Transitions While Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations
by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Alexander
Transitions While Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)
Transitioning is critical to the success of any operation. However within a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation where the interaction between military and inter-agency efforts intertwine with Host Nation dynamics managing transition takes on a degree of complexity that far out paces the conduct of conventional operations on a linear battlefield. Counterinsurgents do not manage transition in a linear fashion like their conventional partners during the conduct of offensive and defensive operations; there is a great deal of doctrine available describing phasing for these actions. Unfortunately we have very few resources or studies that go into any detail on the methodology a COIN force (the military and civil elements deployed to the HN) uses for determining what comprises the conditions that determine a transition under non-linear conditions. Those in the field are left to determine where they are conceptually and what conditions, if adequately accomplished, would allow them to transition responsibility and authority to the Host Nation (HN)-the endstate of most contemporary counterinsurgent efforts. Based on his experiences in Algeria and the Far East David Galula also indentified the challenge of transition in a COIN environment:
The army officer has learned in military academies that combat is divided into distinct phases...For each phase he is taught that there is a standard deployment and maneuver in accordance with the current doctrine. Therefore the intellectual problem of the field officer in conventional combat consists in identifying which phase in which he finds himself and then applying the standard answer to his situation. Such a process does not exist in counterinsurgency warfare. How much time and means to devote to tracking guerillas or, instead, to working the population, by what specific actions and in what order the population could be controlled and led to co-operate, these were questions that the sous-quatier commander had to answer by himself. One can imagine the variety of answers arrived at and the effects on the pacification effort as a whole. (Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, 1963).
There are several external factors that impact on transition such as political will, coalition partner’s agenda, and world opinion. This article will not focus on those issues but rather on the COIN force’s action internal to the HN. There are three areas in which transitions must occur with a degree of predictability and control for counterinsurgents to be successful: security (to include Host Nation forces), legitimacy of the provincial/regional government (with respect to providing essential services), and the strength of the local economy. This article explores the inter-dynamics of non-linear transition within these three areas and their importance in successfully establishing the legitimacy of the HN government.
Transitions While Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

Comments (1)
I agree with Lieutenant Colonel Steven Alexander’s article, Transition While Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations, that “effective transitions are critically important when conducting counterinsurgency”. I also agree the “current doctrine and methodology does not provide sufficient guidance to capture the complexity of prosecuting these actions within a non-linear environment and until it does the actions of any COIN element will be unsynchronized.” I feel one of the examples that demonstrate the complexity and the lack of synchronization is the transition or at least the relationship between the “Rule of Law” and the “Laws of Armed Conflict” in COIN operations.
The Rule of Law “is the principle that governmental authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with written, publicly disclosed law adopted and enforced in accordance with established procedural steps that are referred to as due process”. For example, killing civilians is considered murder and the concepts of legal equality, presumption of innocence, Habeas Corpus, etc. are in play. The Rule of Law is also supported by a complete system of police, lawyers, prosecutors and judges.
The establishment of the Rule of Law is a COIN objective because the insurgents may have eliminated the legal system as one of their objectives. This is particularly true when it comes to COIN “Clear-Hold-Build” stages. The “Clear” part of the equation falls squarely on the shoulders of the military. Their responsibility in a clear operation is to eliminate or at least surpress the insurgents military wing. One of the operational needs for this tactic is that the “Rule of Law” for the clear area, has been eliminated and does not exist. In other words, the host country not longer has legimate control of the clear area. Because the Rule of Law does not exist, the military will apply the Laws of Armed Conflict in the rule of law vacum.
“International humanitarian law (IHL), often referred to as the laws of war, the laws and customs of war or the law of armed conflict, is the legal corpus comprised of the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions, as well as subsequent treaties, case law, and customary international law. It defines the conduct and responsibilities of belligerent nations, neutral nations and individuals engaged in warfare, in relation to each other and to protected persons, usually meaning civilians.”
Under the laws of armed conflict killing civilians is to be avoided but can occure because of the need of “military necessity”. “Military necessity, along with distinction, and proportionality, are three important principles of international humanitarian law governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict. Military necessity is governed by several constraints: An attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy, it must be an attack on a military objective,, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”
If we take into consideration, the number of legal cases and investigations initiated against soldiers and Marines because of civilian casualities in both Iraq and Afganistan, the issue is becoming very prominant. Haditha is probably the best example. Clearly, the Haditha, 3/1 Marines , were conducting a “Clear” operation under the Rules of Armed Conflict and in the absents of the Rules of Law.
Haditha was declared a TAZ (Temporary Autonomous Zone) when the Marines deployed to the area in 2005. A TAZ is a lawless zone that is a major source of funding, manpower and supply for the enemy; in other words, there is absolutely no Iraqi government control.
The first Haditha investigation (Col Watt’s Investigation) , did not find any Rules of Armed Conflict violations. Yet, the Marines were originally charged with unpremeditated murder, negligent homicide and assault, all of which fall under the Rules of Law. Because no evidence existed, under the Rules of Law, the charges against the enlisted Marines were dismissed.
In this case, because the Marines are attack in an ambush, and the enemy is using civilians as human shields, the resulting civilian causalities fall under the rule of military necessity. Yet, there is no discuss or analysis of military necessity in any of the Haditha investigations. If the transition plan existed and included the move from the Rules of Armed Conflict to the Rules of Law, it is very possible that the military leadership could have avoided a public affairs disaster for the Coalition Forces and the Marine Corps.
Another consideration is if the transition has occurred, and the military force is in over watch, what applies if a US military unit is re-committed to fighting insurgents that the local police can’t handle. Do they fight under the Rules of Law (and which law, Host Nation’s or ours) or the Rules of Armed Conflict? It would seem that the transition plan will need to include a contingence for this occurrence allowing the unit to fight under the Rules of Armed Conflict with some sort of “Inter arma silent leges: in time of war the law is silent” agreement on place.
Posted by Polarbear
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October 15, 2008 9:35 AM