Dr. Marston,

This is an excellent and informative paper. I appreciate the not only the data presented, but especially the views and opinions (not only yours, but the good job you did of conveying the British perspective).

I must confess that I do not understand why the Brits, after observing the operations in and around Basra, would turn back to their own history at COIN. Not that there is not a rich history from which to gain, but rather, each of these instances are rather dated and only marginally applicable.

It would seem to me that if we want the most up-to-date, salient, successful examples of COIN conducted in an environment of modern stand off weapons such as cell phones and IEDs, transnational actors, and a strong presence of indigenous forces, we should look no further than the 1/1 AD, Marines and NG in Ramadi in 2006, or the 2/6 Marines in Fallujah in 2007.

Finally, although it is tired and worn to most SWJ readers, I cannot help but point out again what the British were smart enough to say themselves. They have never had enough forces. The small footprint, minimal force size model for COIN is a good way to get your people killed and fail at the mission. It's a loser all around. This is one lesson that every practitioner of COIN should take away from OIF and OEF, if nothing else.

I agree with Mr. Herschel Smith that "This is an excellent and informative paper".

The most interesting finding is: "Like us, the British have encountered problems integrating economic reconstruction with their military operations—the comprehensive (or, in US parlance, interagency) approach. They have seen improved results with better planning and security, but issues remain regarding force protection, numbers of people, and allocation of monies for various projects. In particular, the fact that members of other government departments are all volunteers continues to present problems, in both the quantity and quality of personnel. Many British commanders have indicated interest in the new US approach, known as Civilian Response Teams. Commanders have noted that there are recently retired soldiers, NCOs and officers who may be interested in returning to war zones in a different capacity, and who could provide valuable expertise and manpower".

Seems that Nagl's "tactical" approach in order to establish what would be "District Officials" and/or "Strategic Corporals" could be a 'practical' answer. At the "strategic" level, remains the same old story from Alexander the Great today. Every war is complex, no hi-tech approach, no academical considerations, itself, will run and give us the correct answer. From a Spaniard observer, Mattis/Hoffman/USMC strategic vision on "hibryd wars" contain the keys for success action, "mil/civ" and "civ/mil".

During the Second Peninsular War -the first was Sucession War (1701-1714)- no popular support to Wellington's "regulars" had been given by Spaniards. But, Wellington efforts will be benefitied by Spanish "irregular" fight against Bonnie's ideological and material supporters "on(every)terrain". Deny any "local" or "virtual" support to Taliban -and elsewhere to AlQaida franchises- is the "operational" objetive everywhere.

One last point: "comprehensive approach" or "interagency approach" will be subsumited in the "integral approach" concept ranged from both "local" and "global" perceptions, established by the National Security Strategy, delivered by British Gov last March. I hope that, everywhere, we can adopt it. I'm very pleased to inform SWJ readers that, over the Spanish JCS and some "irregular think-tanks" desks, reading Colin S. Gray, Frank Hoffman and General Mattis papers, your debates are wellcomed.

Sir. A most interesting paper. Two questions:

1) You write: "As of 2008, British Army forces are delving into their own COIN doctrine and history." Care to elaborate this? What constitutes a separate british COIN doctrine?

2) Further, you write: "They are identifying lessons learned from each campaign, and learning the history of their relations with the people of Afghanistan, particularly the Pashtuns, to formulate a base from which to work with and amend as their campaign is fought." Most interesting. Again, care to elaborate on what aspects of previous interaction with Pashtuns are being examined?

An additional point would be my curiosity towards how the british interact with/relates to the opium industry. Obviously, this is not being tackled full on, so is it the policy of the blind eye?

Dr Marsden,

at the time of our deployment to RC(S) I was a member of the operational J3 staff (UK's Permanent Joint HQ), hence my interest in your article. I think, when attempting to draw out enduring lessons, it is important to note that there will always be differing perceptions between those involved in tactical, operational and strategic planning and execution activity. I do not for a moment suggest any inaccuracy in your consolidation of tactical viewpoints but do feel that some of the deductions lack the necessary wider context that will ensure their validity. I offer a few personal (not an official UK perspective) observations by way of example.

It is incorrect to state that HMG and MoD did not regard the military deployment to Helmand as part of a COIN campaign. As to whether this was specifically stated as such I can not recall - albeit political aspirational statements about not firing a shot in anger (or some such words) were misleading (everyone in the MoD, PJHQ and the Helmand TF (HTF) knew that we would be involved in some form of fight). That the framing of the mission was a matter of "political expediency" is correct but in the sense that such military resources that were made available (means) were employed in what was considered at time as the most advantageous manner (ways) to achieve wider grand strategic goals (ends).

In outline, our initial enagagement in Helmand envisaged a 3 legged stool of a battalion group, a cross Governmental PRT and a training team. There were of course other capabilities that contributed directly or indirectly to our efforts in Helmand: political and security activities in Kabul, a non-ISAF/HTF military contribution to Afghan counter narcotic (CN) activity (note that NATO stipulations were such that ISAF activity in this area was, generally speaking, one of support rather than lead - hence the HTF plan did not as you state have a CN focus, much to PJHQ staff chagrin), a contribution to RC(S) HQ staff and a relatively large air and aviation package.

It should not be forgottent that prior to the 'ISAF' deployment much of RC(S) was unchartered territory e.g. SF activity apart only a small US PRT with a very limited mandate existed in Helmand. Predicting, accurately, what the impact of an increased presence would be was difficult. That said, we all expected a 'Spring offensive' and that our presence was likely to draw some form of reaction from all those involved in the extensive narcotic business.

The PSO comment warrants further consideration. PSO implies coercion (as does COIN) but also impartiality on the basis of some form of consent between the various factions - there was absolutely no thought of the HTF being impartial in its approach to terrorism or criminality. Hence the PSO label is inaccurate. That said, the size of our contribution, particularly that which would conduct military security activity was (at least initially) such that a tactical misperception is understandable.

You are right to draw attention to the near disasterous decision to occupy 'platoon houses' so early on in the deployment of combat power. This was (my personal opinion) a failure to synchronise political and military activity - a failing in the Comprehensive Approach. Politically, the UK had agitated for the removal of the governor of Helmand largely on the grounds that he was involved in criminal activity. In itself not unreasonable but, unfortunately, it happened at the time of our deployment. Not surprisingly, circumstances on the ground changed dramatically at a time when we were at our most vulnerable. Consequently, the tactical commander found himself in the difficult position of deploying his limited assets to remote outposts to shore up the reputation of the new governor. As you note, the result was that with limited combat power we became 'fixed'. The way out of this predicament was two-fold; the introduction of the MOGs (with subsequent greater success) and dialogue with Afghan tribes/groupings that provided the 'freedom' for them to accept localised security responsibility. Given the nature of some of these local forces it was this aspect of our tactical activity that I recall being the subject of friction between the Brit and US chains of command. Slightly ironic when one considers the subsequent endorsement of the 'awakening' in Al An bar and Baghdad. Clearly this latter course of action was driven by our own limited means and was fraught with risk. However, compromise is, I submit, an enduring tenet of COIN.

Without doubt our 'means' had a significant impact on our plan for Helmand. At the time of the deployment a number of force generation factors were at play. We had not achieved the force reductions in Iraq that we had anticipated - I recall that as we considered what forces we had available to deploy to Helmand one senior officer in our force generation HQ commented that apart from deploying the Cadets the shelf was bare! Additionally, the strategic imperative to draw NATO (somewhat unwillingly) in to a revised, post-Cold War posture brought with it various constraints. I have already mentioned the CN piece but there was also a 'means' issue at play. If we, UK, had had the wherewithal to deploy an entire brigade there was a real risk that we would 'price NATO out of the market'. Amongst other things, a UK brigade in Helmand would have probably necessitated a divisional RC(S) HQ - which was deemed to be unpalatable to other donor nations at this time. Within theatre a divisional HQ at RC(S) may also have impacted on the nature of the other ISAF RC HQs. You may recall what some have labelled the 'Dutch wobble' - some way in to the NATO force generation process the Dutch placed their deployment on hold as they came to the realisation that their largely PRT focussed contribution lacked the necessary combat power to ensure force protection. The Dutch, as a major contributor, were strategically significant in terms of the wider NATO engagement/evolution piece. Had they not revised their position there was every prospect of NATO failure at the first hurdle. Political expediency with a potentially detrimental effect at the tactical level but when viewed through a grand strategic lens one can begin to appreciate how important this was in terms of achieving one of the 'ends' - NATO engagement.

So to a certain extent there is, for a variety of reasons - many of which I have not mentioned, justification for a perception of an 'economy of force' approach to our initial deployment (on a different scale I know but not unlike the US OIF/OEF balancing act - that may yet be redressed). Personally, I have always believed that at the military strategic level there was an unstated aspect of playing this long (I have absolutley no facts to substantiate this assertion) - support our US allies, get our foot in the door, engage NATO and, as resources and political will permitted, subsequently bring pressure to bare and increase our contribution. But I could be wrong ...

My comments maybe misconstrued as being somewhat defensive - that is not the case. Strategic realities are sometimes unpalatable for the soldier placed in harms way. We certainly did make mistakes and there is much we can learn from this phase and, indeed, from our allies. But it is important that we do not draw conclusions that lack wider context.

Many thanks - an interesting read.