1995 demonstrated that ammunition resupply was not the only problem. Demands on maintenance, supply, transport and medical support surpassed the capabilities of TO&E logistics units. Logistics demands were further increased by the requirement to provide humanitarian relief during the course of the fighting. Russian tactics, techniques and operational concepts for urban combat were based on their broad experience in the Great Patriotic War [World War II]. There were three underlying assumptions that shaped the Soviet/Russian concept of future urban combat. First, urban combat would be fought in nearly "empty" foreign cities where the bulk of the local civilian populace had left. Second, that the enemy force in the city would be a conventional military force. Third, that the army would have a period of conventional combat to fully develop procedures and identify problems before it began that most-difficult mission-- fighting in a city. None of these assumptions proved correct in the fighting in Grozny. The civilians had no place to go and did not expect such extreme fighting, so they sat tight while the fighting engulfed the city. The Russian Army, as the sole government representative, was expected to provide food, shelter, clean water, sewage, electricity, and medical treatment to the civilians (who were citizens of the Russian Federation). The Russian TO&E combat service support units were barely able to sustain the Russian Army, let alone the large civilian populace, due to the increased demands of urban combat. It was beyond their capability and the civilians suffered. Eventually, the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) helped restore these facilities.

Mars and Hippocrates in Megapolis: Urban Combat and Medical Support - Lester Grau and Commander Charles Gbur Jr. (USNR). U.S. Army Medical Department Journal article, January-March 2003. “Don’t go there” is the conventional wisdom for military forces and cities.  However, with the advent of high-precision weapons, many of the world’s forces can no longer maneuver freely on open terrain and have been forced to move to difficult terrain to negate the effectiveness of high-precision weaponry and to regain maneuver.  Forests, jungle, mountains, swamp and cities have long been the terrain of choice for less-technologically equipped forces to maximize their situational awareness and combat capabilities.  The United States Armed Forces may have to fight guerrillas, paramilitary forces or conventional forces in cities.  Military medical support will share the burden of this tough fight.  Casualties may be high.  Last summer, a specially trained 980-man Marine Corps force “fought” a 160-man opposing force during an urban exercise in California.  The Marines eventually took the housing area at a loss of some 100 casualties. Compared to earlier urban exercises, Marine casualties were light, but the exercise was not a protracted conflict—which urban combat is likely to be. Is there a unique role that military medicine will play in support of urban combat?  The physician will still remove bullets and shrapnel or treat burns and disease.  However, medical support to the combatants will pose some special tactical problems, particularly with finding the wounded, evacuating the patient, types of injuries encountered, preventive medicine, medical intelligence and protection of medical facilities and patients.

Handling the Wounded in a Counter-Guerrilla War: the Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya - Lester Grau and Dr. William Jorgensen. Military Review article, July-August 2000. The Soviet Union intervened in the Afghanistan Civil War on Christmas Day 1979 to restore a weak and faltering communist government that was rapidly slipping out of control. The Soviets expected little resistance and apparently had no plan for staying longer than three years. They were there for nine years, one month and eighteen days. Soviet Army medical personnel were also there for the duration fighting disease and wounds. While they were there, they improved casualty-handling and surgical support. Consequently, during the latter part of the war, they saved many lives that would have been lost earlier. They applied many of these lessons to the war in the break-away Republic of Chechnya. Many of their lessons learned can be applied to other modern forces fighting on rugged and urban terrain.

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain: The 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry, at Aachen, October 1944 - Dr. Christopher Gabel. US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992. On 8 October 1944, Hodges undertook the encirclement of Aachen, with the 30th Infantry Division of XIX Corps attacking from the north and the 1st Infantry Division of VII Corps from the south. German resistance was stiff and progress slow, prompting Hodges to begin the reduction of Aachen before the encirclement was complete. A surrender ultimatum delivered to the German garrison in Aachen on 10 October brought no response: Hitler had designated Aachen as a "fortress," meaning it was to be held to the last man.

The Battle for Seoul - Brigadier General Edwin Simmons, USMC (Ret.). US Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School address, March 1985. We were successful at Inchon and Seoul - and that success I think can be attributed to the quality of leadership at all levels. From the division commander, Major General Oliver P. Smith, on down, virtually every officer and non-commissioned officer was a World War II veteran. In my company I had corporals who could do a platoon sergeant's job and do it well, and in fact were so soon doing. The Reserves that filled up our ranks at Camp Pendleton were outstanding - indistinguishable from the Regulars.

The Battle for Hue - Brigadier General Edwin Simmons, USMC (Ret.). Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center's Read Ahead Package - Urban Warrior War Game One, 1998.  With and invisibility almost incomprehensible to Occidentals, the North Vietnamese had infiltrated two regiments of regulars into the ancient imperial capital of Hue to join the local force Viet Cong units already embedded in the city. After midnight on 30 January 1968, as part of North Vietnam's great Tet offensive; these forces materialized behind a thundering rocket and mortar barrage and seized most of the city in an iron grip.

The Battle for Hue - Lieutenant General Ernest Cheatham (USMC Ret.) and Lieutenant General George Christmas (USMC Ret.).  Notes from the 23 January 1998 Hue City Professional Military Education (PME) brief presented by LtGen Cheatham, then Commanding Officer 2nd Battalion 5th Marines (2/5); and LtGen Christmas, then Commanding Officer Hotel Company 2/5 (H 2/5); to the Urban Warrior Commander’s Conference at Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia.

Lessons Learned: Charlie 1/5, Operation Hue City - First Lieutenant Scott Nelson (USMC), Second Lieutenant Nick Warr (USMC) and Second Lieutenant Travis Curd (USMC). Even under the best of circumstances, street fighting is a bloody business. This was, in the end, the ultimate lesson learned by the United States Marine Corps personnel who participated in this historical battle, considered by many to be the bloodiest of the Vietnam War.

Battleground Saigon - John McManus. Vietnam Magazine article.  The infiltrators would spring their surprise on Tet, the Vietnamese lunar new year and one of the country's biggest holidays. Previous years had seen a wary truce during Tet, but not 1968. The Communists expected to be able to overwhelm the ARVN forces, rally the South Vietnamese people to their cause and destroy the Saigon government.

The Battle for Saigon - David Zabecki. Vietnam Magazine article. The key to Giap's plan was the concept of the "General Offensive," borrowed from Chinese Communist doctrine. Following the General Offensive, in a one-two punch combination, would come the "General Uprising," wherein the people of the South would rally to the Communist cause and bring down the Saigon government. The General Uprising was a distinctly Vietnamese element of revolutionary dogma.

Northern Ireland: The Time And Place For Urban Terror - Major Michael Maloney, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College seminar paper, 1985.  This is a study of urban guerrilla warfare in Northern Ireland and principally the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Inherent in such a study are several major obstacles. First, guerrillas involved in guerrilla warfare, and particularly a war that is still occurring by obvious necessity do not write much; thus, primary source material from that side is difficult to come by. Of some assistance in this report was Sean MacStiofain's autobiographical work, Revolutionary in Ireland. Naturally, his biases must be taken into account, but propaganda aside, MacStiofain provided insight into the formative years of the Provisional IRA, the organizational mindset, strategy, and tactics. Finally, his perspective formed an interesting contrast to the more abundant pro-British, anti-terrorist literature. As Richard Clutterbuck, a well-known author of several works on terrorism to include Northern Ireland, observes in Guerrillas and Terrorists, "All those who write (on Northern Ireland) are, with varying degrees of passion, partisans of one side or the other."  In the midst of Clutterbuck's substantial contributions to the literature and his numerous revealing insights, this concise observation is perhaps his moofound. In one brief sentence he describes the emotions, the biases, the polarity and distorted objectivity which confront the uninitiated researcher and leave him dazed and wandering like the legendary Irish traveler wading through a pasture of Ireland's mythical "sleepy grass."

A Change In Tactics? - The Urban Insurgent - First Lieutenant Robert Black, USAF. Air University Review article, January-February 1972. During the mid-morning hours of 8 October 1967, young Mario Teran, a Bolivian army sergeant, very hesitantly entered the back room of an old brick schoolhouse near the Yuro Canyon in southern Bolivia. A few seconds later, a burst of gunfire was heard, and then all was quiet. Inside the building lay the lifeless body of Ernesto “Che” Guevara. This killing not only was the culmination of an abortive eleven-month attempt aimed at a violent overthrow of the Bolivian government but also seemed to serve as a turning point in guerrilla theory.

Urban Dispersion Program - August 2005 Field Study - The New York City Urban Dispersion Program is a four-year (2004-2007) research project whose major objective is to study how air flows in a city environment. During three field studies, the collected data will be used to improve and validate computer models that simulate the atmospheric movement of contaminants within cities, and around, into and within building interiors. Each field study is designed to evaluate seasonal variations in the New York City area. The first of the field studies occurred in March, 2005. The second field study is scheduled August 6-26. A third field study is planned for the spring of 2006. Data analysis and final results from the field samples are scheduled to be complete in 2007.

The Muscatatuck Urban Training Center - The Muscatatuck Urban Training Center (MUTC) is developing to become a full-immersion contemporary urban operating environment. It will be a place where both civilian and military organizations can set the standards, improve the skills and test the systems and concepts to "Defend the Homeland" and "Win the Peace". MUTC is a small town with 70 buildings on 1,000 acres. Furnished infrastructure includes a water treatment plant, power house, 180 acre reservoir and an underground utility tunnel system that connects 90% of the buildings on the installation. This site has the capability to conduct doctrinal and non-doctrinal Department of Defense and Department of the Homeland Security events for more than 2,500 individuals. This joint training capability will achieve and sustain national preparedness through the conduct of systemic and periodic rehearsal of homeland security missions.