Afghanistan: Soviet Union

The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War? - General Mohammad Yahya Nawroz (Afghanistan Army Ret.) and Lester Grau. Military Review article, September-October 1995. One of the enduring lessons from "Desert Storm" is that a nation does not want to stand up against the precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles of the United States unless it has its own large supply of precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles, or, at the very least, an effective air defense. At present, the countries that have a large supply of high-tech weaponry are few and unlikely to go to war with the United States in the near future. Now, the only effective way for a technologically less-advanced country to fight a technologically-advanced country is through guerrilla war. Guerrilla war, a test of national will and the ability to endure, negates many of the advantages of technology. The guerrillas remained when the French left Algeria and Vietnam, the United States left South Vietnam, and the Soviets left Afghanistan. As U.S. forces deploy to areas of civil or ethnic strife such as Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Haiti, the potential for U.S. involvement in a guerrilla war grows. It is increasingly apparent that the more likely type of war that the United States may become involved in during the next twenty years is guerrilla war. The success of the technicals in Somalia and the paramilitary forces in Bosnia suggest that it is in the best interests of U.S. military professionals to review the lessons of the last guerrilla war in which a super power was involved. Afghanistan is both past and prologue.

Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict - Major Robert Cassidy, USA. US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph, February 2003. Asymmetric warfare poses some of the most pressing and complex challenges faced by the United States today. As American defense leaders and strategic thinkers adapt to this era of asymmetry, it is important that we learn both from our own experience and from that of other nations which have faced asymmetric enemies. In this monograph, Major Robert Cassidy uses a detailed assessment of the Russian experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya to draw important conclusions about asymmetric warfare. He then uses this to provide recommendations for the U.S. military, particularly the Army. Major Cassidy points out that small wars are difficult for every great power, yet are the most common kind. Even in this era of asymmetry, the U.S. Army exhibits a cultural preference for the “big war” paradigm. He suggests that the U.S. military in general, including the Army, needs a cultural transformation to master the challenge of asymmetry fully. From this will grow doctrine and organizational change.

The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains - Lester Grau. Journal of Slavic Military Studies article, March 2004. The Soviet-Afghan War involved more than the Soviets and Mujahideen resistance. Afghan communists (the DRA) were involved in the immediate struggle and a large number of countries supplied the Mujahideen during this "Cold War" hot war. Their struggle and their lessons are outlined. The author does not usually write without footnotes, but he wrote this article during a trip to Iraq and lacked his reference library. Needless to say, he drew on his knowledge about the war and the knowledge he gained from noted authorities on the subject. These include Ali Jalali, Barnett Rubin, Riaz Khan, Mohammad Youssaf, Brace Amstutz, Artem Borovik, Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, Aleksandr Mayorov, Scott McMichael, Makhmut Gareev, David Isby, Boris Gromov, Rasul Rais, and Louis Dupree.

Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas - Ali Jalali and Lester Grau. Infantry article, January-April 1999. Urban guerrilla combat is difficult for the urban guerrilla and the regular force. Throughout the war, the Soviets and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) forces were never able to completely control the major cities of Kandahar and Herat. Finally, the Soviets bombed 75% of Herat and virtually the entire Kandahar suburb into rubble. That still failed to stop the urban guerrillas. The DRA and Soviets had more success in controlling the capital city of Kabul--but still were unable to stop the rocket attacks and guerrilla actions. Surviving urban guerrillas are harder to find to interview than guerrillas who fought in the country. Urban guerrillas are surrounded by potential informants and government spies. They must frequently move around unarmed and the government can usually react to their actions much faster than they can in the countryside. The urban guerrilla must be anonymous and ruthless to survive. For this reason, urban guerrilla groups were usually small and fought back with short-duration actions. Many urban guerrillas lived in the countryside or suburbs and only entered the cities for combat. The Soviets and DRA devoted a great deal of effort to finding and eliminating the urban guerrilla. Many innocent civilians were victims of this hunt. The authors are grateful to the urban guerrillas who provided these candid interviews.

Ambush! The Road War in Afghanistan Dr. Graham Turbiville, Jr. Army article, January 1988. The performance of the combat arms exemplified most prominently in Afghanistan by airborne, air assault, special operations and aviation units-clearly is receiving close attention from Soviet planners. One of the most important aspects of the Soviet military experience in Afghanistan, however-as illustrated by the kind of transportation vulnerability noted above-is the performance of the Soviet logistic system and Soviet efforts to set up the rear service infrastructure to sustain military forces and the Afghan civilian economy. A growing body of evidence suggests that Soviet rear service problems in Afghanistan are having a major impact on logistic and movement support concepts force wide - concepts that would be critical for the successful conduct of combat operations in European or other theaters far removed from Afghanistan. Evolving Soviet perceptions are based in large measure on the prosecution of what they call the "highway war" - dorozhnaia voina - the movement of troops and supplies of all types over the limited and frequently interdicted roads throughout Afghanistan.

Convoy Escort in Guerrilla Country: Soviet Experience - Lester Grau. Military Police article, Winter 1995. Current STRAF military police rear area security missions include convoy escort--either in a directing, protecting or escorting role. In a low intensity conflict, the convoy escort mission may fall exclusively on STRAF military police. In a mid or high-intensity conflict, convoy escort forces can be a mix of combat-arms forces and military police or military police may have combat-arms forces attached to them for convoy escort. Conversely, military police may be part of a larger combat-arms convoy escort force. As U.S. forces deploy to areas of civil or ethnic strife such as Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Haiti, the potential for U.S. involvement in a guerrilla war grows. The success of the paramilitary forces in Somalia and in Bosnia suggest that it is in the best interests of U.S. Military Police to review the lessons of the last guerrilla war in which a super power was involved. The place was Afghanistan and the superpower was the now-defunct Soviet Union. The Soviets had a major problem conducting convoy escort against a determined guerrilla enemy. Their experiences may provide lessons which could assist in reviewing SOPs and writing doctrine for future U.S. convoy escort in mountain and desert terrain.

Road Warriors of the Hindu Kush: The Battle for the Lines of Communication in the Soviet-Afghan War - Lester Grau. US Army Foreign Military Studies Office paper, August 1996. The 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan War pitted a modern, mechanized army against a strong-willed guerrilla force fighting on some of the most inhospitable terrain on earth. The war soon devolved into a fight for control of the limited lines of communication-the road network which connected the cities of Afghanistan to each other and to Pakistan and the Soviet Union. The Afghan guerrillas became very adept at ambushing supply convoys and cutting the roads. The Soviets mounted countermeasures to regain use of the roads, for the ultimate survival of the Soviet occupying army depended on its ability to resupply itself.

Handling the Wounded in a Counter-Guerrilla War: the Soviet/Russian Experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya - Lester Grau and Dr. William Jorgensen. Military Review article, July-August 2000. The Soviet Union intervened in the Afghanistan Civil War on Christmas Day 1979 to restore a weak and faltering communist government that was rapidly slipping out of control. The Soviets expected little resistance and apparently had no plan for staying longer than three years. They were there for nine years, one month and eighteen days. Soviet Army medical personnel were also there for the duration fighting disease and wounds. While they were there, they improved casualty-handling and surgical support. Consequently, during the latter part of the war, they saved many lives that would have been lost earlier. They applied many of these lessons to the war in the break-away Republic of Chechnya. Many of their lessons learned can be applied to other modern forces fighting on rugged and urban terrain.

Underground Combat: Stereophonic Blasting, Tunnel Rats and the Soviet-Afghan War - Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali. Engineer article November 1998. The United States Army fought subterranean battles in the tunnels of Vietnam. Following a few tear gas grenades or a charge of C⁴ plastic explosive, "tunnel rats" would go underground to find Viet Cong or North Vietnamese combatants or materiel. Small, slender soldiers, armed with a flashlight and a .45 caliber pistol, would crawl into the Vietnamese tunnels for reconnaissance and possibly close combat. Almost all of the Vietnam-era tunnel rats have left active duty by now, but the need to train for this type of underground combat remains. The US Army's experience was not unique. From 1979 to 1989, the Soviet 40^th Army waged war against the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Part of this war was fought in the tunnels of Afghanistan, which were larger and far more extensive than those of South Vietnam.