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The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda

The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al Qaeda
by Carl J. Ciovacco

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Since its inception, al Qaeda’s treatment of noncombatant immunity has migrated from full observance to complete disregard. In just over a decade, al Qaeda transitioned from basing entire operations on the inviolable nature of noncombatant immunity to specifically targeting noncombatants. From 1991 until 2002, al Qaeda evolved through five distinct phases in its observance of noncombatant immunity. These phases transition from Phase One’s complete respect for noncombatants to Phase Five’s intentional targeting of millions of noncombatants with weapons of mass destruction. More recently, however, al Qaeda appears to be taking stock of the harm that targeting noncombatants is having on its cause. This paper will provide a phased analysis of how al Qaeda’s provision of noncombatant immunity disintegrated over time and why it may be returning today. This progression of thought and action concerning noncombatants serves as a roadmap by which to understand how and why al Qaeda made these ideological leaps.

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Comments (3)

Interesting. Is it possible that Dr Z was the malign influence that changed UBL's view on the killing of non-combatants, or is this just the natural evolution of terrorism?

Florian Broschk [TypeKey Profile Page]:

I’d like to comment on the part on Islamic Law although it might be a bit lengthy - please forgive my bad English – I’m not used to actively speak or write in this language.

The ‚sword verse’-debate (page 3) in my opinion lies clearly not at the heart of the question, whether innocents can rightfully be killed (as always in Islamic Law, the notion of an action being ‚rightful’ versus ‚forbidden’ is central, for every Muslim who considers himself a true believer will painfully avoid the ‚forbidden’). Indeed, bin Laden doesn’t even need the ‚sword verse’ in order to show that violent action is mandatory for Muslims. In his worldview, Muslims everywhere and Islam as a religion is under attack from outsiders, prompting a defensive Jihad that is mandatory to all Muslims according to a majority view of Muslim scholars (note that the great majority of today’s scholars disagree with bin Ladens notion of an ongoing attack against Islam).

Still, this does not solve the question whether women and children can rightfully be killed. The ‚retribution’, that you mention on page 11 is surely a central theme of al-Qaida’s narrative, but without religious justification it would still not be valid for those, who claim to be true believers. So let’s listen a bit more to Osama himself.

Osama bin Laden indeed gave an answer on this shortly after 9/11, when he was interviewed by al-Jazeera’s Tayseer Allouni. The video was never aired by al-Jazeera, but it can be found for download on some Jihadi-Websites. An english transcription is also available on several places, for examle here or in Bruce Lawrence’s „Messages to the World“. The central point comes (after much pressing from Allouni) after about 29 Minutes, when bin Laden admits that the prophet explicitly forbade the killing of children and innocents. His argument is quite subtle, but seems to be well within the limits of Islamic Law: he says that this command is not absolute (‚absolute’ and ‚not absolute’ commandments being time-honored categories of Islamic Law). He states that:

„But this forbiding of killing children and women is not absolute and there are other writings on this issue. Allah says: ‚And if you punish, then punish them with the like of that with which you were afflicted’ (Koran 16:126). The great scholars, amongst them Ibn Taimiya and Ibn al-Qayim, and Shawkani, and many others, and Qurtubi in his commentary on the Koran (tafseer), say that if the disbelievers were to kill our children and women, then we should not feel ashamed to do the same to them, but deter them from trying to kill our children and women.“

So, facing the problem of not being a renowned scholar bin Laden (1) cites the Koran as a proof and (2) cites renowned scholars of the past. The interesting point is, that neither argument is valid.

16:126 does not really fit in here, being revealed to stop Muslims from ‚transgressing’ by inflicting more harm than their enemies did (according to the most widely accepted account after the prophet’s uncle was killed in battle and his body mutilated). Indeed the verse ends with ‚but if you are patient than this the best fort he patient ones’. This Koranic verse is normally seen as an important rule for settling law-cases, but can be hardly read as an abrogation of the explicit order of the prophet to spare innocents.

So what did the great scholars of the past, who bin Laden cites, really say on this question? I have to admit that I didn’t check the others, but al-Qurtubi says exactly the opposite of what Osama bin Laden wants us to think (you can find the relevant point in his online-Tafsir here, but only in Arabic):

وأن المثلة بهم غير جائزة وإن قتلوا نساءنا وأطفالنا وغمونا بذلك فليس لنا أن نقتلهم بمثلة

‚Verily, the retaliation on them is not allowed and if they kill our women and children and we grieve over that, than it is not on us to kill as a retaliation’.

The fact, that bin Laden uses a flagrant lie (maybe he never bothered to check, what those guys really wrote) is telling, as it shows the Jihadists disregard for scholarship, with most scholars – in their opinion – having been corrupted by the corrupt rulers of the Muslim countries throughout the centuries. Instead, every Muslim – so the creed the Jihadi-Salafists share with the wider Salafist movement – can understand god’s commandment by simply studying the Quran and Hadith. More important still are the deeds – with Jihad being the most important for Jihadis.

In the eyes of his admirers, the simple fact that bin Laden had the balls to fight the USSR as well as the USA makes him more authoritative than learned scholars in their libraries. Still, aggressively high-lighting the self-contradictions in his ideology doesn’t seem to be a bad idea for the West.

Florian Broschk [TypeKey Profile Page]:

Just the links - I wanted to use hyperlinks in the text, but now noticed it didn't work out the way I planned:

The transcript of ObL's interview: http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/ubl_int_3.htm

The Tafsir of al-Qurtubi
http://www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=0&tTafsirNo=5&tSoraNo=5&tAyahNo=8&tDisplay=yes&UserProfile=0

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