Military Cultural Education - Colonel Maxie McFarland, USA (Ret.). Military Review article, March-April 2005. Over the past decade the Army has increasingly engaged in lengthy overseas deployments in which mission performance demanded significant interface with indigenous populations.  Such interaction and how it affects military operations is important. In fact, engagement with local populaces has become so crucial that mission success is often significantly affected by soldiers’ ability to interact with local individuals and communities.  Learning to interact with local populaces presents a major challenge for soldiers, leaders, and civilians. Lengthy deployments to areas with other cultures are not new. The Army has experienced many long-lasting operations on foreign soil since the end of World War II. For most long-distance operations, the Army attempts to instill in deployed forces an awareness of societal and cultural norms for the regions in which they operate. While these programs have proven useful, they fall far short of generating the tactile understanding necessary for today’s complex settings, especially when values and norms are so divergent they clash.

Cultural Intelligence and Joint Intelligence Doctrine - Lieutenant Commander John P. Coles, USN. Joint intelligence doctrine focuses too much on traditional adversaries in combat situations and does not adequately address issues of foreign culture. Current doctrine does not adequately direct the joint force commander’s (JFC) intelligence establishment to prepare estimates on the characteristic features of foreign peoples that includes items such as their civilizations, beliefs, and social institutions. In order to better support the commander across the range of military operations, we must expand joint intelligence doctrine to include cultural intelligence. To develop the best courses of action for mission success, the JFC must understand the cultures of the foreign groups with which he, his staff, and his forces will interact. In Iraq, U.S. leaders and forces must interact every day with all segments of the local population. Iraq is an obvious example, but operations in Afghanistan, Djibouti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, the Philippines, and Somalia highlight only a few of the many places where U.S. and U.S. led coalition forces have recently had troops, airmen, and sailors on the ground conducting operations. These operations included the local peoples in the joint operations area as well as foreign forces in coalitions.

Strategic Implications of Cultures in Conflict - Paul Belbutowski. Parameters article, Spring 1996. More than ever, a sense of vision is required for senior leaders and policymakers to estimate the intangible forces at work in the environment within which the United States will have to function into the 21st century. When archetypal energies such as warrior and shaman explode into reality in a chaotic world, leaders and policymakers have the responsibility to analyze and evaluate their meaning and recommend appropriate courses of action for the country to follow, thereby offsetting the onslaught of these forces. John Ruskin, 19th-century poet, provides a suitable epigram for leaders when he talks about "seeing":

Hundreds of people can talk
For One who can think
But thousands can think
For One who can see.

To see clearly
Is poetry,
Prophecy,
And Religion,
All in One.

This article seeks to provide insights into a complex environment for those charged with the nation's safekeeping. Sometimes called low-intensity conflict, now often grouped with less violent peace operations, activities in that environment are best approached through an appreciation of the vital roles that human culture and the concept of time play in examining, for example, the decline of the nation-state.

Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and Ends to Successful Strategy - Richard Taylor. US Army Strategic Studies Institute Carlisle Paper, August 2005. In a military area of operations, particularly in countries in the Middle East that are lacking adequate traditional state based public administrative organizations or institutions, US national military policy must recognize the value that tribes can bring to the spectrum of military operations. The following conclusions and recommendations are offered to further facilitate national military policy success. Four conclusions, linked to the essential elements of analysis and the thesis at large were found to be of value. First, tribes are not explicitly considered in the National Security Strategy or the National Military Strategy of the United States as a tool of military power. Some implicit linkages can be assumed. Second, tribes offer value in all bands of the spectrum of military operations—from pre-crisis access to conventional warfare. Third, when considering tribal alliances as a tool for success, recognize and evaluate thoroughly the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing tribal resources. Finally, throughout history, both past and present, tribes have delivered functional capability (intelligence, security, combat arms, etc.) to successful military operations. In light of the conclusions offered, three recommendations are provided. First, make tribal partnerships an explicit tool of national security policy. The example of the Northern Alliance during Operation Enduring Freedom provides a historical example of success. Second, use tribes across the full spectrum of military operations. The successes tribes have shown in various bands of the spectrum of military operation indicate further potential for tribes as a force multiplier. Finally, use tribes across the continuum of military campaign phases, from Phase I (Deter and Engage) to Phase IV (Transition). Tendencies are to use tribes in one phase of military campaigns.

The Impending Collapse of Arab Civilization - Lieutenant Colonel James Lacey, U.S. Army Reserve. Proceddings article, September 2005. More and more of our strategic judgments are being built upon the untested edifice of two books: Bernard Lewis' The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror and Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order . While there have been a few critical reviews of both works, for the most part they have become the basic canon of 21st century strategic thought with very little serious negative commentary. In military publications and briefings these works are now cited repeatedly and uncritically as authoritative support for developing strategic concepts. Both books paint a dismal global picture. Huntington argues that for centuries civilizations have been kept apart by distance and serious geographical obstacles. However, modern technologies are eroding these obstacles and as civilizations begin to interact on a more regular basis they will find each other so repugnant they will be unable to resist trying to slaughter one another. Bernard Lewis is not as pessimistic about the global environment. Rather, he focuses his dire warnings on just the Muslim world, which appears to him on an irreversible road to doom.

Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City - Lieutenant Colonel Louis DiMarco, US Army. US Army Combat Studies Institute paper, 2004.  In July 2002 the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was reconstituted and given a new charter by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, General John Abrams. One of the three missions outlined in that charter is to conduct original, interpretive research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the US Army. Having published some 10 works in the intervening two years, CSI is now poised to initiate a new series addressing important facets of the Global War on Terrorism. Lieutenant Colonel Louis DiMarco’s Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City is the first in that series called Occasional Papers.The Middle East is one of the most urbanized regions of the world, and growth continues at an unprecedented rate. With operations ongoing in the Middle East today, it is fitting that this inaugural study should focus on mil­itary aspects of the urban areas of that region. There is an undoubted need for US military planners to possess a solid foundation of military history, cultural awareness, and an understanding of the intricacies of city design and function in this critical region. Each conflict brings its own challenges and dynamics. The challenges of a Middle Eastern fight require decisive involvement in that region’s cities. The enemy is adaptive—we must be adaptive as well. This call to study and understand history and culture is the first step along that road to critical thinking and adaptability.

The 27 Articles of T. E. Lawrence - T. E. Lawrence. The Arab Bulletin, August 1917. The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for greater clarity and to save words. They are, however, only my personal conclusions, arrived at gradually while I worked in the Hejaz and now put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the Arab armies. They are meant to apply only to Bedu; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person's need, or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules. At the same time we have a great chance there; the Sherif trusts us, and has given us the position (towards his Government) which the Germans wanted to win in Turkey. If we are tactful, we can at once retain his goodwill and carry out our job, but to succeed we have got to put into it all the interest and skill we possess.

Seven Pillars of Wisdom - T. E. Lawrence. Online book provided by eBooks@Adelaide. Full text of this timeless classic.

Jihad, War and Terrorism - George Gawrych. US Army Command and General Staff College.  Studying Islam presents an intellectual challenge to Americans. Muslims generally regard unity of politics and religion as the ideal and, therefore, mix faith and war together. American political tradition, on the other hand, enshrines the clear separation of church and state. Americans are by nature skeptical of religion intruding into politics. Calls to Jihad, thus, invoke images of religious fanaticism and extremism. Such a view is dead wrong. In fact, the religion of Islam contains strong moral and ethical principles on Jihad and the conduct of war, and there is a strong tradition against killing innocent people. Radical Islam, however, generally preaches total war against its opposition and therefore condones the killing of some civilians as part of Jihad.

Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq - W. Andrew Terrill. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, February 2005. The future of Iraq is uncertain. The country is in a dangerous phase. The removal of a brutal dictatorship by coalition forces in April 2003 has given the Iraqi people hope for a new and better political system, where individuals do not have to live in continuing fear and uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Iraqi people must also address the difficult challenges of self-government for a diverse population, with major ethnic and sectarian groups that often maintain widely divergent agendas. If they fail to do this and an ethnic/sectarian war ensues, the consequences will be dire, not only for Iraq, but for the entire Middle Eastern region. This monograph, by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, does not predict an Iraqi civil war, which is the worst-case outcome for the current struggle in Iraq. Neither can this monograph fully rule out this possibility since the responsibility for preventing such an eventuality is ultimately Iraqi and not American, and U.S. analysts cannot predict with certainty what Iraqis will do once they take full control of their own country. Rather, this monograph underscores what is at stake in the Middle East by a comprehensive discussion of potential region-wide consequences should an ethnic and sectarian war actually occur. This work therefore serves as an important warning of how an Iraq civil war could offer new strategic opportunities, but especially dangers, to many of the states within the Middle East. Dr. Terrill’s work performs this important task by examining how an Iraqi civil war may develop and how this could influence the internal stability and foreign policies of regional countries.

Socio-economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals. - Alan Richards. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, July 2003. The September 11 attacks against U.S. targets came as a frightening shock to most Americans who had never previously heard of Osama Bin Laden or the virulent radicalism associated with his al Qaeda network. In the tumultuous aftermath of the attacks, many Americans grasped for explanations as to why these events occurred and what was to be done about them. Closely-related queries were why Islamic radicals enjoy a significant amount of popular sympathy within the Muslim World, and how this trend can be reversed.  This monograph addresses the critical questions involved in understanding and coping with the roots of Islamic radicalism. His work closely examines the links between radicalism and a series of crises associated with modernization in the Islamic World. The result is a thoughtful and probing study including policy recommendations for U.S. military and civilian decisionmakers that makes intelligible the complex subject of Islamic radicalism.

The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya - Christopher Blanchard. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 2004. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent investigations of these attacks have called attention to Islamic puritanical movements known as Wahhabism and Salafiyya. The Al Qaeda terrorist organization and its leader Osama bin Laden have advocated a message of violence that some suggest is an extremist interpretation of this line of puritanical Islam. Other observers have accused Saudi Arabia, the center of Wahhabism, of having disseminated a religion that promotes hatred and violence, targeting the United States and its allies. Saudi officials strenuously deny these allegations. This report provides a background on Wahhabi Islam and its association to militant fundamentalist groups; it also summarizes recent charges against Wahhabism and responses, including the findings of the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (“The 9/11 Commission”).

Islamic Rulings on Warfare - Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, October 2004.  The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history, and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause.

Five Pillars of Democracy: How the West Can Promote an Islamic Reformation - Cheryl Benard. Rand Review article, Spring 2004. Rival versions of Islam are contending for spiritual and political dominance, with immense implications for the rest of the world. By understanding the ongoing ideological struggle within Islam and by distinguishing among the competing strains of Islamic thought, Western leaders can identify appropriate Islamic partners and work with them to discourage extremism and violence as well as to encourage democratization and development.  It is no easy matter to transform a major world religion. If "nation-building" is a daunting task, "religion building" is immeasurably more perilous and complex. Islam is neither a homogeneous entity nor a self contained system. Many extraneous issues and problems have become entangled with the religion. Many political actors in the Muslim world deliberately seek to "Islamize" the debate in a way that they think will further their goals.

A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement - Stephen Pelletiere. US Army Strategic Studies Institute paper, September 1995. Islamic fundamentalism is growing at such a rapid rate that many believe it threatens to take over the Middle East. To prevent this, enormous resources have been summoned, not only from within the region, but in the West as well. Yet, for all the efforts to contain, if not turn back the fundamentalists, the movement appears likely to pose a security challenge well into the next century.  In this monograph Dr. Stephen Pelletiere points out that containment of fundamentalism depends first and foremost on accurate information about the nature of the movement. He examines the origins of the various fundamentalist groups that are challenging the area's governments, and explains why they were able to grow in the face of official repression by some of the most sophisticated and well-equipped security services in the world. The author concludes by building a theory about fundamentalism, which implies a need to redirect policy for coping with it.

Hidden Unities: Alternative Strategic Divisions - Ralph Peters. US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities study, June 2002.  All cultures generated by only-one- god religions - Christian, Muslim or Jewish - believe in one path to the truth. The debate - often bloody - is over which path is best, not over the equivalent value of alternate paths. These are all-or- nothing cultures. This “one true path” mentality compels them to inflict their vision of both religious and secular order on others.

Cultural Assessments and Campaign Planning - Major James Gordan, USA. US Army School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, 2004.  Campaign planning for major operations including Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) continues to be a challenge for the United States military. This monograph proposes that a major deficiency in current Joint doctrine is the failure to conduct cultural assessment of population groups in an area of operations and to integrate these results into the campaign planning process. Cultural assessment, as defined in this monograph, is a detailed analysis of factors that influence cultural behavior and a summary of the characteristics of that culture of a given population in relation to proposed military operations.

Demography and Security - Rand workshop proceedings, 2000. Institutions that shape public policies on health care, insurance, education, and economics have long been producers and consumers of demographic information. Indeed, demography as a science can trace one of its major roots in actuarial calculation by British insurance companies that needed to evaluate the price and cost of annuities, and Swiss financiers who used Genevan maidens with exceptional longevity to purchase said annuities.  By contrast, the wealth of empirical observation, analysis, and prediction generated by demographers has not found its proper place in the thinking of some of its most important potential consumers: the foreign affairs, strategic, and defense communities. These areas, which could usefully integrate demographic consideration into their policy planning, have only sporadically paid attention. Demographic shifts are a cause, an effect, and a forerunner of geopolitical shocks and transformations. Their study should be one of the first steps in any form of strategic estimate. It may be that the academic and professional tracks of the demographic community and the strategic and defense communities do not naturally intersect. Providing venues for such intersections is therefore important. Once both communities are drawn into the same room and are given a chance to hear each other, however, the complementarity and mutual usefulness of their respective work promptly becomes visible.

Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?) - Lieutenant Colonel George Smith, USMC. Essays 2004 article. cultural intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) with a focus on the post-hostilities landscape is perhaps more important than traditional intelligence preparation of the battlespace, which typically has monopolized the intelligence effort. Countless lessons from history resemble Napoleon’s experiences with popular Spanish resistance and provide insight as to what should comprise the proper balance of effort within intelligence preparation for armed intervention.  These lessons demonstrate that an inordinate focus on armies at the expense of a focus on the people has and will continue to make winning the peace more difficult than winning the war. Closing the cultural intelligence gap by striking an IPB balance within campaign planning may reduce surprises for an occupying force that historically have impeded the accomplishment of the campaign’s stated political or grand strategic objectives.

My Clan Against the World” - US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994 - Robert Baumann, Lawrence Yates and Versalle Washington. US Army Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004. “My Clan Against the World”: US and Coalition Operations in Somalia, 1992-94 represents another in a series of military case studies published by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The impetus for this project came from the commanding general, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, who directed CSI to examine the American military’s experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. That original focus can be found in the following pages, but the authors address other, broader issues as well, to include planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand. This case study also cautions against the misuse and overuse of “lessons” learned from any given military undertaking. As with the lessons of Vietnam, one of which dictated that conventional units should not engage in unconventional warfare, the US experience in Somalia left many military analysts and policymakers convinced that the United States should eschew any undertaking that smacked of nation building. Yet, as this book is published, just ten years after the US exit from Somalia, American forces are engaged in several locations against an unconventional foe and are involved in nation building in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps the first lesson to be learned about extracting lessons is, in the words of a once-popular motion picture, “Never Say Never Again.”

Military Geography for Professionals and the Public - John Collins. Link to National Defense University book.  This book will arguably become the most comprehensive treatment of military geography in print. The author presents a sweeping, sophisticated interpretation of the term "geography," covering not just the lay of the land, but the human beings who live on the land, change it, and are shaped by it. He relates virtually every aspect 0-f the physical world we live in to every imaginable endeavor in the military realm, from reading a tactical map to conducting a major campaign in some far-flung corner of the Earth. He considers military operations in every geographical environment, while taking into account ever-changing strategies, tactics, and technologies on all levels. He enriches his text with many practical examples that span recorded history. Finally, he writes in plain, direct language to reach the widest possible audience.

The Geography of Economic Development - Jeffrey Sachs. Naval War College Review article, Autumn 2000. Without question, the buzzword of our era is globalization. Some say this term is now so hackneyed as to be without content. In fact, it is a real phenomenon, one that is important for us to understand. But it is also important that different parts of the world fit into this fast, globalizing system in thoroughly different ways and have equally different economic prospects. One part of our analysis, then, is the shape of the world system as it is evolving; there is also the important question of why different parts of the world, different geographies or ecologies, face such different futures in it. Let us start, therefore, with some basic ideas about globalization, and then turn to the differences, which I think is the more interesting subject.

Social Studies: 21st Century Tribes - David Ronfeldt. Rand commentary / Los Angeles Times article, December 2004. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is fighting virulent tribalism as much as Islamic fundamentalism. Salafi and Wahhabi teachings calling for jihad against infidels, fatwas from clerics justifying the murder of noncombatants and ultimatums from Sunni insurgents who behead captives all are expressions of extreme tribalism more than Islam.  The ways religion gets layered onto tribalism, and vice versa, deeply condition a people's thinking and behavior. A tribe may regard a deity as the ultimate ancestor of its identity. Its religion also may instruct tribal members how to uphold their society and treat one another. It does not determine how they may behave toward outsiders, but religion often supplies the justification.

Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies - Cheryl Benard. Rand study, 2003. In the face of Islam’s own internal struggles, it is not easy to see who we should support and how. This report provides detailed descriptions of subgroups, their stands on various issues, and what those stands may mean for the West. Since the outcomes can matter greatly to international community, that community might wish to influence them by providing support to appropriate actors. The author recommends a mixed approach of providing specific types of support to those who can influence the outcomes in desirable ways.

Culture... A Neglected Aspect of War - Major B.C. Lindberg, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1996.  American political and military strategists continue to demonstrate their failure to adequately embrace the aspects of culture as a relevant factor in developing and planning military operations. Although the Marine Corps has made some efforts towards applying the significance of culture to military operations, a greater requirement must be placed upon the educational system to provide the needed emphasis on the cultural aspects of war.  The complexity of missions that Marines, at all levels, face in OOTW requires an increased knowledge and acceptance of the cultural aspects of war. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Marine Corps to further develop and expand its educational programs to better prepare its leaders for meeting the myriad of threats today and in the future.

Cultural Expertise and Its Importance in Future Marine Corps Operations - Major Stephen Kaczmar, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1996.  This study was born out of a sense of frustration with the inadequate cultural literacy present within the US Marine Corps. As an intelligence officer and former Naval and Acting Defense Attaché, the lack of understanding or even interest in foreign cultures among many US military servicemen, ranging from flag officers through junior enlisted personnel, appalled me. Few expressed a desire to learn about other people, particularly the cultural details, before meeting or working with them. Rarely did the question arise, "What are some of the cultural taboos associated with this population with whom I am about to work?" All too often a US translator or another person aware of the local cultural nuances would have to intervene to preclude a serious political-military faux pas, which could have resulted in international repercussions perhaps with strategic consequences. Too often Americans assume that foreigners act and think as they do--they do not! If nothing else, this lack of cultural sensitivity paints the offender as arrogant and ignorant, losing all credibility with the foreign host.

The Muslim World After 9/11 - Rand study, 2004. Examines the dynamics that drive changes in the religious-political landscape of the Muslim world, the effects of 9/11, the global war on terrorism, and the war in Iraq. The authors present a typology of ideological tendencies; identify the factors that produce religious extremism and violence; assess key cleavages along sectarian, ethnic, regional, and national lines; and identify possible strategies and military options for the United States to pursue in this critical and volatile part of the world.

The "Arab Street" and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit - Dale Eickelman. Naval War College Review article, 2002. Even before the events of 11 September 2001, it was already becoming clear that rapidly increasing levels of education, greater ease of travel, and the rise of new communications media were developing a public sphere in Muslim-majority societies in which large numbers of people—not just an educated, political, and economic elite—expect a say in religion, governance, and public issues. State authorities continue in many ways to be arbitrary and restrict what is said in the press, the broadcast media, and in public, but the methods of avoiding such censorship and control have rapidly proliferated. Today, silence in public no longer implies ignorance. Silence, or apparent acquiescence, is often a weapon of the weak. In some countries of the Arabian Peninsula, a “politics of silence,” in which audiences applaud tepidly rather than with enthusiasm, is one of the few forms of public protest available, despite the simulacra of democratic forms offered by repressive and authoritarian governments. For instance, Tunisia’s President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was reelected with 99 percent of cast ballots in 1994, but few Tunisians would take at face value his response to a French journalist’s question that such results, far from being “a bit too good,” merely reflected “the profound realities of the Arab-Muslim world” and that the vote was “a massive adhesion to a project of national salvation.” Public silence in Tunisia in the face of such claims does not equal agreement with them.

Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds - Captain Stephanie Kelley, USAF. Naval Post Graduate School thesis, September 2004.  This thesis proposes the study of rumor as a guide to the battle for hearts and minds in Iraq. It reviews existing rumor theory to identify how rumors function and what we can learn from them. Rumors often serve as a window into a community, and can provide valuable information for developing a campaign to assess, monitor, and gain the support necessary to defeat insurgents. This thesis employs two distinct typologies to analyze over ten months of rumors in Baghdad, Iraq. The motivation typology provides indications of Iraqi sentiment, and suggests unrelieved anxiety and fear is likely contributing to widespread hostility towards the US-led Coalition. Indications of unrealistic expectations are also evident, potentially contributing to hostility levels as they go unrealized. The subject typology identifies overarching concerns of the Iraqi people, and suggests there are specific fears inhibiting cooperation with US counterinsurgency efforts. This thesis then examines rumor remedies. Because they rely on effective communication skills, American and Arab cultural communication styles are contrasted and integrated into tailored remedies for Iraq. The findings in this thesis could assist Coalition information campaigns by alerting them to existing Iraqi perceptions so they can tailor messages to address significant concerns and fears.

Mutual Trust and Respect - Chief Warrant Officer Two Oscar Chaney (USMC) and Chief Warrant Officer Two Kenneth R. Silvers (USMC). Marine Corps Gazette - article, November 2004. Foreign powers have never done well in Afghanistan over time. For us to be successful in Afghanistan, we will have to continue building and working with the Afghan National Army and local Afghan Militia Forces (AMF). From April through July, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 1/6) fought with AMF forces under the command of Jan Mohammed, the Governor of Oruzgan Province in south-central Afghanistan. Across the six warfighting functions at the tactical level, we had to make several innovations and accommodations to allow us to operate side by side with the AMF. Our BLT commander was a foreign area officer, specializing in central Asian cultures, which gave us an advantage while navigating the language and cultural nuances.

Report on the Cultural Intelligence Seminar on Afghan Perceptions - US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities report, December 2001.  The participants displayed a high level of optimism that contrasts markedly with the pessimistic attitude of many western journalists regarding the ability of the Afghans to make a go of a post-Taliban government. After six years of Taliban repression, this seems to them to be a very promising opportunity for their nation. They stressed that the Afghan people want to get themselves on their feet and will work hard to do so. They stressed that the U.S. and follow-on multinational efforts should convey their goals clearly and honestly and that all tribes and ethnic groups should be represented fairly in any post-Taliban government.

Report on a Seminar Regarding Arab / Islamic Perceptions of the Information Campaign - US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities report, November 2001.  CETO conducted a workshop on the issue of Islamic and Middle Eastern perceptions of the information campaign in the War on Terrorism at the offices of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA, on November 8, 2001. Participants included members of the Islamic and Arab-American communities and members of the Interagency community involved in the information campaign. The objective was to give the government representatives a perspective on how the campaign is being received by the worldwide Muslim and Arab communities.

Cultural Differences, East and West: Silent Lessons From U.S. Involvement in East Asia - Lieutenant Commander Thomas Nolan, USN. US Marine Corps Command and Staff research paper, 1996. To what degree was the war in Vietnam influenced by differences in culture and time? Is there an effective model to study these differences to improve any future interactions? The war in Vietnam was influenced by cultural differences that paralleled; in general, the larger differences between East and West. One method of studying these differences and their impact is to use Ernst Cassirer's Circle of Humanity and its six categories-- art, language, history, science, religion, and myth -- to describe the essential elements of human culture. This paper will discuss religion, history, and science from Cassirer's Model to show that neither the United Sates nor North Vietnam really understood the other. The other components of the model -- art, language, and myth -- will not be examined as art was not a significant player in the conflict; language, while different for both sides, failed to alter the outcome of the conflict; and myth is too closely allied with religion; and accordingly, Cassirer treats them very similarly. Using only three categories also enhances the focus of the paper. Differing views of time, East and West, will also be discussed, highlighting their impact on the Vietnam conflict.

Terrorist Beheadings: Cultural and Strategic Implications - Ronald Jones. US Army Strategic Studies Institute report, June 2005. This Carlisle paper, by Mr. Ronald H. Jones, defines terrorism; reviews the history of ritual murder, human sacrifice, and terrorism as a tactic used by religious groups; and focuses on the cultural significance, motivations, and objectives of these groups. Terrorist beheadings in Iraq are described and analyzed, and political rituals in democracies and the Middle East are discussed. Finally, the author provides policy recommendations for strategic leaders and planners to utilize as they assess and develop effective defensive and offensive countermeasures to this tactic.

Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs - Dr. Montgomery McFate. Military Review Article, May - June 2005. devices (IEDs) are among the deadliest weapons coalition forces face in Iraq, and defeating their use by insurgents is both essential and extremely challenging. Thus far, U.S. defense science and technology communities have focused on developing technical solutions to the IED threat. However, IEDs are a product of human ingenuity and human social organization. If we understand the social context in which they are invented, built, and used we will have an additional avenue for defeating them. As U.S. Army Brigadier General Joseph Votel, head of the Pentagon’s Joint IED Task Force, noted, commanders should focus less on the “bomb than the bombmaker.” A shift in focus from IED technology to IED makers requires examining the social environment in which bombs are invented, manufactured, distributed, and used. Focusing on the bombmaker requires understanding the four elements that make IED use possible in Iraq: knowledge, organization, material, and the surrounding population.

The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture - Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cassidy, USA. Military Review article, May - June 2005. Historically British Army culture has influenced its approach to counterinsurgency. The British Army’s experiences in small wars and counterinsurgencies during the 19th and 20th centuries remain topical and salient. The U.S. military and its coalition partners, including Britain, are prosecuting counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere. An analysis of British military cultural predilections in the context of counterinsurgency is therefore germane because the U.S. Army is transforming while in contact, and a big part of Transformation is about military cultural change. If U.S. military culture has traditionally exhibited a preference for a big, conventional-war\ paradigm, and if this preference has impeded its capacity to adapt to small wars and counterinsurgencies, then there might be something to gain or learn from examining the cultural characteristics of another army with a greater propensity for counterinsurgency. In short, military culture comprises the beliefs and attitudes within a military organization that shape its collective preferences toward the use of force. These attitudes can impede or foster innovation and adaptation. Military culture sometimes exhibits preferences for either small wars or big wars.

The Strategic Importance of Water - Kent Hughes Butts. Parameters article, Spring 1997.  Geographical variables and their importance to international relations and political military affairs are easily ignored, even though two events of the 1970s drew the attention of policymakers to the issue of resource availability with an urgency unknown in peacetime. The first was the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74; the second was the 1978 invasion of Zaire's Shaba province by Angola-based guerrillas. The former quadrupled petroleum prices and reminded producers and consumers alike that the world economy depended on the highly concentrated deposits of this increasingly scarce fossil fuel. In the latter case, even the brief curtailment of cobalt shipments from Zaire caused prices to escalate from $6 to over $50 per pound on the spot market. Disruption of the cobalt market forced a wide-scale reevaluation of the concept of strategic resources. In the United States, the review included non-fuel minerals essential to US industry, such as chrome, manganese, and platinum group metals, virtually 100 percent of which are imported. Analysts were reminded that, as with petroleum, world reserves of these minerals were not evenly distributed but were largely concentrated in politically unstable regions. Policymakers, in turn, acknowledged that the destabilizing imbalance of natural resource supply and demand can have profound consequences for US security interests.

The Strategic Importance of the World Food Supply - Leif Roderick Rosenberger. Parameters article, Spring 1997.  Clausewitz reminds us that "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that a statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." That admonition applies equally to the strategist seeking to understand what motivates or deters other states in a time of relative peace. For a while during the oil crisis of the 1970s, food was sometimes called the green weapon, apparently on the assumption that the embargo of one commodity could be countered by the embargo of another. At the time, no one took the concept very seriously. Now, however, with the world's population half again what it was at that time, food--who has it, who doesn't--and the arable land from which it is produced become legitimate strategic considerations.  This article explores aspects of world agriculture and suggests ways to examine and think about arable land and the world food supply, considerations that strategists are sometimes too quick to dismiss. Some support one or another of the two opposing views, because of folk wisdom or prejudice. Some believe that the "world is full of food"; others believe that little can be done to avert starvation in Africa. Still others argue that the world food supply is not vital to US national interests. Common to all views often is a lack of opportunities to examine the matter in depth.

Links for Further Research:

Air War College: Cultural Intelligence

USMC Small Wars Center of Excellence

USMC Center For Advanced Operational Culture Learning

Cultural Awareness - University of Military Intelligence

Cultural Awareness: Iraq - University of Military Intelligence

Cultural Awareness: Afghanistan - University of Military Intelligence

Foreign Language Training Online - University of Military Intelligence

Language Survival Kits - Defense Language Institute

Languages by Country - CIA World Factbook

Languages of the World - National Virtual Translation Center

How To Communicate Effectively Through Interpreters: A Guide for Leaders - Brief guide by S3-XO.NET

Center for World Indigenous Studies - Research and Education Organization

Cultural Awareness Links - Delphi International Research

CIA World Factbook

Country Background Notes - US Department of State

Library of Congress Country Studies

Country Profiles - BBC News

T. E. Lawrence Factfile - Jeremy Wilson