Iraqi Non-Lethal Contributions to the Counterinsurgency

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In the battle for the support of the population, it is not the capture of the Zarqawis or the Bin Ladens that will defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Nor is it the cordon and search of the villages that have had their doors kicked in by every coalition force rotation over the past four years. The solutions are much more complex and much further out of the conventional mindset. The current threat is extremely unique, making it impossible to use a stenciled approach in applying large scale solutions developed in other insurgencies throughout history. What we can do is take the knowledge, experience and tools we possess, and immerse ourselves in the current situation, developing new methods and tools that are effective in defeating a known threat. One staple in an insurgency is the role of the population, and counterinsurgents must apply that knowledge to all actions and inactions. A method that effectively gains popular support in one geographic area may actually be counter-productive in another due to fundamental differences in the ways of life. Many factors contribute to the way people think and feel. Counterinsurgents cannot fully develop techniques that will affect thought and emotion unless they are immersed in the situation. Counterinsurgents need small unit leaders with the mental capacity and agility to think on their own to develop solutions not found in field manuals. They must be adaptive and continually reexamine the insurgent and population to be most successful in developing methods that are effective in defeat.

This article does not attempt to provide a solution to fight the insurgency in Iraq. It does provide insight on successful methods that can be applied to the current situation. An insurgency's success is fundamentally based on its level of popular support. The counterinsurgent's success is therefore intertwined with the limitation of the insurgent support base. Critical to the attainment of popular support for counterinsurgents is the presence of non-lethal effects. Non-lethal effects can simply be defined as the results of all actions that are not designed to kill. Primary contributors are civil affairs, public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations. Efforts must focus on effecting how people think and how counterinsurgent actions or inactions affect those thoughts.

"Virtually every action, message, and decision of a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population..."[1]

Non-lethal effects are intrinsically designed to gain popular support. Their contributions towards the population are crucial in the maintenance of security and the flexibility of the security force. Like counterinsurgents in Iraq, the most successful non-lethal forces are

those that are completely immersed in the culture and situation. The more they know and understand about the people, the more effectively they will satisfy popular needs.

No one is more immersed in a culture or situation than members of the local population. Trained Iraqi non-lethal personnel have a huge advantage in their ability to gain popular support. They know the people because they are the people. Their intimate knowledge of the "state of the populace" puts them on a near level playing field with the insurgent – an invaluable luxury that outside forces do not possess. The greatest strides toward gaining popular support can best be achieved through a systematic approach that capitalizes on the native force's understanding of what motivates the Iraqi people. The analysis and execution through the knowledge of what the Iraqi people need versus which Iraqi people deserve to have those needs satisfied will work to transform the erratic non-lethal contributions into streamlined effects. With the concerted efforts of coalition forces to train the new Iraqi Army, it is vitally essential for them to understand the importance of Iraqi non-lethal effects.

The Population

The ease of being an insurgent is almost overwhelming, especially with the current situation in Iraq. The fluidity of insurgent efforts is dependent upon the popular support base. Support of the populace consists of both active support and passive acquiescence. An increase in popular support means an increase in the intransience of the insurgent. Thus, the battle for the support of the population becomes the main concern of the counterinsurgency as well; although, winning the support of the populace is significantly more difficult due to the vast expectations placed on counterinsurgents. The counterinsurgent gains his support largely through the provision of security. The insurgent naturally has an advantage in exploiting his adversary's weaknesses. He can level a village with a Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) or kidnap the village Muqtar to prove that support for the counterinsurgency is both dangerous and futile. The counterinsurgent's reaction to such an event will not satisfy the people, no matter how much aid they provide to those affected. The closest thing to satisfaction by the people is the capture and prosecution of those who committed the crime. With an enemy that is both everywhere and nowhere, it is very rare that such action takes place.

Given the significant ineffectiveness of the current government, the Iraqi people lean even more heavily on the Iraqi security forces for both security and the necessities of survival. The people want to see visible changes and place blame for the lack thereof on the shoulders of the entire counterinsurgency. The dynamics of the current situation present an excellent opportunity for the Iraqi security forces to win at least some level of popular support. Most people involved in the counterinsurgent effort, both military and civilian, do not understand the importance of taking advantage of this situation.

Conventional warfare requires a security force to be split into two main sections: operations/intelligence and logistics. As stated by David Galula, in "Counterinsurgency Warfare," there is a desperate need for a third section – a political one that would have the same weight as the others.[2] Non-lethal effects fill the role of the third section. The

commonly stated motto of civil affairs is to win the "hearts and minds" of the people, obviously something extremely valuable to counterinsurgent efforts.

The coalition non-lethal contingent is well trained. They have experts in all areas designed to provide security, as well as economic and social stability. However, their tactics, procedures and value are not widely known to the counterinsurgent force. Every maneuver commander at the company level and above who owns battle-space must understand the insurgency and the importance of non-lethal effects. Knowing how to influence popular thought and emotion is an extremely powerful tool in counterinsurgency. The greatest success can only be achieved through the execution of non-lethal efforts by personnel immersed in the culture of a relatively small geographical area. They have to know the people, their ethnic backgrounds, their tendencies, their history and their needs and operate accordingly. This requires the counterinsurgent to be a master of the environment.

No matter how well trained the coalition civil affairs force is, they are still outsiders in a culture that is as different from Western civilization as any culture can be. Outside forces could study the religions, ethnic histories and languages for years and only begin to scratch the surface of the detailed cultural aptitude possessed by the average local civilian. When considering cultural immersion, no one is more immersed than someone who is a part of that culture. In other words, no one knows how to deal with the Iraqis better than an Iraqi.

Non-Lethal Effects from an Iraqi perspective

There are very few certainties when fighting an insurgency, but one fact is that very rarely will the exact tactics used to fight one insurgency work when fighting another. There are some examples throughout history of the use of native forces to assist in the counterinsurgency, one of the most relevant being the use of Philippine scouts in the early 1900's where U.S. Army began using the scout's knowledge of the Philippine population to aid in lethal efforts of the insurgency.[3] Another example is the French use of the Harkis in Algeria beginning in 1957. Harkis were stationed near their homes to most effectively take advantage of their knowledge of the population and insurgency in that area.[4] Leaders in both these examples sought to harness the knowledge of the local people for lethal means. However, there is no clear cut example of the training and methodic use of native non-lethal personnel. The fight in Iraq can be fought most effectively from a non-lethal standpoint and the most effective tactics will only be developed through the work of intuitive, small unit leaders who are willing to integrate non-lethal contributions from Iraqi personnel.

When considering the populace's paternal bond with the insurgency, there is an absolutely essential need for trained and respected non-lethal personnel from within the host nation. The insight and perspective that can be provided by resident non-lethal officers are unparalleled. Their knowledge of the state of the populace and perceptiveness of how the people will react to certain stimuli make them an invaluable asset for the

counterinsurgent. With the main effort of coalition forces now focused on training the Iraqis to take over responsibility, this becomes even more relevant.

The nature of non-lethal effects is largely interpersonal. It is fundamentally meshed with building relationships and not everyone is right for the job. The new Iraqi Army has a record of putting very little thought into filling the frowned upon non-lethal roles. The nature of the job mandates a specific type of person, a politically minded and systematically trained officer. Those filling the non-lethal roles must be chosen very carefully; they have to be ethnically unbiased and cannot be affiliated with any political parties. They must be well respected and well trained on the basic principles effects.

One of the best contributions coalition force non-lethal personnel can make to produce the greatest long term effects in the defeat of the insurgency is training the "third section" of the Iraqi security force: non-lethal effects. Coalition forces have the quick ability to thoroughly and accurately teach the resident force the fundamentals of populace and resource control, humanitarian assistance, military civic action, emergency services, support to the civil administration, and most importantly, incentive based operations. Additionally, through training the indigenous personnel, coalition forces will sharpen their own skills and greatly bolster their knowledge of the local perspective.

In a civilization where power and money go to great lengths in determining social stature, it is also paramount for the non-lethal personnel to be well respected, especially the civil affairs officer who engages the local people and government on a daily basis. Again, the more respected he is, the larger his effects will be. The officer's excellent training and competence will strengthen his credibility, but he will still need the social support of influential people to truly make him capable. Visible coalition force support greatly enhances the reputation and subsequent respect of these individuals by their countrymen. The same goes for well respected Iraqi civilian leaders or military commanders. If the civil affairs officer is not viewed as powerful, he will not be nearly as successful in gaining popular support.

In the northern oil rich city of Kirkuk, Major Zyad Junade Omar is arguably the pioneer of Iraqi civil affairs. He has been trained by coalition force personnel on civil affairs concepts since establishment of the new Iraqi Army in late 2003. He has received formal training in Baghdad and Turkey on everything from how to deal with dislocated civilians to the Laws of Armed Conflict. His detailed training and proactive mindset have greatly contributed to his success. However, it is the full support of his idolized and politically unaffiliated brigade commander and MAJ Zyad's partnership with coalition forces that give his efforts real credence. The contributions that the Arab Major Zyad is able to make at the Kurdish dominant Kirkuk Government Building are only possible through the social stature he achieved through support from his brigade commander and his relationship with the partnered coalition force brigade.

The Way Ahead for Iraqi Army Non-Lethal Effects – Method to the Madness

The Iraqi Army's role in the counterinsurgency is ultimately providing security to the Iraqi people. Non-lethal effects contribute to the provision of security through the gaining of popular support, and the subsequent sharing of information. With the existence of a formal government, however skeletal it may be, the next step for the counterinsurgent in gaining popular support is to provide essential services. This is the critical step that will bring the counterinsurgent over the hump in gaining the support of the populace. With ties to both the elected government and coalition forces, the provision of essential services nullifies one of the insurgent's root causes for insurgency.

Incentive Based Operations

Many old regime Iraqi officers tend to stereotype civil affairs personnel as Baba Noel or Santa Claus. They think of the civil affairs officer as nothing more than a candy man – someone who blindly hands out random supplies during kinetic operations. In most cases, they are correct. They do not see any purpose to his efforts or long term results that benefit the counterinsurgency. This stems chiefly from the lack of staff training on non-lethal effects or the lack of training the civil affairs officer has received.

Non-lethal operations, to include reconstruction, must be prioritized based on the positive effects they provide. Civil military operations conducted by counterinsurgents must provide the populace with some incentive in order to gain their support. The operations cannot be a random distribution of supplies to a random part of the population. If the primary mission of the counterinsurgent is to gain the support of the population and the subsequent sharing of information vital to the defeat of the insurgency, then they are going to have to provide the people with justification for risking their lives; something the populace knows the insurgent cannot provide - something essential. The people will not risk their lives if they know they're going to get their "candy" whether they share information with the counterinsurgent or not. On the other hand, they know they will be killed if caught working with the counterinsurgent. All civil military operations must be based on the incentive they provide the population. Counterinsurgents must use a very systematic, effects based approach in conducting incentive based operations.

A Look at Iraqi Needs

In order to determine what will provide the Iraqi people with incentive, one needs to look closely at their needs. It can be difficult for the counterinsurgent to fully understand the priority of needs for a different culture, as many needs are circumstantial. Western motives and ideals cannot be superimposed on a Middle-Eastern Islamic society. For example, the Iraqis could view electricity as more important than complete security or public safety, especially since their history has forced them to become accustomed to violence. Once again, the perspective that the Iraqi personnel can provide as persons derived from the culture will prove invaluable in prioritizing the needs of the populace.

Maslow's hierarchy of needs demonstrates the priority of human needs. The concept holds that those most basic needs, at the bottom of the pyramid, must be satisfied first to allow growth and upward movement. The higher needs will not become clear until basic needs are realized. The lack of satisfaction of these fundamental needs by those responsible (i.e. central or local government), is a good cause for insurgency. Most Iraqis lack the most basic of needs: physiological and safety. The Iraqi hierarchy of essential needs parallels Maslow's, from an Iraqi point of view.

Diagram 1 – Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs versus Iraqi Hierarchy

(Maslow, A.H.)[5]

With the knowledge of how Iraqis prioritize their needs, counterinsurgents can much more accurately identify in which state the Iraqi people perceive themselves. Therefore, they are able to determine what operations will provide Iraqis with the most incentive.

The Process: Determine the *State of the Populace*

As masters of the environment with a solid understanding of the needs of the people, counterinsurgents must first determine in which state the populace is currently. Although they are Iraqi and have a good understanding of the provincial situation, just as Americans have a good understanding of the needs for their city or county, a more formalized assessment is necessary. The assessment must consider all parts of the Iraqi hierarchy of needs, as these are the areas identified as providing the most incentive to the people, and thus the greatest amount of positive effects.

It is essential that the assessment be completed at the village or neighborhood level, which is feasible with the use of host nation forces. The village level is the lowest level at which counterinsurgents can affect these essential needs in an attempt to gain popular support. A change in any of the Iraqi hierarchy of needs will impact all residents in the village.

To accurately and quickly build a village assessment database, the village assessments must be created as self-explanatory as possible to allow completion by host nation counterinsurgents at the lowest level of command. Counterinsurgents are intimately familiar with the green, amber, red, black status system, and it has proven effective in allowing the assessor an easy way to determine a quantifiable status.

Diagram 2 – Village Assessment

AREA	GREEN	AMBER	RED	BLACK
FOOD SUPPLY	GOVERNMENTAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION IS 100% FUNCTIONAL AND RELIABLE; FOOD IS FRESH AND 100% CONSUMABLE	GOVERNMENTAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION IS FUNCTIONAL, BUT NOT 100%; MOST OF THE FOOD IS FRESH AND CONSUMABLE	GOVERNMENTAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM EXISTS, BUT IS NOT 100%; SOME OF THE FOOD IS CONSUMABLE, MOST IS SPOILED	NO GOVERNMENT FOOD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM EXISTS; FOOD IS COMPLETELY SPOILED AND CANNOT BE CONSUMED
WATER	WATER DISTRIBUTION WORKS IN 100% OF BLDGS TESTED AS CLEAR OR TOLD BY LOCALS CLEAN	WATER DISTRIBUTION WORKS 50% STRENGTH; APPEARS CLEAR, NO SMELL	WATER DISTRIBUTION DOES NOT WORK DOES NOT APPEAR CLEAN	NO WATER DISTRIBUTION LEFT, DESTROYED CONTAMINATED WATER, SMELLS
HOUSING	100% VILLAGE PEOPLE HAVE SHELTER; RESIDENCES ARE STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND OFFER PROTECTION FROM THE ENVIRONMENT	GREATER THAN 75% VILLAGE PEOPLE HAVE SHELTER; SOME HOMES DAMAGED, NEED STRUCTURAL EVAL; LIMITED PROTECTION	GREATER THAN 50% VILLAGE PEOPLE HAVE SHELTER; RESIDENCES ARE DAMAGED; NOT STRUCTURALLY SOUND; SHOULD NOT BE OCCUPIED	LESS THAN 50% VILLAGE PEOPLE HAVE SHELTER; RESIDENCES DESTROYED; NOT HABITABLE
POWER	POWER SYSTEM WORKS; BLACK OUTS ARE PLANNED; ELECTRIC LINES ARE UP 100%, NO DAMAGE, NO ENERGY LOSS; POWER GRID STATION INTACT; SECUREABLE	POWER SYSTEM WORKS; BLACK OUTS UNPLANNED; ELECTRIC LINES ARE UP AT LEAST 50%, SOME DAMAGE, SOME LINE DETERIORATION, CAN'T DETERMINE POWER LOSS; POWER GRID STATION WORKING; NOT SECUREABLE	POWER SYSTEM NOT WORKING; BROKER; GREATER THAN 50% OF ELECTRIC LINES DOWN; BLDG DAMAGED; OVER 50% DETERIORATED; POWER LOSS SEEN; POWER GRID STATION NOT WORKING; NOT SECUREABLE; LOOTED	POWER SYSTEM DESTROYED; ELECTRIC LINES ARE ALL DOWN, NOT WIRES; POWER LOSS; POWER GRID STATION STRIPPED; DESTROYED
PUBLIC SAFETY	POLICE WORKING; BUILDING SECUREABLE AND INTACT; EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AND USEABLE; FIRE SYSTEM IS IN PLACE, WORKING; BLDG SECUREABLE AND INTACT; EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AND USEABLE; CRIME IN AREA IS NOT ISSUE; JAIL EXISTS, CLEAN AND USEABLE; LOCALS LISTEN AND OBEY; MAJOR ROUTES INTO AREA ARE 100% PASSABLE; NO PIRATING OR CORRUPTION; NGO'S/IED'S ARE NOT AN ISSUE; AREA SWEPT	POLICE WORKING AT LEAST 50%; BLDG SECUREABLE BUT DAMAGED; EQUIPMENT AT LEAST 50% AVAILABLE AND USEABLE; FIRE SYSTEM IS IN PLACE, BLDG SECUREABLE BUT DAMAGED; EQUIPMENT AT LEAST 50% AVAILABLE AND USEABLE; CRIME OCCURS; POLICE ARE PROACTIVE; JAIL IS USEABLE; MAJORITY OF LOCALS OBEY AUTHORITY; MAJOR ROUTES ARE USUALLY PASSABLE; OCCASIONAL PIRATING OR CORRUPTION; NGO'S/IED'S HAVE BEEN FOUND, MARKED AND REMOVED; NO CONTINUOUS THREAT	POLICE WORKING AT UNDER 50% STRENGTH; BLDG DAMAGED; OVER 50% OF EQUIPMENT NOT USEABLE; FIRE SYSTEM IS NOT ORGANIZED, NOT FORMAL; NO SET BLDG; LESS THAN 50% EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE; CRIME OCCURS; POLICE ARE REACTIVE; JAIL IS SUBSTANDARD; LOCALS DISCREDITED; MAJOR ROUTES INTO AREA SOMETIMES PASSABLE; PIRATING AND CORRUPTION EXIST; NGO'S/IED'S CAN STILL BE FOUND; CONTINUOUS SWEEPS REQUIRED; THREAT	POLICE ARE NOT USEABLE; BLDG NOT USEABLE; NO USEABLE EQUIPMENT; NO FIRE SYSTEM BUILT; NO BLDG; NO EQUIPMENT; CRIME GREAT PROBLEM; NO JAIL; LOCALS DO NOT FOLLOW AUTHORITY; MAJOR ROUTES INTO AREA ARE NOT PASSABLE; PIRATING AND CORRUPTION PREVALENT; NGO'S/IED'S ARE A CONTINUOUS OCCURRENCE; EFFECT DAILY LIFE AND OPERATIONS
HEALTH SERVICES	MEDICAL BUILDING INTACT; HAS BACK UP GENERATOR; NO SUPPORT ISSUES; EMERGENCY SERVICE RUNNING AND EFFICIENT; MORE THAN ONE VEHICLE; DESIGNATED PERSONNEL; MEDICAL BUILDING IS SUFFICIENTLY STAFFED WITH 100% TRAINED	MEDICAL BUILDING USEABLE; NO BACK UP GENERATOR; MINIMAL BASIC SUPPORT ITEMS; EMERGENCY SERVICE EXISTS; ONE VEHICLE; PERSONNEL MAN THE TRUCK BUT MAY NOT BE; MEDICAL BUILDING IS STAFFED WITH OVER 50% TRAINED PERSONNEL	MEDICAL BUILDING HEALTH ISSUE; UTILITIES NOT RELIABLE; SUPPORT ITEMS MISSING; EMERGENCY SERVICE IS NOT IN PLACE; VEHICLE EXISTS; NO TRAINED PERSONNEL; MEDICAL BUILDING IS STAFFED WITH LESS THAN 50% TRAINED PERSONNEL	MEDICAL BUILDING NOT USEABLE FROM DAMAGE OR REPAIR; NO WORKING UTILITIES; LOOTED; NO EMERGENCY SERVICE; NO VEHICLE; NO PERSONNEL; MEDICAL BUILDING IS UNDERMANNED AND UNDERTRAINED
TRASH	TRASH COLLECTION SYSTEM EXISTS; RELIABLE; TRASH PUT IN AN AREA THAT IS NOT A HEALTH ISSUE; PUBLIC FACILITIES DO NOT HAVE A TRASH PROBLEM	TRASH COLLECTION EXISTS BUT NOT RELIABLE; NOT KNOWN WHERE TRASH IS DUMPED; PUBLIC FACILITIES DO HAVE TRASH; BUT REMOVAL IS RELIABLE	TRASH COLLECTION DONE INFORMALLY; NO SYSTEM; TRASH IS CONSOLIDATED IN A PLACE THAT COULD BE A HEALTH ISSUE; PUBLIC FACILITIES HAVE TO REMOVE THEIR OWN TRASH	NO TRASH COLLECTION; TRASH STAYS; TRASH IS CONSOLIDATED IN A PLACE THAT IS A HEALTH ISSUE; PUBLIC FACILITIES HAVE TRASH; NOT REMOVED
SEWER	SEWAGE SYSTEM WORKS, CONSISTENT; NO SEWAGE SEEN, OR SMELL; PUBLIC FACILITIES WORK IN 100% OF BLDGS	SEWAGE SYSTEM RUNS DRY CAN'T DETERMINE WHERE/IF TREATED; NO SEWAGE SEEN, CAN BE SMELT; SYSTEM BROKER; PUBLIC FACILITIES WORK IN AT LEAST 50% OF BLDGS	NO TREATMENT SEEN; SOMETHING EXISTS BUT BROKER; NO SEWAGE SEEN AND SMELT; WOULD BE A HEALTH ISSUE; PUBLIC FACILITIES EXIST, WORK IN LESS THAN 50% OF BLDGS	NO SEWAGE SYSTEM LEFT, DESTROYED; RAW SEWAGE AND SMELL WOULD BE A HEALTH ISSUE; PUBLIC FACILITIES DO NOT EXIST, NO WORKING SEWER

AREA	GREEN	AMBER	RED	BLACK
ROADS	MINIMUM OF PAVED ROAD; CAN BE UPGRADED, NO DAMAGE OR POTHOLES	ROAD PAVED OR REPAVED; POTHOLES OR DAMAGE THAT WILL EFFECT FLOW OF TRAFFIC	SEVERELY DAMAGED; UPGRADE TO SUPPORT IS EXTENSIVE; MATERIAL NOT READILY AVAILABLE	ROAD IS NOT TRAFFICABLE
BRIDGES	BRIDGE IS TRAFFICABLE; NO VISIBLE DAMAGE	BRIDGE IS TRAFFICABLE; DAMAGE TO SPANS, NOT SUPPORTS	BRIDGE IS NOT TRAFFICABLE; DAMAGE TO BOTH SPANS AND	BRIDGE IS NOT PASSABLE
SCHOOLS	BUILDING IS USEABLE; SECUREABLE; UTILITIES WORK; EQUIPMENT IN BUILDING ENOUGH FOR ALL STUDENTS; 100% OF STUDENTS HAVE ADEQUATE SCHOOL SUPPLIES	BUILDING USEABLE; NOT SECUREABLE; UTILITIES WORK AT OVER 50%; EQUIPMENT IN BUILDING ENOUGH FOR OVER 50% OF STUDENTS; MORE THAN 50% OF STUDENTS HAVE ADEQUATE SCHOOL	BUILDING USEABLE; NOT SECUREABLE; UTILITIES WORK AT UNDER 50%; EQUIPMENT IN BUILDING ENOUGH FOR LESS THAN 50% OF STUDENTS; LESS THAN 50% OF STUDENTS HAVE ADEQUATE SCHOOL	BUILDING NOT USEABLE; UTILITIES DON'T WORK; NO EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT STUDENTS; NO STUDENTS HAVE SCHOOL SUPPLIES
COMMUNICATION	LAND LINE TELEPHONE WORKS, EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE, RELIABLE IN ALL PUBLIC FACILITIES; ALL THREE FORMS OF MEDIA: RADIO, TV, NEWSPAPER EXIST AND ARE	LAND LINE HOOKUPS ARE IN PUBLIC FACILITIES; EQUIPMENT IS OVER 50%; FAIRLY RELIABLE; ONE FORM OF MEDIA EXISTS AND IS RUNNING	LAND LINE HOOKUPS ARE NOT SECUREABLE; SKEPTIC OF 50/50 SUPPORT; ONE FORM OF MEDIA EXISTS BUT IS NOT RUNNING	NO LAND LINE HOOKUPS IN FACILITIES; SYSTEM DOES NOT WORK; NO FORMS OF MEDIA EXIST
ATTITUDE/ ATMOSPHERICS	COMMUNITY LEADERS NOT HOSTILE; RELIGIOUS CENTERS ARE INTACT; SUPPORT 50/CF FIXING; NO ETHNIC TENSION, ALL ONE COMMUNITY; EMPLOYMENT IS OVER 50%; NO FORMAL PARAMILITARY THREAT; ENTIRE POPULATION SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (LOCAL, PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL); ENTIRE POPULATION SUPPORTS THE IRAQI ARMY; ENTIRE POPULATION SUPPORTS THE IRAQI POLICE	COMMUNITY LEADERS ARE NEUTRAL; RELIGIOUS CENTERS ARE DAMAGED; NOT SECUREABLE; SUPPORT 50/CF FIXING; DISTRICT ETHNIC GROUPS WITHIN AO; WILL SUPPORT IF IMPROVING OR FIXING IS EQUAL TO ALL GROUPS; EMPLOYMENT IS UNDER 50%; ABLE TO WORK; PARAMILITARY THREAT BRIEFED AT DOC LEVEL; MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ AND/OR NATIONAL; MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION SUPPORTS THE IRAQI ARMY; MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION SUPPORTS THE IRAQI POLICE	COMMUNITY LEADERS ARE NEGATIVE; RELIGIOUS CENTERS ARE DAMAGED, NOT SECUREABLE; SKEPTIC OF 50/CF SUPPORT; DISTRICT ETHNIC GROUPS WITHIN AO; ONE GROUP IS DOMINANT; IMPROVING AREA CAN NOT BE EQUAL TO ALL GROUPS; EMPLOYMENT IS UNDER 50%; UNABLE TO WORK; PARAMILITARY THREAT BRIEFED AND CONCERNED AT DOC LEVEL; MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (LOCAL, PROVINCIAL; MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE IRAQI ARMY; MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE IRAQI	COMMUNITY LEADERS HOSTILE; RELIGIOUS CENTERS DESTROYED; DON'T TRUST IA/CF AND DON'T WANT HELP; ETHNIC VIOLENCE OCCURS; ONE GROUP RULES; TO IMPROVE AREA WOULD INCREASE ETHNIC TENSION; EMPLOYMENT IS AN ISSUE; WON'T WORK; PARAMILITARY THREAT BRIEFED AND CONCERN AT DIV LEVEL; ENTIRE POPULATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ (LOCAL, PROVINCIAL AND/OR NATIONAL); ENTIRE POPULATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE IRAQI ARMY; ENTIRE POPULATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE IRAQI POLICE

| VILLAGE SPECIFICS	
NAME OF VILLAGE:	
# HORSES:	PRINTED NAME AND DATE OF ASSESSOR:
# PEOPLE:	
RELIGION X: (X SUNNI/SHIA, ETC)	
ETHNICITY X: (X ARAB/ KURD/ TURK,	SIGNATURE OF ASSESSOR:
OCCUPATION X: (X FARMERS/ IA/ BANKERS, ETC);	
IMPORTANT PEOPLE AND LOCATION OF HOUSE (GRID):	
# SCHOOLS:	
# CLINICS:	
#/NAME OF GOV'T BLDGS:	
HISTORIC/PROTECTED PLACES AND GRID:	

(USACE)[6]

Assessment throughout the entire area of operations is absolutely essential to later determine the most effective area to conduct incentive based operations. Additionally, updated village assessments should be conducted as any significant changes take place or at a minimum at periodic intervals. This method is the most accurate, non-biased way of determining the state the populace at the lowest level. The next step is analyzing in which areas incentive based operations will provide counterinsurgents the greatest positive effects.

Area Breakdown

To accurately analyze the needs throughout the area of operations, the region must first be broken down into manageable sectors and sub-sectors. The divisions should start at the provincial level and follow local governmental, military or police boundaries as closely as possible to maximize coordination. The sectors and sub-sectors must be split up according to population size, to most accurately average the needs of the residents. They

should also be small enough to truly reflect the needs of the people at the village level. Large cities should constitute their own sector, with the neighborhoods as the sub-sectors.

Diagram 3 – Area Breakdown

The state of the populace, determined at the village or neighborhood level, can be averaged to reflect the state of the sub-district, district and province.

Example province

Province broken down into manageable sectors of equal population size

LEGEND

The status wheel displays the current status of sub-districts, and starting with food are based clockwise on the Iraqi hierarchy of needs.

Food
Water
Housing
Electricity
Public Safety
Health Services

Communications
Academics
Roads/ Bridges
Sewer
Trash
Overall Average

What do the colors mean?

🟢	= Working, sufficient
🟡	= Moderate, some issues
🔴	= Many problems, insufficient
⚫	= Completely broken, non-existent

These divisions allow the counterinsurgent to portray the true needs of the people, based on the village assessments. A weighted scale is necessary to distinguish those needs that are more important from the Iraqi hierarchy of needs. Thus, a numerical average can be depicted for all essential services in each sub-sector, with the overall average weighted more heavily by the more important needs. Finally, a prioritized list can be developed, with those areas suffering most from the lack of essential services at the top.

Who Deserves?

Once the counterinsurgent determines who needs what the most, the critical step lies ahead. If counterinsurgents have gotten this far, the tendency is to provide essential services to the people who need them the most. However, greater effects can be achieved through a more systematic approach. Some villages are more supportive, actively, passively or both, to insurgent activity. In an effort to provide incentive to the population, projects targeting civilian needs must be balanced with how much they deserve assistance. The population can be broken down into four main groups between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.

Diagram 4 – Spectrum of Support for the Population of Iraq

A win for counterinsurgents would consist of gaining both passive and active support of the large majority, obviously active would be preferred.

The next step is to determine which part of the population to target with incentive based operations. Counterinsurgents do not expect to gain support of insurgents or active supporters of the insurgency. The goal is to eradicate these groups through information provided, in large part, by the remainder of the population. There is also not much justification to target active supporters of the counterinsurgency since they have already

been "won" so to speak, however it is important to keep them satisfied through engagements and necessary aid. Thus, the target area becomes those of the populace majority who do not passively support the insurgency. There are many reasons why someone would passively support insurgents. Some may agree with the insurgent's logic or actions, but prefer a passive approach. Some are loving family members of insurgents, unwilling to deny them sanctuary because of familial ties. However, many supporters passively comply because they are frightened of the consequences if they do not. They don't passively support insurgents because they want to; they do it because they have to. Through the targeting of the populace located toward the low-center of the spectrum (Diagram 4) with incentive based operations, counterinsurgents achieve an inherent trickle-down effect with those civilians who only support the insurgents because they have to. Once they see the counterinsurgency can provide security and those services essential to their survival, the insurgent's cause will become increasingly vague and their support will begin to dwindle.

There are many ways to determine where a particular village falls in the spectrum of support (Diagram 4). The amount of insurgent activity that has taken place near the village is a pretty relevant starting point. The amount of visible support villagers have shown to counterinsurgents or calls they've made to report insurgent activity in the past are also good indicators. Due to the fact so much village history is involved here, the perspective that Iraqi personnel can provide is once again invaluable.

The village assessment, with which the state of the populace was determined in terms of needs, should also include a detailed section on atmospherics. At a minimum, that section should include: level of support to central and provincial government, support for Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police and coalition forces, ethnic or tribal tension, malicious presence, and hostility of community leaders. This section allows the assessor, who is Iraqi and typically knows the village well, to quantifiably gauge the amount of support the village provides to the counterinsurgent in the same green/amber/red/black ranking. The village assessment, combined with the counterinsurgent's knowledge of the village history, determines where the village falls in the spectrum of support, how much they warrant incentive based operations, and ultimately the amount of positive effects counterinsurgents will gain by conducting incentive based operations in the respective location.

Needs vs. Deserve Relationship Analysis

When the needs of the populace (Diagram 3) are overlaid with the status of the population in the spectrum of support (Diagram 4), a prioritized list of specific projects can be developed that will provide the counterinsurgent with the greatest amount of positive effects in gaining support. The level of cooperation of the entire counterinsurgent community in the execution of the prioritized incentive based operations will help determine how positive the effects are.

Those projects at the top of the list will consist of sub-sectors that are most in need and relatively deserving, as depicted in the target area of Diagram 4. A weighted scale

analyzing popular needs will produce numerical results allowing the counterinsurgent to determine which areas most need assistance, with areas the most black having the highest number (Diagram 3). The populace target area consists of those in the low-center of the popular support spectrum, which are represented as amber (Diagram 4). Thus, once again the ideal relationship or effects producing project, at least initially in the fight for the populace, would be those that are black in terms of needs and amber in terms of deserve.

The process will culminate in the sharing of results from the analysis with the provincial government and coalition forces. With the execution of provincial in the hands of the voting city council members, coalition forces will again play a large role in ensuring the provincial councils place heavy emphasis on the completion of these projects and execute accordingly.

The Path Ahead

The application of projects in the needs versus deserve relationship format is extremely critical in the timely gain of popular support for counterinsurgents in Iraq. However, it is not possible without the education and support of the local government and Iraqi security forces. Emphasis must be placed on these areas now by coalition advisors, and security force personnel at all levels must fully understand their role in the fight for the population. Non-lethal effects and civil affairs must serve as a pillar of the new Iraqi Army, with personnel in possession of the knowledge and resources to fully complete their mission. It is paramount for advisors to focus less on training conventional tactics that were dominate in the old regime, and focus more on adapting to overcome the current threat.

There are many other areas where Iraqi non-lethal effects personnel can have a profound impact on shaping the counterinsurgency. Iraqi contributions in information operations, psychological operations, and public affairs can affect the population physically, emotionally and spiritually beyond a level that coalition forces could ever imagine. Their intrinsic knowledge of the culture gives them the edge that must be exploited by coalition forces to defeat the insurgency.

In the war for popular support, the mind is the most powerful asset, infinitely more so than Kalashnikov's or armored vehicles. The mind is also the most critical target. Counterinsurgents need Soldiers who can think better than they can shoot. They must enlist personnel who know the people they are trying to protect and how to influence their thought; they must be masters of their environment. The value that Iraqi security forces can bring to the fight for the population is unmatched by outside forces. Through the harness and shaping of native knowledge and energy, external forces will most effectively be able to contribute to the defeat of the insurgency.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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[6] *This diagram is a revised and expanded version by CPT Justin Gorkowski, adapted from the original version by the US Army Engineer School. For the original version, see* US Army Engineer School. (Oct 4, 2005). *The SWEAT/IR Book: Infrastructure Reconnaissance* (PGS 18-19). Ft Leonard Wood: USAES.