http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/ en Copyright 2008 Mon, 04 Aug 2008 18:54:01 -0500 http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/ http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency by LTC Raymond Millen Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency (Full Article PDF) Perhaps the most bandied about premise in counterinsurgency strategy is the need to win the hearts and minds of the affected population. In abstract, both the insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for the allegiance of the people through social, economic, and political incentives. Yet, this premise begs the question: if the rectitude of hearts and minds is indisputable, why does it have such a poor record of success? The lackluster results of its application are certainly not from a lack of effort and resources. Here lies the rub. The aforementioned incentives are founded on a tacit assumption that people have a choice in the matter. If they don’t, what eclipses hearts and minds? In his book, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes contends that the pursuit of self-preservation dominates human behavior first and foremost. The covenant between the citizen and the government centers on security, not only at the macro-level (e.g., sovereignty of the state) but also the micro-level (e.g., sovereignty of local governance). People created society and surrendered some individual sovereignty in exchange for the collective good of security. It is within this province that citizens are able to pursue happiness and societal progress. Hence, this covenant is founded on a tacit security agreement between the citizen and the government. Insurgents understand and seek to shatter the covenant by creating the conditions of insecurity as a means of gaining control of the population in their area of operation. Subversion of government authority through terrorist acts, selected assassinations of officials, murder and threats perpetrated on the populace, and general mayhem ultimately results in the intimidation of the populace and hence its acquiescence to insurgent activities. With the individual’s faith in and allegiance to the government in question, the government’s task of reasserting its authority and regaining the confidence of the people becomes infinitely more difficult. All this is not to say that the present understanding of hearts and minds is unimportant, it is, but its application must be sequenced properly. Or stated another way, the attainment of security must be the first stage of hearts and minds. Without a solid foundation of security, the other incentives will crumble on a bed of sand. The challenge lies in the ways and means of achieving these ends. In view of Hobbes’ contention that self-preservation dominates human behavior, this article addresses the operational and tactical calculus for the prosecution of a counterinsurgency strategy: 1) the centrality of local communities in the conflict; 2) the methodology for securing local communities; 3) restoring the covenant between the government and the people; and 4) enhancing the covenant. Success for any counterinsurgency hinges on three factors: understanding the plight of the people caught in the vise of an insurgency; acknowledging that insurgents derive their strength from population centers; and denying insurgents access to local communities. In short, counterinsurgency strategy should focus on creating security spheres for every community (e.g., city, town, village, or hamlet) as the first step in restoring local societies. For the U.S. military, pursuit of this calculus carries significant political-military implications. Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency (Full Article PDF)]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/08/thinking-small-applying-hobbes.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/08/thinking-small-applying-hobbes.php Mon, 04 Aug 2008 18:54:01 -0500 An Intellectual Genealogy of the Just War A Survey of Christian Political Thought on the Justification of Warfare by Keith Gomes An Intellectual Genealogy of the Just War (Full Article PDF) This paper will briefly outline the development of the just war doctrine, with special emphasis on the developments in Christian thought which ultimately influenced modern international legal documents . Numerous legal documents, such as the Geneva Conventions (1864-1948) contain within them references to just war. More recent attempts to codify the just war include the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty entitled Responsibility to Protect. In examining the development of Christian thought with respect to war, I will illustrate the link between developments within Christian philosophy, the precepts of the Bible, and ultimately, the eventual universalisation of certain elements of Christian morality through the intermediary of natural law. The need for just war criteria represents the efforts of Western cultures to regulate and restrict violence by establishing rules which specify the situations in which war can be legitimately used as a tool in international statecraft, as well as by setting out rules which govern ethical conduct during combat. However, today these regulations and restrictions are not confined to only Western cultures but, because of developments in international law and the establishment of international organisations such as the UN, this once Western narrative is seen to have universal relevancy, and to a large extent, universal appeal and applicability. While this paper will focus mainly on the rules dealing with the decision to go to war, both sets of rules arise from the same intellectual narrative which recognises recourse to violence not as the preferential modus operandi for dealing with disputes, but the exception. Both sets of rules trace their genealogy to developments in Christian thought, and understanding this genealogy is important, not only for academics, but for military strategists and foreign policy planners alike, since it highlights that these rules are never static because the rationale for these rules is situated in various historical contexts, and interpretations vary depending on the prevailing socio-political atmosphere. This, therefore, always leaves open the possibility that at the very least, the interpretations of these rules can be modified, or at the most, that the rules themselves ought to be more closely scrutinised, given that Christianity itself is constantly evolving and reinventing itself to retain contemporary social, political and ethical applicability. An Intellectual Genealogy of the Just War (Full Article PDF) ]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/08/an-intellectual-genealogy-of-t.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/08/an-intellectual-genealogy-of-t.php Sun, 03 Aug 2008 07:56:15 -0500 Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level The Integration of Special Operation Forces and USAID in Afghanistan by Sloan Mann Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level (Full Article PDF) The publication of FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) was a major step in the evolution of military thinking about unconventional warfare. It provides a useful guide to military commanders, soldiers, and civilians as they face a determined enemy interwoven within foreign cultures in Iraq and Afghanistan. It further recognizes that the military cannot counter insurgency alone. This multi-dimensional form of warfare requires the advice, expertise, and resources of civilian agencies that can focus on the political, social, and developmental aspects necessary to undermine support for insurgents. Despite there being an entire chapter dedicated to the integration of civilian and military activities in the COIN manual, it does not address how to work with and integrate civilian agencies. Different organizational cultures, values, and sensitivities to risk create challenges to integration. Misunderstandings about methods of operation, timelines, and authorities can create friction. Managing expectations and working with idiosyncratic personalities, on both the military and civilian sides, can create frustration. Fully integrating military and civilian agencies down to the tactical level, however, can enhance operational effects and speed the process of creating stability in COIN operations. In Afghanistan, USAID and Special Operation Forces are working together in a successful interagency model to address the myriad of challenges posed by a growing insurgency. USAID representatives working with SOF are integrating principles of development in creative ways with COIN principles to develop appropriate interventions in select communities. This paper will examine USAID’s relationship with CJSOTF-A, describe a successful interagency process for selecting strategic communities, and cover best practices associated with interagency operations. Examples of holistic planning and joint operations in insecure areas will highlight what can be achieved when expertise and combined resources are brought to bear in a COIN environment. Taking Interagency Stability Operations to a New Level (Full Article PDF)]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/08/taking-interagency-stability-o.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/08/taking-interagency-stability-o.php Sat, 02 Aug 2008 11:34:34 -0500 Contested Nation Building The Challenge of Countering Insurgency in Afghanistan in 2007 by Colonel John Frewen Contested Nation Building (Full Article PDF) In a military sense, 2007 was the coalition’s year in Afghanistan. The coalition defeated the Taliban tactically at every turn, forcing them to resort to indiscriminate attacks with explosives and suicide bombers — tactics which risk alienating the local population. The Taliban’s much-vaunted ‘Spring offensive’ failed to materialise and they suffered substantial losses, including the death of key leaders such as Mullah Dadullah by coalition actions. They lost freedom of action in former sanctuaries such as the Upper Garesh and Chora valleys, and had Musa Qala — a town the Taliban vowed they would never surrender — seized from them as the 2007 fighting season drew to a close. While international media reports have played up the headline-grabbing “coalition’s deadliest year”, only one side of the ledger has been considered. The increase in coalition fatalities from 191 in 2006 to 232 in 2007 also points to a heightened engagement with the enemy that has produced good results. Throughout last year the Taliban saw support from sanctuaries in Pakistan erode, and a better-trained and more capable Afghan Army played a leading role in the assault on Musa Qala. By military standards 2007 was an awful year for the Taliban. Yet their resolve and influence persists, and more must be done through non-military means to achieve peace for Afghanistan. Colonel John Frewen is a career infantryman who has served in 1 RAR, 2 RAR and the School of Infantry. In 2003, as CO 2 RAR, he led the initial regional military intervention force to re-establish law and order in the Solomon Islands. Other operational service includes Rwanda and, in 2007, Afghanistan. In 2006 he was the Military Assistant to the Chief of Army. He has been posted with the armies of New Zealand and the United States and holds a Masters of Defence Studies from UNSW. Colonel Frewen is currently the Director Military Strategic Commitments in the Australian Defence Headquarters. This article was originally published in the Australian Army Journal and is posted here with permission of the author. Contested Nation Building (Full Article PDF)]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/contested-nation-building.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/contested-nation-building.php Thu, 31 Jul 2008 17:31:23 -0500 Rethinking Smith-Mundt by Matt Armstrong Download interim version of article as PDF The question asked repeatedly since 9/11 is how can a guy in cave out propagandize the country that created public relations and the Internet? An obscure group in 1998, Al-Qaeda increased their influence and reach with words, images, and actions. The United States responded with showcases of Americana that, not surprisingly, failed to resonate with the target audiences: our enemies’ base, moderates, “swing voters”, and even our friends and allies. Ignoring the importance of linking policy with the psychology of information to persuade and dissuade, American public diplomacy and strategic communication increasingly became an irrelevant whisper and beauty contest in stark contrast to the adversary’s propaganda of words and deeds. In the war of ideas, the United States is largely unarmed and has accordingly fallen in global influence and stature, increasing vulnerabilities not only in the military domain, but in economic, financial, and diplomatic realms too. Sixty years ago, the elements of America’s national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics – were retooled with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The former has received significant attention over the years and is currently the subject of an intense project to recommend updates. In contrast, the latter, a direct response to the global ideological threat posed by Communist propaganda, has been variously ignored, glossed over, or been subject to revisionism. Smith-Mundt was a largely successful bipartisan effort, establishing the foundation for the informational and cultural and educational engagement that became known as “public diplomacy.” While today is unlike yesterday, it is worthwhile to look back on the purpose of Smith-Mundt and the debates surrounding the dissemination prohibition that has taken on mythical proportions. The modern interpretation of Smith-Mundt has given rise to an imaginary information environment bifurcated by a uniquely American “iron fence” separating the American media environment from the rest of the world. In 1948, the prohibition was a minor hurdle as the requirements for information and cultural and educational exchanges were debated. However, modern analysis of Smith-Mundt tends to be informed by modern perceptions in disregard of the historical record. The prohibition was not intended to be prophylactic for sensitive American eyes and ears, but to be a non-compete agreement to protect private media. It was also to protect the Government from itself in the form of censoring the State Department, whose loyalties were suspect to many Congressmen. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/rethinking-smithmundt.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/rethinking-smithmundt.php Mon, 28 Jul 2008 16:58:34 -0500 Posturing for the Durand Line - ‘We Can and Must do Better’? by Paul Smyth Download interim version of article as PDF On 10 July 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported a political agent in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as stating that the Pakistan-Afghanistan border had been ‘completely sealed’ to criminals. Unfortunately, the reality of the situation along the forbidding 2430km border is rather different, and the 24 coalition casualties suffered in the insurgent attack against a joint US/Afghan outpost in Eastern Afghanistan on 13 July, clearly illustrated the severe consequences of instability in the border zone. Unsurprisingly, when speaking about security in the border region at a Pentagon press briefing on 16 July, Admiral Michael Mullen (Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) said ‘we can and must do better'. While this sound-bite has more application in Washington, Islamabad and other capitals than in-theatre, he was right, and with the significance of the border area indubitably set to increase, his public sentiment is a timely catalyst to consider the ‘border problem’ in a little more detail. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/posturing-for-the-duran-line-w.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/posturing-for-the-duran-line-w.php Fri, 25 Jul 2008 17:42:05 -0500 Counterinsurgency Principles for the Diplomat by Kurt Amend Download interim version of article as PDF The recent resurgence of interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has revealed a deficit in material written by and for the diplomat, the actor ostensibly responsible for the political component of a counterinsurgency campaign. Classical theorists stress that progress along the political track is essential for ultimate success. Recent commentary, in shedding new light on the characteristics of modern insurgencies, reaffirms this principle. To make political headway the diplomat-counterinsurgent needs to develop a strategic narrative, build a political strategy around the narrative, acquire expertise, become a catalyst for political change, and maximize contact with the local population. In doing so, he will make important contributions to and help accelerate success in a counterinsurgency campaign. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/counterinsurgency-principles-f.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/counterinsurgency-principles-f.php Sat, 19 Jul 2008 10:59:30 -0500 Shortchanging the Joint Doctrine Fight One Airman’s Assessment of the Airman’s Assessment by LtCol Buck Elton Download interim version of article as PDF The traditional, often bitter inter-service battle for resources has been taken to a new level in a senior Air Force officer’s recent assault on service doctrine. In late December, 2007, Air University published a 111-page monograph written by Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. entitled Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman’s Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine. The study analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army and Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution and offers an Airman’s perspective to deliver “fresh” alternatives for joint counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine development. This heavily referenced monograph (438 end notes) relentlessly attacks the Army and Marine Corps doctrine for its almost exclusively ground-centric perspective and failure to reconcile the full potential of today’s airpower capabilities. Although General Dunlap discusses several interesting ideas regarding how the Airman’s perspective can help shape joint COIN doctrine, his undue criticisms of Army philosophies, conventional approaches and dogmatic mindset distract from his argument and recommendations. Readers will likely focus exclusively on the unwarranted and erratically referenced land-power condemnations and accuse the Air Force of advocating a COIN solution that involves Airmen or airpower for their own sake, which the author half-heartedly adds as an imperative at the end of the essay. This Airman’s assessment of “an Airman’s Assessment” will provide an alternative perspective of Field Manual 3-24 and offer counter arguments to many of the monograph’s criticisms. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/shortchanging-the-joint-doctri.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/shortchanging-the-joint-doctri.php Sat, 12 Jul 2008 08:23:28 -0500 Visualizing Transition from the “Bottom Up” Observations from Joint Urban Warrior 2008 by Dennis Burket Download interim version of article as PDF Joint Urban Warrior 2008 (JUW 08) was a United States Marine Corps (USMC) and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) cosponsored seminar wargame that was designed to objectively observe and capture operational insights during a forces drawdown from an Irregular Warfare operation/environment. Participants were presented with an “OIF-like” scenario and asked to drawdown current US and Coalition forces to an “advisory organization” in two years. Using the JUW 08 scenario, participants created many visualization tools to help them describe what a two-year drawdown of forces/event-driven transition would look like from their viewpoint. This paper discusses a doctrine-based visualization tool developed during JUW 08 that both military and non-military participants found to be especially useful. This particular model was successful because it allowed participants to look at transition from the viewpoint of a tactical commander, or from the “Bottom Up.” Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/visualizing-transition-from-th.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/visualizing-transition-from-th.php Tue, 08 Jul 2008 16:56:21 -0500 Rethinking “IO:” Complex Operations in the Information Age by BG Huba Wass de Czege, US Army, Retired Download interim version of article as PDF We are in a period of unprecedented and rapid change, and this realization should make us skeptics of wisdoms revealed as recently as a decade and a half ago when the problems the military faced were very different. Paradigms that might have seemed sensible then confuse more than clarify today. In the years just prior to September 11, 2001, a new American Way of War emerged to replace Cold War paradigms -- those underlying unthinking ways of thinking embedded in our doctrines. The April 2000 Defense Planning Guidance tasked U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to develop “… new Joint warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the ability of future Joint force commanders to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly challenging and important operational missions, such as … coercing an adversary to undertake certain actions or denying the adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbors …” The object of these operations were to be rogue states such as Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Panama were or had been. What emerged was dubbed the “Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)” concept. It rested on four pillars. An Air Force and Navy capable of controlling air, space, and sea domains from which to coerce enemies with a hail of precise air and naval missile power; increasingly more capable special operating forces to penetrate enemy territory and provide targets; and a new core capability called “Information Operations” to “influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decisionmaking, while protecting our own.” In this “domain,” as in the others, the term most used in the late 1990’s to describe the product of American technological superiority was not just superiority, but dominance. RDO asserted that leveraging these asymmetric superiorities in the air, space, naval, and information domains would not only conserve scarce ground forces and reduce casualties, but they would also achieve rapid and decisive results. As we saw versions of RDO applied in Kosovo in 2000, in Afghanistan in 2002, and in Iraq in 2003, it became clear to most professionals that this new paradigm oversimplified complexities then not well understood. In fact the chief failing of RDO was an utter lack of respect for the difficulty of what it set out to do: either to achieve relevant dominance in any sense; or to coerce any determined adversary to undertake any actions what-so-ever. Even denying an adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbors has to be approached with humility today. However, thinking about the Information Operations component of this package has been most resistant to revision, especially two prized and related tenets. One is that “the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities” is the best way to gain the maximum benefit of so-called IO core, supporting, and related capabilities. Another is that when these capabilities are thus integrated, an independent IO “logical line of operations” can influence the behaviors of adversaries and the publics that support them with so-called “information effects” alone. This is an amateurish outlook, and not shared by all IO practitioners, especially those who have been in the trenches, and working closely with the Brigade Combat Teams most involved in the real challenges of trying to “influence” the behaviors of real people under stress. While progress is being made on other fronts of “Defense Transformation,” IO is stuck in a late 20th Century time warp. Future Shock author Alvin Toffler, in a passage from a 1996 book, makes this relevant point: "The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn." In this case a Pentagon bureaucracy, the tyranny of a slow-to- change, lowest-common-denominator and top-down-biased Joint Doctrine, plus engrained habits of thought stand in the way of learning, unlearning, and relearning. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/rethinking-io-complex-operatio.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/07/rethinking-io-complex-operatio.php Fri, 04 Jul 2008 16:27:32 -0500 Improving Information Operations in Iraq and the Global War on Terror by Farook Ahmed and Oubai Shahbandar Download interim version of article as PDF The Surge of US military forces in Iraq has delivered a tremendous level of success in providing security to areas of Iraq that were previously under insurgent control. In order to build on these successes in the future, the United States would greatly benefit from force multipliers that can help promote security and foster political reconciliation as the extra troops provided by the Surge withdraw. A cheap and effective way to augment the Soldiers on the ground is to defeat radical extremist groups’ ideologies and continue to win over the Iraqi population. The first step in developing this capability will be for the United States to establish a strategic framework that provides a central role for information operations (IO). These operations are analogous to a political campaign; they revolve around putting together and conveying a coherent message that convinces people to be sympathetic to one group and oppose that group’s adversary. In Iraq and in the broader war against violent Jihadism, the United States not only needs the power to act, but also the power to influence how its actions are interpreted. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/improving-information-operatio.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/improving-information-operatio.php Sat, 28 Jun 2008 04:22:02 -0500 Terrorists and Terrorism The Cost of a Redundant State Media Strategy by Adam Hammond Download interim version of article as PDF Former British PM Margaret Thatcher once said Democratic nations must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend. Her choice of terminology reflects the traditional use of State media strategy to maintain popular support by de-legitimizing the causes of insurgent groups. This very strategy was employed by France during the unsuccessful Battle of Algiers, and continues today in the Coalition “War on Terror” despite radical changes in the nature of what many continue to refer to as “terrorism”. The world is in fact in the midst of a global insurgency, a worldwide revolutionary war the likes of which it has never before seen. The results of outdated strategy and its inherent terminology are of no small consequence. They range from operational planning problems at the tactical level, to a fundamental misalignment at the strategic level between the “Three Pillars of Counter-Insurgency”: Governments, Security Agencies, and Economic actors. Until this misalignment is addressed, it will be impossible to effectively counter global insurgent activity in a sustainable fashion. What is required with respect to both international and domestic matters is therefore nothing short of a wholesale re-think of government media strategy and the very terminology used to describe “terrorists” and “terrorism”. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/terrorists-and-terrorism.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/terrorists-and-terrorism.php Wed, 25 Jun 2008 10:50:20 -0500 Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment Models by Clinton Watts Download interim version of article as PDF Currently, debate focuses on two models of foreign fighter recruitment and transit to theaters of open conflict. The first model is one of top-down recruitment where al-Qa’ida recruits young men and coordinates their travel to an operational theater. The second model suggests the opposite where young men recruit themselves and find their way to open theaters of conflict joining a global Jihadi movement inspired but not necessarily led by al-Qa’ida. Both models assign a role to the Internet in this process. The first model (top-down) holds that militant propaganda on the Internet makes young men susceptible to recruiters. The second model (bottom-up) holds that the Internet not only radicalizes young men, but also helps them find a way to travel to open theaters of conflict. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/foreign-fighters-how-are-they.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/foreign-fighters-how-are-they.php Sun, 22 Jun 2008 06:33:50 -0500 Restraint as a Successful Strategy in the 1999 Kargil Conflict by Colonel Devendra Pratap Pandey, Indian Army Download interim version of article as PDF In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) of the Pakistan Army, orchestrated a major intrusion into an unoccupied but strategically sensitive complex of Kargil along the northern border of India. The Kargil intrusion was an operation of strategic importance conducted by Pakistan to provide a much required momentum to its weakening proxy war in the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), a state of India. Pakistan had waged an irregular war, in J&K, for a decade, exploiting religious similarities to incite secessionist activities, by actively supporting, financing, and training insurgents, while exporting foreign radicals and so called jihadist elements across the borders. This latest aggression across the border by the Pakistan Army was another attempt to redeem its prestige after the defeats of 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. The 1998-99 act of intrusion was of even greater significance because it was enacted during a political peace process when the then Indian Prime Minister was visiting Pakistan on invitation. The surprise intrusion, along a stretch of the border that had historically remained peaceful due to the terrain difficulties, was a spark in an already charged regional tinderbox. Download interim version of article as PDF]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/restraint-as-a-successful-stra.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/restraint-as-a-successful-stra.php Sun, 15 Jun 2008 10:47:40 -0500 A Tale of Two Countries Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building in the Pacific by Dr. Russell W. Glenn Download interim version of article as PDF It is sometimes said that “Small is beautiful.” That does not imply that small is simple or easy. Two ongoing Pacific region contingencies - one in Solomon Islands, the other in the Southern Philippines and neither with over 500 military personnel on a typical day - provide many lessons for those conducting, planning, or studying counterinsurgency (COIN) and capacity building undertakings regardless of size. Those lessons validate many drawn from historical events of the past. Others reflect challenges more characteristic of insurgency in its evolving, twenty-first-century form. Though the soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and civilians of nations participating in the two operations have seen considerable progress, those individuals share a common realization that success during such operations is a never a given. The outsider complementing previous triumphs is ever reminded that any thoughts of success apply only to actions “so far.” This unwillingness to presume seems another trait shared with predecessors of ages past. Success, it seems, is a description that only historians should feel comfortable applying to a counterinsurgency. Download interim version of article as PDF ]]> http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/a-tale-of-two-countries.php http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/06/a-tale-of-two-countries.php Thu, 12 Jun 2008 20:39:23 -0500