Lebanon

United States

Tactical Lessons For Peacekeeping U.S. Multinational Force in Beirut (1982-1984) - Major Ronald F. Baczkowski, USMC. Research paper, undated but likely mid to late 1980's. Were the Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) employed in Beirut, Lebanon from August 1982 to February 1984 properly trained, equipped, and organized to conduct peacekeeping operations? If so, were there tactical reasons for the 24th MAU's failure? What are the tactical lessons learned for future peacekeeping forces?  The U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) operated in Beirut, Lebanon from 25 August 1982 to 26 February 1984. During this period four different MAUs served as peacekeepers. The USMNF was initially successful; but, as the strategic and tactical situations changed, the peacekeepers came increasingly under fire. On 23 October 1983, a lone terrorist destroyed the headquarters building of BLT 1/8, killing 241 Marines and sailors and wounding over 100 others. This study examines the tactical situation and how it changed. It analyzes how the training before employment may have assisted or prevented the tactical-level forces from operating effectively. It examines both positive and negative lessons learned through critical analysis. It provides many details concerning the actual tactical situation so the reader can conduct his or her own critical analysis and come to their own conclusions.

Beirut's Lesson for Future Foreign Policy - Lieutenant Commander Steven Westra, USN. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1993. Lessons learned from America's failed Lebanon policy during 1982-83 are valid today as a means to guide foreign policy formulation and to assist policymakers in determining the suitability of using military forces to secure the objectives of policy in regional conflicts. America's Lebanon policy during 1982-83 was in disarray.  Centralized control of policy in a few individuals virtually eliminated the traditional interagency debate on the ends, ways, and means of achieving American goals. As a result, those goals became overly aggressive and attempted to solve virtually all of Lebanon's complex problems simultaneously. American policy was formulated without adequate consideration of the complexity of the Lebanese conflict or its political and religious antecedents.  Additionally, our policy was pursued from a purely American perspective without consideration of the goals and motivations of numerous factions involved in the fighting.  As a consequence of these policy shortcomings, American military forces were mistakenly committed as a first resort before all diplomatic and other means had been exhausted.  The U.S. military mission included peacekeeping and support to the minority Christian government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces.  However, the Christian government lacked support from a majority of the Lebanese population.  This resulted in our forces rapidly becoming non-neutral in the eyes of most Lebanese factional leaders and their state sponsors such as Syria and Iran.  Ultimately, our forces became targets of Lebanon's violence.  The decision to commit military forces in Lebanon was made despite opposition by the senior military and civilian leadership of the Armed Forces. The mistake of using military force in a conflict that did not have a military solution resulted in the death of 241 American soldiers and contributed to a humiliating defeat for U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon (1958) - Roger Spiller. US Army Command and General Staff College Leavenworth Paper # 3, January 1981. This latest Leavenworth Paper examines the U.S. military intervention in the 1958 Lebanese political crisis. By focusing on a relatively recent Army experience in planning and conducting a major contingency operation, the study illuminates the complexity of military planning and the incongruity between plans and performance. This focus promotes the value of the historical perspective in dealing with contemporary military subjects and provides a timely opportunity to apply the lessons of the past.

The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander's Reminiscence - Major General David Gray, USA (Ret.). In the summer of 1982, the Director, Combat Studies Institute, assigned me the task of writing a Leavenworth Paper on rapid deployment logistics, using the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958 as a case study. Lebanon was chosen because there was ample documentation, much of it only recently declassified, and because Dr. Roger Spiller had set the strategic and tactical stage in Leavenworth Paper No. 3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon. In the course of my investigation, I decided to contact several military officers who had participated in the operation. Major General (Retired) David W. Gray was one of those contacted. General Gray said in his initial response that he would reply at a later date, after he had had time to review his papers and comb his memory in order to prepare as thorough and accurate a narrative as possible. When his reply arrived, it totaled over one-hundred handwritten pages.

High Tea in Low Places: Adventures in Peacekeeping and Nation Building - Lieutenant Colonel Charles Armstrong, USMC (Ret). Marine Corps Gazette article, December 2004. “Wait a moment, Sirs! We must shoot some fellows!” Since I was the “sir” behind the wheel of the United Nations (U.N.) jeep (call sign UNIFIL 658) that winter morning in 1984, I hit the brake. I glanced at the Fijian officer in the passenger seat, LtCol George “Jiogi” Konrote, and at his ever-vigilant “batman” in the prone position with his rifle pointed out the back of our ride. As we paused at the gate of the Fijian Battalion compound in Qana, Lebanon, we heard three crisp, clear shots from the rifleman atop the headquarters building. Seconds later, we saw him wave and heard his instructions, “OK to proceed, Sirs. I got the chaps.” I asked Konrote—my nominal reporting senior and best friend in the Middle East—“Didn’t that rifleman just serve us tea a few minutes ago?” George replied, “And scones, Chuck, very tasty scones.” Welcome to “Peacekeeping Central,” U.N. style!

Israel

Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies publication, 17 August 2006.  Instant military history is always dangerous and inaccurate. This is particularly true when one goes from an effort to describe the fighting to trying to draw lessons from uncertain and contradictory information. The following analysis is based largely on media reporting, data provided by Israeli and Arab think tanks, and a visit to Israel sponsored by Project Interchange of the American Jewish Committee. This visit made it possible to visit the front and talk with a number of senior Israeli officers and experts, but Israeli officers and experts were among the first to note that the facts were unclear and that it might take weeks or months to establish what had happened.  This analysis is, however, limited by the fact that no matching visit was made to Lebanon and to the Hezbollah. Such a visit was not practical at this time, but it does mean the lessons advanced analysis cannot be based on a close view of what Liddle Hart called the "other side of the hill."

The Vulture and The Snake Counter-Guerrilla Air Warfare: The War in Southern Lebanon - Shmuel Gordon. Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 39, July 1998. In recent years there has been a growing interest in counter-guerrilla warfare, taking an ever more important place alongside the preparation for High Intensity Conflicts (HIC), though little theoretical discussion of the subject has taken place. Guerrilla strategy and tactics, however, have been thoroughly studied in all their aspects in the writings of Clausewitz, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Lawrence, Che Guevara, Giap and Debray. Guerrilla warfare encompasses much beyond the purely military, and so does the struggle against it. This struggle integrates political activity, economic and social policy, ideological and religious confrontation, psychological warfare, the competition for public opinion and for the media. Thus, the results of a struggle between a state and a guerrilla movement are not necessarily decided on the battlefield. However, it is very important to address the military aspect of counter-guerrilla warfare, since, while military victories do not necessarily end the overall conflict, military failures in the struggle against guerrillas are conducive to a guerrilla victory. The major part of the literature in this field concentrates on guerrilla warfare, while, strangely, despite the fact that intellectual centers and think-tanks are largely located in countries that have to fight guerrillas, the literature that addresses counter-guerrilla warfare is quite limited.

“Just War” Case Study: Israeli Invasion Of Lebanon - Major Christopher Arantz, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 2002. This essay examines Israel’s overall reasons for invasion of southern Lebanon, and compares them to just war theory’s war-decision law and war-conduct law. This examination will establish that Israel achieved her objectives before war termination, which lead to some unjust actions. Between 1948 and 1982 Israel had engaged in conventional combat four times against Arab coalition forces. In all cases, Israel fought for survival of its state and established a military dominance in the region. In the years leading up to 1982, the Israeli government sought ways to eliminate security problems in its occupied territory and across its border with southern Lebanon. Israel defined its security problems as terrorist excursions that threatened the security of its people and property in northern Israel. This paper will examine Israeli conduct of deciding to go to war and their conduct of war in relation to just war theory. Three areas will be examined; 1) Did Israel have a just cause, use a legitimate authority and the right intention for invading Lebanon as in accordance with Jus ad Bellum? 2) Did Israel conduct the conflict in accordance with Jus in Bello? 3) What are the long-term ramifications for the region since the invasion?

The Israeli Experience in Lebanon, 1982-1985 - Major George Solley, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College research paper, 1987. On 6 June 1982, the armed forces of Israel invaded Lebanon in a campaign which, although initially perceived as limited in purpose, scope, and duration, would become the longest and most controversial military action in Israel's history. Operation Peace for Galilee was launched to meet five national strategy goals: (1) eliminate the PLO threat to Israel's northern border;  (2) destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon; (3) remove Syrian military presence in the Bekaa Valley and reduce its influence in Lebanon; (4) create a stable Lebanese government; and (5) therefore strengthen Israel's position in the West Bank. This study examines Israel's experience in Lebanon from the growth of a significant PLO threat during the 1970's to the present, concentrating on the events from the initial Israeli invasion in June 1982 to the completion of the withdrawal in June 1985. In doing so, the study pays particular attention to three aspects of the war: military operations, strategic goals, and overall results.

Urban Warfare Study: City Case Studies Compilation - Marine Corps Intelligence Activity study, 1999. In 1997, in light of the probability of future operations in urban environments, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) was tasked to provide a preliminary assessment of urban warfare lessons learned in support of the CSEEA Joint Wargame. Three scenarios across the spectrum of conflict from mid- to low-intensity were chosen to represent urban operations. The lessons are drawn from Russian operations in Chechnya, Israeli operations in Lebanon and British operations in Northern Ireland.  This study presents strategic, operational, tactical and technical lessons learned from each of those operations.

Attack Helicopters in Lebanon, 1982 - Dr. George Gawrych. US Army Command and General Staff College Press article, 1992. While the Vietnam War saw the evolution of the helicopter from a troop transport and medical evacuation vehicle to a close air support weapon, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon witnessed the emergence of attack helicopters as tank killers. In the 1973 Middle East War, the Israelis employed helicopters primarily to transport ground troops, evacuate casualties, and resupply combat units. By 1982, however, both the Israelis and the Syrians had purchased attack helicopters and were developing their own particular doctrines for their employment.