Information / Influence Operations
Issues / Concepts / Lessons
The
Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation
- Todd Helmus, Christopher Paul and Russell Glenn. Rand monograph,
July 2007. COIN and other stability operations are central to the
current operational environment and are likely to remain so in the
future. These operations demand a unique focus on shaping indigenous
audiences. Virtually every action, message, and decision of a force
shapes the opinions of an indigenous population. Creating a unified
message is key in this regard, as the words and deeds of coalition
forces must be synchronized to the greatest extent possible. U.S. force
actions help set conditions for establishing credibility and fostering
positive attitudes among the indigenous population, which, in turn,
enable effective and persuasive communication. We have identified
commercial marketing practices that can assist the U.S. military in its
COIN shaping endeavors. We have also drawn on the insights of U.S.
military personnel and past operational experiences.
Choosing
Words Carefully: Language to Help Defeat Islamic Terrorism
Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse - Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin. Parameters article, Summer 2006. The means and ends of mass mobilization are changing, bypassing the traditional state-centered approach that was the hallmark of the French Revolution and leaving advanced Western democracies merely to react to the results. Today’s dynamic social, economic, and political transitions are as important to war as were the changes at the end of the 18th century that Clausewitz observed. Most important is the 21st century’s levée en masse, a mass networked mobilization that emerges from cyber-space with a direct impact on physical reality. Individually accessible, ordinary networked communications such as personal computers, DVDs, videotapes, and cell phones are altering the nature of human social interaction, thus also affecting the shape and outcome of domestic and international conflict. Although still in its early stages, this development will not reverse itself and will increasingly influence the conduct of war. From the global spread of Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks, to the rapid evolution of insurgent tactics in Iraq, to the riots in France, and well beyond, the global, non-territorial nature of the information age is having a transformative effect on the broad evolution of conflict, and we are missing it. We are entering the cyber-mobilization era, but our current course consigns us merely to react to its effects.
Information Operations: Putting the “I” Back Into DIME - Robert Steele. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, February 2006. In the past year, Information Operations (IO) has matured from an early emphasis on the protection of critical infrastructures and against electronic espionage and is now more focused on content and on interagency information-sharing. The value of information--all information, not only secret information--and the value of global monitoring in all languages, 24/7, has been clearly established by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). This monograph defines and discusses three IO elements: Strategic Communication (the message); Open Source Intelligence (the reality); and, Joint Information Operations Centers (the technology). It concludes with a strategic overview of the various conceptual and technical elements required to meet modern IO needs, and provides a requirements statement that could be tailored to the needs of any Combatant Commander, service, or agency.
Information Operations - Appendix B to draft Small Wars 21st Century. US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, 2004. IO involves actions taken to affect an enemy's information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems in order to achieve specific objectives. The focus of IO is on the individual decision makers and the decision making process. IO is the ability to adversely influence enemy decision making processes while enhancing and protecting our own. Therefore, for IO to be successful, it demands an ability to understand people, cultures, and motivations. In the context of maneuver warfare, IO attempts to disrupt the observe, orient, decision, action (OODA) loop of the enemy, affecting his ability to act by causing the enemy to receive information that is inaccurate, incomplete, or received at an inopportune time.
What is Information Warfare? - Martin Libicki. National Defense University Institute for National Security Studies paper, August 1995.
Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare - Central Intelligence Agency Handbook for the Contras in Nicaragua.
Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas - Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty report, June 2007. The book-length report, "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas" by RFE/RL regional analysts Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, provides an in-depth analysis of the media efforts of Sunni insurgents, who are responsible for the majority of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq. Kimmage and Ridolfo argue that the loss of coordination and message control that results from decentralization has revealed fundamental disagreements about Iraq's present and future between nationalist and global jihadist groups in Iraq and that these disagreements are ripe for exploitation by those interested in a liberal and democratic Iraq.
Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of “Cyberplanning” - Timothy Thomas. Parameters - Spring 2003. We can say with some certainty, al Qaeda loves the Internet. When the latter first appeared, it was hailed as an integrator of cultures and a medium for businesses, consumers, and governments to communicate with one another. It appeared to offer unparalleled opportunities for the creation of a “global village.” Today the Internet still offers that promise, but it also has proven in some respects to be a digital menace. Its use by al Qaeda is only one example. It also has provided a virtual battlefield for peacetime hostilities between Taiwan and China, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and India, and China and the United States (during both the war over Kosovo and in the aftermath of the collision between the Navy EP-3 aircraft and Chinese MiG). In times of actual conflict, the Internet was used as a virtual battleground between NATO’s coalition forces and elements of the Serbian population. These real tensions from a virtual interface involved not only nation-states but also non-state individuals and groups either aligned with one side or the other, or acting independently. Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that al;Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages via the Internet. As recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda cells operating in America reportedly were using Internet-based phone services to communicate with cells overseas. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a “cyberplanning” tool for terrorists. It provides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options.
Hamas: A Further Exploration of Jihadist Tactics - Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, US Navy. Strategic Insights article, September 2005. This essay will explore Hamas literature and delve into its Bayanat (proclamations, leaflets, or broadsheets) and military-political objectives. First published during the 1987 Palestinian Intifadah (Uprising), the Bayanat are two-page leaflets that encouraged grassroots Palestinian activism, dictating events such as business strikes and the conduct of demonstrations. Hamas has published these broadsheets in four volumes in 1991. They are available in the Library of Congress and titled, “Wathaiq Harakah Al-Muqawama Al Islamiyah (Hamas): Min Wathaiq Al- Intfadah Al-Mubaraka” (Documents of the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas”: Documents of the Blessed (Palestinian) Uprising). This essay will touch on the first three years of Hamas Bayanat. The impact of Bayanat can still be seen today, when such tools are used along with the Internet, and Arab satellite television.
Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations - Captain Stoney Trent (USA) and Captain James Doty III (USA). Military Review article, July-August 2005. Defeating enemy formations on the field of battle is merely the first, and often the easiest, phase of a military operation. Ultimate success (accomplishing the political goals of the National Command Authority) hinges on a successful post-high-intensity conflict occupation in which the population comes to accept the new state of affairs. In all phases, understanding and influencing the people is critical to reducing the cost of victory in terms of lives, dollars, and time. The U.S. Army has had varying degrees of success over the past 100 years in influencing the people of opposing nations. In Cuba, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Italy, Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Haiti, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, we have run the gamut from success to failure. Recognizing the need to win over populations, the Army has begun to emphasize information operations (IO) in every deployment. Such operations are one part of the Army’s campaign to achieve information superiority during a conflict. Information superiority is “the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”1 According to U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, information operations are “actions taken to affect the adversary’s and influence others’ decision-making processes, information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and information systems.
How to Win the Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror - Robert Satloff. The Washington Institute of Near East Policy. Public diplomacy should, in the best of circumstances, focus on three objectives: sharpening America's image; investing in identifying, nurturing, and supporting allies; and promoting U.S. interests. In the post-September 11 era, the critical new element is the ideological battle against Islamism. Those who dismiss this as a public relations challenge and not a potentially cataclysmic life-and-death struggle are wrong; it is far more akin to the choice between communist and free during the Cold War. While this is principally a fight being waged by Muslims against Muslims, within each society, the United States cannot avoid its role as a central player. This is a series of national struggles within a global context, and a string of individual national defeats could spell a catastrophe for U.S. interests and ruin for America's friends on three continents.
Civil Affairs: Trust and Confidence Earned - Chief Warrant Officer Two Thomas Dye, USN. Marine Corps Gazette article, November 2004. To be successful in combat operations in this global war on terrorism, we have to earn the trust and confidence of the local population. Civil affairs (CA) operations are a key component that will ultimately decide the long-term success or failure of any military operation. Although the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (22d MEU(SOC)), supported by the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team, had a very extensive CA program, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 1/6) felt that we needed our own CA capability to coordinate and implement timely CA as a follow-on to our operations. Since there are no naval surface fires in Afghanistan, we established our shore fire control party as the S–5 (CA) section and began planning for the integration of CA into our operations at the earliest stages.
Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints - Steven Collins. Parameters article, Summer 1999. While it is true that implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina has proceeded much more peacefully than many predicted, it is also true that the US peacekeeping forces have maintained vigil over this Balkan country for much longer than was anticipated or advertised. Since the US commitment to Bosnia is now acknowledged to be open-ended, it is important to consider how to influence attitudes and emotions in a way that will allow the ethnic groups in this area to live with one another without a permanent foreign presence guaranteeing security. There are many methods to change attitudes and shape behavior in Bosnia--economic and military pressure to name just two. However, not all approaches are as invasive as these two elements of power. A more subtle, certainly more neglected, but potentially longer-lasting element of power is information.
Tactical Information Operations in Kosovo - Major Marc Romanych (USARet.) and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Krumm (USA). Military Review article, September - October 2004. Information Operations (IO) are the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, and operations security, along with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decisionmaking. Information operations are enabling operations that support offensive and defensive operations, stability operations, and support operations. Consequently, they are primarily shaping operations that create and preserve opportunities for decisive operations. Information operations are a key component of the commander’s effort to achieve information superiority, which is an operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying the adversary’s ability to do the same.
Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations - Pascale Combelles Siegel. National Defense University Institute for National Security Studies paper, 1999. With each day that passes drawing us further down the path from the Industrial to the Information Age, many officers are convinced that victory is no longer determined on the ground, but in media reporting. This is even more true in peace support operations (PSO) where the goal is not to conquer territory or defeat an enemy but to persuade parties in conflict (as well as the local populations) into a favored course of action. This monograph examines the role of information in PSO and its impact on command and control through the prism of NATO-led operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from December 1995 into 1997.
Psychological Operations in Haiti - Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Arata, USA. Small Wars Journal article, April 2005. The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of Psychological Operations on the ability of Infantry Battalions to accomplish their missions in Peacekeeping and Stability Operations. In my years of experience associated with and working within the Infantry, I had never had the opportunity to work with a Tactical PSYOP team. When I was introduced to our battalion’s attached PSYOP NCO and his two PSYOP soldiers the day we air assaulted into Haiti, I thought of them as troops who had very specific jobs to do that might impact the operations of our battalion if we saw an opportunity to use them. Little did I know on that day how much of an impact that PSYOP team would have on our operations
The 101st Airborne Division in Iraq: Televising Freedom -Major John Freeburg (USA) and Sergeant First Class Jesse Todd (USA). Military Review article, November-December 2004. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault participated in one of the most impressive military actions in history. Moving rapidly from Kuwait to combat in Karbala and on to Mosul, the 101st transitioned just as rapidly from combat to stability and support operations (SASO). Tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) were important to the 101st’s success during combat, and operational PSYOP was vital to “winning the peace” afterward.
Report on the Cultural Intelligence Seminar on Afghan Perceptions - US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities report, December 2001. The participants displayed a high level of optimism that contrasts markedly with the pessimistic attitude of many western journalists regarding the ability of the Afghans to make a go of a post-Taliban government. After six years of Taliban repression, this seems to them to be a very promising opportunity for their nation. They stressed that the Afghan people want to get themselves on their feet and will work hard to do so. They stressed that the U.S. and follow-on multinational efforts should convey their goals clearly and honestly and that all tribes and ethnic groups should be represented fairly in any post-Taliban government.
Report on a Seminar Regarding Arab / Islamic Perceptions of the Information Campaign - US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities report, November 2001. CETO conducted a workshop on the issue of Islamic and Middle Eastern perceptions of the information campaign in the War on Terrorism at the offices of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA, on November 8, 2001. Participants included members of the Islamic and Arab-American communities and members of the Interagency community involved in the information campaign. The objective was to give the government representatives a perspective on how the campaign is being received by the worldwide Muslim and Arab communities.
Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds - Captain Stephanie Kelley, USAF. Naval Post Graduate School thesis, September 2004. This thesis proposes the study of rumor as a guide to the battle for hearts and minds in Iraq. It reviews existing rumor theory to identify how rumors function and what we can learn from them. Rumors often serve as a window into a community, and can provide valuable information for developing a campaign to assess, monitor, and gain the support necessary to defeat insurgents. This thesis employs two distinct typologies to analyze over ten months of rumors in Baghdad, Iraq. The motivation typology provides indications of Iraqi sentiment, and suggests unrelieved anxiety and fear is likely contributing to widespread hostility towards the US-led Coalition. Indications of unrealistic expectations are also evident, potentially contributing to hostility levels as they go unrealized. The subject typology identifies overarching concerns of the Iraqi people, and suggests there are specific fears inhibiting cooperation with US counterinsurgency efforts. This thesis then examines rumor remedies. Because they rely on effective communication skills, American and Arab cultural communication styles are contrasted and integrated into tailored remedies for Iraq. The findings in this thesis could assist Coalition information campaigns by alerting them to existing Iraqi perceptions so they can tailor messages to address significant concerns and fears.
Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment - Major Norman Emery (USA), Major Jason Werchan (USAF) and Major Donald Mowles, Jr. (USAF). Military Review article, January - February 2005. Over the past decade, various high profile terrorist groups have demonstrated a sound knowledge and coordinated use of information operations. Their ability to successfully achieve objectives by shaping their battlespace in the information environment, coupled with willingness to conduct nontraditional warfare, make them a significant threat to the United States. Although the initial Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, addresses a traditional IO approach against conventional forces such as China or North Korea, it does not sufficiently consider nonstate threats such as terrorists and insurgents. The joint staff is currently updating JP 3-13 by incorporating the October 2003 revised Department of Defense (DOD) IO policy, informally known as the secretary of defense’s (SECDEF’s) “IO Roadmap.”3 To succeed in the new security environment, JP 3-13 must provide an IO approach that better defines and shapes operations in the information environment (IE) to enable victories over nonstate actors in the physical environment (PE).
Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism - Jerrold Post. Joint Force Quarterly article, 2005. Psychological operations (PSYOP) has been defined as “the planned use of communications to influence human attitudes and behavior. It consists of political, military, and ideological actions conducted to induce in target groups behavior, emotions, and attitudes that support the attainment of national objectives.” The term psychological operations, especially when combined with political warfare, denotes “operations, whether tactical or strategic, on the battlefield or in the theater, in peacetime or in war, directed primarily at our adversary’s mind rather than his body.” Yet historically, psychological operations has for the most part only been employed tactically, in wartime. There has been little attention to the potential of strategic PSYOP in undermining the enemy to prepare the battlefield. Properly conducted, it should “precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force”3 and be an integral component of the overall strategic plan. Yet because planners over-rely on technological superiority and pay insufficient attention to an enemy’s psychology, it is either omitted or is a late afterthought.
Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies - Edited by Colonel Frank Goldstein (USAF) and Colonel Benjamin Findley Jr (USAR). The inherent strength of Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies lies in the expertise and experience of its editors and contributors, most of whom participated in the Cold War's “war of ideas” during their service in academic, government and military positions. As with any edited volume, some of the essays contained in this book are better than the others. Specifically, the case studies are not as strong as the articles dealing with principles. The four-part volume begins with a block of essays that provide a foundation for the understanding of psychological warfare. This section includes not only a strong introduction to the nature and the elements of PSYOP (by Goldstein and Colonel Daniel Jacobowitz) but perhaps the best-written essay of the volume: A study of U.S. military psychological operations, by Colonel Alfred H. Paddock Jr. Part II of the work focuses on PSYOP planning at the national level and includes an exceptional essay by Dr. Carnes Lord, who writes about the historical influences that have shaped U.S. psychological-operations strategy. Part III includes several assessments of Soviet PSYOP activities during the latter stages of the Cold War, as well as short pieces on the role of the U.S. Information Agency, PSYOP during the Hukbalahap insurgency in the Philippines, and intelligence activities related to PSYOP Part IV contains traditional case studies, including an analysis of U.S. and Viet Cong psychological warfare in Southeast Asia, one of the few unclassified assessments of PSYOP in Operation Just Cause, and case studies on both Iraqi and US psychological-warfare activities during Desert Shield/Storm.
Information Warfare in the Second (1999-Present) Chechen War: Motivator for Military Reform? - Timothy Thomas. Russian Military Reform 1992-2002 article, 2003. During the past ten years, the Russian military has attentively studied the subject of information war (IW). The main catalyst for this interest was the successful use of IW by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Russian military theorists watched coalition planes bomb Iraqi targets in real time with precision and understood that warfare had entered a new phase, one dominated by information-based equipment and resources. Two further motivators were the poor use of IW by the Russian armed forces during the first Russian-Chechen war (1994-1996), which contributed to the loss of Russian morale, and the successful use of IW by NATO during the conflict over Kosovo. The success of the coalition forces in both Desert Storm and Kosovo indicated that military reform would be bankrupt if the technical aspect of reform did not include information-based technologies. These technologies must be imbedded into new military equipment, from sensors and radars to jet fighters and cruise missiles. However, Russia was also concerned about the impact of information technologies on the brain and consequently morale. These technologies included the rapid distribution of information via the mass media and Internet. Military reform would also have to take this element into consideration.
Manipulating The Mass Consciousness: Russian And Chechen "Information War" Tactics In The 2nd Chechen-Russian Conflict - Timothy Thomas. US Army Foreign Military Studies Office paper, 2001. How important is public opinion to the overall success of a military operation? In the information age, as Russians and Chechens clearly demonstrated, it is "more important than ever." Live feeds from all corners of the globe shape an audience's understanding of events. These digital images spawn a virtual battlefield on which the actions of soldiers and sergeants acquire strategic significance, especially when presented and explained by TV reporters who lack a military background. This makes media control of sensitive military-political situations a crucial though difficult proposition. In addition the Internet can circumvent media control by reporting directly from battle zones with no intervening media filter. The Internet can also shape images and build public and financial support. The end result is an "information war" in the true sense of the word. This chapter discusses the battle for public opinion, the "information war," during the second Chechen campaign. The discussion has a Russian, Chechen, and foreign news context, and includes the evolving Internet battle between Russia and Chechnya. Initially, the Russians were successful in capturing public opinion. Their information victory changed public support for the conflict almost overnight. For example, in May 1999 President Boris Yeltsin was almost impeached for his decision to intervene in Chechnya in 1994. By October of 1999, with the press under control, Yeltsin gathered widespread support for the second intervention, and raised the popularity of then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. But as the war drags on into the summer of 2000, Russia may be neutralizing its own achievements by promising victory too many times. Sustaining the rosy picture that all will end well has become a very difficult proposition.
The Second Chechen War: The Information Component - Emil Pain. Military Review article, July-August 2000. In December 1994 Russian authorities made their first attempt to crush Chechen separatism militarily. However, after two years of bloody combat the Russian army was forced to withdraw from the Chechen Republic. The obstinacy of the Russian authorities who had decided on a policy of victory in Chechnya resulted in the deaths of at least 30,000 Chechens and 5,000 Russian soldiers. This war, which caused an estimated $5.5 billion in economic damage, was largely the cause of Russia's national economic crisis in 1998, when the Russian government proved unable to service its huge debts. It seemed that after the 1994-1996 war Russian society and the federal government realized the ineffectiveness of using colonial approaches to resolve ethnopolitical issues. They also understood, it seemed, the impossibility of forcibly imposing their will upon even a small ethnoterritorial community if a significant portion of that community is prepared to take up arms to defend its interests. Aslan Maskhadov was recently elected president of the Chechen Republic and has been so recognized by Russian officials. In 1997, when Maskhadov visited Moscow to sign a treaty, both he and President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement obligating both sides to resolve peacefully all contentious issues arising between the Federation and the Chechen Republic. Just a few months before the second war, Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin stated that federal troops would not be sent into Chechnya, which most experts believed. However, in August 1999 President Yeltsin removed Stepashin from his post and named Vladimir Putin as his replacement. In October combat actions began anew in Chechnya. Russian authorities called these actions "operations to suppress terrorism," while journalists christened them the "second Chechen war."
