Restraint as a Successful Strategy in the 1999 Kargil Conflict
by Colonel Devendra Pratap Pandey, Indian Army
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In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) of the Pakistan Army, orchestrated a major intrusion into an unoccupied but strategically sensitive complex of Kargil along the northern border of India. The Kargil intrusion was an operation of strategic importance conducted by Pakistan to provide a much required momentum to its weakening proxy war in the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), a state of India. Pakistan had waged an irregular war, in J&K, for a decade, exploiting religious similarities to incite secessionist activities, by actively supporting, financing, and training insurgents, while exporting foreign radicals and so called jihadist elements across the borders. This latest aggression across the border by the Pakistan Army was another attempt to redeem its prestige after the defeats of 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. The 1998-99 act of intrusion was of even greater significance because it was enacted during a political peace process when the then Indian Prime Minister was visiting Pakistan on invitation. The surprise intrusion, along a stretch of the border that had historically remained peaceful due to the terrain difficulties, was a spark in an already charged regional tinderbox.

Comments (2)
This was a very interesting and useful article by Colonel Prandey; notable particularly for its analysis of the successful subordination of military strategy to civilian political ends, which of course is the proper situation in a democracy.
Col. Prandey's article does not address the interesting flip side of the situation, which of course is what happened in Pakistan over the same period. The Kargil incursion, while a merely notable event in recent Indian history, is arguably the single most important event in recent Pakistani history, (and much to Pakistan's detriment) precisely because it was a case where military strategy was not pursued in subordination to civilian ends but rather showed the weakness of civilian authority; it was a military-led incursion, which failed for the reasons Col. Prandey discusses; following the failure and the civilian government's forced withdrawal, the general who had led the incursion (Musharraf) carried out a coup d'etat against the weakened civilian government of Nawaz Sharif.
Posted by jack brown
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July 6, 2008 11:47 AM
Apologies to Col. Pandey for misspelling his name.
Posted by jack brown
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July 6, 2008 11:56 AM