Balkans

Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia - Max Manwarring. Parameters article, Winter 1998. The United States' civil-military involvement in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, with NATO and other elements of the international community, has been a major topic in the national and international security dialogue since the 1995 signing of the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia. Many have concluded, in light of that experience and subsequent developments, that conflict of the sort encountered in the Balkans may well be a harbinger of future US military operations. The dialogue suggests that the complex challenges of multinational peace and stability operations encountered in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflect the disorder of the post-Cold War era and could characterize other intranational conflicts. The US Army deployed a significant number of personnel to Bosnia early in 1996 to collect, consolidate, and report on hundreds of incidents and activities that were related to the deployment and subsequent operations of US forces in the region. The raw material collected by the teams under the rubric of "lessons learned" was reviewed and analyzed within the Army, emerging as lessons to be examined by all of its elements to support training, review doctrine, and develop and acquire materiel appropriate to peace support operations. One of the organizations involved in the process of learning from the experiences of the deployed force, the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, subsequently sponsored two meetings of senior US and other officers and civilians, during which the lessons were examined and validated. This article examines some of the recurring themes from those meetings, which took place in May 1996 and April 1997. The intent then and now was not to relive history as we would have liked it to have been, but to focus on the broad themes and issues that invoke the invaluable power of leader judgment and unity of effort in peace operations. The consistency of the lessons learned from these and other US and United Nations reports is impressive, and inspires confidence that the lessons are valid.

War in the Balkans, 1991-2002 - R. Craig Nation. US Army Strategic Studies Institute book, August 2003. This book, by Dr. R. Craig Nation, was written to address the need for a comprehensive history of the Balkan wars provoked by the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991. These wars, and the instability that they have provoked, became preoccupations for international security management through the 1990s. After an initial phase of distancing and hesitation, Balkan conflict drew the United States and its most important European allies into an open ended commitment to peace enforcement, conflict management, and peace-building in the region, importantly supported by the U.S. Army. These efforts are still underway, and significant tensions and potential flashpoints remain in place within former Yugoslavia and the entire Southeastern European area. The lessons learned from the new Balkan wars, and the successes and failures of U.S. and international engagement, provide a significant foundation for future efforts to manage intractable regional conflict. Dr. Nation’s work has been supported by a research grant provided by the U.S. Army War College, and is published under the auspices of the Strategic Studies Institute.

Bosnia-Herzogovina Conference After Action Review - United States Army Peacekeeping Institute, May 1996. The Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I) was held at Carlisle Barracks, 20-23 May 1996, as the first of two AAR conferences to examine the strategic implications of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) for the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). The first conference, the essence of this report, examines the planning, preparation, deployment, and early entry operations of OJE from a US perspective. The second conference, BHAAR II, to be held early in 1997, will focus on operations, transition and exit strategy, and redeployment of US forces.

Kosovo Operations - Major James Davis, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, June 2004. It has been said that we, as military professionals, should always be doing one of two things—participating in combat (or military operations other than war (MOOTW)) or preparing for combat. Training for combat is a difficult task that takes insight, planning, resources, and clear goals with measurable standards. The preparation for operations in an “other than war” environment, such as in Kosovo, is especially difficult. The skills required to be successful encompass all conventional capabilities and additional skills that are oftentimes inconsistent, or even contradictory, with those conventional warfighting capabilities. Close and continuous civilian interaction, while conducting primarily law enforcement functions, requires a whole new set of skills other than those dealing with “mere combatants.” Preparing U.S. troops for operations in Kosovo requires a more extensive training plan that includes familiarization with the history and political sensitivity of the region. The extensive battlespace and complexity of the situations encountered in the primarily urban environment will force decentralization, while making decisions at the tactical level quite often leads to strategic ramifications. There are no secret recipes for conducting peace operations in an uncertain urban environment. However, there are numerous factors and considerations that, when properly implemented during training, can prepare a unit for operating in Kosovo or any similar environment with its own set of intricacies and nuances.

Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis - UK Ministry of Defence report, 2000. The aim of this paper is to set out the background to the crisis, explain why the UK and NATO had to intervene, give our assessment of how we performed and give details of the lessons we have learned and are implementing for the future. It is right that we should look closely at how we might have done better. But this must not obscure the fact that we were successful. We forced Milosevic to halt his ethnic cleansing and to allow the people of Kosovo to return to their homes, so preventing a potential humanitarian disaster. Our experience in Kosovo has demonstrated the effectiveness of the international community working together in a just cause, with clear objectives.

Failed Intervention: The United States in the Balkans - Lieutenant Colonel Kelly Fisk, USA. US Army War College Strategy Research Project, April 2002. The violence of Yugoslavia is soaked in historical injustice and nationalist tradition. Its historical mold is not unique; but the world's reaction is. The ongoing failure of Yugoslavia and its fractious cascade of regime changes are a product of flawed intervention. United States intervention failed because it opted for termination determined by strategic ways rather than resolution to meet strategic ends. The failure of Yugoslavia presents a model for flawed intervention and the instability achieved through the intrusion of sovereignty. This analysis follows a framework of examining the failure of U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia in three parts: (1) the developmental history that create the conditions for the latest Balkan War; (2) reasons and results of US intervention; (3) strategic implications for similar interventions.

Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999 - Bruce Nardulli, Walter Perry, Bruce Pirnie, John Gordon IV and John  McGinn. Rand Report, 2002. The 1999 military operation in Kosovo suggests several areas in which Joint military operations were deficient. This study examines all aspects of the Kosovo conflict, with a focus on U.S. Army involvement, including its political and historical underpinnings, in an attempt to understand these deficiencies and to recommend improvements.

Lessons from the War in Kosovo - Benjamin Lambeth. Joint Force Quarterly article, Spring 2002. Allied Force, the most intense and sustained military operation in Europe since World War II, represented the first extended use of force by NATO as well as the first major combat operation conducted for humanitarian objectives against a state committing atrocities within its own borders. At a cost of more than $3 billion, it was also expensive. Yet in part because of that investment, it was an unprecedented exercise in the discriminate use of force, essentially airpower, on a large scale. There were highly publicized civilian fatalities; yet despite 28,000 high-explosive munitions expended over 78 days, no more than 500 noncombatants died as a direct result, a far better performance in terms of civilian casualty avoidance than either Vietnam or Desert Storm. But Allied Force was a less than exemplary exercise in U.S. and NATO strategy and an object lesson in the limitations of Alliance warfare. A balanced appraisal must accordingly account not only for its signal accomplishments, but its shortcomings in planning and execution, which nearly made it a disaster.

Lessons from the Bosnian Peace Support Operations - Leighton Smith. Institute for National Security Studies article, January 1999. Three elements—military, civil, and political—seem to be the essentials of the operations in Bosnia; and, these elements probably apply to all peace support operations. Each element has difficult and distinct responsibilities. Yet they are interdependent to the degree that overall success in achieving peace in Bosnia is a function of each element working in harmony with the other two. Regrettably, despite great efforts on the part of many, progress in the civil sector has been slow; and among the political bodies, nearly nonexistent. That is why Bosnia has an absence of war rather than the peace the Dayton Accords sought to establish. And that is why there will be little progress unless and until the political leadership there demonstrates a willingness to work together to create the conditions for peace.

Lessons and Conclusions on the Execution of IFOR Operations and Prospects for a Future Combined Security System: The Peace and Stability of Europe after IFOR - Joint US / Russian Research Project; US Army Foreign Military Studies Office and Russia's Center for Military-Strategic Studies, November 2000. The success of the IFOR mission, documented here, will reap continual rewards in future partnership endeavors, but our soldiers must not become complacent. During IFOR, our forces patrolled together, trained together, and shared the risks. They learned from one another and came to respect one another. Overcoming the legacy of five decades of Cold War, they contributed to the peace and stability of Europe. The lessons we learned together will help us create better Combined Joint Task Forces in the future. They and the allied and partnership forces from many nations can be justly proud of their collaboration. On the other hand, there remain many obstacles to peace in Bosnia, as the rapidly changing regional situation indicates. This guarantees that new challenges await this and future generations of Russian and NATO soldiers.

The Role of the Political Advisor in Peacekeeping Operations - David Lange. Parameters article, Spring 1999. A major theme of Clausewitz's work On War was that military considerations are subordinate to the political point of view. The primacy of political influences in the conduct of war understood by Clausewitz in the 19th century equally applies to peacekeeping operations today. The negotiations that led to the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia demonstrated the truth of Clausewitz's observation. The successful application of NATO's military power created the conditions for diplomacy to achieve a political end.  And as the international community works with Bosnia to build a multi-ethnic, democratic society, NATO's military presence continues to serve political goals.

Civil-Military Operations in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo - Thomas Mockaitis. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, October 2004. The U.S. missions to Bosnia and Kosovo and the current operation in Iraq make it clear that winning wars accomplishes little if we cannot also win the peace. The strategic goals for which the wars are fought can only be achieved if the follow-on mission leaves an occupied territory more stable and democratic than before. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is the key to achieving such stability. This study is based on field work in Kosovo, supported by several years of research on peace operations. Its principal value is as a historical record of where the U.S. military was with regard to CIMIC in the 1990s. Much progress has been made, though more remains to be done. The study concludes with general recommendations for all militaries engaged in humanitarian intervention and specific suggestions for improving the U.S. approach to CIMIC.

Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints - Steven Collins. Parameters article, Summer 1999.  While it is true that implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina has proceeded much more peacefully than many predicted, it is also true that the US peacekeeping forces have maintained vigil over this Balkan country for much longer than was anticipated or advertised. Since the US commitment to Bosnia is now acknowledged to be open-ended, it is important to consider how to influence attitudes and emotions in a way that will allow the ethnic groups in this area to live with one another without a permanent foreign presence guaranteeing security. There are many methods to change attitudes and shape behavior in Bosnia--economic and military pressure to name just two. However, not all approaches are as invasive as these two elements of power. A more subtle, certainly more neglected, but potentially longer-lasting element of power is information.

Tactical Information Operations in Kosovo - Major Marc Romanych (USARet.) and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Krumm (USA). Military Review article, September - October 2004.  Information Operations (IO) are the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, and operations security, along with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decisionmaking. Information operations are enabling operations that support offensive and defensive operations, stability operations, and support operations. Consequently, they are primarily shaping operations that create and preserve opportunities for decisive operations. Information operations are a key component of the commander’s effort to achieve information superiority, which is an operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying the adversary’s ability to do the same.

Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations - Pascale Combelles Siegel. National Defense University Institute for National Security Studies paper, 1999.  With each day that passes drawing us further down the path from the Industrial to the Information Age, many officers are convinced that victory is no longer determined on the ground, but in media reporting. This is even more true in peace support operations (PSO) where the goal is not to conquer territory or defeat an enemy but to persuade parties in conflict (as well as the local populations) into a favored course of action. This monograph examines the role of information in PSO and its impact on command and control through the prism of NATO-led operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from December 1995 into 1997.

In Search of a New Type of Army: Nation Building and Occupation - Major Mark Camarena, USA. US Army School of Advanced Warfighting, 2004. This report includes two case studies, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995 until present) and Iraq (2003 until present). The case studies examine the events leading up to the conflicts, the introduction of the American military forces, and the major lessons learned about stability and support operations. The research revealed that there are reoccurring themes and lessons of nation building and occupation. First, that nation building and occupation are protracted operations. Second, that a secure environment is of utmost importance. Third, that unity of effort is vital for success in these types of operations. Lastly, that the level of national commitment on the part of the United States is usually the determining factor of success.

Macedonia: End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End? - P. H. Liotta and Cindy Jebb. Parameters article, Spring 2002. Following the horrific events of 11 September 2001, the security dilemma of the former Yugoslavia virtually vanished before the eyes of many policymakers. Understandably, the United States and Europe felt compelled to divert resources away from the region and into their mutual struggle against global terrorism. Yet for more than a decade, the Balkans presented the West with one of its greatest strategic and policy challenges. The prosecution and aftermath of four violent conflicts there--including the first military intervention by NATO--consumed billions of dollars and involved exhaustive diplomatic and regional initiatives. The Balkans no longer constitute a primary foreign policy challenge; this does not mean, however, that the international community can afford to look in all directions other than Southeast Europe. The region itself is in a period of difficult, painful transition, and stands the chance of rapidly succumbing to transnational criminal influences and becoming a “black hole” of terrorism such as happened in Afghanistan, which became not a sponsor of terrorism but rather a terrorist-sponsored state. Even as halting progress toward representative government and institution-building takes place in Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo, internal corruption, black-market activities, and illegal arms shipments threaten the stability of the region. When $25 can buy anyone a real, not a counterfeit, passport, the area has increasingly become attractive to those who easily escape the notice of already overstretched internal security forces. Nowhere has this security dilemma entered a more crucial period than in Macedonia.

The Third Balkan War, and How It Will End - Michael Roskin. Parameters article, Autumn 1994. The current fighting in ex-Yugoslavia gains clarity if we look at it as the Third Balkan War--a series of purposeful, planned moves to enlarge the power and territory of the Serbian state, rather than the chaotic "mess" depicted in the news media. The first two Balkan wars also offer some clues as to how the third might end.

Operation Allied Force and the Legal Basis for Humanitarian Interventions - Robert Tomes. Parameters article, Spring 2000. On 24 March 1999, NATO initiated Operation Allied Force with the following objectives: stop the Serb offensive in Kosovo, force a withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo, allow democratic self-government in Kosovo, allow a NATO-led international peacekeeping force into Kosovo, and allow the safe and peaceful return of Kosovar Albanian refugees. From an international law perspective, Operation Allied Force garners mixed reviews. It was at once a violation of the principles of nonintervention and nonaggression, a new customary law precedent supporting the use of military force for humanitarian reasons, and a case study on the use of force by regional organizations without UN Security Council authorization. Allied Force will undoubtedly receive a great deal of attention from international relations scholars, foreign policy analysts, and others interested in the ramifications for global politics of NATO's bombing campaign. On the one hand, liberal internationalists are likely to applaud intervention to enforce human rights norms. On the other hand, ethicists, just war scholars, and noninterventionists will undoubtedly devote considerable time and effort to criticizing its legitimacy. Regardless of these academic arguments for or against intervention, the fact remains that few recourses are available to policymakers seeking to halt destabilizing ethnopolitical violence. This article reviews international law arguments against NATO's bombing campaign, suggests that the operation should be considered legitimate, and concludes with a jus cogens argument--similar to a natural law argument--in support of intervention to stop gross violation of human rights.

SFOR in Bosnia in 1997: A Watershed Year - John Cirafici. Parameters article, Spring 1999. Historians may eventually identify NATO's 1997 operations in the Balkans as the basis for peace in that troubled region. To be sure, troops are still on patrol in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their presence having been twice extended by the UN. And as deadlines for withdrawing US troops have come and gone, domestic sources have frequently characterized US involvement in the operation as a hopeless exercise and in any case a European affair. The value of continued US presence in Bosnia, debated heatedly in Congress, has been probed by pundits and defended or assailed by regional experts. Consensus is elusive; the United States still copes with an uncomfortable situation. The many different viewpoints demonstrate just how complicated, frustrating, and challenging the mission has been for NATO, other nations providing troops, and the participating international humanitarian relief and development agencies. With the emphasis on political goals established in December 1995 by the General Framework Agreement for Peace, deployed military units from more than 30 countries have deftly avoided the use of arms in pursuit of those goals. The force has been evenhanded in its efforts to reduce or eliminate friction while preserving its position as an honest broker to the three major factions: Serb, Croat, and Bosnian Muslim (the latter is also referred to as the "Bosniac" faction). NATO and other units have managed to defuse flash points without becoming involved as a "fourth faction" in Bosnian politics, and 1997 was a critical year in their success thus far.

Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers - Tony Cucolo. Parameters article, Spring 1999. As he stepped out of the tiny smoke-filled meeting room, the American battalion commander took a deep breath of the cold February air of the Posavina River Valley. Catching a glimpse of his executive officer's questioning look, the commander grunted, "Brian, I'm not built for this." He was almost out of patience and certainly the most frustrated he had been since crossing the Sava River into Bosnia shortly after New Year's Day 1996, six weeks earlier. The Bosniac city fathers of Brcko, ousted by force from that key crossroads city in April 1992, sat in a makeshift meeting room in the battalion's base-under-construction. Chain-smoking, shrugging their shoulders, and reminding the US officer that it was they who were ready for peace and not the Bosnian Serbs, the three politicians were ready to leave. At the battalion commander's invitation they had come to the base--purposely being built dead-center in the Zone of Separation to create a safe, neutral territory where Implementation Force (IFOR) soldiers could foster dialogue and keep their eyes on the factions--to speak with their Bosnian Serb counterparts who now controlled the city. It would be the first time the sides had spoken to each other since the war began.

Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate - Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. MIT Press Journal article, 2000. capitulation of
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on June 9, 1999, after seventy-eight days of bombing by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is being portrayed by many as a watershed in the history of air power. For the ªrst time, the use of air strikes alone brought a foe to its knees—and at the cost of no NATO lives. The prophecies of Giulio Douhet and other air power visionaries appear realized. Lieut. Gen. Michael Short, who ran the bombing campaign, has argued that “NATO got every one of the terms it had stipulated in Rambouillet and beyond Rambouillet, and I credit this as a victory for air power.” This view is not contained to the air force. Historian John Keegan conceded, “I didn’t want to change my beliefs, but there was too much evidence accumulating to stick to the article of faith. It now does look as if air power has prevailed in the Balkans, and that the time has come to redefine how victory in war may be won.”  Dissenters, of course, raise their voices. Noting the failure of air power to fulfill its promise in the past, they are skeptical of its efficacy in Kosovo. Instead, they point to factors such as the threat of a ground invasion, the lack of Russian support for Serbia, or the resurgence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as key to Milosevic’s capitulation. Without these factors, dissenters argue, air strikes alone would not have forced Milosevic’s hand. They also point out that air power failed to prevent the very ethnic cleansing that prompted Western leaders to act in the first place.

Targeting After Kosovo: Has the Law Changed for Strike Planners? - Colonel Frederick Borch, USA. National Defense University Press. Recent reports published by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch charge that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1999 air operations against Serbia—Operation ALLIED FORCE—selected and attacked targets in violation of the law of armed conflict. While the two high-profile organizations clearly supported NATO’s goal of stopping the bloodshed in Kosovo, both reports were sharply critical of some NATO combat operations. Both claimed, for example, that an air strike on a Serbian radio and television station during the campaign was illegal because it was “a direct attack on a civilian object.” Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch further charge that the bombing of two bridges was unlawful because too many civilians were on or near the structures during the attack. Finally, both groups contend that the deaths of civilians during NATO attacks on military targets necessarily meant that NATO had failed to obey the law’s mandate to minimize harm to noncombatants. According to Amnesty International, “NATO forces did commit serious violations of the laws of war leading in a number of cases to the unlawful killings of civilians.” Similarly, Human Rights Watch declared that NATO “illegitimate” attacks on nonmilitary targets resulted in excessive civilian casualties. If these and other allegations are true, General Wesley K. Clark, the regional commander responsible for the conduct of ALLIED FORCE, as well as the NATO planners who sequenced and synchronized the operation, violated the law—and incurred both personal liability and state responsibility for NATO members and the United States. Additionally, if the charges are true, commanders and their planners cannot look to ALLIED FORCE as a model for targeting in future military operations.

When Lawyers Advise Presidents in Wartime: Kosovo and the Law of Armed Conflict - James Baker. National Defense University Press. The events of 11 September changed how we perceive national security as a society, a government, and as individuals. This is as true of national security specialists, who have been aware that America has been at war with terrorism since at least the 1990s, as it is for those whose sense of geographic security was shattered in New York and Washington. There is talk of “new war” and “new rules,” and concern that we not apply twentieth-century lessons to a twenty-first-century war. Over time, 11 September and its aftermath will test our interpretation and application of domestic law. It may also test the traditional framework under international law for resorting to and applying force. But much will, and should, stay the same for lawyers. As a result, my objective remains, as it was when I spoke at the Naval War College before 11 September, to give some personal insight into the application of the law of armed conflict to the 1999 NATO Kosovo air campaign from the perspective of a lawyer serving the president as commander in chief. I offer these observations not out of any desire to tell my story. Almost all of my instincts as a lawyer, former national security official, and judge run against my doing so. However, I have overcome my reticence because I am committed to constitutional government, and I believe that national-level legal review is critical to military operations, not just in determining whether the commander in chief has domestic and international legal authority to resort to force, but also in shaping the manner in which the United States employs force. Lawyers also have an important role to play in sustaining “good-government” process, offering a degree of detachment and long-term perspective. Constitutional government means that every decision should be made according to law; it also means that, as a matter of process, certain elected and appointed officials should be involved in decisions to resort to force as well as decisions on use of force, even when the need is immediate and the military option clear. Knowing how lawyers performed these tasks during the Kosovo conflict will not answer today’s contextual legal questions, but it may offer insight on how to lawyer better and how policy makers effectively use their lawyers as part of a national security process that is necessarily secret.

SFOR Lessons Learned: In Creating a Secure Environment With Respect for the Rule of Law - SFOR study, May 2000. The pre-eminent lesson from the Bosnia experience is that the military may have an indispensable role to play in securing an environment that is conducive to the rule of law.  This was essential in Bosnia because each of the three formally warring ethnic communities (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) is controlled by power structures that obstruct development of institutions essential to the rule of law as reflected in the Dayton Accord.  These power structures consist of nationalist and obstructionist politicians who rely on formal political party structures as well as extra-legal security services (secret intelligence, police, and paramilitary) and transnational criminal syndicates to sustain themselves in power.  These “unholy alliances” maintain their hegemony through a monopoly of violence and control over patronage.  In spite of extensive efforts by the international community to construct the formal institutions of democratic governance established at Dayton, including the rule of law, the reality is that these efforts are co-opted and corrupted by Bosnia’s illicit and criminal power structures.  Until the political environment is shaped to defeat these structures and provide a basis for the rule of law, efforts to reduce and ultimately withdraw the international presence by turning “ownership” over to local authorities will do little more than consolidate political and economic power in the hands of these “unholy alliances.”  Unless effective measures are taken to secure the Bosnian environment with respect to the rule of law, it is most likely that our long-term interests will be thwarted, including prospects for sustainable peace.

Russian "Lessons Learned" in Bosnia - Timothy Thomas. Military Review article, September-October 1996. In January 1995 Colonel Andrei Demurenko, who in 1993 became the first and to date the only Russian officer to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), was sent to Bosnia, where he became the Chief of Staff of Sector Sarajevo for a year. He returned home to Moscow in January of 1996. On a June 1996 trip to Moscow, the author, who in 1993 was an active duty LTC and served as the Russian officer's military sponsor at FT. Leavenworth, caught up with Colonel Demurenko. Their discussions of Russian lessons learned in Bosnia make up the major portion of the following article. The interpretation of Colonel Demurenko's comments is solely the responsibility of Mr. Thomas.

Mujahedin Operations in Bosnia - Lieutenant Colonel John Sray, USA. Military Review article, February 1995. Mujahedin units, possibly supported by Iranian SOF, have once again intensified their activities in central Bosnia as the weather has become conducive to offensive combat operations. Their increasing influence on both the Muslim government in Sarajevo and the three army corps located to the west of the city has alienated much of the local populace and developed into another source of irritation for the UN peacekeeping forces in this war-ravaged country. Detachments of Mujahedin have assisted in training selected Bosnian army elements for the past two years, but last summer they also began to spearhead many of the tactical-level attacks against Bosnian Serb forces. The potential for this organization to escalate its activities remains high and thus further threatens regional stability in the republic's hinterland. Funding for the Mujahedin has been provided by Iran and various other Islamic states with an interest in expanding extremism into the European theater. International radical groups, such as Hizbollah, have also been included on the suspected list of sponsors. Bosnian government sources have grudgingly admitted the presence of the Mujahedin but publicly intimate that they have accepted their presence as a "necessary evil" to maintain the flow of aid from international Islamic contributors. This "aid" has been distributed in forms ranging from hard currency to clandestine arms shipments.

Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations - Steven Bowman. Congressional Research Service Report For Congress, July 2003.

Kosovo: Reconstruction and Development Assistance - Curt Tarnoff. Congressional Research Service Report For Congress, July 2001.

Bosnia: US Military Operations - Steven Bowman. Congressional Research Service Report For Congress, July 2003.

Kosovo: Lessons from Operation Allied Force - Paul Gallis. Congressional Research Service Report For Congress, November 1999.

Institute for War and Peace Reporting - Balkans page.

Back to the Balkans Page - Britain's Small Wars.

Bosnia: A Frustrating Mission - Britain's Small Wars.