Transition / Post-Conflict / End-State / Exit Strategy
In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities - Brent Scowcroft, Samuel Berger and William Nash. Council on Foreign Relations report, July 2005. Two years after the United States invaded Iraq, the turmoil there is a daily reminder that winning a war also requires winning the peace. A dramatic military victory has been overshadowed by chaos and bloodshed in the streets of Baghdad, difficulty in establishing security or providing essential services, and a deadly insurgency. The costs—human, military, economic—are high and continue to mount. For some years, foreign policy experts have debated the desirability and necessity of intervening in “internal” conflicts. In today’s world of failed states, terrorism, proliferation, and civil conflict, the trend is clear: the United States will often be drawn into complex situations when they affect its national security or its conscience. Without improved capacities and better organization, the United States will waste time, energy, and critical resources putting together ad hoc responses that may imperil military gains. This Task Force calls on the president to make improving America’s post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization capabilities a top foreign policy priority. More specific recommendations include: preparing the U.S. military to undertake post-conflict missions; putting together a coherent military and civilian interagency effort under the leadership of the National Security Council; making the State Department the lead agency for the civilian side of post-conflict reconstruction; appointing the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as the agency responsible for managing daily operations in the field; and strengthening the capacity of the intelligence community to play a larger and more useful role in supporting stabilization efforts.
Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations - Major General General Peter Chiarelli (USA) and Major Patrick Michaelis (USA). Military Review article, July-August 2005. For the last 3 decades serving as an Army officer, the traditional military training model prepared me to win our Nation’s wars on the plains of Europe, or the deserts of the Middle East. I envisioned large, sweeping formations; coordinating and synchronizing the battlefield functions to create that “point of penetration;” and rapidly exploiting the initiative of that penetration to achieve a decisive maneuver against the armies that threatened the sovereignty of my country. But in Baghdad, that envisioned 3-decade-old concept of reality was replaced by a far greater sense of purpose and cause. Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace. Penetration did not occur merely through synchronization of the battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement; training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond short-term infrastructure improvement; and, an information operations (IO) campaign that supported the cultural realities of the area of operations. The proverbial “point of penetration” for the 1st Cavalry Division and the coalition occurred on 30 January 2005. Millions of eligible Iraqi citizens, from across the sectarian divides, triumphed over a fractured insurgency and terrorist threat in a show of defiance never before seen across the Middle East. The purple index finger, proudly displayed, became a symbol of defiance and hope. The Iraqi people proved to the world their willingness to try democracy in whatever unique form evolves. Task Force Baghdad’s campaign to “win the peace” in Iraq has forced us, as an instrument of national power, to change the very nature of what it means to fight.2 Although trained in the controlled application of combat power, we quickly became fluent in the controlled application of national power. We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought. Our own mentality of a phased approach to operations boxed our potential into neat piles the insurgent and terrorist initially exploited.
“Stay the Course”: Nine Planning Themes for Stability and Reconstruction Operations - Lieutenant Colonel David Cavaleri, USA (Ret.). Military Review article, July-August 2005. When U.S. President George W. Bush declared an end to Phase III (Decisive Operations) of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on 1 May 2003, one could almost hear the global sigh of relief from a world that naively assumed the “hard work” was finished. But those in a position to appreciate the complex operational environment understood all too well that the hard work was far from over. Operation Iraqi Freedom has been underway for over 2 years, during which time the Army has conducted decisive combat operations as well as stability and reconstruction operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, explains why the United States executed OIF: “When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the U.S. national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. . . . In such cases the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities in terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.” “Win quickly” the coalition did, if one defines “winning” only in terms of defeating an enemy’s conventional combat capabilities. However, JP 3-0 recognizes that achieving the intended end state of a campaign is much more complex: “Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of military operations need to be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national goals.” In other words, the Army becomes involved in stability and reconstruction operations in addition to decisive combat when both are required to attain strategic objectives.
The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development - Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Natsios, USAR. Parameters article, Autumn 2005. The US foreign assistance community is in the midst of the most fundamental shift in policy since the inception of the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II. The events of 11 September 2001 suddenly and unexpectedly forced the United States to confront a historic challenge equal in magnitude to the Soviet threat of the Cold War. The tragedy initiated a series of changes leading to the most extensive government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. No agency has undergone a greater degree of internal review and transformation than the US Agency for International Development (USAID). For better or worse, USAID is on the front lines of the dominating news stories of the day, whether engaging in reconstruction work in Afghanistan or providing tsunami relief in South Asia. This renewed prominence is not an accident. On the contrary, President George W. Bush’s Administration has made development work a national security priority; the September 2002 National Security Strategy underscores development as one of three strategic areas of emphasis (along with diplomacy and defense), and clearly states that “including all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of US international policy." This new development climate has brought about internal recognition in the agency that it requires a more uniform and consistent set of guiding principles, and that these principles must accurately reflect how USAID approaches development from all levels—from day-to-day project operations to high-level policy decisions. Drawing on more than 40 years of institutional development experience and building on a series of recent policy strategies, including U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century and the Fragile States Strategy,2 this article presents the Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development, comprising ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and accountability. The purpose of this article is to introduce and analyze the Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development to the military community.
Implications of DoD Directive 3000 - Douglas Johnson. US Army Strategic Studies Institute paper, July 2005. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000: Department of Defense Capabilities for Stability Operations (DRAFT) has now progressed through two or three iterations and appears to be approaching formal publication. The directive could be one of the most important documents of this decade, whether properly or improperly written and interpreted. Beginning with a statement of DoD policy “that Stability Operations are a core U.S. military mission and . . . shall be accorded priority and attention comparable to combat operations,” it is clear that what has been done since at least 1846, when Major General Winfield Scott’s forces occupied and administered Mexico City, is about to be formalized and more importantly resourced in meaningful terms. The thrust of the directive’s early evolutions strongly suggests a significant commitment of resources, as well as the extension of stability operations awareness into every campaign plan and specifically the full development of the stability operations phase.
War and the Art of Governance - Nadia Schadlow. Parameters article, Autumn 2003. On April 2003, jubilant crowds and US troops toppled the statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad and drew down the curtain on the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Within hours of the liberation of Baghdad, amid spreading disorder and growing expectations, debate began over the reconstruction challenges ahead. Criticism and frustration with the chaos on the ground intensified over the apparent failure of the United States to plan adequately for the restoration of political and economic order once major combat operations had ended. The root of Washington’s failure to anticipate the political disorder in Iraq rests precisely in the characterization of these challenges as “postwar” problems, a characterization used by virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The Iraq situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance of civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to consider the establishment of political and economic order as a part of war itself. The point is not academic. It is central to any effective reconstruction strategy in future wars and has profound implications for the military’s planning, command arrangements, and implementation of current and future governance operations.
What do You do For an Encore? - Colonel Christopher Conlin, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, October 2004. The following article will outline how we in 1st Battalion, 7th Marines addressed the daunting issue of what are often called “Transition Operations” in Baghdad. Of course, no one operates in isolation, and this article should hopefully address the great support we received from our higher and adjacent commands. But it will also identify some thoughts on how we can better affect these operations when presented with similar circumstances. Additionally, this will be the first of a series of articles that also address the challenge of what are being called “Stability Operations” as we further refined our tactics in the Southern city of Najaf. These articles will provide a little history, a bit of perspective, some strong opinions, and some suggestions on what to do if you find yourself similarly challenged.
The Exit Strategy Myth and the End State Reality - David Bame, US Department of State. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 2001. While the term “exit strategy” has become synonymous with questions about U.S. military deployments, U.S. officials have failed to apply the more important concept of “end state” as successfully as possible. Military end states, as necessary elements of military planning and conduct, can help refine strategic and diplomatic end states that sometimes become clouded by changes in circumstance.
Exit Strategy Delusions - Jeffrey Record. Parameters article, Winter 2001-2002. During the past decade of US military interventions in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Balkans, there has been a rising clamor on Capitol Hill and within the Pentagon for "clear exit strategies" before resorting to force overseas. It is believed that road maps for post-intervention military extrication can and must be crafted in advance of military action, and that such maps can and must be followed throughout the course of intervention. The United States remains stuck in the Balkans, and came close to being sucked into a Vietnam-like quagmire in Somalia, some argue, because the Clinton Administration allowed the missions there to expand without inquiring into the likely consequences. The Clinton Administration failed to follow the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine--the military's professional take on the lessons of the Vietnam War, which demands both clear objectives and the use of overwhelming force to achieve those objectives swiftly and conclusively. Obviously, it is foolish to undertake military action without having clear ideas on political purpose and the connection between that purpose and the military means selected to achieve it. Strategy is a plan of military action to accomplish a political object. A resort to force motivated by simple frustration and without contemplation of the enemy's probable response does not pass for strategy, as the Clinton Administration did indeed learn when it launched its initially feeble air "war" against Serbia in the spring of 1999. Strategy requires formulation of a desired political end-state and the appropriate application of sufficient force to achieve that end-state. Getting into a war without a reasonable idea of how to get out of it--i.e., without a concept of success--doomed US military intervention in Vietnam. That said, the idea of a sure-fire, pre-hostilities road map to post-hostilities military extrication is a delusion. Having a concept of success is always good, but having a healthy appreciation of the difficulties of maintaining it in the face of war's vicissitudes is even better.
Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations - Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Benson (USA) and Captain Christopher Thrash (USA). Parameters article, Autumn 1996. Responsibility for ending support of a peace operation may be one of the more challenging features of the post-Cold War environment. It has certainly proven to be one of the most controversial, as our involvement in Somalia demonstrated. The enormous scale of human misery associated with recent complex humanitarian relief operations--often the result of civil conflict--complicates decisions about ending our support for them. However, unless decisions are made, sometimes a priori, about the limits of our involvement in those operations, we could find ourselves once again unable to recognize the desired endstate when we reach it. Exit strategies can be based on the passage of time, the occurrence of events or, most often, a combination of the two. The initial decision to stay a year in the former Yugoslavia is an example of a time-determined exit. Events in humanitarian relief operations, such as the resettlement of a certain number of Kurds, or unanticipated incidents, such as the 3-4 October 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, can also mark the beginning of the end of US support for specific operations.
Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success - Colonel William Flavin, USA (Ret.). Parameters article, Autumn 2003. Conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict. US doctrine holds that the goal of military operations is to set conditions that compel belligerents’ decisionmakers to end hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Current joint doctrine thus recognizes that although coercive military operations may end, the conflict may continue under other means such as terrorism, insurgency, cyber war, economic disruptions, political actions, or acts of civil disobedience. Although the military may be engaged in a “post-conflict” peace operation, the belligerents may continue their struggle using these other means. The keys to successful conflict termination include the following fundamentals: conducting early interagency planning; establishing workable objectives, goals, and end states; providing for adequate intelligence and signaling; ensuring unity of effort; harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and establishing the appropriate post-conflict organization.
Preparing foe War, Stumbling to Peace. Planning for Post Conflict Operations in Iraq. - Major James Howard, British Army. US Army School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, 2004. This monograph discusses planning for the post-conflict phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. More specifically, it examines whether a disparate focus on war-fighting operations during the planning and execution phase of Operation Iraqi Freddom is to blame for the lack of progress towards reconstruction. It examines the factors and influences that led political and military leaders to make certain decisions during the preparatory and combat phases of operations to depose Saddam Hussein. Moreover, it asks whether military leaders could have acted differently in pursuit of the Bush Administration’s strategic objectives for Iraq.
Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario - Dr. Conrad Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, January 2003. With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks. The interagency planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of any possible combat, was an excellent approach. Still, that operation eventually failed because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission once military forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. Recent experiences In the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated the potential assistance that can be provided by international and non-governmental organizations, though coordination with them can be difficult. In Iraq it will also be important to lessen military involvement as expeditiously as possible, so interagency planners must be sure that governmental, non-governmental, and international civilian organizations are ready to perform assigned tasks when required. The primary problem at the core of American deficiencies in providing post-conflict capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation-building. U.S. leaders must accept this mission as an essential part of our national security and better tailor and fund the military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it. This will take considerable manpower and money.
Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning - Lieutenant Colonel James Reed, USA. Parameters article, Summer 1993. Among those who occupy themselves with matters of military strategy and operational art, war termination has been a neglected topic both for academic study and, more particularly, for doctrinal development. The American strategic culture, with its tendency to view war and peace as wholly distinct states, has left little room for consideration of war termination as a bridge between the two. Moreover, our strategic thinking has for good reason given preference to deterrence, while our operational thinking has focused more on concepts of warfighting that would allow us to "win" without resort to nuclear escalation. Recent events, however, suggest that discussion of war termination should perhaps be assigned a higher priority in our thinking about strategic and operational matters.
Law of Occupation and Democracy - Lieutenant Commander James Kraska, USN. Small Wars Journal article, July 2005. Lost amid the international politics that defined the Iraq war, the preceding diplomatic maneuvering in the United Nations (UN) and the lingering legal debate over jus ad bellum, is the maturation and globalization of an Anglo-American doctrine of democratic occupation. A century in construction, the principle that occupying powers have a duty to introduce democracy into an occupied non-democratic state was once quite unsettled; today it has achieved the status of a new global norm. In Part II, this manuscript briefly traces the law of occupation regarding activities that may be taken by the occupying power to impose regime change in non-democratic occupied states. Part III relates some of the milestones in Anglo-American occupation of foreign territories, particularly in regard to early American occupation experiences. These practices coalesced into a doctrine of democratic occupation that has achieved global acceptance; the emergence of this norm is discussed in Part IV. The Anglo-American experience transposes the rather conservative state of the law of occupation with the emergence of the new expectations of democratic governance. The fact that state practice has departed from the traditionalist Hague law has been identified previously. The contribution of this piece is to suggest that the source of the new norm of democratic occupation unfolded from British and American state practice. With the UN’s Chapter VII actions in Somalia and Haiti in the early-1990s, the doctrine of democratic occupation reached global recognition and approval.
The Rule of Law and Expeditionary Operations - Major Karl Rohr, USMC. Small Wars Journal article, July 2005. The purpose of this essay is to examine the legal requirements for establishing the Rule of Law (ROL) during United States Marine Corps expeditionary operations. The focus is on the role of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as an enabling force, establishing a stable security situation for follow-on force deployment. The discussion will center on stability and support actions that could be taken during the first 3 to 9 months in the immediate and temporary rear area created by Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) operations. Specifically, how can the MAGTF operate as an occupation force or as a civil affairs administration to implement a temporary military government?
Post Conflict Operations: A Critical Analysis of US Army Force Structure Requirements - Major Jason Smallfield, USA. US Army School of Advanced Warfighting monograph, 2004. This study uses a methodology that starts by introducing the thesis that US Army operational requirements over the next ten years will require changes in the US Army force structure with regards to size, active and reserve balance, and capabilities mix. The criteria to judge this thesis include consistency, historical basis, and balance. Consistency is defined as the US Army force structure being consistent with US strategic policies. The second criteria, historical basis, is defined as the US Army force structure being based upon and informed by practical lessons of the past? The final criteria, balance, is defined as the US Army force structure striking a balance among the suite of capabilities necessary to conduct full spectrum operations. Next, the strategic policies of the United States, including the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the United Stated Code Title 10, and the Army Modernization Plan are analyzed to determine their implications on US Army force structure. The third chapter analyzes the impact of an operational environment on US Army capabilities and the historical US experience in post conflict operations. Finally, the requirements and capabilities of the US Army with regards to post conflict operations are determined.
Post-Conflict Operations From Europe to Iraq - Dr. James Carafano. Heritage Foundation lecture, June 2004. The difficulties that the U.S. military and other coalition forces have experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the consternation expressed in the Western press and public opinion should come as no surprise—in part because both press and people have scant appreciation for the difficulties of post-war occupation. Yet there is legitimate cause for complaint. The U.S. military and its allies were poorly prepared to undertake post-conflict operations. This shortfall exacerbated the “fog of peace”—the chaos, uncertainty, violence, and privation that typically occur during the initial post-conflict period. Operations were not as efficient and effective as they could have been. This paper argues that weaknesses in how the United States and its allies approached the challenges of post-conflict operations run deeper than the debate over policies, the justification for the war, the number of troops committed to the occupation, and the resources available. Lack of historical memory has played a significant role. Unrealistic expectations are one reflection of this dynamic. Perhaps even more important, the trials of Iraq reflect long-standing flaws in how U.S. forces prepare for the fight for peace—weaknesses that exacerbated strategic mistakes made while planning for the occupation.
The “Post Conflict” Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan - Anthony Cordesman. Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 2004. The current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan has exposed the fact that there is a serious danger in the very term “post conflict:” It reflects critical failures in American understanding of the world it faces in the 21st Century, and in the nature of asymmetric warfare and defense transformation. If the US is to succeed in the conflicts that are likely to shape much of the 21st Century, it must learn from both its successes and mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategic engagement requires an objective – not an ideological – assessment of the problems that must be dealt with, and of the size and cost of the effort necessary to achieve decisive grand strategic results. Neither a capabilities-based strategy nor one based on theoretical sizing contingencies is meaningful when real-world conflicts and well-defined contingencies require a strategy and force plan that can deal with reality on a country-by country basis, rather than be based on ideology and theory.
Towards Post-Conflict Reconstruction - John Hamre and Gordon Sullivan. The Washington Quarterly article, Autumn 2002. One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter—not just for humanitarian reasons but for national security as well. If left untended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach, not to mention international organized crime and drug traffickers who also exploit the dysfunctional environment. As such, failed states can pose a direct threat to the national interests of the United States and to the stability of entire regions. During war, international law endeavors to protect the populace from excessive threats to life and property. Failure to ensure noncombatant immunity may prolong a conflict, repress a struggle until a later generation, or draw additional belligerents into a war. At a minimum, it encumbers post-conflict reconciliation. Strategic leaders, civilian and military alike, must therefore look beyond the array of opposing military forces to the relationship that should emerge among belligerents once the conflict ends. A comparison of military end-states is necessary but not sufficient to meeting political objectives. The key to any post-conflict vision of relations among states is the civil sector
Change, Security, Stability and Reconstruction - US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities report on a Office of the Secretary of Defense Principles of War seminar, December 2004. Today we are at the epicenter of several very historical changes, therefore it is vital we get things right. We have only a limited amount of time to do this, as world events are not slowing down. It also is critically important to reorganize our military forces and other national capabilities in such a way to deal with the realities of the future. The tremendous legacy of World War II was our nation’s coming out party. We were a bit hesitant at first. But by the end of the twentieth century, we were playing the role as the world’s sole superpower. Now in the first years of the new millennium, not far removed from the last century, we have to figure out what we have to do to get to where we want to be in fifty years.
Nation Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower - James Dobbins. Rand Review article, Summer 2003. We at the Rand Corporation have compiled what we have found to be the most important lessons learned by the United States in its nation-building efforts since World War II. Not all these hard-won lessons have yet been fully applied to America's most recent nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. We define nation-building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy." We have compared the levels of progress toward this goal among seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These are the most important instances in which American military power has been used in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin democratization elsewhere around the world since World War II.
Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century - Lloyd Matthews. US Army Strategic Studies Institute conference report, December 2004.
Lessons Learned in Transition Settings - US Agency for International Development (USAID). Since 1994, The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has learned a number of important lessons about operating in transition settings.
