Threat / Adversaries / Insurgents / Terrorists
Country Reports on Terrorism - US Department of State, 28 April 2006. U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. This annual report is entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.
RAND Voices of Jihad Database - This online database is a compilation of speeches, interviews, statements, and publications of jihadist leaders, foot soldiers, and sympathizers. Nearly all content is in English translation, and has been collected from publicly-accessible websites. Original links are provided, along with excerpts and full-text content when available. The voices of jihad are numerous, varied, and constantly evolving. Jihadists often disagree on goals, tactics, and worldview; they may also change their message depending on the intended audience. The database content reveals several aspects of what might be termed a jihadist ideology.
Conflict 21: Center for Terrorism Studies - US Air Force Air University research resource.
Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures - Edited by Barry Schneider and Jerrold Post. US Air Force Counterproliferation Center book, 2003.
Patterns of Global Terrorism - US Department of State. Latest report posted is from 2003.On Guerrilla Warfare - Mao Tse Tung. Written by Mao in 1937, when Japanese imperialists occupied all of China, this book served as an instruction manual for guerrilla fighting, written based on more than a decade of personal experience by Mao. Based on the basic strategy and tactics of warfare as described by Sun-tzu, Mao stresses the importance of guerrilla warfare tactics in a revolutionary war, emphasizing that they must be combined in conjunction with conventional warfare tactics.
Guerrilla Warfare - V. I. Lenin. 1906.Guerrilla Warfare - Ernesto Che Guevara. 1960.
Guerrilla Warfare: A Method - Ernesto Che Guevara. 1963.
Che Guevara: Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare - Major Jackie Clark, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College paper, 1988. The purpose of this paper is to review the writings of Ernesto Che Guevara (1928-1967) on the subject of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. A veteran of the l968 Cuban Revolution and one of the first Cuban advisors in the Congo, Guevara spent the last decade of his life participating in revolutionary struggles throughout the Third World. His book Guerrilla Warfare is considered by many to be a "cookbook" for insurgent fighters. The military tactics and strategies he presents therein are based on his extensive battlefield and political experiences as a guerrilla leader. As such, his writings provide an excellent foundation upon which contemporary military leaders can develop a sound understanding of insurgent warfare.Irregular Enemies - Dr. Colin Gray. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, March 2006. The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of “the American way.” He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that “way” and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is “perhaps, but only with difficulty.”
Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? - Dr. Colin Gray. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, March 2006. The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."
Redefining the Enemy The World Has Changed, But Our Mindset Has Not - Brian Michael Jenkins. Rand Review article. The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the security environment, which changed further on 9/11 and yet again as a consequence of the war in Iraq. We in the United States have created new institutions to preserve our security. We have invented new approaches to how we conduct military operations, from the war in Afghanistan to the pursuit of al Qaeda to the occupation of Iraq. But we have yet to digest the full impact of these changes, seeing them as temporary tactical deviations, exotic interludes. We have barely begun to reexamine our obsolete assumptions about the way our enemies organize and operate. We wage a "global war on terror"—a confusing conflation of threats—while we continue to concentrate on future conventional wars with hypothetical, nation-state foes. We still consign all "lesser contingencies" to the "other war" as opposed to the "real war." We still tend to view the enemy through the narrow bores and restricted optics of our existing national security structure. The 9/11 Commission hearings reveal the difficulty we have in addressing foes that fall outside our normal field of vision. We tend to focus on what we can hit with our capabilities.
A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency - Dr. Sherifa Zuhur. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, January 2006. This monograph takes its title from President Hosni Mubarak’s prediction that American involvement in Iraq would give rise to a “hundred Osamas.” The author explores “the new jihad” and the regeneration of Islamist insurgencies and extremist movements in the context of religious and political movements throughout the Muslim world. It describes the contributions of various Islamist leaders to this discourse of extremism and how their strategies of recruitment, retention and engagement function. In contrast, various U.S. responses to extremists are critiqued, and new elements of a counterstrategy are proposed.
Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency - Lieutenant General David Barno, US Army (Ret.). Parameters article, Summer 2006. The strategic nature of war has changed, and our military and government are striving to adapt to fight and win in this new environment. Today we are engaged in a global counterinsurgency, an unprecedented challenge which requires a level of original strategic thought and depth of understanding perhaps comparable only to that of the Cold War. Our ongoing political-military actions to achieve success in Iraq and Afghanistan are simply subordinate efforts of this larger, complex world war. Our enemies today clearly understand the value of asymmetrical approaches when dealing with the overwhelming conventional combat power of the United States military. Unfortunately, our unmatched conventional capability has slowed the US response to the changing, asymmetrical nature of modern war. We as a military are at risk of failing to understand the nature of the war we are fighting—a war which has been characterized as “a war of intelligence and a war of perceptions.” We must confront this dilemma and take our thinking to a new strategic level in this era to understand the tools and strategic approaches required to create victory in this very different 21st-century environment.
Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks - Shawn Brimley. Parameters article, Summer 2006. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report begins with a statement of strategic clarity: “The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war.” From the suburbs and cities of North America and Europe, to the deserts, jungles, and villages of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, the “long war” is indeed a global one that has been and will continue to be a challenge for the professionals tasked with waging it. This war is characterized by its transnational nature, and although our military forces are heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must be vigilant in our appreciation of the breadth and depth of the strategic battleground. One gets a sense of the magnitude of the challenge by examining the service and support mechanisms of al Qaeda and its progeny. The ways in which our enemies learn and adapt to pressure, as well as recruit followers and resupply combatants, offer important insights into the nature of the conflict. Using safe houses, smuggling rings, secured communications, and personnel who connect individuals to training and support networks, our enemies benefit from an interconnected global system that enables violent groups and handicaps intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The recent example of a Belgian woman traveling to Iraq to perform a suicide attack against a US military convoy is a case in point. A convert to Islam, the woman typifies the growing threat facing Europe, America, and the nascent democracy in Iraq. Both the global jihadist movement and insurgent forces in Iraq utilize support networks that are best characterized by their mobility, flexibility, and fluidity. Understanding and successfully targeting the service and support networks of terrorist groups is a prerequisite for success in the long war.
Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities - US Army Combating Terrorism Center study, February 2006. This study, conducted by the faculty and research fellows of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, serves multiple purposes, the most important of which is contributing to the depth of knowledge about the al-Qa’ida movement. Evidence supporting the conclusions and recommendations provided in this report is drawn from a collection of newly-released al-Qa’ida documents captured during recent operations in support of the Global War on Terror and maintained in the Department of Defense’s Harmony database. In the text of these documents, readers will see how explicit al-Qa’ida has been in its internal discussions covering a range of organizational issues, particularly regarding the internal structure and functioning of the movement as well as with tensions that emerged within the leadership.
Reinforcing the Mujahideen: Origins of Jihadi Manpower - Michael Scheuer. The Jamestown Foundation article, May 2006. Much is written about how non-indigenous, would-be Islamist fighters enter the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan to join the mujahideen fighting U.S.-led coalitions in both countries. Do they enter Afghanistan from Pakistan? Or Iran? Perhaps Central Asia? What about Iraq? Which border is the most porous? Does that dubious honor belong to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Iran? These are, of course, important questions. To know and close the entry points of these aspiring mujahideen would slow the pace at which foreign fighters could join the fray. It also would make local insurgent field commanders unsure about the dependability of the flow of replacement fighters for their units, and thereby probably limit their willingness to undertake operations that are likely to result in sizeable manpower loses. A more basic question, however, is seldom asked or debated. While it is clear that closing points of entry would give the U.S.-led coalitions a better chance to reduce the level of each insurgency, the more important path to victory probably lies in determining exactly from where these prospective insurgents emanate. There has been an intense concentration in both the media and academic literature on the role that madrassas play in producing young men eager to join the war against the West. Indeed, so thoroughly has this been discussed and analyzed that we are nearing the point where it will become common wisdom that if Washington, London and their allies can close down the madrassas, we could halt the flow of reinforcements to the Iraqi and Afghan mujahideen.Rethinking Asymmetric Threats - Stephen Blank. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, September 2003. Assessment of the threat environment is a critical element in the formulation of any state’s strategy and defense doctrine. It also should be an inherently critical process that seeks to free policymakers from incorrect, antiquated, or misconceived perceptions about the threat. Consequently, the nature of the threat(s) the United States or any other government faces is the subject of a never-ending debate. For several years U.S. policymakers, officials, and writers on defense have employed the terms “asymmetric” or “asymmetry” to characterize everything from the nature of the threats we face to the nature of war and beyond. This monograph challenges the utility of using those terms to characterize the threats we face, one element of the broader debate over the nature of war, U.S. strategy, and the threats confronting us. As a work of critique, it aims to make an important contribution to the threat debate.
Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in our Mist - Max Manwaring. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, November 2004. This monograph comes at a time when U.S. and other world political and military leaders are struggling with the “new” political psychological aspects of unconventional conflict. Unfortunately, the strategic theory of unconventional political war has played little part in the discourse. Yet political-insurgency war is the most likely type of conflict to challenge the maintenance and enhancement of global and regional security over the near-to-long term. Contemporary political-insurgency war is a threat we can ill afford to ignore. Through the analysis of the cases of Argentina (1969-79), Peru (1962-present) and Italy (1968-82), the author identifies the political-strategic challenges of modern unconventional conflict.
Insurgency In Iraq And Afghanistan: Change And Continuity - Steven Metz and Raymond Millen. US Army Strategic Studies Institute discussion paper. To understand the insurgencies the United States now faces, whether those in Iraq and Afghanistan or the global one against violent radical Islam, and to develop coherent strategies to counter them, American planners and leaders must ask two questions: Do these insurgencies exhibit the characteristics that have traditionally led to insurgent success or victory? and Do these insurgencies have any characteristics that break with traditional patterns and may allow them to attain success or victory even though they are missing some of the traditional determinants of success?
Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas - Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty report, June 2007. The book-length report, "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas" by RFE/RL regional analysts Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, provides an in-depth analysis of the media efforts of Sunni insurgents, who are responsible for the majority of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq. Kimmage and Ridolfo argue that the loss of coordination and message control that results from decentralization has revealed fundamental disagreements about Iraq's present and future between nationalist and global jihadist groups in Iraq and that these disagreements are ripe for exploitation by those interested in a liberal and democratic Iraq.
A Clash of Systems: An Analytical Framework to Demystify the Radical Islamist Threat - Andrew Harvey, Ian Sullivan and Ralph Groves. Parameters article, Autumn 2005. In the Winter 2004-05 issue of Parameters, Philip Seib makes a laudable effort to establish the imperative for journalists, policymakers, and the American public to “undertake a more sophisticated analysis of how the world works.”1 This is critical because the analytical framework adopted by the media and policymakers has a direct effect on how they approach news coverage and frame discussions regarding the threat posed by radical Islamist extremists. This in turn directly affects public opinion in the United States and the world, which in the context of a war of ideas is directly related to the success or failure of both sides. Professor Seib also pointed out the fact that the “clash of civilizations” theory espoused by Samuel Huntington has been widely criticized, and this article rejects it as an appropriate analytical framework. Our purpose is to provide an alternative framework that portrays the current global conflict as a clash of systems, not civilizations.
Jihad and Terrorism Studies Project - Middle East Media Research Institute. The threat of militant-Islamic terrorist organizations operating in the United States has become a reality. In response, MEMRI has established a Jihad and Terrorism Studies Project to monitor militant-Islamic groups that educate and preach Jihad and martyrdom in mosques, school systems, and in the media. This project will also focus on individuals and radical Islamist organizations, sermons and religious rulings (fatwas) and reactions to terrorist attacks both in the U.S. and abroad.
Hamas: A Further Exploration of Jihadist Tactics - Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, US Navy. Strategic Insights article, September 2005. This essay will explore Hamas literature and delve into its Bayanat (proclamations, leaflets, or broadsheets) and military-political objectives. First published during the 1987 Palestinian Intifadah (Uprising), the Bayanat are two-page leaflets that encouraged grassroots Palestinian activism, dictating events such as business strikes and the conduct of demonstrations. Hamas has published these broadsheets in four volumes in 1991. They are available in the Library of Congress and titled, “Wathaiq Harakah Al-Muqawama Al Islamiyah (Hamas): Min Wathaiq Al- Intfadah Al-Mubaraka” (Documents of the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas”: Documents of the Blessed (Palestinian) Uprising). This essay will touch on the first three years of Hamas Bayanat. The impact of Bayanat can still be seen today, when such tools are used along with the Internet, and Arab satellite television.
The 9-11 Commission Report - National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States report, 2004. The Commission’s Final Report provides a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. It also includes recommendations designed to guard against future attacks. Below you will find the official Government edition of the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment - Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, February 2005. Most U.S. and international intelligence institutions, as well as outside experts, agree that Al Qaeda retains the intention to conduct major attacks in the United States and against U.S. interests abroad. These institutions also appear to agree that U.S. counter efforts in the past few years have weakened Al Qaeda’s central leadership structure and capabilities, and that Al Qaeda’s sympathizers now represent the preeminent threat from this organization. However, there is little agreement among experts over the degree to which these changes have materially reduced the overall Al Qaeda threat. This report will be updated as warranted by developments. See also, CRS Report RL32759, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology.
Al Qaeda Overview Page - Global Security. Al-Qaeda is an international terrorist network led by Usama bin Laden [the "Osama" spelling is deprecated, because there is no letter "O" in Arabic). Established around 1988 by bin Laden, al-Qaeda helped finance, recruit, transport and train thousands of fighters from dozens of countries to be part of an Afghan resistance to defeat the Soviet Union. To continue the holy war beyond Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries.
Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities - Paul Smith. Parameters article, Summer 2002. Al Qaeda’s model has been to establish bases with indigenous groups throughout the world. Early in its existence, al Qaeda developed the ability to penetrate Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the point that it was “inseparably enmeshed with the religious, social, and economic fabric of Muslim communities worldwide.” In some cases, al Qaeda pursued a virtual “hands off” policy with its affiliated group. It may have guided or directed the group’s operations, but at the same time required it to raise its own funds. Ahmed Ressam, who was intercepted entering the United States in December 1999 as part of the infamous “Millennium Plot,” was part of a cell in Montreal, Canada, that survived by engaging in petty theft—including passport theft—and other crimes. However, for certain operations, such as the 11 September attacks in the United States, al Qaeda was much more willing to provide substantial and direct financial support.
Jihad, War and Terrorism - George Gawrych. US Army Command and Staff College paper. Studying Islam presents an intellectual challenge to Americans. Muslims generally regard unity of politics and religion as the ideal and, therefore, mix faith and war together. American political tradition, on the other hand, enshrines the clear separation of church and state. Americans are by nature skeptical of religion intruding into politics. Calls to Jihad, thus, invoke images of religious fanaticism and extremism. Such a view is dead wrong. In fact, the religion of Islam contains strong moral and ethical principles on Jihad and the conduct of war, and there is a strong tradition against killing innocent people. Radical Islam, however, generally preaches total war against its opposition and therefore condones the killing of some civilians as part of Jihad.
Socio-economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals. - Alan Richards. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, July 2003. The September 11 attacks against U.S. targets came as a frightening shock to most Americans who had never previously heard of Osama Bin Laden or the virulent radicalism associated with his al Qaeda network. In the tumultuous aftermath of the attacks, many Americans grasped for explanations as to why these events occurred and what was to be done about them. Closely-related queries were why Islamic radicals enjoy a significant amount of popular sympathy within the Muslim World, and how this trend can be reversed. This monograph addresses the critical questions involved in understanding and coping with the roots of Islamic radicalism. His work closely examines the links between radicalism and a series of crises associated with modernization in the Islamic World. The result is a thoughtful and probing study including policy recommendations for U.S. military and civilian decisionmakers that makes intelligible the complex subject of Islamic radicalism.
A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement - Stephen Pelletiere. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, September 1995. Islamic fundamentalism is growing at such a rapid rate that many believe it threatens to take over the Middle East. To prevent this, enormous resources have been summoned, not only from within the region, but in the West as well. Yet, for all the efforts to contain, if not turn back the fundamentalists, the movement appears likely to pose a security challenge well into the next century. In this monograph Dr. Stephen Pelletiere points out that containment of fundamentalism depends first and foremost on accurate information about the nature of the movement. He examines the origins of the various fundamentalist groups that are challenging the area's governments, and explains why they were able to grow in the face of official repression by some of the most sophisticated and well-equipped security services in the world. The author concludes by building a theory about fundamentalism, which implies a need to redirect policy for coping with it.
The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya - Christopher Blanchard. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 2004. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent investigations of these attacks have called attention to Islamic puritanical movements known as Wahhabism and Salafiyya. The Al Qaeda terrorist organization and its leader Osama bin Laden have advocated a message of violence that some suggest is an extremist interpretation of this line of puritanical Islam. Other observers have accused Saudi Arabia, the center of Wahhabism, of having disseminated a religion that promotes hatred and violence, targeting the United States and its allies. Saudi officials strenuously deny these allegations. This report provides a background on Wahhabi Islam and its association to militant fundamentalist groups; it also summarizes recent charges against Wahhabism and responses, including the findings of the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (“The 9/11 Commission”).
The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism - Shmuel Bar. Policy Review article. While terrorism - even in the form of suicide attacks - is not an Islamic phenomenon by definition, it cannot be ignored that the lion’s share of terrorist acts and the most devastating of them in recent years have been perpetrated in the name of Islam. This fact has sparked a fundamental debate both in the West and within the Muslim world regarding the link between these acts and the teachings of Islam. Most Western analysts are hesitant to identify such acts with the bona fide teachings of one of the world’s great religions and prefer to view them as a perversion of a religion that is essentially peace-loving and tolerant. Western leaders such as George W. Bush and Tony Blair have reiterated time and again that the war against terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. It is a war against evil.
Al Qaeda Manual Part I - This manual was located by the Manchester (England) Metropolitan Police during a search of an al Qaeda member’s home. The manual was found in a computer file described as “the military series” related to the “Declaration of Jihad.” The manual was translated into English and was introduced earlier this year at the embassy bombing trial in New York.
Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi - Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 11 October 2005. Today the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a letter between two senior al Qa'ida leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, that was obtained during counterterrorism operations in Iraq. This lengthy document provides a comprehensive view of al Qa'ida's strategy in Iraq and globally. The letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi is dated July 9, 2005. The contents were released only after assurances that no ongoing intelligence or military operations would be affected by making this document public.
Intercepted Zarqawi Letter to Al-Qaeda - Small Wars Journal posting, 2005. Here is the current situation as I, with my limited vision, see it. I ask God to forgive my prattle and lapses. I say, having sought help from God, that the Americans, as you know well, entered Iraq on a contractual basis and to create the State of Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates and that this Zionized American Administration believes that accelerating the creation of the State of [Greater] Israel will accelerate the emergence of the Messiah. It came to Iraq with all its people, pride, and haughtiness toward God and his Prophet. It thought that the matter would be somewhat easy. Even if there were to be difficulties, it would be easy. But it collided with a completely different reality. The operations of the brother mujahidin began from the first moment, which mixed things up somewhat. Then, the pace of operations quickened. This was in the Sunni Triangle, if this is the right name for it. This forced the Americans to conclude a deal with the Shi`a, the most evil of mankind. The deal was concluded on [the basis that] the Shi`a would get two-thirds of the booty for having stood in the ranks of the Crusaders against the mujahidin.
The World According to Osama Bin Laden - Ahmed Hashim. Naval War College Review article. The context from which Usama Bin Laden emerged was that of the Arab world. Bin Laden, after all, is an Arab from Saudi Arabia, even though he later based himself in non-Arab Afghanistan. In this context, it is instructive to begin with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 following its defeat in World War I. The Arabic-speaking peoples who had been a part of this Turkish-ruled multiethnic empire sought to found an independent Arab state, or states. In a remarkable study, the noted Arab-American scholar Fouad Ajami borrowed from T. E. Lawrence the phrase “dream palace” to describe the intellectual edifice of secular nationalism and modernity that the Arabs constructed and thought would constitute the theoretical underpinnings of their entry into the modern world.
When Devils Walk the Earth: The Mentality and Roots of Terrorism, and How to Respond - Ralph Peters. US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities study. This analysis is divided into three parts. The first is a broad initial discussion of the mentalities of the two basic types of terrorists--the practical and the apocalyptic--to help users differentiate between “traditional,” politically-oriented terrorists with specific goals, and the far more dangerous religious terrorists irreconcilably hostile to the United States and the West. The second section examines the environmental conditions that breed terrorism, focusing primarily upon the troubled Islamic world. The concluding section proposes “do’s and don’ts” in the struggle against terrorism.
The Origins of the New Terrorism - Matthew Morgan. Parameters article, Spring 2004. Some analysts argue that the evolution of terrorism represents continuity rather than change, that mass-casualty bombings have long been characteristic of terrorist methods, and that radical extremism has always dominated terrorist motivations. Walter Laqueur’s most recent book warns against trying to categorize or define terrorism at all because there are “many terrorisms,” and he emphasizes the particularities of various terrorist movements and approaches. (Laqueur, however, recognizes some evolving strains of terrorism, especially the Islamist variant.) Bruce Hoffman discussed the definition of terrorism at length in his 1998 book, Inside Terrorism, and his final definition includes “political change” as the desired end-state of terrorist activity. This would be more consistent with traditional means-end constructions of terrorism. Richard Falkenrath pointed out in a pre-9/11 article that mass-casualty terrorism is still an aberrant occurrence. A recent survey of terrorism suggests historical and intellectual links between the fascism of fanatical Islamist terrorism today and the totalitarian movements of the 20th century, further emphasizing continuity rather than change. Most recent scholarship, however, has taken the perspective that contemporary terrorism represents a significant departure from the past. Various factors have led to the development of this new type of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson pondered the increase in indiscriminateness among terrorists, and he posited several possible reasons accounting for this upsurge. First, the saturation of the media with images of terrorist atrocity has raised the bar on the level of destruction that will attract headline attention. Second, terrorists have realized that civilian soft targets involve lower risk to themselves. Finally, there has been a shift from the politically-minded terrorist to the vengeful and hard-line fanatic.
Bearers of the Sword Radical Islam, Philippines Insurgency, and Regional Stability - Dr. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. Military Review article, March-April 2002. In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. President George W. Bush and his national security leadership articulated objectives for a wide-ranging war against terrorism. Six months later, these objectives remain focused on destroying international terrorist centers, dismantling terrorist networks around the world, and punishing states that support terrorist activities. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization--sponsors of the 11 September attacks and earlier terrorist assaults on U.S. people, property, and interests--remains a high priority. As Al-Qaeda's principal bases and leadership cadres in Afghanistan were destroyed and its Taliban supporters routed, U.S. planners shifted resources and focus to other Al-Qaeda cells and associates operating in dozens of countries around the world. The U.S. national leadership emphasized that these groupings--and other terrorist organizations as well--constituted legitimate targets in the global war on terrorism. Among those targets receiving early attention from the U.S leadership was a small, violent Islamic group that--despite origins in the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan War--operates in the jungles, hills, towns, and coastal waters of the southern Philippines.1 This group is Abu Sayyaf , meaning Bearer of the Sword in Arabic, that has become noted for its ambushes of government forces, kidnappings, piracy, and the not infrequent beheading of captives. As this is written, Abu Sayyaf elements remain engaged in sporadic clashes with the Philippines Armed Forces and continue to perpetrate a mixture of political terrorism and banditry throughout the area. Its purported links to Al-Qaeda and its asserted devotion to a radical, perverted form of Islam, identifies the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) as a vector of local terrorism that also has broader regional and international implications. Of particular concern is the prospect of further radicalizing other Muslim insurgent and pro-independence groups in the Philippines, and serving as a catalyst for analogous developments in Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere. This article addresses the origin and activities of Abu Sayyaf , the operational environment in which it carries out its activities, and its influence on the Philippines and the region. Before examining Abu Sayyaf specifically, it is instructive to review briefly the historic continuity of Muslim insurgency in the Philippines, the U.S. experience in what was 100 years ago a new operational environment, and the current context in which Abu Sayyaf has sought to advance its goals.
Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf - Dr. Zachary Abuza. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, September 2005. The author warns that despite the regeneration of the ASG as a bonafide terrorist organization, the primary security threat confronting the GRP comes from the Communist Party of the Philippines and their armed wing, the New People's Army. To that end, the GRP will focus on the ASG and MILF in as much as they expect it to garner U.S. materiel support and assistance. He advises U.S. Defense department and policymakers regarding institutional frailties of the GRP and institutional corruption within the Philippine armed forces. While the author suggests that training continue, he cautions about being drawn into a quagmire. Despite the MILF's ties to the ASG and JIO, he also suggests that the U.S. should continue to support the peace process and to try to wean the MILF off their relationship with terrorist organization.
Deterring and Responding to Asymmetrical Threats - Major John Reynolds, USA. US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003. This study examines the doctrinal definition of deterrence, reviews Bernard Brodie’s deterrence theory and discusses the impacts of his theory upon state and nonstate actors. The study further defines the terms asymmetry and asymmetrical threats and reviews a World View Threat survey (European and American) that identifies these asymmetrical threats as Islamic fundamentalists. Additionally, the study presents the ends, ways, and means utilized by the Union Army during the Civil War, and the ends, ways, means utilized by the US Army during operations in Bosnia in order to deter asymmetrical threats. The study concludes by presenting operational commanders with five principles for consideration when designing campaign plans against asymmetrical threats. These five principles are 1) first strike capability, 2) force protection (second strike capability), 3) the ability to threaten sever consequences on the belligerent’s interests, 4) sending a deterrence message, and 5) demonstrating the will and determination to conduct retaliatory strikes. Additionally, the study concludes that neither active, passive, nor retributive actions by themselves are effective in deterring asymmetrically threats; it is only when these three actions are integrated together into a single campaign plan where one can hope to deter asymmetrical threats and regain the deterrence equilibrium.
Threats, Dangers & Uncertainties US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities report on a Principles of War Seminar, October 2004. On Tuesday, October 12, 2004, the Office Force Transformation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Navy conducted the fifth seminar in the Principles of War Seminar Series. The guest speaker was former U.S. National Security Advisor Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2 He spoke on threats, dangers, uncertainties, and other issues that likely will shape our thinking about future security and the principles of war. A summary of his comments follows. Other points Dr. Brezinski made during the question and answer session are attached.
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response - Steven Metz and Raymond Millen. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, 2004. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has developed a national security strategy designed to eliminate the conditions that spawn asymmetric threats. An important part of that is helping build stable, legitimate governments in nations which allowed or supported terrorism and other forms of asymmetric aggression. This has led the United States to renewed involvement in counterinsurgency. The United States, particularly the Army, has a long history of counterinsurgency support. During the past decade, though, this has not been an area of focus for the American military. To renew its capability at counterinsurgency, the military is assessing 21st century insurgency, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and revising its strategy, operational concepts, organization, and doctrine.
Guerrilla Warfare Tactics in Urban Environments - Major Patrick Marques, USA. US Army Command and General Staff College thesis, 2003. Current Special Forces doctrine is very limited concerning the conduct of guerrilla warfare combat operations in urban environments. The focus of the current doctrine is on conducting combat operations in rural environments. The material available on urban environments is defined in broad terms primarily focused on the larger picture of unconventional warfare. Some considerations and characteristics of urban tactical operations are addressed but are so general they could be applied to a conventional infantry unit as easily as to a guerrilla force. Traditionally, Special Forces guerrilla warfare doctrine has focused on its conduct in a rural environment as historically, most guerrilla movements have formed, operated, and been supported outside of the cities. Increasing world urbanization is driving the “center of gravity” of the resistance, the populace and their will to resist, into urban settings. As populations have gravitated to the cities on every continent, the ability to prosecute a successful guerrilla war has often depended on the ability to conduct combat operations in these environments. Predominantly, the aspects of unconventional warfare that were executed in urban settings were those such as intelligence activities, recruiting, sabotage, or subversion. Guerrilla warfare combat operations were done in urban environments only when absolutely necessary.
Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency - Max Manwaring. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, March 2005. Gang-related crime, in conjunction with the instability it wreaks upon governments, is now a serious national security and sovereignty problem in important parts of the global community. Although differences between gangs and insurgents exist, in terms of original motives and modes of operation, this linkage infers that the gang phenomenon is a mutated form of urban insurgency. That is, these nonstate actors must eventually seize political power to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that clearly links gangs and insurgents is that the gangs’ and insurgents’ ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries.
Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas - Ali Jalali and Lester Grau. Infantry article, January-April 1999. Urban guerrilla combat is difficult for the urban guerrilla and the regular force. Throughout the war, the Soviets and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) forces were never able to completely control the major cities of Kandahar and Herat. Finally, the Soviets bombed 75% of Herat and virtually the entire Kandahar suburb into rubble. That still failed to stop the urban guerrillas. The DRA and Soviets had more success in controlling the capital city of Kabul--but still were unable to stop the rocket attacks and guerrilla actions. Surviving urban guerrillas are harder to find to interview than guerrillas who fought in the country. Urban guerrillas are surrounded by potential informants and government spies. They must frequently move around unarmed and the government can usually react to their actions much faster than they can in the countryside. The urban guerrilla must be anonymous and ruthless to survive. For this reason, urban guerrilla groups were usually small and fought back with short-duration actions. Many urban guerrillas lived in the countryside or suburbs and only entered the cities for combat. The Soviets and DRA devoted a great deal of effort to finding and eliminating the urban guerrilla. Many innocent civilians were victims of this hunt. The authors are grateful to the urban guerrillas who provided these candid interviews.
The Urban Threat: Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations - Marine Corps Intelligence Activity study, 1999. Urban guerrilla groups and terrorist organizations clearly constitute one of the greatest threats to our forces abroad. Because of the randomness and unpredictability of guerrilla offensive operations and terrorist acts, it is important that all service members, private through general, understand these organizations and the threat that they pose. This paper examines the nature of urban warfare from the perspective of irregular paramilitary groups; i.e., the kinds of organizations that U.S. expeditionary forces are likely to encounter while engaged in peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and regional stabilization. More specifically, the paper profiles the nature and composition of such groups, identifies their most likely objectives, and discusses how they go about achieving those ends.
A Change In Tactics? - The Urban Insurgent - First Lieutenant Robert Black, USAF. Air University Review article, January-February 1972.
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Bin Laden and His Special Effects - Brian Michael Jenkins. Rand commentary / Chicago Tribune article, February 2005. Forced out of his sanctuary in Afghanistan and without a standing army at his command, the world's most hunted man must spend his life in hardship and hiding. But despite his lack of military power, Osama bin Laden remains a deadly threat because he has the awesome power of inspiring words and ideas at his command. Delivering a message of endless holy war against a demonized enemy, he remains a frequent and fervent communicator with the power to motivate his followers to willingly sacrifice their lives to wage holy war.
Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom - Robert Bunker. Military Review article, January - February 2005. Persistent suicide bombings during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (in pre-, trans-, and postmajor combat operations) suggest this “criminal-warfighting” technique will be used with increasing frequency against U.S. Army and allied forces deployed for combat and humanitarian missions in and around Islamic lands.2 Therefore, U.S. Army, Marine, and constabulary personnel must develop appropriate intelligence, countermeasure, and force-protection capabilities to interdict, mitigate, and respond to what has become a threat against U.S. forces in the global war against radical Islamic terrorism and insurgency.
Female Suicide Bombers - Debra Zedalis. US Army Srategic Studies Institute monograph, June 2004. Suicide bombers are today’s weapon of choice. Terrorists are using suicide bombers because they are a low cost, low technology, and low risk weapon. Suicide bombers are readily available, require little training, leave no trace behind, and strike fear into the general population. The success of suicide bombers depends upon an element of surprise, as well as accessibility to targeted areas or populations. Both of these required elements have been enjoyed by women suicide bombers. Female suicide bombers were used in the past; however, the recent spate of them in different venues, in different countries, and for different terrorist organizations forces us to study this terrorist method. This research paper reviews historical female suicide bombers, focuses on female suicide bomber characteristics, analyzes recent changes in application by various terrorist organizations, and provides implications of change within a strategic assessment of future female suicide bombings.
Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications - Ronald Jones. US Army Strategic Studies Institute report, June 2005. This Carlisle paper, by Mr. Ronald H. Jones, defines terrorism; reviews the history of ritual murder, human sacrifice, and terrorism as a tactic used by religious groups; and focuses on the cultural significance, motivations, and objectives of these groups. Terrorist beheadings in Iraq are described and analyzed, and political rituals in democracies and the Middle East are discussed. Finally, the author provides policy recommendations for strategic leaders and planners to utilize as they assess and develop effective defensive and offensive countermeasures to this tactic.
Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective - Ian Beckett. US Army Strategice Studies Institute monograph, January 2005. This monograph considers the patterns of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how much the confl ict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli experience.
Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror - Colin Gray. Parameters article, Spring 2002. In American common usage today, asymmetric threats are those that our political, strategic, and military cultures regard as unusual. Such threats differ significantly in character both from those that we anticipate facing from putative enemies and from the methods with which we plan to menace them. Much as international lawyers thus far have failed to define terrorism to the general satisfaction, so US national security specialists have found that the endeavor to define asymmetric threats has proved generally unproductive. Borrowing from the terrorism case, the most fruitful approach to the better understanding of asymmetric threats is not via a forlorn quest for the perfect definition, but rather by the identification of the principal characteristics of, and corollaries to, asymmetry.
Asymmetric Conflict 2010 - Brad Roberts. Institute for Defense Analysis and Defense Threat Reduction Agency paper, November 2000. The objective of this task was to evaluate how the challenges of asymmetric conflict will have changed over the two decade period from the wake-up call provided by the Persian Gulf war to 2010. As a result of investments made under the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, US forces ought be much better prepared to project and prevail against regional adversaries armed with chemical and biological weapons. But the nature of the asymmetric challenge is increasingly debated within the US defense community, leading many to conclude that the asymmetric problem of the future may well not be attack on power projection forces in theater with weapons of mass destruction. Various camps have emerged. One emphasizes terrorist-style attacks on US civilians (and thus Homeland Defense). Another emphasizes strategies in theater that play on perceived American aversion to casualties and/or quagmires. A third camp coalesces around the view that the major asymmetric challenge of the future is posed not by a small power in a regional war of aggression but by China in a war over Taiwan under the nuclear shadow. Against this background, the value of continued NBC threat reduction is that it enables the US to rely on nuclear deterrence on regional contingencies only where it is likely to be credible to do so.
Matrix Warfare: The New Face of Competition and Conflict in the 21st Century - J. Noel Williams. US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities paper, 2004. Al Qaida’s approach to terrorism represents a new manifestation of conflict as transformational and momentous as the advent of nuclear warfare. A combination of technology and wealth now empowers individuals as only nation-states have been empowered in the past. This confluence of economic and technologic power enables individuals, such as bin Laden, and sub-national groups, such as al Qaida, to seriously threaten the interests and, potentially, the very survival of a modern nation-state. The principal attribute of matrix warfare is the dynamic nature of its internal membership structure and its external alliance structure. Membership is actualized to fulfill varying combinations of geopolitical, economic, and/or psychological/ideological/ religious needs or desires.
Something Old, Something New: Guerrillas, Terrorists and Intelligence Analysis - Lieutenant Colonel Lester Grau, USA (Ret.). Military Review article, July - August 2004. The United States and its coalition allies are currently engaged in counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these are clearly different countries and insurgencies, they have some common features.
Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of “Cyberplanning” - Timothy Thomas. Parameters - Spring 2003. We can say with some certainty, al Qaeda loves the Internet. When the latter first appeared, it was hailed as an integrator of cultures and a medium for businesses, consumers, and governments to communicate with one another. It appeared to offer unparalleled opportunities for the creation of a “global village.” Today the Internet still offers that promise, but it also has proven in some respects to be a digital menace. Its use by al Qaeda is only one example. It also has provided a virtual battlefield for peacetime hostilities between Taiwan and China, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and India, and China and the United States (during both the war over Kosovo and in the aftermath of the collision between the Navy EP-3 aircraft and Chinese MiG). In times of actual conflict, the Internet was used as a virtual battleground between NATO’s coalition forces and elements of the Serbian population. These real tensions from a virtual interface involved not only nation-states but also non-state individuals and groups either aligned with one side or the other, or acting independently. Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that al;Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages via the Internet. As recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda cells operating in America reportedly were using Internet-based phone services to communicate with cells overseas. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a “cyberplanning” tool for terrorists. It provides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options.
Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse - Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin. Parameters article, Summer 2006. The means and ends of mass mobilization are changing, bypassing the traditional state-centered approach that was the hallmark of the French Revolution and leaving advanced Western democracies merely to react to the results. Today’s dynamic social, economic, and political transitions are as important to war as were the changes at the end of the 18th century that Clausewitz observed. Most important is the 21st century’s levée en masse, a mass networked mobilization that emerges from cyber-space with a direct impact on physical reality. Individually accessible, ordinary networked communications such as personal computers, DVDs, videotapes, and cell phones are altering the nature of human social interaction, thus also affecting the shape and outcome of domestic and international conflict. Although still in its early stages, this development will not reverse itself and will increasingly influence the conduct of war. From the global spread of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks, to the rapid evolution of insurgent tactics in Iraq, to the riots in France, and well beyond, the global, non-territorial nature of the information age is having a transformative effect on the broad evolution of conflict, and we are missing it. We are entering the cyber-mobilization era, but our current course consigns us merely to react to its effects.
Economic Terrorism: The Radical Muslim War Against the Western Tax Base - Shawn O’Connell. Small Wars Journal article, July 2005. This paper outlines a theory concerning why Muslim terrorists attacked the World Trade Towers on Sept. 11, 2001, bombed London’s subway during the G-8 economic summit on July 7th, and detonated blasts in an Egyptian resort on 23rd July. The reason for these attacks was to create ‘Economic Terrorism.’ Economic Terrorism is defined here as the attempt to assault and destroy a foe through decimation of the enemy’s tax base via rank economic sabotage. Such attacks on economic infrastructures lower net tax yield, thereby shrinking the capital pool for military spending.
Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat - Milton Leitenberg. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, December 2005. It is nearly 15 years since biological weapons (BW) have become a significant national security preoccupation. This occurred primarily due to circumstances occurring within a short span of years. First was the official U.S. Government suggestion that proliferation of offensive BW programs among states and even terrorist groups was an increasing trend; second was the discovery, between 1989 and 1992, that the Union USSR had violated the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since its ratification in 1975 by building a massive covert biological weapons program; third was the corroboration by the UN Special Commission in 1995 that Iraq had maintained a covert biological weapons program since 1974, and had produced and stockpiled large quantities of agents and delivery systems between 1988 and 1991; and, fourth was the discovery, also in 1995, that the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, which had carried out the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, also had spent 4 years attempting—albeit unsuccessfully—to produce and disperse two pathogenic biological agents. The distribution of professionally prepared anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system in the weeks afterwards September 11, 2001, magnified previous concerns by orders of magnitude. In December 2002, after U.S. forces had overrun much of the territory of Afghanistan, it was discovered that the al-Qaida organization also had spent several years trying to obtain the knowledge and means to produce biological agents. These new factors shifted the context in which BW was considered almost entirely to “bioterrorism.” Within 4 years, almost $30 billion in federal expenditure was appropriated to counter the anticipated threat. This response took place in the absence of virtually any threat analysis. The purpose of this monograph is to begin to fill that gap.
