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Iraq Study Group Report - In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Group present a new approach because we believe there is a better way forward. All options have not been exhausted. We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a critical region of the world, and protect America’s credibility, interests, and values. Our report makes it clear that the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people also must act to achieve a stable and hopeful future. What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount of political will and cooperation by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It demands skillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its success depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political polarization. Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate within a democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure -- as is any course of action in Iraq -- if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus.

Post-Saddam Iraq: The War Game - George Washington University's National Security Archive. In late April 1999, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), led by Marine General Anthony Zinni (ret.), conducted a series of war games known as Desert Crossing in order to assess potential outcomes of an invasion of Iraq aimed at unseating Saddam Hussein. The documents posted here covered the initial pre-war game planning phase from April-May 1999 through the detailed after-action reporting of June and July 1999.

Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy - Steven Metz. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, December 2006. While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?

Small Wars and Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Lessons from Iraq - Major M. W. Shervington, British Army. Cranfield University thesis, July 2005. On 1 May 2003, President George W. Bush stood aboard USS Abraham Lincoln, in front of a banner stating ‘Mission Accomplished’, and declared that ‘major combat operations have ended. In the battle for Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.’ The President’s declaration has proved to be a false dawn. Despite a breathtaking conventional military campaign that removed Saddam Hussein’s regime in 43 days, the US-led Coalition has since been embroiled in countering an increasingly violent, diverse and unpredictable insurgency. This dissertation provides some historical perspective to the development of insurgency and counter-insurgency. It traces the background to the creation of the modern state of Iraq. It examines the post-conflict insurgency in Iraq. It considers those decisions made by the Coalition that most contributed to its emergence and growth. It analyses those lessons that should contribute to future British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. The paper addresses four themes. First, the US military alone in Iraq is conducting a COIN campaign against an insurgency that is unprecedented in history. Secondly, key lessons for British COIN doctrine must be learnt from the American politico-military experience; the British Army must therefore be receptive and open-minded. Thirdly, Iraq has witnessed a continued failure by American and British policy-makers to learn the lessons from history. Lastly, COIN operations in Iraq have to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people as they have to do with the perceptions of the wider Muslim world and the American and British electorates. It is a battle of perceptions in a war over ideas.

U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation - Shane Lauth, Kate Phillips, Erin Schenck. Edited by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute colloquium report, April 2006. A colloquium on “U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation” was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.

Planning Lessons From Afghanistan and Iraq - Colonel Joseph Collins (USA Ret.). Joint Force Quarterly article, Issue # 41, 2nd Quarter 2006. For planners and bureaucrats, Afghanistan and Iraq appear to present a puzzle. In Afghanistan, on one hand, we had little time for planning; we did lots of innovative things on the cheap; our relatively small, international force has taken few casualties; we have had great local and international support; and we are, by most accounts, on the way to a good outcome. On the other hand, in Iraq, we had over a year to plan; our national policy has been expensive and often unimaginative; a relatively large, primarily American force has taken over 18,000 casualties, most of them in the so-called postconflict phase; we have had severe problems with local and international support; and the outcome, although looking up, is still in doubt. A wag might conclude from the above that Americans should avoid planning at all costs. It brings bad luck, stifles creativity, and interferes with our penchant for achieving success through our normal standard operating procedure: the application of great amounts of material resources guided by brilliant improvisation and dumb luck. While the wag’s conclusion is flawed, problems in planning indeed contributed to serious shortcomings connected with Operation Iraqi Freedom. With 3 years of hindsight, it was clear that these shortcomings included ineffective planning and preparation for stability operations, inadequate forces to occupy and secure a country the size of California, poor military reaction to rioting, d looting in the immediate postconflict environment, slow civil and military reaction to a growing insurgency, and problematical funding and contracting mechanisms that slowed reconstruction failure to make effective use of former Iraqi military forces.

The Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies report, July 2006. This report argues for fundamental changes in the way the US plans to fight counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns. It argues that the US must place far higher reliance on local allies in both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns. It also argues that the US must work with existing allied governments and seek reform and transformation at the far slower pace that Middle Eastern and other nations and societies in the developing world can accept.

So You Want to Be an Adviser - Brigadier General Daniel Bolger, US Army. Military Review article, March - April 2006. BG Bolger, one of the Army’s top advisers in Iraq, offers a vivid description of what it is like to train Iraqi security forces. A combat adviser influences his ally by force of personal example. You coach, you teach, and you accompany in action. Liaison with friendly forces becomes a big role, and you ensure independent ground-truth reporting to both your counterpart and your own chain. Finally, an adviser provides the connection and expertise to bring to bear fires, service support, and other combat multipliers. accolades go to the leader you support. That, at least, is the idea. The people advising today’s Forces have learned to fight what T.R. Fehrenbach so rightly and ruefully called “this kind of war.” the opening rounds of this enduring, twilight struggle, our wily enemies wear civilian clothes and strike with bombs and gunfire without regard to innocents in the crossfire. The battles feature short, sharp exchanges of Kalashnikov slugs and M-4 carbine bullets, the fiery death blossom of a car bomb, the quick, muffled smack of a wooden door going down and a blindfolded figure stumbling out at gunpoint. Dirty little firefights spin up without warning and die out in minutes. But the campaign in will last years, and will not be cheap in money or blood. Since the present advisory effort began to accompany forces into action, we have lost 8 killed. In today’s major theaters, most of the fighting is done by Afghans and Iraqis. They have signed on, but they could use our help. So you want to be an adviser? If so, read on.

The "Baghdad Problem" - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies report, July 2006. The announcement that the U.S. is sending more troops into Baghdad is a grim warning of just how serious the situation in Iraq has become. The fact is that US forces are now strained throughout the country in spite of efforts to create Iraqi military, security, and police forces. Reinforcing Baghdad inevitably means weakening both U.S. and Iraqi capabilities somewhere else, and despite all of the talk that the insurgency focuses on Baghdad and four provinces, civil strife is steadily broadening in most of Iraq.

Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations - Matt Matthews. US Army Combat Studies Institute paper, September 2006. The two battles for the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004 were turning points in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Elements of the US Marine Corps began an offensive in April to destroy enemy forces in the town, but the battle ended prematurely with the Marines being replaced by the “Fallujah Brigade,” followed soon after by a complete enemy takeover of the city. Some units of the new Iraqi Army were also committed to the first battle; they were found wanting and the entire Iraqi training program significantly changed in response. In November 2004, a combined USMC, US Army, and Iraqi Army offensive succeeded in eliminating the enemy in Fallujah in a destructive urban battle. In Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations, Mr. Matt Matthews focuses on the ways in which Army and Marine forces operated together in the second Battle of Fallujah.

Operation AL FAJR - Commander John Patch, US Navy. Marine Corps Gazette article, November 2006. While the combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) reasserted American supremacy in a classic combined arms campaign on open terrain, success against the protracted insurgency in urban areas is more elusive. As a recent analysis argued, “The very success of American joint operations—and joint fires in particular—guarantee that a clever opponent will move into cities for protection.” While cautionary maxims oft-repeated since Sun Tzu’s time point to avoiding cities, the U.S. military must be prepared to defeat the urban adversary when war aims demand it. Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) are not new phenomena, but some pundits bemoaned coalition readiness prior to Operation AL FAJR (OAF) (also known as Operation PHANTOM FURY) in Fallujah. Though neither sterile nor quick, OAF proved not to be the feared bloody quagmire that other armies historically faced. In the tradition of Hue City, coalition forces under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) successfully breached Fallujah’s defenses and seized the city, eliminating a key insurgent stronghold. Several key factors contributed to rapid tactical/operational victory—the virtual absence of civilians; effective MOUT doctrine, tactics, and command and control (C²); and adherence to the laws of war, especially regarding joint fires. Extant joint and Service doctrine discusses MOUT characteristics and caveats in detail; many apply to this article but are not restated here.

The Iraqi Marines - Captain Giles Walger, US Marine Corps. Marine Corps Gazette article, 2006. Starting as the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force (ICDF) during the initial phases of the reconstruction of Iraq, the Iraqi Marines have undergone several name changes. At one point the ICDF was split in two. Half became the Iraqi Navy while the other half became the Iraqi Naval Infantry Battalion. In May 2005 the Iraqi Navy Board and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense agreed to expand the Iraqi Naval Infantry Battalion and its mission. With those changes a decision to formally change the title to the Iraqi Marines was reached. The Marine Corps should foster a relationship with these new Marines and in doing so consider their mission, operational tasks, training, and the development of a future relationship with them. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) for the Iraqi Navy and Marines is based in Umm Qasr. Since 2003 the Australian Commandos, Dutch Marines, Royal Marines, and U.S. Marines have all provided individual augments to the CMATT. The CMATT for the Iraqi Navy and Marines has been focused on three objectives: (1) to man, train, and equip them; (2) to assist the Iraqis in developing a roadmap to meet the requirements for handover of oil terminal responsibility, sustaining a Navy and Marine force capable of defending Iraq’s coast and protecting Iraqi national interests out to 12nm; and (3) to advise them in meeting the coalition’s operational requirements. Due to the drawdown of the CMATT for the Iraqi Navy and Marines, no U.S. Marines remain on the team, and the Royal Marines will draw down to termination in early 2006. The Iraqi Marine mission is to provide security and point defense on ABOT and KAAOT; to provide base security for the Iraqi Naval Base, Umm Qasr; and to assist the Iraqi Navy with coastal maritime defense of Iraq’s vital national interests.

Operation Knockout: COIN in Iraq. Colonel James K. Greer, U.S. Army. Military Review article, November - December 2005. On 12 December 2005, Coalition and Iraqi forces demonstrated again the flexibility and agility so necessary for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against a smart, adaptive foe. After concentrating large-scale operations for months in Ninewah and Al Anbar Provinces northwest and west of Baghdad, Coalition forces conducted a new, no-notice operation in Diyala Province, northeast of Baghdad. Named Operation Knockout, this successful action reinforced the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to defeat the insurgents and terrorists in Iraq. The bread-and-butter offensive COIN operation in Iraq is the battalion and smaller unit cordon and search. From 2003 to 2004, Coalition forces conducted literally dozens of these operations daily. In 2005, however, Iraqi Security Forces independently planned, prepared for, and conducted most cordon and search operations. Confronted constantly by these operations, some insurgent and terrorist cells adapted to survive; others did not, and Coalition and Iraqi forces disrupted their operations or destroyed them. Coalition and Iraqi forces have also been successful in large-scale, deliberate offensive operations such as in Fallujah in November 2004 and in Tal Afar in September 2005. Publicized ahead of time and with deliberate force buildups accompanied by provincial, tribal, and sectarian diplomacy, these large-scale operations resulted in significant gains in two major insurgent strongholds—gains that were reinforced with economic, social, and civil efforts. As with cordon and search operations, large-scale offensive operations are increasingly Iraqi-led. For example, in 2004 nine Coalition battalions led five Iraqi Army battalions in the attack on Fallujah. By contrast, in the successful 2005 attack on Tal Afar, 11 Iraqi Army battalions led 5 Coalition battalions. Coalition forces killed or captured insurgents who did not flee Tal-Afar, disrupted their cells, and restored law and order to the towns and surrounding areas.

Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War - Dr. David Hendrickson and Dr. Robert Tucker. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, December 2005. Though critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration’s conduct of the Iraq war, the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers—criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups—were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself. Military and civilian planners were culpable in failing to plan for certain tasks, but the most serious problems had no good solution. Even so, there are lessons to be learned. These include the danger that the imperatives of “force protection” may sacrifice the broader political mission of U.S. forces and the need for skepticism over the capacity of outsiders to develop the skill and expertise required to reconstruct decapitated states.

What Lies Beneath: Saddam's Legacy and the Roots of Resistance in Iraq - Captain Peter Munson, USMC. US Navy Naval Postgraduate School thesis, December 2005. Saddam Hussein’s patrimonial coercive rule reshaped major aspects of the Iraqi state and society, providing structures and motivations that have fueled resistance in the wake of regime change. By linking literature describing the effects of Ba’ath rule on the Iraqi state, society, and individual to the characteristics and motivations of the resistance, a more nuanced understanding of the complex landscape of Iraqi transition is possible. Repressive regimes produce a lasting and complex legacy in the structures of state and society that they leave behind. This legacy is often contentious and unpredictable, complicating efforts toward a democratic transition. This thesis concludes that, in the case of Iraq, patrimonial coercive rule produced a set of Sunni sub-state power structures that coveted the state and personal powers enjoyed under the old system. This sub-state landscape has proven to be difficult terrain for a successful transition, producing a network of actors that resist for varied motives. Exploration of the case of Iraqi transition reveals a demand for balanced political and military policies that address the sociopolitical roots of the resistance as well as the violent symptoms. Military initiatives alone cannot produce a solution to the problems in Iraq.

How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers - Dr. Leonard Wong and Colonel Stephen Gerras (USA). US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, March 2006. The situation in post-war Iraq is producing combat veterans accustomed to a perspective of combat that differs greatly from past wars. The Forward Operating Base (FOB) has become the mainstay of the U.S. presence in Iraq. The authors explore the facets of fighting from the FOB. Their research shows that the FOB gives soldiers the unprecedented advantage of gaining a respite from constant danger, minimizing the wearing effects of hunger and fatigue, and reducing the isolation of combat. As a result, many of the factors of psychological stress typically present in combat are greatly reduced. They also point out, however, that technology on the FOB allows soldiers to communicate frequently with home, shifting the family from an abstract to concrete concept in the minds of deployed soldiers. As a result, the competition between the family and Army for soldier time, commitment, loyalty, and energy is renewed.

Operations in the North Babil Province of Iraq - Captain Ross Meglathery, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, February 2006. The threat in the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (24th MEU’s) North Babil area of operations (AO) was a conglomeration of various factions representing Sunni and Shia, former regime elements, homegrown and foreign Wahabbist/Salafist extremists, criminal thugs, dirt poor farmers scratching out an existence, and hardcore foreign fighters. As such, there was no “silver bullet,” clear-cut single menace within the AO. Rather, there were numerous threats whose specific goals often overlapped. However, the one consistent characteristic these disparate groups shared was their desire to see coalition forces (CF) fail in their mission to bring stability to this highly volatile region of Iraq. These factions do not discriminate as to which U.S. forces they want to kill in their desire to defeat us. They do seek to attack us at our weakest points. This is where the old adage that every Marine is a rifleman comes into play. Insurgents recognize that for our U.S. Army counterparts, combat service support (CSS) units are not trained to the same level as combat arms soldiers. For CSS Marines, infantry tactics are also not the main focus of training, but due to our Marine Corps warfighting philosophy, we are prepared to fight when given the opportunity. The CSS role traditionally has been a rear area mission dismissed by combat arms as a noncombat arms administrative mission. As Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) transitioned from a fluid, traditional maneuver war, the role of CSS changed. Convoy missions have become some of the most dangerous operations carried out in Iraq.

Operation Iraq Freedom Phase IV: The Watershed the U.S. Army Still Needs to Recognise? - Brigadier Nigel Alwyn-Foster, British Army. Military Review article, November - December 2005. Few could fail to be impressed by the speed and style of the US dominated Coalition victory over Saddam’s forces in Spring 2003. At the time, it appeared, to sceptics and supporters alike, that the most ambitious military action in the post Cold War era had paid off, and there was an air of heady expectation of things to come. Much of the credit lies rightly with the US Army, which seemed entirely attuned morally, conceptually and physically to the political intent it served. In contrast, 2 years later, notwithstanding ostensible campaign successes such as the elections of January 2005, Iraq is in the grip of a vicious and tenacious insurgency. Few would suggest Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has followed the path intended by the US President when he committed US forces. Pentagon and other Administration staff acknowledge that a moment of opportunity was missed immediately after the toppling of Saddam’s regime: that fleeting chance to restore law and order, maintain the momentum, nurture popular support and thus extinguish the inevitable seeds of insurgency sown amongst the ousted ruling elite. Today, the Coalition is resented by many Iraqis, whilst analysis of attack trends since mid 2003 shows that Coalition forces formed the bulk of the insurgents’ target set throughout 2004. In short, despite political and military leaders’ justifiable claims of achievement against tough odds, others claim, justifiably on the face of it, that the Coalition has failed to capitalise on initial success. This change in fortune has been attributed to many factors. The Iraq undertaking was, in any case, ‘forbiddingly difficult’ and might not have seemed as appealing had the US forces not recently achieved a sudden and decisive victory over Taleban forces in Afghanistan. Inadequate attention was paid to planning for OIF Phase 4, including Security Sector Reform (SSR), arising in part, according to at least one source, from frictions in the Administration. The CPA decisions to disband the senior levels of the Baath Party and the entire old Iraqi Army, thus effectively disenfranchising those most likely to resent the new order, have also attracted much criticism. Some argue, however, that the Coalition military, particularly the US Army, were partly to blame, citing aspects of their performance since the cessation of formal hostilities and commencement of Phase 4 of the operation. Indeed, some serving US Army and DOD personnel acknowledge that whilst the Army is indisputably the master of conventional warfighting, it is notably less proficient in the Phase 4 type of role, or what the US defence community commonly calls Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The crux of the debate is whether the performance and approach of the US Army have indeed been contributory factors in the deepening crisis in OIF Phase 4, and, if so, what that means for the future development of the Army, particularly given that it has already embarked on a process of transformation. OIF is a joint venture, and dedicated, courageous Americans from all 4 Services and the civil sector risk their lives daily throughout Iraq, but the Army is the pivotal, supported force, and thus the most germane to the issue. My motivation to study this has arisen from my experience serving with the US Forces in Iraq throughout 2004. There can be few acts more galling than a soldier from one country publicly assessing the performance of those from another. However, this is not an arrogant exercise in national comparisons: there is no other Army in the world that could even have attempted such a venture. It is, rather, an attempt to understand and rationalise the apparently paradoxical currents of strength and weakness witnessed at close hand over the course of a year. Ultimately, the intent is to be helpful to an institution I greatly respect.

Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency - Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2005. How does one assess the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq? The answer is critical to the public debate about the ongoing war and to U.S. strategy. Yet, this task has proven more than challenging to experts within and outside government, for a number of reasons: it is often difficult, if not impossible, to calculate accurately the numerical strength of an insurgency; there are no front lines whose movement could provide an indication of the war’s progress; and military factors are usually less important than political and psychological considerations in deciding the outcome of such conflicts. Part of the challenge is that the coalition and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) face a composite insurgency whose elements act out of diverse motives. These include former regime members and Iraqi Islamists, foreign jihadists, angry or aggrieved Iraqis, tribal groups, and criminals, who draw considerable strength from political and religious ideologies, tribal notions of honor and revenge, and shared solidarities deeply ingrained in Iraq’s Sunni Triangle. The motives of these groups include a desire to: 1) resist occupation; 2) subvert or overthrow the new Iraqi government; and/or 3) establish an Islamic state or caliphate in Iraq. More fundamentally, the insurgency is about power: who had it, who has it now, and who will have it in the future. Indeed, major elements of the Sunni Arab insurgency seek to regain power—as individuals, as members of the former regime, or as a community.

How to Win in Iraq - Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. Foreign Affairs article, September / October 2005. Because they lack a coherent strategy, U.S. forces in Iraq have failed to defeat the insurgency or improve security. Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade.

Iraq and Beyond: Recognizing Shortfalls in Performance, Identifying Options for Improvement - Rand Review editorial, Spring 2006. Among the issues sparked by the Iraq War are three distinctly practical ones: sustaining U.S. Army forces in combat, promoting reenlistments across the services, and rebuilding Iraqi security forces and institutions. At times, these efforts have been hampered by shortfalls in U.S. performance. As outlined in this series on “Iraq and Beyond,” the lessons learned can help to reduce the risks and costs in future contingencies.

Iraq and Beyond: Rebuilding Iraqi Security - Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane. Rand Review article, Spring 2006. From May 2003 to June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq sought to reconstruct Iraqi security forces and to develop Iraqi security institutions. We examined these attempts in the defense, interior, and justice sectors. We assessed the CPA’s successes and failures so that we could draw lessons from the experience, insofar as currently possible. In planning for postwar Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction, the United States and its coalition partners had assumed a benign security environment and an Iraqi police force able to maintain order. Instead, the security environment deteriorated, and those police and security forces that remained were incapable of responding to rising criminality and political violence. Once the CPA agreed in November 2003 to shift power to the Iraqis by the end of June 2004, the CPA was confronted with the challenges of restoring order, rebuilding Iraqi security forces, and building security institutions on an abbreviated timeline. Consistently, the emphasis on meeting short-term security needs at the expense of building long-term security institutions led to failures.

Iraq and Beyond: Sustaining Army Forces - Eric Peltz, Marc Robbins, and Kenneth Girardini. Rand Review article, Spring 2006. By virtually every account, the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in the spring of 2003 were remarkably successful in terms of achieving the military objectives. Yet there is a general belief within the U.S. Army and the broader defense community, supported by our analysis, that this success was achieved despite numerous logistics problems.

Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq - Dr. W. Andrew Terrill and Dr. Conrad C. Crane. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, October 2005. The questions of how to empower the Iraqis most effectively and then progressively withdraw non-Iraqi forces from that country is one of the most important policy problems currently facing the United States. The authors seek to present the U.S. situation in Iraq in all of its complexity and ambiguity, with policy recommendations for how that withdrawal strategy might be most effectively implemented. They consider previous instances of U.S. military occupation of foreign countries and the difficulty of maintaining domestic support for such operations. The authors view the empowerment of a viable Iraqi central government and a security force to defend its authority as vital to the future of that country, but also suggest that there are severe constraints on the potential for the United States to sustain its military presence in that country at the current level. They conclude that the United States must be prepared to withdraw from Iraq under non-optimal conditions and that the chief U.S. goals should be to devise an exit strategy for Iraq that focuses on bolstering Iraqi government legitimacy even if this does not involve creating a Western style democracy. The authors strongly reject the idea withdrawing from Iraq by the use of a formal timetable, and call for the U.S. to continue its policy of renouncing permanent Iraqi bases.

Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi - Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 11 October 2005. Today the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a letter between two senior al Qa'ida leaders, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, that was obtained during counterterrorism operations in Iraq. This lengthy document provides a comprehensive view of al Qa'ida's strategy in Iraq and globally. The letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi is dated July 9, 2005. The contents were released only after assurances that no ongoing intelligence or military operations would be affected by making this document public.

Success or Failure in the Fighting in Iraq? - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2005. It now seems unlikely that either the draft Constitution, or the election that may follow, will persuade a large number of Sunnis to support the government more actively, or reduce Iraqi Sunni support for the insurgency in the near term. If political developments do have a positive effect, it will be more out of compellance than persuasion. It will be because a substantially larger number of Iraqi Sunnis feel they have no real chance of winning, and see the military balance shifting decisively in favor of Iraqi government forces that can largely suppress a civil war and which—unlike Coalition forces—cannot be driven out of the country. For this to happen, US and Iraqi forces must win both an urban battle—centered in Baghdad, Mosul, and their environs—and a battle for the rural areas and towns and smaller cities in the West. In both cases, military victories will be largely unimportant unless they can be followed up by an enduring Iraqi government presence in terms of both effective governance and effective police forces.

Iraqi Insurgency - Talk of the Nation National Public Radio audio roundtable, June 2005. Guests are David Greene (NPR correspondent), Christopher Gelpi (associate professor of Political Science at Duke University), Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (U.S. Marine Corps, author of The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century), Shawn Woodward (military historian at the Dupuy Institute) and Stanley Karnow (Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, author of In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines and Vietnam: A History).

Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2005. The US-led Coalition initially tried to restrict the development of Iraqi armed forces to a token force geared to defend Iraq’s borders against external aggression. It did not try to create police forces with the capability to deal with serious insurgency and security challenges. As time went on, it ignored or did not give proper priority to the warnings from US military advisory teams about the problems in organizing and training Iraqi forces, and in giving them the necessary equipment and facilities. The US failed to treat the Iraqis as partners in the counterinsurgency effort for nearly a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and did not attempt to seriously train and equip Iraqi forces for proactive security and counterinsurgency missions until April 2004 –nearly a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein and two-thirds of a year after a major insurgency problem began to emerge.

In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities - Brent Scowcroft, Samuel Berger and William Nash. Council on Foreign Relations report, July 2005. Two years after the United States invaded Iraq, the turmoil there is a daily reminder that winning a war also requires winning the peace. A dramatic military victory has been overshadowed by chaos and bloodshed in the streets of Baghdad, difficulty in establishing security or providing essential services, and a deadly insurgency. The costs—human, military, economic—are high and continue to mount. For some years, foreign policy experts have debated the desirability and necessity of intervening in “internal” conflicts. In today’s world of failed states, terrorism, proliferation, and civil conflict, the trend is clear: the United States will often be drawn into complex situations when they affect its national security or its conscience. Without improved capacities and better organization, the United States will waste time, energy, and critical resources putting together ad hoc responses that may imperil military gains. This Task Force calls on the president to make improving America’s post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization capabilities a top foreign policy priority. More specific recommendations include: preparing the U.S. military to undertake post-conflict missions; putting together a coherent military and civilian interagency effort under the leadership of the National Security Council; making the State Department the lead agency for the civilian side of post-conflict reconstruction; appointing the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as the agency responsible for managing daily operations in the field; and strengthening the capacity of the intelligence community to play a larger and more useful role in supporting stabilization efforts.

Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq - W. Andrew Terrill. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, February 2005. The future of Iraq is uncertain. The country is in a dangerous phase. The removal of a brutal dictatorship by coalition forces in April 2003 has given the Iraqi people hope for a new and better political system, where individuals do not have to live in continuing fear and uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Iraqi people must also address the difficult challenges of self-government for a diverse population, with major ethnic and sectarian groups that often maintain widely divergent agendas. If they fail to do this and an ethnic/sectarian war ensues, the consequences will be dire, not only for Iraq, but for the entire Middle Eastern region. This monograph, by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, does not predict an Iraqi civil war, which is the worst-case outcome for the current struggle in Iraq. Neither can this monograph fully rule out this possibility since the responsibility for preventing such an eventuality is ultimately Iraqi and not American, and U.S. analysts cannot predict with certainty what Iraqis will do once they take full control of their own country. Rather, this monograph underscores what is at stake in the Middle East by a comprehensive discussion of potential region-wide consequences should an ethnic and sectarian war actually occur. This work therefore serves as an important warning of how an Iraq civil war could offer new strategic opportunities, but especially dangers, to many of the states within the Middle East. Dr. Terrill’s work performs this important task by examining how an Iraqi civil war may develop and how this could influence the internal stability and foreign policies of regional countries.

Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Lessons of Recent Conflicts in the Middle East - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2004. The very nature of warfare is changing in a region where nations have previously tended to focus on building the largest possible conventional forces and obtaining the most advanced major weapons. On the one hand, the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA), modern technology, professional forces, and jointness are transforming the nature of the conventional capabilities of the US, and inevitably many of its European and regional allies. On the other hand, hostile, and potentially hostile, states are adapting in their own way, as are extremist, radical, and terrorist movements. For all of the advantages the RMA offered in defeating Iraq’s conventional forces and deposing Saddam Hussein, Iraqi insurgents have since found ways to counter many of the advantages of the US and its allies. Similar trends have emerged in Afghanistan, and in the fighting between the US and the Taliban and Al Qaida. Both sides learn and adapt. War remains a duel where both sides must constantly adapt, and one that is becoming steadily more asymmetric with time.

Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - U.S. Department of Defense, 2005. This report to Congress is submitted pursuant to the section entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13. The report is divided into two sections corresponding to those identified in the Conference Report. The initial section of the report focuses on Stability and Security in Iraq and enumerates goals and progress regarding Iraq’s political stability, security environment, and economic progress.

Security Strategies for Post-War Iraq - George Fella. US Army War College Strategy Research Project, March 2004. This paper examines shortcomings in the development and execution of the postwar security strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The strategy is evaluated from the perspective of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic elements of national power. The paper presents lessons learned from the postwar strategy as they relate to recommendations made before the war by the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction. It also includes other lessons learned and corrective actions the Commission didn't address.

Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues - General Accounting Office report, June 2004. As of the end of April 2004, about $58 billion in grants, loans, assets, and revenues from various sources had been made available or pledged to the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. Resource needs are expected to continue after the transfer of power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government.

Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario - Dr. Conrad Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, January 2003. With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks. The interagency planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of any possible combat, was an excellent approach. Still, that operation eventually failed because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission once military forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. Recent experiences In the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated the potential assistance that can be provided by international and non-governmental organizations, though coordination with them can be difficult. In Iraq it will also be important to lessen military involvement as expeditiously as possible, so interagency planners must be sure that governmental, non-governmental, and international civilian organizations are ready to perform assigned tasks when required. The primary problem at the core of American deficiencies in providing post-conflict capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation-building. U.S. leaders must accept this mission as an essential part of our national security and better tailor and fund the military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it. This will take considerable manpower and money.

The Day After: The Army in a Post-Conflict Iraq - Colonel Dennis Murphy (USA), Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Turner (USA) and Lieutenant Colonel Bob Hesse (USA). US Army Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, December 2002. The world’s geostrategic environment, dramatically influenced by terrorism, continues to undergo change marked by a wide array of economic, technical, societal, religious, cultural, and physical challenges. No - where is this more apparent than in recent calls by the United States for regime change in Iraq. And assuming a regime change does occur, forced by ground combat in a “coalition of the willing” led by the U.S., the most challenging and important phase of the operation may not be the actual combat, but the post-conflict requirements that follow. Determining the role of the Army “the day after” and beyond in Iraqis critical to understanding the ability of the United States to continue the Global War on Terror while preparing for other unforeseen future.

What do You do For an Encore? - Colonel Christopher Conlin, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, October 2004. The following article will outline how we in 1^st Battalion, 7^th Marines addressed the daunting issue of what are often called “Transition Operations” in Baghdad. Of course, no one operates in isolation, and this article should hopefully address the great support we received from our higher and adjacent commands. But it will also identify some thoughts on how we can better affect these operations when presented with similar circumstances. Additionally, this will be the first of a series of articles that also address the challenge of what are being called “Stability Operations” as we further refined our tactics in the Southern city of Najaf. These articles will provide a little history, a bit of perspective, some strong opinions, and some suggestions on what to do if you find yourself similarly challenged.

The Mayor of Ar Rutbah - Major James Gavrilis, US Army. Foreign Policy article, November/December 2005. Amid the chaos in Iraq, one company of U.S. Special Forces achieved what others have not: a functioning democracy. How? By relying on common sense, the trust of Iraqis, and recollections from Political Science 101. Now, their commander reveals the gritty reality about nation-building in Iraq, from the ground up.

Next Steps in Iraq and Beyond - James Dobbins. Link to Rand document, September 2003. Testimony of James Dobbins before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

Preparing foe War, Stumbling to Peace. Planning for Post Conflict Operations in Iraq. - Major James Howard, British Army. US Army School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, 2004. This monograph discusses planning for the post-conflict phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. More specifically, it examines whether a disparate focus on war-fighting operations during the planning and execution phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is to blame for the lack of progress towards reconstruction. It examines the factors and influences that led political and military leaders to make certain decisions during the preparatory and combat phases of operations to depose Saddam Hussein. Moreover, it asks whether military leaders could have acted differently in pursuit of the Bush Administration’s strategic objectives for Iraq.

Post-Conflict Operations From Europe to Iraq - Dr. James Carafano. Heritage Foundation lecture, June 2004. The difficulties that the U.S. military and other coalition forces have experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the consternation expressed in the Western press and public opinion should come as no surprise—in part because both press and people have scant appreciation for the difficulties of post-war occupation. Yet there is legitimate cause for complaint. The U.S. military and its allies were poorly prepared to undertake post-conflict operations. This shortfall exacerbated the “fog of peace”—the chaos, uncertainty, violence, and privation that typically occur during the initial post-conflict period. Operations were not as efficient and effective as they could have been. This paper argues that weaknesses in how the United States and its allies approached the challenges of post-conflict operations run deeper than the debate over policies, the justification for the war, the number of troops committed to the occupation, and the resources available. Lack of historical memory has played a significant role. Unrealistic expectations are one reflection of this dynamic. Perhaps even more important, the trials of Iraq reflect long-standing flaws in how U.S. forces prepare for the fight for peace—weaknesses that exacerbated strategic mistakes made while planning for the occupation.

The “Post Conflict” Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan - Anthony Cordesman. Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 2004. The current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan has exposed the fact that there is a serious danger in the very term “post conflict:” It reflects critical failures in American understanding of the world it faces in the 21st Century, and in the nature of asymmetric warfare and defense transformation. If the US is to succeed in the conflicts that are likely to shape much of the 21st Century, it must learn from both its successes and mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Strategic engagement requires an objective – not an ideological – assessment of the problems that must be dealt with, and of the size and cost of the effort necessary to achieve decisive grand strategic results. Neither a capabilities-based strategy nor one based on theoretical sizing contingencies is meaningful when real-world conflicts and well-defined contingencies require a strategy and force plan that can deal with reality on a country-by country basis, rather than be based on ideology and theory.

Iraq Without a Plan - Michael O'Hanlon. Policy Review article. The post-invasion phase of the Iraq mission has been the least well-planned American military mission since Somalia in 1993, if not Lebanon in 1983, and its consequences for the nation have been far worse than any set of military mistakes since Vietnam. The U.S. armed forces simply were not prepared for the core task that the United States needed to perform when it destroyed Iraq’s existing government — to provide security, always the first responsibility of any sovereign government or occupier. The standard explanation for this lack of preparedness among most defense and foreign policy specialists, and the U.S. military as well, is that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and much of the rest of the Bush administration insisted on fighting the war with too few troops and too Polyannaish a view of what would happen inside Iraq once Saddam was overthrown. This explanation is largely right. Taken to an extreme, however, it is dangerously wrong. It blames the mistakes of one civilian leader of the Department of Defense, and one particular administration, for a debacle that was foreseeable and indeed foreseen by most experts in the field. Under these circumstances, planners and high-ranking officers of the U.S. armed forces were not fulfilling their responsibilities to the Constitution or their own brave fighting men and women by quietly and subserviently deferring to the civilian leadership. Congress might have been expected to do more as well, but in fact it did a considerable amount of work to highlight the issue of post-invasion planning — and in any case, it was not well positioned to critique or improve or even know the intricacies of war plans. On this issue, the country’s primary hope for an effective system of checks and balances on the mistakes of executive branch officials was the U.S. armed forces.

What Went Wrong in Iraq - Larry Diamond. Foreign Affairs article, September/October 2004. Although the early U.S. blunders in the occupation of Iraq are well known, their consequences are just now becoming clear. The Bush administration was never willing to commit the resources necessary to secure the country and did not make the most of the resources it had. U.S. officials did get a number of things right, but they never understood-or even listened to-the country they were seeking to rebuild. As a result, the democratic future of Iraq now hangs in the balance.

Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience - Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence Kelly, David Brannan and Keith Crane. Rand study. 2005. Soon after the coalition’s occupation of Iraq began in April 2003, it became evident that prewar assumptions about the security situation that would follow the ouster of Saddam Hussein had been unduly optimistic. The environment was not benign—in fact, it was deteriorating. Iraqi security forces had largely disintegrated, and those that remained were incapable of responding to rising criminality and political violence. In this environment, the coalition confronted three security imperatives: (1) to restore order and neutralize insurgents and terrorists; (2) to rebuild Iraqi security forces, which could eventually take on responsibility for Iraq’s security; and (3) to build security sector institutions, such as national security management institutions, the interior and defense ministries, and the justice sector, to ensure that the Iraqi security sector could be an effective bulwark for a democratic Iraq in the future. At the time that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on June 28, 2004, it was clear that the coalition had made little progress in the first task. Insurgent and terrorist violence was escalating, organized crime was flourishing, and the security situation was threatening both the political transition and the reconstruction program. The coalition’s record on the second and third tasks, however, is somewhat less simply categorized. From April 2003, the coalition embarked on efforts to rapidly field Iraqi security forces and to build security sector institutions. This effort was broad in scope, but its implementation was patchy, its results were varying, and its ultimate success or failure remains difficult to determine. Significant analysis has focused on the inability of the coalition to adequately counter political violence and crime in post-Saddam Iraq. There has also been considerable discussion about the coalition’s effort to develop Iraqi security forces. The matter of institution building, however, has been largely ignored by observers and policymakers; it is often seen as a long-term issue that is too far removed from immediate security needs. But the three efforts are interdependent: Iraq’s future security depends on its indigenous security forces, and these forces’ success and sustainability depend on the institutions that support them. This report concerns itself with the efforts to build both forces and institutions in Iraq. It provides a historical record of the coalition’s experience and seeks, insofar as is possible at this early stage, to draw lessons from the successes and failures of that experience.

Nation Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower - James Dobbins. Rand Review article, Summer 2003. We at the Rand Corporation have compiled what we have found to be the most important lessons learned by the United States in its nation-building efforts since World War II. Not all these hard-won lessons have yet been fully applied to America's most recent nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. We define nation-building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy." We have compared the levels of progress toward this goal among seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These are the most important instances in which American military power has been used in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin democratization elsewhere around the world since World War II.

Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective - Ian Beckett. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, January 2005. This monograph considers the patterns of insurgency in the past by way of establishing how much the confl ict in Iraq conforms to previous experience. In particular, the author compares and contrasts Iraq with previous Middle Eastern insurgencies such as those in Palestine, Aden, the Dhofar province of Oman, Algeria, and Lebanon. He suggests that there is much that can be learned from British, French, and Israeli experience.

Insurgency In Iraq And Afghanistan: Change And Continuity - Steven Metz and Raymond Millen. US Army Strategic Studies Institute discussion paper. To understand the insurgencies the United States now faces, whether those in Iraq and Afghanistan or the global one against violent radical Islam, and to develop coherent strategies to counter them, American planners and leaders must ask two questions: Do these insurgencies exhibit the characteristics that have traditionally led to insurgent success or victory? and Do these insurgencies have any characteristics that break with traditional patterns and may allow them to attain success or victory even though they are missing some of the traditional determinants of success?

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq - Bruce Hoffman. Rand Occasional Paper, 2004. The aim of this paper is not to rake over old coals or rehash now familiar criticism. Much has been written about past mistakes in Vietnam and El Salvador and more recently about the planning and implementation failures that have attended our current involvement in Iraq. Rather, its purpose is to use the present as prologue in order to understand in counterinsurgency terms where we have gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the current conflict in Iraq presents to the U.S. and other coalition military forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements.

Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs - Dr. Montgomery McFate. Military Review Article, May - June 2005. devices (IEDs) are among the deadliest weapons coalition forces face in Iraq, and defeating their use by insurgents is both essential and extremely challenging. Thus far, U.S. defense science and technology communities have focused on developing technical solutions to the IED threat. However, IEDs are a product of human ingenuity and human social organization. If we understand the social context in which they are invented, built, and used we will have an additional avenue for defeating them. As U.S. Army Brigadier General Joseph Votel, head of the Pentagon’s Joint IED Task Force, noted, commanders should focus less on the “bomb than the bombmaker.” A shift in focus from IED technology to IED makers requires examining the social environment in which bombs are invented, manufactured, distributed, and used. Focusing on the bombmaker requires understanding the four elements that make IED use possible in Iraq: knowledge, organization, material, and the surrounding population.

The War In Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare - Andrew Krepinevich. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments paper, June 2004. This paper presents an overview of the nature of insurgency warfare, along with some insights as to how the US military is positioned to wage it in Iraq. Future papers will provide further elaboration on this issue, and on other aspects of the United States’ involvement in this conflict.

Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency - Nicholas Haussler. US Naval Postgraduate School thesis, September 2005. The insurgency in Iraq has continued despite the determination of U.S. and Iraqi forces. U.S. counter-insurgent strategy has operated from the premise that the main thrust behind anti-U.S. activities is a combination of Sunnis desiring a return to their former privileged position and tribal collective actors with long-standing grievances fuelled by radical Islam. Yet an analysis incorporating insights from gang theory illuminates the diverse, practical, and local motivations of those involved in insurgent networks. Gang theory is uniquely suited to illuminate the street-level dynamics that drive insurgent violence. Through this, a more precise picture of the relevant networks and their operative motivations can be drawn, allowing finer tuned policies targeted to the differentiated factors behind non-state violence. I first consider the origins of and interactions between the armed groups operating in Iraq for discernable trends in development, paying particular attention to factors consistent with gang models. I then alter the gang model for the context of Iraq, and present an integrated model that articulates the likely effects of state-insurgent interaction on stability and security there. I conclude with recommendations demonstrating the model’s relevance for strategic use in other regions.

U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War - Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk. National Security Outlook article, November 2003. With American soldiers repeatedly ambushed in the areas around Baghdad this summer, the Pentagon also began to reorient its postwar operations toward counterinsurgency. In June and July, it launched a series of large-scale raids--Operation Peninsula Strike, Operation Desert Scorpion, and Operation Soda Mountain--designed to seize weapons caches, demolish guerrilla infrastructure, and prevent Baathists from regrouping. Implicit in the sweeps was a recognition that the U.S. military had underestimated the tenacity of the Iraqi irregulars--having initially assumed the violence to be nothing more than the last gasps of a dying regime--and that American soldiers were now facing a "classic, low-level insurgency." But what does this mean? For many journalists and defense analysts, unfortunately, counterinsurgency operations continue to be viewed through an ideological prism stuck in the 1960s. In place of measured analysis, the term provokes a rush of damning stereotypes: shadow wars in the jungles of Southeast Asia, waged in the absence of oversight and rife with human rights abuses; wrenching, disorienting conflicts in which allies become indistinguishable from enemies, and strengths indistinguishable from weaknesses. Counterinsurgency, in short, becomes code for a kind of war that cannot be won-a fatalistic conviction. Rather than imagine Iraq as postwar Germany or Japan, military planners and policymakers would do well to study the lessons of the Philippine War (1899-1902), perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency campaign waged by a Western army in the past 200 years.

Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?) - Lieutenant Colonel George W. Smith, Jr., USMC. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay, 2004. The parallels of Napoleon’s challenges in Spain with the challenges of contemporary coalition forces in Iraq are striking. While there is a danger in attempting to take historical parallels too far, some similarities are too close to ignore. Moreover, such similarities may reflect the failure to understand the local populace within campaign planning. That understanding forms the bedrock for any successful post-hostility occupation phase. Thus, cultural intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB with a focus on the post-hostilities landscape is perhaps more important than traditional intelligence preparation of the battlespace, which typically has monopolized the intelligence effort. Countless lessons from history resemble Napoleon’s experiences with popular Spanish resistance and provide insight as to what should comprise the proper balance of effort within intelligence preparation for armed intervention. These lessons demonstrate that an inordinate focus on armies at the expense of a focus on the people has and will continue to make winning the peace more difficult than winning the war. Closing the cultural intelligence gap by striking an IPB balance within campaign planning may reduce surprises for an occupying force that historically have impeded the accomplishment of the campaign’s stated political or grand strategic objectives.

The Battle for Fallujah: The Underlying Military Issues - Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2004. Urban warfare can be highly unpredictable. There is a tendency to assume that because some of the bloodiest battles in history have occurred in cities, all such battles are bloody. In practice, many urban defenses collapse almost immediately, partly through inexperience but more often because the defender is not committed to an almost suicidal form of last ditch combat. The rapid fall of Baghdad in 2003 is a good example of a rapid collapse caused by both military incompetence on the part of defender (and high confidence on the part of the attacker) and a lack of commitment to final combat. Fallujah seems far more likely to have a determined set of defenders, although this is not certain. It certainly has enough armed Islamists and potential diehards, and Zarqawi and others have already promised a bitter battle.

Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights - Dr. Jeffrey Record and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, May 2004. U.S. political and military difficulties in Iraq have prompted comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. How, in fact, do the two wars compare? What are the differences and similarities, and what insights can be gained from examining them? Does the Vietnam War have instructive lessons for those dealing with today’s challenges in Iraq, or is that war simply irrelevant?

The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq: An Old Technique for a New War - First Lieutenants Jason Goodale and Jon Webre, USMC. 2004. On 30 May 2004 the Marines of 3d Platoon, Company G, Task Force 2nd Battalion, Seventh Marines (TF 2/7), Regimental Combat Team-7 (RCT 7), were activated as one of the first Combined Action Program (CAP) platoons since the end of the program during Vietnam in 1971. Upon entering into this mission, which was new to everyone involved, the TF 2/7 CAP platoon had to “reinvent the wheel” and use an almost forgotten model in order to wage modern counter-insurgency warfare in the west-central Al Anbar Province of Iraq. The scope of the TF 2/7 CAP mission can be broken into three phases: initiating and founding the CAP mission, coordination and operations in a joint CAP environment, and establishing a training base to ensure the continuation of the mission.

Revive Combined Action Platoons For Iraq - Marcus Corbin. The CAP program put squads of a little more than a dozen Marines in villages, to support, train and fight with existing Vietnamese units defending their own homes. The heavy artillery and air support used by most U.S. forces would be less readily available for the CAPs – a risk for the Marines, but a substantial bonus in avoiding the destruction that lost local hearts and minds.

Introduction to 2/7 Combined Action Program (CAP) Platoon Actions in Iraq - Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Skuta, USMC. Part of the 1^st Marine Division pre-deployment training for Operation Iraqi Freedom-II (OIF-II) included an orientation of the Combined Action Program (CAP). The Corps’ successful experience with the CAP in Vietnam covered some six years, from 1965-1971. Some 33 years later, the contemporary CAP effort by the 1^st Marine Division in Iraq is being adapted to Iraqi society and Arab culture. As of this writing, the CAP effort has been ongoing, in one form or another, within the I MEF area of operations for ten months. The U.S. Army has also experimented with a similar concept in Iraq. Since the 1^st Marine Division returned to Iraq for OIF-II in March 2004, platoon size units have been training and operating alongside Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units. This effort must continue in order for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to be capable of providing security independent of the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).

Partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces - Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Skuta, USMC. Training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to be capable of providing security for Iraq is a central campaign objective of the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). One of the essential tasks assigned to Task Force 2nd Battalion, 7^th Marines (TF 2/7) during Operation Iraqi Freedom-II was to, “train and conduct operations with the Iraqi Security Forces.” This article presents insights and lessons learned by TF 2/7 while partnering with the ISF. Cultural keys to success, understanding how to train an Arab military force, and the internal unit costs associated with training the ISF are discussed.

Growing the Iraqi Security Forces - Major Steven Miska, USA. Political leaders in America and military leaders in Iraq have repeatedly emphasized the importance of building up Iraqi security forces (ISF) as a foundation for the rule of law, economic progress, and political stability. Underlying the strategy is the ancient proverb “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime.” Arming a democratic Iraq with the internal and external security to defend itself will be a political victory that will allow the United States to withdraw from operations. Military units across the Iraqi theater have spent a tremendous amount of energy and resources to help produce an Iraqi National Guard (ING), civic and border police, and special operations and regular army units. Much remains to be done, but the U.S. Army has laid a solid foundation for democracy despite the persistent barbs of a stubborn insurgency.

Fighting Through the Fog of War - Major Karl Rohr, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, March 2006. “Fog” plays a role on all battlefields. In the battle for An Nasiriyah—particularly on 23 March 2003—friction influenced every action, often compounding difficulties in an ever-growing chain. While the attack to seize and open a corridor along Route 7 through the city ultimately succeeded, the men engaged were forced to deal with a fluid situation, mass casualties, disrupted communications, and a willful and determined but incoherent and often illogical enemy. This article summarizes many of the friction points and their effect on the battle.

Heavy Forces and Decisive Warfare - William Hawkins. Parameters article, Autumn 2003. The Iraq War was a stunning example of the new paradigm of “decisive warfare,” even more so than had been the Afghanistan campaign. The Bush Administration came into office defining this new paradigm as the ability to march on an enemy’s capital and overthrow its regime. The thinking behind this paradigm is often linked to the failure of the United States to march on Baghdad in 1991, but there is also a link back to the indecisive “limited war” doctrine which led to failure in Vietnam. In Southeast Asia only Hanoi waged decisive warfare by sending an army south to capture Saigon and impose a regime change that ended the war. US attempts to bomb North Vietnam to a negotiated settlement did not result in victory. Regimes that cannot be persuaded to change their behavior must themselves be changed, or else conflicts will drag on, and America is at a political and diplomatic disadvantage in wars of attrition.

The 1st CAV in Baghdad: Counterinsurgency EBO in Dense Urban Terrain - Interview with Major General Peter Chiarelli, US Army. Field Artillery article, September-October 2005.

Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations - Major General General Peter Chiarelli (USA) and Major Patrick Michaelis (USA). Military Review article, July-August 2005. For the last 3 decades serving as an Army officer, the traditional military training model prepared me to win our Nation’s wars on the plains of Europe, or the deserts of the Middle East. I envisioned large, sweeping formations; coordinating and synchronizing the battlefield functions to create that “point of penetration;” and rapidly exploiting the initiative of that penetration to achieve a decisive maneuver against the armies that threatened the sovereignty of my country. But in Baghdad, that envisioned 3-decade-old concept of reality was replaced by a far greater sense of purpose and cause. Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace. Penetration did not occur merely through synchronization of the battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement; training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond short-term infrastructure improvement; and, an information operations (IO) campaign that supported the cultural realities of the area of operations. The proverbial “point of penetration” for the 1st Cavalry Division and the coalition occurred on 30 January 2005. Millions of eligible Iraqi citizens, from across the sectarian divides, triumphed over a fractured insurgency and terrorist threat in a show of defiance never before seen across the Middle East. The purple index finger, proudly displayed, became a symbol of defiance and hope. The Iraqi people proved to the world their willingness to try democracy in whatever unique form evolves. Task Force Baghdad’s campaign to “win the peace” in Iraq has forced us, as an instrument of national power, to change the very nature of what it means to fight.2 Although trained in the controlled application of combat power, we quickly became fluent in the controlled application of national power. We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought. Our own mentality of a phased approach to operations boxed our potential into neat piles the insurgent and terrorist initially exploited.

The United States and Iraq's Shi'ite Clergy: Partners or Adversaries? - W. Andrew Terrill. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, February 2004. The U.S. military presence in Iraq is currently in a transitional phase. Either the anti-U.S. insurgency will be brought under control and security will be provided to those forces involved in nationbuilding; or the insurgency will expand, and U.S. goals in Iraq will be undermined by increasing civil unrest. It is imperative that the former objective be accomplished while the later fate be avoided. To ensure this outcome, U.S. policymakers must understand the internal dynamics of Iraq, including the role of Iraq’s Shi’ite clerics.

Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom - Robert Bunker. Military Review article, January - February 2005. Persistent suicide bombings during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (in pre-, trans-, and post-major combat operations) suggest this “criminal-warfighting” technique will be used with increasing frequency against U.S. Army and allied forces deployed for combat and humanitarian missions in and around Islamic lands.2 Therefore, U.S. Army, Marine, and constabulary personnel must develop appropriate intelligence, countermeasure, and force-protection capabilities to interdict, mitigate, and respond to what has become a threat against U.S. forces in the global war against radical Islamic terrorism and insurgency.

Iraqi Resistance to Freedom: A Frommian Perspective - Cynthia Ayers. Parameters article, Autumn 2003. Iraqi civilians were dancing and singing in the streets of Baghdad on the morning of 9 April 2003, while the American military consolidated efforts to secure the city. On that day it was obvious that Saddam Hussein had been deposed. In spite of the celebrations, however, coalition soldiers continued to meet opposition. Santayana’s famous warning (“those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”) may have been considered by war planners in seeking to predict Iraqi reactions to a liberating force, but the lessons to be learned in this case should not be limited to those gleaned only from conflict between Western elements and the country of Iraq, or even from East-West cultural differences. In September 2002, a group of Iraqi exiles boldly implied a comparison between Saddam’s regime and Nazi Germany. Certainly, Pan-Arabism is a form of fascism and Saddam shared many qualities with Hitler—the two even had similar experiences in their formative years. If the comparison between the two rulers and regimes is indeed valid, perhaps the answers we seek can be found in an analysis of fascist tendencies in early 20th-century Europe.

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain in Iraq: Population Dependent? - Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Thomas, USA (Ret.). US Army Foreign Military Studies Office article, December 2002. Combat in cities has never been a good idea. Sun Tsu noted long ago “the worst strategy in war—attack walled cities.” Yet if combat erupts in Iraq, coalition forces may have no option but to fight in cities. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein witnessed the destruction of his force at the hands of an outnumbered coalition force during Desert Storm, and he appears to have learned from his armed forces’ mistake of taking on a high tech force in open terrain. Of course, Hussein is often unpredictable because he is blinded by his own propaganda.

What Went Wrong in Iraq - Larry Diamond. Foreign Affairs article. With the transfer of power to a new interim Iraqi government on June 28, the political phase of U.S. occupation came to an abrupt end. The transfer marked an urgently needed, and in some ways hopeful, new departure for Iraq. But it did not erase, or even much ease at first, the most pressing problems confronting that beleaguered country: endemic violence, a shattered state, a nonfunctioning economy, and a decimated society. Some of these problems may have been inevitable consequences of the war to topple Saddam Hussein. But Iraq today falls far short of what the Bush administration promised. As a result of a long chain of U.S. miscalculations, the coalition occupation has left Iraq in far worse shape than it need have and has diminished the long-term prospects of democracy there. Iraqis, Americans, and other foreigners continue to be killed. What went wrong?

Iraq: Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) Swamp - G. I. Wilson. Military.com article, March 2004. Iraq is fast becoming a fourth generation warfare swamp. The attacks on Shiite shrines in Baghdad and Karbala, killing and wounding hundreds, portends more of the same. These coordinated attacks signal a change in the very nature of the insurgency itself. Iraqi terrorists (both foreign fighters and indigenous) are waging symbolic and ideological warfare against the U.S., Coalition Forces, and segments of the Iraqi people. These terrorists remain elusive and often effective in their attacks. Improvised explosive devises and suicide bombers take their toll on both Iraqis and U.S. troops. Determining with specificity what factions are precipitating this violence is no easy task. The next 13 months will determine the path Iraq will ultimately pursue. The volatile concoction of resistive Kurds in the north, assertive Shiites in the south and embittered Sunni Muslims in between, exacerbated by the presence of foreign interlopers, has all the potential for an internal explosion. Hopefully terrorist and fundamentalist factions will not turn Iraq into a fourth generation warfare swamp.

Intercepted Zarqawi Letter to Al-Qaeda - Small Wars Journal posting, 2005. Here is the current situation as I, with my limited vision, see it. I ask God to forgive my prattle and lapses. I say, having sought help from God, that the Americans, as you know well, entered Iraq on a contractual basis and to create the State of Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates and that this Zionized American Administration believes that accelerating the creation of the State of [Greater] Israel will accelerate the emergence of the Messiah. It came to Iraq with all its people, pride, and haughtiness toward God and his Prophet. It thought that the matter would be somewhat easy. Even if there were to be difficulties, it would be easy. But it collided with a completely different reality. The operations of the brother mujahidin began from the first moment, which mixed things up somewhat. Then, the pace of operations quickened. This was in the Sunni Triangle, if this is the right name for it. This forced the Americans to conclude a deal with the Shi`a, the most evil of mankind. The deal was concluded on [the basis that] the Shi`a would get two-thirds of the booty for having stood in the ranks of the Crusaders against the mujahidin.

Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step - Colonel Matthew Bogdanos, USMCR. Joint Force Quarterly article, 2005. This article traces the development of the CENTCOM JIACG through two wars, using it as a case study to highlight the need for better and institutionalized interagency coordination at the operational level, and concludes with practical recommendations for using “every tool in our arsenal” to reduce the likelihood of future terrorist attacks.

Social Studies: 21st Century Tribes - David Ronfeldt. Rand commentary / Los Angeles Times article, December 2004. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is fighting virulent tribalism as much as Islamic fundamentalism. Salafi and Wahhabi teachings calling for jihad against infidels, fatwas from clerics justifying the murder of noncombatants and ultimatums from Sunni insurgents who behead captives all are expressions of extreme tribalism more than Islam. The ways religion gets layered onto tribalism, and vice versa, deeply condition a people's thinking and behavior. A tribe may regard a deity as the ultimate ancestor of its identity. Its religion also may instruct tribal members how to uphold their society and treat one another. It does not determine how they may behave toward outsiders, but religion often supplies the justification.

Rule of Law in Iraq: Transitional Justice under Occupation - Major Leonard Law, USA. US Army School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, 2004. In 2003, the United States led a Coalition force into Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein’s repressive Ba’ath Party regime. Under the provisions of the Hague Regulation of 1907, the Coalition became an occupying power with all of the attendant rights and responsibilities. To administer Iraq during the occupation, the United States and its allies established the Coalition Provisional Authority. The Coalition’s responsibilities included establishing the rule of law to replace Saddam Hussein’s rule by decree. The key elements of establishing the rule of law were helping Iraq to reestablish its judicial system and deal with its past. Military planners need guidelines and effective analysis to plan for restoring rule of law in occupations and peace operations. The Coalition Provisional Authority’s errors are significant. The administrative justice process of de-Ba’athification disenfranchised tens of thousands of Iraqis, leading to widespread unemployment and contributing to armed insurgency. The Coalition Provisional Authority failed to establish alternatives to criminal prosecution for Ba’ath Party abuses, placing an unmanageable burden on Iraq’s courts. Despite these problems, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s overall transitional justice effort met with reasonable success. Within six months after the war, most of Iraq’s courtrooms were open and hearing cases. Those who committed the worst abuses under Saddam Hussein no longer serve in Iraq’s government or preside in court. The Department of Defense, and the Army in particular, need to capture the lessons of the Iraq occupation and develop planning guidelines for future operations.

Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period - Coalition Provisional Authority, March 2004.

Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds - Captain Stephanie Kelley, USAF. Naval Post Graduate School thesis, September 2004. This thesis proposes the study of rumor as a guide to the battle for hearts and minds in Iraq. It reviews existing rumor theory to identify how rumors function and what we can learn from them. Rumors often serve as a window into a community, and can provide valuable information for developing a campaign to assess, monitor, and gain the support necessary to defeat insurgents. This thesis employs two distinct typologies to analyze over ten months of rumors in Baghdad, Iraq. The motivation typology provides indications of Iraqi sentiment, and suggests unrelieved anxiety and fear is likely contributing to widespread hostility towards the US-led Coalition. Indications of unrealistic expectations are also evident, potentially contributing to hostility levels as they go unrealized. The subject typology identifies overarching concerns of the Iraqi people, and suggests there are specific fears inhibiting cooperation with US counterinsurgency efforts. This thesis then examines rumor remedies. Because they rely on effective communication skills, American and Arab cultural communication styles are contrasted and integrated into tailored remedies for Iraq. The findings in this thesis could assist Coalition information campaigns by alerting them to existing Iraqi perceptions so they can tailor messages to address significant concerns and fears.

Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas - Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty report, June 2007. The book-length report, "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas" by RFE/RL regional analysts Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, provides an in-depth analysis of the media efforts of Sunni insurgents, who are responsible for the majority of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq. Kimmage and Ridolfo argue that the loss of coordination and message control that results from decentralization has revealed fundamental disagreements about Iraq's present and future between nationalist and global jihadist groups in Iraq and that these disagreements are ripe for exploitation by those interested in a liberal and democratic Iraq.

Reporters on the Battlefield: The Embedded Press System in Historical Context - Christopher Paul and James Kim. Rand study, 2004. Focusing on the embedded press system deployed during Operation Iraqi Freedom, this book attempts to answer the following questions: How effective was the embedded press system in meeting the needs of the three main constituencies-the press, the military, and the citizens of the United States? What policy history led to the innovation of an embedded press system? Where are press-military relations likely to go in the future?

Media's Coverage Has Distorted World's View of Iraqi Reality - Lieutenant Colonel Tim Ryan, USA. World Tribune article, January 2005. LTC Tim Ryan is Commander, Task Force 2-12 Cavalry, First Cavalry Division in Iraq. He led troops into battle in Fallujah late last year and is now involved in security operations for the upcoming elections. He wrote the following during "down time" after the Fallujah operation. All right, I've had enough. I am tired of reading distorted and grossly exaggerated stories from major news organizations about the "failures" in the war in Iraq. "The most trusted name in news" and a long list of others continue to misrepresent the scale of events in Iraq. Print and video journalists are covering only a fraction of the events in Iraq and, more often than not, the events they cover are only negative.

The 101st Airborne Division in Iraq: Televising Freedom -Major John Freeburg (USA) and Sergeant First Class Jesse Todd (USA). Military Review article, November-December 2004. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault participated in one of the most impressive military actions in history. Moving rapidly from Kuwait to combat in Karbala and on to Mosul, the 101st transitioned just as rapidly from combat to stability and support operations (SASO). Tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) were important to the 101st’s success during combat, and operational PSYOP was vital to “winning the peace” afterward.

Paralyzed or Pulverized? The Fall of the Republican Guard - Howard Belote. Joint Force Quarterly article. The regime was not paralyzed; it lacked the capability to act. The war was rapidly concluded in Baghdad in part due to the effect of joint and coalition airpower on Republican Guard divisions. In conjunction with landpower, the air component crushed Saddam’s major source of power in decisive battle— and once again validated the enduring insights of Carl von Clausewitz. Seen through a Clausewitzian lens, Iraqi Freedom air operations highlight joint success and recast the airpower debate: fielded forces can be centers of gravity and strategic targets, and paralysis is a means—not “the perfection of strategy.” Finally, Clausewitz’s focus on uncertainty cautions against overreliance on command and control technology, but at the same time he suggests a way to counteract uncertainty, fog, and friction. The U.S. military possesses the most incredible assets in the world—its fighting men and women. We must educate them, train them, trust them, then use them.

“Bureaucratic Decision Making in Troop Rotation Policy for OIF-2” - Lieutenant Colonel A. Thomas Ball, US Army. Natrional War College National Security Strategy Process paper. After the unparalleled successes of the United States led coalition during combat operations in Iraq, the coalition was left with a terrible dilemma—what levels of military capabilities or troop strengths will be necessary to provide a safe and secure environment for reconstruction efforts, commonly referred to as Phase IV operations, to effectively occur. As the process to arrive at a troop rotation policy decision for OIF-2 ensued, U.S. casualties continued to mount and the diversity of opinion on the correct troop rotation policy proliferated with the number of parties interested in the outcome. This paper attempts to demonstrate that the decision making process for a troop rotation policy in OIF was not a highly structured, detached analytical process arriving at an optimized answer designed to achieve the goals mentioned above. Instead, it was a bureaucratic political process which yielded a pragmatic solution, a result of bargaining and the compromises brought on by organizational influences and the relative power of the people involved in the process.

On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom - Center for Army Lessons Learned study, 2004. On Point is a study of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as soon after the fact as feasible. The Army leadership chartered this effort in a message to the major commands on 30 April 2003. In his guidance, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki directed "a quick, thorough review that looks at the US Army's performance, assesses the role it played in the joint and coalition team, and captures the strategic, operational, and tactical lessons that should be disseminated and applied in future fights." We wrote On Point with a readership of soldiers and those familiar with armies in battle in mind - discussing not only the fighting, but also describing the hard work" behind the scenes" that made the combat victories so successful. On Point is an operational history that derives some provisional insights that soldiers, our colleagues in the other services, and others may find useful or interesting. On Point will not be the last word or the definitive history of this operation that, as we went to publication, is still unfolding, but we believe that it will be cited in that effort and will help to explain the role the Army played. That is the goal of this effort - to kindle the discussion on what happened and why.

Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future - UK Ministry of Defence, December 2003. Earlier this year, some 46,000 UK Servicemen and women joined a US-led coalition in military operations against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The campaign began on 20 March, and by 1 May President Bush had declared the end of major combat operations, although the regime had been removed and most of Iraq taken under coalition control after just four weeks. The background to the conflict, and the planning, deployment and combat phases of the operation, together with some early lessons identified, were described in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) report “Operations in Iraq – First Reflections” (hereafter referred to as First Reflections). This report provides a deeper analysis of the lessons we have drawn from the operation, together with a more detailed insight into particular combat missions, and describes the continuing coalition operation to bring stability and regeneration to Iraq since the end of the combat phase.

The War in Iraq: Australia Defence Force Operations In The Middle East In 2003 - Australia Department of Defence report, February 2004. This report is drawn from a review of Australia’s contribution to US-led coalition operations in Iraq. It follows the progress of the war – focusing on the part played by the ADF – and identifies some of the key lessons learned during three operations: Operation Bastille (pre-deployment of forces to the Middle East, acclimatisation and in-theatre training); Operation Falconer (combat operations to disarm Iraq); and Operation Catalyst

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