Haiti

Operation Uphold Democracy Overview Page - Global Security.

Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy - Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann and John Fishel. US Army Command and Staff College Press Article, 1998. In September 1994, U.S. military forces were ordered to execute Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The stated objectives of that undertaking included the return to office of the democratically elected president of that country and the creation of a stable and secure environment in which democratic institutions could take hold. In the short term, these objectives were met: President Aristide reassumed his duties as president, the junta that had ousted him in 1991 was forced to leave the country, and national elections were successfully held in 1996. Although the long-term prognosis for Haiti remains guarded, the democratic process there was given the opportunity to succeed due, in large part, to Operation Uphold Democracy.

Integrating Partner Nations into Coalition Operations - Major Barbara Fick, US Army. Joint Force Quarterly article, Issue # 41.  Within 48 hours of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s resignation and departure on February 29, 2004, Chilean forces deployed and integrated into a multinational interim force to help secure and stabilize the small, impoverished island nation. Days after the passage of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1529, Chile, Canada, France, and the United States established a multinational force responsive to and capable of coordinating with international authorities and aid efforts in Haiti. The rapid reaction, deployment, and integration of coalition forces saved the lives of many Haitians, prevented mass migration during a time of rough seas, and facilitated transition to the process of restabilization.  Chile continues to deploy forces as a member of the UN Stabilization Force Haiti (MINUSTAH), led by Brazil and comprised mostly of Latin American troops. While many challenges continue in Haiti, the success of initial security and stabilization operations, continued support to MINUSTAH, and the significant contribution of Latin American and Caribbean nations to peacekeeping  operations around the world demonstrate a growing capability in the Western Hemisphere for participation in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, such as those currently required in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Civil Military Operations Center in Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti) - Major Aaron Wilkins, USAF. US AIr Force Air Command and Staff College research paper, March 1997. In a relatively short period of time, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) has grown in prominence and is now regarded in joint doctrine as the synergistic bridge which focuses the efforts of military and civilian organizations toward achieving a common unity of effort. Through the lessons learned and oral testimonies compiled by various joint staff, unified command, and US Army organizations, I was astounded to learn just how far we’ve come in so short a time, not only in formalizing the CMOC concept into doctrine, but also in developing an interagency planning process as a result of the planning shortcomings and lessons learned from some of the major military operations this decade. In hindsight, the CMOC was very effective during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti - A Case Study - Dr. Margaret Daly Hays and Rear Admiral Gary Wheatley (USN, RET.). National Defense University Press book, 1996. This report is the product of a workshop organized for the National Defense University's Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT) by Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes and RAdm Gary F. Wheatley USN (Ret.) of Evidence Based Research, Inc. (EBR), supporting ACT. Dr. Richard E. Hayes of EBR chaired the meeting. The workshop was prompted by the dramatically different emphases apparent in two separate renditions of the Haiti experience_one by a civilian and one by a senior military officer. These different perspectives suggested that a comparison of interagency and civilian-military planning concerns during the buildup to Operation Uphold Democracy might provide useful insights for ACT's on-going examination of command arrangements in coalition and military Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The workshop was attended by senior officials of both civilian and military agencies. More senior civilians attended than senior military, an indication, perhaps, of the growing recognition that interagency command and control needs to be seriously addressed.

Haiti: Lessons Learned - Lama Khouri-Padova. United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit discussion paper, March 2004. This paper reviews the international community’s involvement in Haiti and identifies some lessons to be learned from United Nations engagement between 1994 and 2001. Owing to time and space limits, it focuses on selected peacekeeping aspects of such involvement. It does not address other important issues such as socio-economic development, agency funding and the role of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. The study is a discussion paper only and does not represent the views of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Its recommendations are solely for the consideration of mission planners, and have no directive weight or intent.

Psychological Operations in Haiti - Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Arata, USA. Small Wars Journal article, April 2005. The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of Psychological Operations on the ability of Infantry Battalions to accomplish their missions in Peacekeeping and Stability Operations.  In my years of experience associated with and working within the Infantry, I had never had the opportunity to work with a Tactical PSYOP team.  When I was introduced to our battalion’s attached PSYOP NCO and his two PSYOP soldiers the day we air assaulted into Haiti, I thought of them as troops who had very specific jobs to do that might impact the operations of our battalion if we saw an opportunity to use them.  Little did I know on that day how much of an impact that PSYOP team would have on our operations.

Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti - Lotta Hagman. International Peace Academy Seminar Report; Canadian Mission to the United Nations, January 2002. Peacebuilding is not merely a technical exercise - it is highly political. In a combustible political atmosphere as in Haiti, effective peacebuilding requires careful and sustained management. The importance of a long-term approach cannot be overestimated. In Haiti, the international community was successful in restoring the constitutional government, improving the respect for basic human rights, and initiating economic development. However, for these efforts to take hold and lead to a self-sustaining democratic process, continuous international engagement in Haiti is vital. From this perspective, the cutback in the UN involvement in February 2001 was premature.

A New Policy for Haiti - Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Azemar, US Army. US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2005.  Over the past century, the United States has intervened no less than three times in Haiti to maintain stability. While the historical contexts in which the three interventions took place are different, in every instance the presiding administration claims stability as the compelling justification. Yet, nothing has been done to address the root cause of the instability in the country. A new and comprehensive policy is badly needed for Haiti, one that addresses not only the instability issue but also lays the foundation for lasting democratic development in the country.

Capacity Building for Latin America and the Caribbean: PKO and the Case of Haiti - Colonel Joseph Napolil, US Army.  US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2005.  On February 29, 2004, only ten years after the United States last intervened in Haiti to reinstall President Jean Bertrand Aristide, U.S. military forces once again entered Haiti to stabilize the country after President Aristide fled as violence gripped the country. However, unlike the 20,000 troops, significant resources, and ambitious objectives of Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994, the recent intervention was executed with a much smaller force, with much more limited United States government goals, objectives, and expectations. This paper will analyze the events leading to the U.S. decision to intervene and the rationale to limit U.S. objectives and participation. It will then examine the planning, organization, objectives, and effectiveness of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and the transfer of responsibility to the U.N. stabilization force. The paper will conclude with recommendations on how the U.S. may build upon and strengthen the demonstrated capacity for collective security operations for Latin America and the Caribbean in the future.

Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart? - Donald Schulz. Paramaters article, Winter 1997-1998. Some time ago I published a bleak, though by no means hopeless analysis of Haiti's political and socioeconomic prospects, arguing that in spite of the substantive progress that had been made since the US-led multinational intervention in September 1994, there was still a long way to go. The political situation remained extremely fragile, and the prospects for economic development were at best problematic. The latter was all the more doubtful because of the suspension of over $130 million in foreign aid due to the Aristide administration's failure to rationalize the economy in accordance with the prescriptions of international lenders. Unless this deadlock were to be broken, the tactical success that had been achieved to that point would likely, sooner or later, turn into a strategic failure. Subsequent developments have served only to confirm and lend urgency to that prognosis. The past year has witnessed an intensification of both political and nonpolitical violence. National unity has dissipated, as the ruling "Lavalas" coalition has splintered into hostile factions, the largest of which opposes the Préval administration's structural adjustment program. In April 1997, flawed elections led to a major political crisis. Meanwhile, the government's inability to implement reforms in a timely fashion has once again jeopardized substantial amounts of foreign aid. The upshot is that economic recovery has been stymied, and public unrest is reaching dangerous proportions. All this has once again raised questions about the viability of the Haitian experiment. Moreover, it comes at a time when the UN peacekeeping effort is winding down. Though 650 soldiers, 250 civilian police, and a 50-member military headquarters staff are to stay on until December 1997, by the time this article appears Haiti essentially will be on its own. At that point, the Préval government and the Haitian National Police will face a moment of truth. Will they be able to maintain political stability and the rule of law, or will things fall apart?

Haiti: A Case Study of the International Response and the Efficacy of Nongovernmental Agencies in the Crisis - Leslie Benton and Glenn Ware. In 1990, a military coup ousted the democratically-elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The United States led the international response to the coup, Operation Uphold Democracy, a multinational military intervention meant to restore the legitimate government of Haiti. The operation enjoyed widespread support on many levels: the United Nations provided the mandate, the Organization of American States (OAS) supported it, and many countries participated in the multinational force and the follow-on United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) worked with the multinational force and later the UNMIH to restore the elected government and to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Haiti. This article focuses on the latter aspect of the international response–the delivery of humanitarian aid. It closely examines the methods of interorganization coordination, with particular attention given to the interaction among NGOs and the United States military. An examination of that relationship indicates that the infrastructure the military used to coordinate with the NGO community–the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)–was critical to the success of the humanitarian mission. Because both the military and the humanitarian community will probably have to work together again in humanitarian assistance operations in response to civil strife, each community must draw on the lessons of past operations to identify problems in coordination and to find solutions to those problems.

Haiti: A Case Study in Post-Cold War Peacekeeping - Ambassador James Dobbins; Special Advisor on Haiti, U.S. Department of State. Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy article, 1996. Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S.-led, multinational intervention that restored Haiti's legitimate government, can serve in many ways as a paradigm of post-Cold War peacekeeping, embodying a number of features that have marked other peacekeeping enterprises. First, the operation proceeded in the sequence, initially employed before the 1991 Gulf War, of a UN Security Council "all necessary means" resolution followed by the creation of an ad hoc, multilateral coalition, which in turn fielded a multilateral force (MNF) that, in the Haitian case, was replaced by a UN peacekeeping force--the UN Mission in Haiti, or UNMIH. Second, the operation dealt with an internal, not an external, conflict. Third, the objective of this operation was to restore a legitimate government and to provide temporary security support to a society moving from authoritarianism to democracy. Finally, both in its MNF and UNMIH phases, the operation made a significant, although perhaps insufficient, use of international police to supplement the efforts of its military component.