Africa
CJTF Horn of Africa - Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa official web page.African Command: The Newest Combatant Command - Lieutenant Colonel Paul P. Cale, US Army. US Army War College Strategy Research Project, March 2005. African Command (AFRICOM) must be established as the newest Combatant Command in the Unified Command System. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) currently divides the Continent of Africa into areas of responsibility served by European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. This current division of Africa, within the UCP, has led to the creation of "seams" between the current combatant command boundaries. EUCOM's focus is based on their expansion into the newest NATO countries on their Eastern border. CENTCOM's focus for the indefinite future is on OEF, OIF, and the future of U.S. presence in the Middle East. PACOM's focus has been and remains on the Asian continent. For these and other reasons that will be further developed the UCP must establish AFRICOM as its Combatant Command Headquarters on the African continent.
A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan - Commander Richard G. Catoire, US Navy. Parameters article, Winter 2000-01. To date, US foreign policy for Africa, and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, has been reactive rather than proactive--generally driven by events rather than shaping events. Because of this tentative approach to the region, African problems have obliged the US military to undertake a continuing series of contingency operations, and the prospect for future interventions is high. If any region of the world warrants the kind of "shaping" now prescribed by US strategic doctrine, surely that region is Africa. While US security interests in Africa are minimal and economic interests are currently limited (excepting the importation of oil and strategic minerals), the developed world does not ignore humanitarian tragedy. With its prominent position in the post-Cold War world, the United States will at times accede to international pressures to take the lead in addressing the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. For the immediate future, such initiatives will require the capacity to intervene militarily when appropriate. US reluctance to accept this responsibility would undermine important international relationships and ultimately could require a far greater commitment and involvement of resources when events finally force the US hand. It is in the best interests of the United States to stay actively involved in the region to ensure that strategic objectives are accomplished and that diplomatic and political goals are achieved. The Department of Defense already plays some role in US efforts in Africa to promote democratization, to increase respect for human rights, to promote conflict resolution, and to generate economic prosperity. Those efforts could be more effectively managed by structural change within the Unified Command Plan. If any region of the world warrants careful US attention to potential coalitions to alleviate greater reliance on US resources, surely that region is Africa. This is a key unified command role which can best be accomplished by creating a unified or sub-unified command exclusively for Sub-Saharan Africa. The advantages of creating "an area-oriented senior US military command," even if it is only an "economy of force" command headquartered in the United States, would far outweigh any perceived disadvantages.
Brokering Peace in Sudan - Major Patrick Christian, US Army. Special Warfare Magazine, March-April 2006. In August 2004, the author found himself in just such a role when he deployed to the Darfur region of Sudan as part of a small joint-special operations advisory team dispatched there by the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Horn of Africa. The team, deployed from Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, consisted of a Navy SEAL lieutenant commander, a Marine recon major, and the author, then an Army Special Forces major. The team was tasked to work as advisers to the African Union’s 12 military-observer teams, or MILOBS, which were attempting to document cease-fire violations among the multiple parties in Sudan’s civil war. The mission was simple: to keep the MILOBS collecting information on the conflict, as well as to stay positioned between the warring parties as advisers without getting killed in the process. The mission originated when the United States partnered with the European Union, or EU, in an effort to avoid a full-scale civil war in Sudan. The coalition focus is on funding and supporting the newly formed African Union, or AU, in a role designed to mediate between the Government of Sudan, or GoS (which is primarily in the control of the Northern Arab Sudanese), and the armed rebel groups in the Darfur region. The government-supported militias were created when the GoS armed a large number of Arab nomadic civilians, known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed have since begun attempting to clear the African Muslim tribes out of Darfur in a form of political/cultural cleansing.
More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa - Council on Foreign Relations sponsored Independent Task Force Report, January 2006. This Council-sponsored Independent Task Force Report argues that Africa is becoming steadily more central to the United States and to the rest of the world in ways that transcend humanitarian interests. Africa now plays an increasingly significant role in supplying energy, preventing the spread of terrorism, and halting the devastation of HIV/AIDS. Africa’s growing importance is reflected in the intensifying competition with China and other countries for both access to African resources and influence in this region. A more comprehensive U.S. policy toward Africa is needed, the report states, and it lays out recommendations for policymakers to craft that policy.
The Environment, the US Military, and Southern Africa - Dr. Dan Henk (Colonel, USA Ret.). Parameters article, Summer 2006. Since the 1960s, the environment has become a consistent theme in international political discourse, no longer solely the concern of small groups of activists but a mainstream issue. As environmental concerns have gone increasingly global, countries like Norway and Finland have garnered international acclaim for their strong commitment to environmental causes. The government of the United States, in contrast, has been widely and vehemently criticized for its alleged disinterest. The bad press is ironic because the United States is engaged with other countries on a wide range of environmental issues. A significant amount of that involvement occurs in regions of the world where America’s policymakers are hard pressed to find any vital interest. Perhaps more surprisingly, the US Department of Defense is an actor in these activities, a situation doubly ironic because America’s military leaders have never engaged in serious, protracted debate to define environmentally-related military roles and responsibilities. This article briefly examines US engagement on environmental issues with the countries of Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, locating military involvement in the wider context of overall US environmental partnerships. It argues that all these efforts could achieve better results if they were more coherently focused and integrated. While not advocating a lead role for the military, it concludes that a more concerted engagement on environmental issues could make a contribution both to regional stability and to better military-to-military relations with regional partners.
Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia - J. K. Cilliers. Online book, 1985. Chapters:
- Brief History of the War for Zimbabwe 1890 - 1979
- Command and Control
- Protected and Consolidated Villages
- Border Minefield Obstacles
- Psuedo Operations and the Selous Scouts
- Internal Defence and Development
- External Operations
- Operation Favour: Security Force Auxiliaries
- Intelligence
- The Security Situation by Late 1979
- Conclusion
Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978 - Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Odem. US Army. US Army Combat Studies Institute study, April 1993. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom's study, Shaba II The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978, presents a historical analysis of the 1978 invasion of Shaba province by the exiled Katangan Gendarmerie. Included in this study is the Western reaction to the invasion, from the Zairian Army's initial response, which set off the massacre of expatriate mine workers, to the airborne landings of French and Belgian forces. The French responded by sending the Foreign Legion into Shaba to restore order in the province. Belgium, on the other hand, sent its Paracommando Regiment on the humanitarian mission of rescuing the hostages. Both countries developed independent plans for their missions, plans that were not coordinated until the two European forces were accidentally shooting at one another. The 1978 operations in Shaba should not be dismissed as something unusual or unlikely to reoccur, nor should they be discounted as European operations of little interest to U.S. planners. Since these Shaba II operations, the United States has been committed to similar operations in Lebanon, Grenada, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Panama, and the Persian Gulf. Without doubt, U.S. forces will continue to be involved in such operations, making Shaba II worthy of study by U.S. Army officers.
Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions - Colonel Thomas Dempsey, US Army. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, April 2006. Terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa failed states have demonstrated the ability to avoid the scrutiny of Western counterterrorism officials, while supporting and facilitating terrorist attacks on the United States and its partners. The potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists makes terrorist groups operating from failed states especially dangerous. U.S. counterterrorism strategies largely have been unsuccessful in addressing this threat. A new strategy is called for, one that combines both military and law enforcement efforts in a fully integrated counterterrorism effort, supported by a synthesis of foreign intelligence capabilities with intelligence-led policing to identify, locate, and take into custody terrorists operating from failed states before they are able to launch potentially catastrophic attacks.
Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War - Lieutenant Colonel Lou DiMarco, US Army (Ret.). Paramters article, Summer 2006. One of the keys to success in the US war on terror and counterinsurgency, in Iraq and around the world, is the ability to use intelligence to effectively target the adversary. Obtaining useful intelligence is one of the most important challenges of counterinsurgency operations. This requirement has focused attention on the interrogation of combatants captured on the battlefield and in raids on safe-houses in third-party states. Almost from the beginning of US counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, accusations have been made that US interrogation techniques have included torture. Typical of the domestic reporting is an article in Newsweek in June 2004, titled “New Torture Furor,” which states that the US Defense Department was exploring legal means for justifying torture. The foreign press has echoed what was reported in the United States, and expanded upon it. The German magazine Der Spiegel asserted that torture was rampant among US forces, and it represented the United States as “exempting itself from international criminal jurisdiction. While the rest of the world is expected to abide by the UN Convention against Torture, for example, the Americans evaluate international law on the basis of whether it serves their interests.” This type of reporting is a strategic distraction and has the potential to cause a crisis in American foreign policy. It erodes international and domestic support and can embolden the enemy. Senior US officials have had to speak forcefully on the subject of torture to control the domestic and international damage, distracting their focus from the details of nation-building in Iraq. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has had to invest considerable effort in reaffirming that US policy officially prohibits torture and affirming American support for the UN Convention against Torture (CAT), indicating that “it [CAT] extends to US personnel wherever they are, whether they are in the US or outside the US.” Still, rumors and accusations persist that US forces routinely abuse prisoners. The French newspaper Le Monde reported in March 2006—without any hint of ambiguity—that the United States has condoned the “use of torture in secret prisons on foreign soil, and . . . justif[ied] the illegal treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay.”
The “Problems of Mobilization” and the Analysis of Armed Groups - Dr. Anthony Vinci. Parameters article, Spring 2006. The first step in knowing your enemy is deciding what to call him. When dealing with non-state, armed groups, there is a set list of categories which are used for classification. These categories include insurgent, guerilla, warlord, terrorist, and militia. From this initial classification we tend to apply a set of assumptions about the groups for our analysis and response. For instance, if we believe we are fighting a guerilla insurgency, we ask where the popular support is coming from; or if it is a terrorist group, we apply counter-terror tactics. The danger in this approach is that poor classification and analysis may lead to an improper response. At best, this may be ineffective; at worst, it can be catastrophic. For instance, the Ugandan government began by treating the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as a guerilla insurgency, and this led to standard strategies such as creating protected hamlets in order to distance the group from local support. However, the LRA had never had much local support, nor did it really need it. Thus, the protected hamlet strategy has not reduced the LRA’s ability to continue the conflict and has served only to further alienate the affected population from the Ugandan government. If the LRA was better classified and analyzed, the Ugandan army’s response might have been more effective.
