Site - Main - Reference Library

Coalition / Combined Operations

Doctrine / TTP

JP 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations

FM 100-8: The Army in Multinational Operations

Issues / Concepts / Lessons

Alliances and American National Security - Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall. US Army Strategic Studies Institute study, November 2006. One of the greatest challenges facing the United States today is the translation of its overwhelming might into effective influence. Traditionally, the United States has leveraged its power through bilateral and multilateral alliances. However, the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001, have led some policymakers and analysts to question the value of alliances in American foreign and defense policy. This monograph advocates that allies are more important than ever to the achievement of U.S. national security goals.

Integrating Partner Nations into Coalition Operations - Major Barbara Fick, US Army. Joint Force Quarterly article, Issue # 41. Within 48 hours of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s resignation and departure on February 29, 2004, Chilean forces deployed and integrated into a multinational interim force to help secure and stabilize the small, impoverished island nation. Days after the passage of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1529, Chile, Canada, France, and the United States established a multinational force responsive to and capable of coordinating with international authorities and aid efforts in Haiti. The rapid reaction, deployment, and integration of coalition forces saved the lives of many Haitians, prevented mass migration during a time of rough seas, and facilitated transition to the process of restabilization. Chile continues to deploy forces as a member of the UN Stabilization Force Haiti (MINUSTAH), led by Brazil and comprised mostly of Latin American troops. While many challenges continue in Haiti, the success of initial security and stabilization operations, continued support to MINUSTAH, and the significant contribution of Latin American and Caribbean nations to peacekeeping operations around the world demonstrate a growing capability in the Western Hemisphere for participation in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, such as those currently required in Afghanistan and Iraq.

U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century - Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland and Dr. Douglas T. Stuart. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, January 2006. Although there is widespread agreement that the United States is the world’s most powerful country in military, economic, and diplomatic terms, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, there is little agreement as to how the rest of the world will react to America’s lead. Theory has an even more difficult time explaining the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), especially its remarkable endurance over the past 6 decades. The U.S.-UK partnership flourished during World War II, deepened during the long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union, and has prospered further since the end of the Cold War. It is likely to survive any new challenges that may loom on the horizon.

United in Fact? A Critical Analysis of Intent and Perception in the Application of American and British Army Doctrine. - Major A. D. Firth, British Army. US Army School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, 2003. The primary research vehicle for this work was a survey conducted amongst American officers attending the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, and UK Army officers at their Joint Service Command and Staff College, Watchfield. The study examined the two armies’ respective approaches to some fundamental components of operational design, asking whether their perspectives betrayed physical or conceptual foundations. The responses to this survey were set against the intent of respective doctrinal publications, the US Army Field Manual 3-0 and the British Army Doctrinal Publication 1, both of which are entitled Operations.

Australia and New Zealand: Like-minded Defence Partners? - Emmet McElhatton, New Zealand Defence Review, July-August 2006. The trans-Tasman relationship is an optical illusion, showing different pictures depending on when we view it and from which perspective. In the later years of the 20th century, after sharing two hot wars and one long cold one, New Zealand considered a mature co-relationship had developed between two close and equal partners. We lived in the same neighbourhood, shared the same values, were members of the same clubs and could depend on each other in a crisis. The Australian view was, however, a little different. In its white paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, the Australian government reveals a very different perception of the relationship from that existing in Welllington.

Improving Army Planning for Future Multinational Coalition Operations - Thomas Szayna, Frances Lussier, Krista Magras, Olga Oliker, Michele Zanini and Robert Howe. Rand study, 2001. The Army currently lacks effective and appropriate processes to plan for enhanced multinational force compatibility (MFC). The current system was not designed for, and therefore is not capable of, supporting centralized oversight of MFC activities. The authors address this problem by focusing recommendations on two primary issues, the management of resources and a means of prioritizing between partners and activities.

The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility - Michele Zanini and Jennifer Morrison Taw. Rand study, 2000. As part of Force XXI, the Army plans to have a digitized division by 2000, a digitized corps by the end of fiscal 2004, and the entire force digitized by 2020-2025. This report discusses how these technological developments will affect compatibility between digitized units, other Army units, and multinational forces.

Alliance and Coalition Warfare - Wayne Silkett. Parameters article, Summer 1993. Necessity drives nations to form coalitions, as going it alone normally imposes serious limitations. Individual nations are usually insufficiently capable of addressing a given threat. Mobilization resources or time may not be available, and few factors contribute to public legitimacy like a coalition effort. The ambiguous environment a coalition leader must contend with stems from often huge differences in operational-level realities such as goals, training, capabilities, equipment, logistics, culture, doctrine, intelligence, and language. Unilateral action, of course, dramatically reduces ambiguity. But since unilateral action is the exception, not the rule (in this century alone, all major wars have been coalition wars, excepting the Russo-Japanese and Iran-Iraq), the areas listed above demand attention. They will not likely be fully resolved no matter the degree of integration, but coalition partners must learn to manage them. Let us look briefly at them individually.

Mutual Trust and Respect - Chief Warrant Officer Two Oscar Chaney (USMC) and Chief Warrant Officer Two Kenneth R. Silvers (USMC). Marine Corps Gazette - article, November 2004. Foreign powers have never done well in Afghanistan over time. For us to be successful in Afghanistan, we will have to continue building and working with the Afghan National Army and local Afghan Militia Forces (AMF). From April through July, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 1/6) fought with AMF forces under the command of Jan Mohammed, the Governor of Oruzgan Province in south-central Afghanistan. Across the six warfighting functions at the tactical level, we had to make several innovations and accommodations to allow us to operate side by side with the AMF. Our BLT commander was a foreign area officer, specializing in central Asian cultures, which gave us an advantage while navigating the language and cultural nuances.

Improving Aircrew Interoperability in Coalition Warfare: The Human Dimension of the Air Power Equation - Colonel Greg Matte, Canadian Air Force. Canadian Military Journal article, Winter 2005-2006. Despite the stunning results of relatively recent offensive air operations, such as those witnessed in Desert Storm, the planning and execution of an effective coalition air campaign in a modern combat theatre can be a tremendously complex interoperability challenge. Not only must the Coalition Force Air Component Commander (CFACC) bear the weight of the combined political expectations of minimal losses, precision targeting, low collateral damage and rapid decisive results, he is expected to rapidly and seamlessly integrate the disparate elements of multinational contributions assigned to the air operation into an effective fighting force. Given that the maximum exploitation of air power is achieved through a unified approach to the air campaign under a centralized command and control system, and through the flexible, integrated assignment of tactical forces to the dynamic taskings of the unfolding operation, the requirement for interoperability among multinational participants is crucial to the effectiveness of an air campaign. Although the need to focus on interoperability from a technical perspective is self-evident, interoperability among aircrew must not be overlooked, for the human dimension of the air power equation will ultimately determine the success or failure of the overall air campaign plan.

Links for Further Research:

Ongoing Coalition Commands:

Multi-National Force Iraq

Combined Forces Command Afghanistan

US Military:

Department of Defense

Joint Chiefs of Staff