Somalia

The United States Army in Somalia - 1992 - 1994 - US Army Center for Military History Publication 70-81-1. The United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian relief. No such operation has proven as costly or shocking, however, as that undertaken in Somalia from August 1992 to March 1994. Greeted initially by Somalis happy to be saved from starvation, U.S. troops were slowly drawn into interclan power struggles and ill-defined “nation-building” missions. The American people woke up one day in early October 1993 to news reports of dozens of our soldiers killed or wounded in fierce fighting in the streets of the capital city, Mogadishu. These disturbing events of a decade ago have taken on increasing meaning after the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001.

Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned - Colonel Kenneth Allard, USA. National Defense University book, 1995. The American mission in Somalia presented U.S. forces with a variety of difficult operational challenges as they tried to bring peace to a country ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. After initial success in the summer of 1992 in restoring order and saving thousands of lives, American soldiers clashed with Somali forces and were withdrawn in the spring of 1994. In the months that followed, we have studied what the Somalia experience can teach us about peace missions and learned how we might improve our capabilities across the spectrum of joint operations.

Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine - Colonel Kenneth Allard, USA.. Joint Force Quarterly article, Autumn 1995. As the Armed Forces prepare for new peacekeeping assignments, the lessons learned from operations in Somalia continue to have cutting-edge relevance. Some of those lessons were clearly learned and applied in Haiti, while others dominate planning for any Bosnian deployment. These specific insights are important for current and future operations, but our experience in Somalia also highlighted the enduring problem of effectively integrating joint operations. Despite the difficulties of working with the United Nations and coalition partners in a new, demanding class of missions, U.S. forces were beset by deficiencies in joint operations which persist ten years after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.1 The larger lesson of the book on which this article is based, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, is that we must forge closer links among three processes: the way we plan operations, the way we draw lessons from those operations, and the way we apply the lessons in formulating joint doctrine.

Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief Operations - Jonathan Dworkin. Joint Force Quarterly article, Summer 1995. Joint force commanders and their staffs can expect to be called on to coordinate with humanitarian relief organizations (HROs). Restore Hope in Somalia exposed problems between the military and relief agencies in everything from operational planning to organizational culture. Such difficulties in the future could endanger the mission if relations between JTF officers and relief workers are not more firmly established. The military operated under a U.N. mandate to create a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance could be delivered. In turn, some officers saw HROs as supporting the military in distributing food and perceived relief workers as disorganized do-gooders. HROs, on the other hand, saw their role as delivering supplies to the Somali people with military support. They found the military rigid and bureaucratic, unable to tackle the complexities of relief work, and consumed by a fear of “mission creep.” Both sides sparred over policies on security, convoys, and weapons confiscation because of deep institutional differences.

My Clan Against the World” - US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994 - Robert Baumann, Lawrence Yates and Versalle Washington. US Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004. “My Clan Against the World”: US and Coalition Operations in Somalia, 1992-94 represents another in a series of military case studies published by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The impetus for this project came from the commanding general, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, who directed CSI to examine the American military’s experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. That original focus can be found in the following pages, but the authors address other, broader issues as well, to include planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand. This case study also cautions against the misuse and overuse of “lessons” learned from any given military undertaking. As with the lessons of Vietnam, one of which dictated that conventional units should not engage in unconventional warfare, the US experience in Somalia left many military analysts and policymakers convinced that the United States should eschew any undertaking that smacked of nation building. Yet, as this book is published, just ten years after the US exit from Somalia, American forces are engaged in several locations against an unconventional foe and are involved in nation building in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps the first lesson to be learned about extracting lessons is, in the words of a once-popular motion picture, “Never Say Never Again.”

Somalia: Friction In Operations Other Than War - Major Donald Burlingham, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1994. Though not delineated in current doctrine, addressing the potential sources of friction in Operations Other Than War increases their chances of success. The great difference between the situation when U.S. forces first entered Somalia and the events, which led to U.S. withdrawal, are evidence that friction plays a significant role in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). This concept is included in both the Marine Corps and Army capstone doctrine that describes how these services wage war. Carl von Clausewitz originated the concept and listed eight potential sources of friction in an 1812 essay. Using this information as a foundation, this paper investigates potential sources of friction in OOTW using Operation RESTORE HOPE as a case study. Three major areas were identified as sources of friction in OOTW: (1) the mission, (2) the enemy, and (3) the environment. Parallels are evident between the sources of friction identified by Clausewitz and events in Somalia that appear to have been most burdened by the presence of friction. Planners and operators in Operations Other Than War should deliberately address the potential sources of friction to decrease the effects of this sapping force.

Somalia: Origins of Conflict and Unintended Consequences - Major Brent Norquist, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 2002. Four distinct elements led to the conflict between UN/US forces and the Somalis.  These key elements were (1) the Somali culture and character, (2) the impact of the legacy left by the dictator Siad Barre on the psyche and ambitions of the Somali clans, (3) the tainted relationship between the UN leadership and the Somali people, and (4) the failure of the US and UN leaders to effectively deal with the most powerful and influential Somali warlord, General Mahammad Farah Aideed.  The failure of both the US and the UN political and military leadership to fully understand and address these factors, thereby failing to know themselves and their enemy, resulted in unintended negative consequences. The UN and US did not go into Somalia with the intent of picking a fight, yet they stumbled their way into a deadly one.  While the first two factors leading to this fight, the Somali character and the legacy of “power addiction” left by Siad Barre were not a direct result of any US or UN action, they were critical elements to the eventual outcome of the campaign.  Sadly, these factors went largely unmeasured with terrible consequences for the US and UN forces engaged.  This oversight was the result of a poor understanding of the Somalis prior to Operation “RESTORE HOPE” and a failure, on the part of both parties (US and UN) to learn from their early experiences.  These failures precluded the effective anticipation of the Somalis reactions to the US and UN courses of action.  The tenuous relationship between the UN and the Somalis, which was compounded by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s past involvement in Said Barre-era Somali politics, tainted the UN’s credibility and effectiveness. These dynamics thwarted the UN’s attempts, however honorable they may have been, to rebuild a functioning government in Somalia.  Finally, the naive US policy of supporting the UN’s efforts to re-establish the Somali government while refusing to deal with General Aideed, arguably the most powerful man in Somalia, put the coalition’s mission on a collision course with misfortune. Future military operations in such environments must be planned and executed with a far better understanding of the culture, history, and character of potential adversaries in order to better control and shape the nature of any conflict in which US forces may be involved. Future military and political strategists must take a hard look at themselves prior to engaging in a military campaign with the intent of identifying any factors that may contribute to an adversarial relationship with nonaligned elements within the area of operations as well as those factors that will be used by an adversary to support their position through an information operations campaign. In order to maintain and capitalize on the legitimacy of an operation as well as reduce the amount of force required to coerce the adversary, future military and political leaders must focus on a strategy of perception control.

Lessons From Somalia: The Dilemma Of Peace Enforcement - Major Robert Allen, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1997. Peace enforcement is a viable peace operation only under the conditions of a superior military command and control structure, well trained and equipped combat forces, and limited objectives. Peace enforcement is a relatively new concept which precariously lies in the gray area between the logic of peace and the logic of war. Despite the lack of well established peace enforcement doctrine, the international community has increasingly turned to peace enforcement as a mode of intervention in its efforts to maintain world peace and security in the post-Cold War environment. As a consequence, this operation is inherently complex, misunderstood, difficult to manage, and often highly contentious. Both the potential benefits and the devastating pitfalls of this mode of intervention were demonstrated in the Somalia experience. At the risk of oversimplifying two extremely complex operations, the United Task Force (UNITAF) phase is generally credited for saving hundreds of thousands of starving Somalis while the subsequent United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) phase is remembered for warlord hunting and the infamous Mogadishu firefight which led to the termination of the United Nations mission. The differences between these operations and the dilemmas associated with the concept of peace enforcement warrant a candid evaluation so that similar problems can be more effectively managed or circumvented in the future. Peace enforcement was no panacea to remedy the causes of the Somali conflict. The limited approach taken during the United States-led UNITAF operation provided the best possible alternative to this situation. This operation proved to be remarkably successful in stemming the tide of starvation and serves as a testimony to the fact that peace enforcement is be a viable tool under limited conditions. During the United Nations led UNOSOM II mission, the enormous gap between the ambitious mandates and the inadequate means provided to accomplish the given objectives reflected the unrealistic expectations that the international community attached to the use of force. This ends, ways, and means mismatch was coupled with inadequate command and control and resulted in inconsistency and confusion. In the end, this combination led to a situation which ultimately backfired with disastrous consequences. Superior leadership, a unified military command structure, well trained and equipped combat troops, and an unambiguous and realistic mission clearly demarcated the difference between UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

The Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program and Modern Peace Operations - Common Themes and Lessons - Major William Go, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1997. The mixed performance of U.S. forces in recent low intensity conflicts or "small wars", i.e. Vietnam (counterinsurgency) and Somalia (peace operation), has been due in part to a failure to understand the political, economic, social, and cultural factors at work in the area of operations. The Combined Action Program (CAP) of the Vietnam War has been frequently cited by military historians as an example of a successful small wars operation, this because the CAP did have cultural aspect. The U.S. Marine Corps-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) portion of the 1992-1995 UN operation in Somalia was successful partly because it applied lessons learned from Marine Corps small wars experience from the Central American "Banana Wars" of the 1930's and the CAP in Vietnam. Counterinsurgency and peace operations are similar in that they both involve adversaries often indistinguishable from noncombatants and that operations frequently occur in an environment totally unfamiliar to Americans. Even more than conventional operations, they are characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, and friction.  In both cases, success depends on a well defined mission, properly trained and equipped forces, intelligently designed Rules of Engagement, and an in depth knowledge of the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the target area. As in conventional warfare, successful resolution of the conflict will depend on a political, not a military, solution. The Combined Action Program in Vietnam and UNITAF in Somalia both demonstrated that well trained and well led conventional forces can be successfully adapted to some unconventional roles. Both cases also demonstrated that military might, no matter how skillfully or how massively applied, cannot solve the underlying political cause of a conflict. Political problems require political solutions and the viability any political solution is wholly dependent on the characteristics of the native population. Presently, there is much that the U.S. military can do to improve the ways that it prepares forces for participation in peace operations. Too much emphasis is currently placed on tactics, techniques, and procedures and not enough is placed on cultural appreciation of the target area. A common failing of virtually all of our recent small wars experience has been that our forces have deployed "culturally under armed."

Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia - Lieutenant William Kendrick, USA. Infantry article, May-June 1995. Peacekeeping operations are the colonial wars of our time - the "savage wars of peace" as described by Rudyard Kipling.  When I first stood in the Mogadishu seaport and looked up at the city, I expected the Italian colonial governor to appear to welcome us to his province. In the colonial wars of the 19th century, European armies were able to overwhelm far more numerous native levies because of superior organization and more advanced weapons, particularly the British Maxim gun.  The Maxim guns of today are the armored and other heavy force, including attack helicopters - that modern American and Western European armies possess but that local militias of the Third World typically do not.

Task Force Ranger: A Case Study Examining the Application of Advanced Technologies in Modern Urban Warfare - Frank Akers, Jr. Department of Energy study, November 2000.  The purpose of this case study is to review the events surrounding the firefight that took place on October 3, 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, from a technology perspective. The focus is on how current technology could influence a similar incident and how technology could be used in a similar operation to reduce the number of causalities and to mitigate collateral damage in future combat situations.