Small Wars Journal

Journal

Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.

We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 09/02/2009 - 7:45pm | 21 comments
Afghan Village Militia

A People-Centric Strategy to Win

by Dr. Ronald L. Holt

Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win (Full PDF Article)

The evidence is clear that what we are doing in Afghanistan is not working. Our credibility with the average Afghan is deteriorating along with popular confidence in the Karzai government (Ackeman, 2008). Counterinsurgency can only buy time and ultimately success depends on government reform and the effective delivery of services. There is little hope of this happening under a Karzai government.

Our methods are too clumsy, too alien, and we depend too much on airpower for the Afghan civilians to tolerate the current situation. We need to inculcate a new attitude of leveraging culture, as it is, not trying to change it into a centrally-organized nation mimicking US or NATO models. We are too focused on risk-aversion, careerism and force protection to make significant changes in the way we operate easily. If you keep doing the same thing the same way you generally get the same results.1 More troops will help, but will not be sufficient if they are used in the same way as the troop already in Afghanistan. In fact, more troops used the same way tactically, will leave a bigger Coalition Force (CF) footprint and, could potentially do more harm than good. Even with three new brigades we will still be running an economy of force operation and the force to space ratio is still going to be insufficient to provide the local population with security. This is particularly true if most of the increased troops spend most of their time on the FOBs and are road-bound targets of IEDs. We get a passing grade at "clear" but we are failing completely at "hold."

Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win (Full PDF Article)

by Gian Gentile | Wed, 09/02/2009 - 4:34pm | 21 comments
Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan

by Colonel Gian P. Gentile

Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

A very recent article in the Washington Post says that the enemy in Afghanistan has improved its tactical fighting abilities when confronting American forces there. The article stated that the enemy has figured out "gaps" in the current American tactical and operational approach of population centric counterinsurgency. And the article added the tactical improvement on the part of the enemy in Afghanistan, according to "American military officials," has taken us by "surprise." This means in effect that the enemy has the initiative.

Afghanistan is war, right? In war there has to be fighting or the threat of fighting for it to be war, right? If there is no fighting or threat of fighting then it cannot be war, right?

The answer to this tactical problem in Afghanistan provided by the Counterinsurgency Experts is better population centric Coin tactics and operations; just try harder at building schools, roads, local security forces, establishing government legitimacy, and population security through dispersion of forces to protect them. Once we get better at these processes and try just a bit harder, with a just a few more troops, then voila (just like we think happened in Iraq) victory is achieved, triumph is at hand. But where in this formulation of scientific processes are the enemy and the killing of them?

Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 09/01/2009 - 6:48pm | 0 comments
Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations

Lessons from Afghanistan 2005-2006

by Luke Coffey

Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

With the ongoing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan much has been written recently concerning counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare. Even though counterinsurgency operations do not stop at the gates of a detention center, adequate guidance on dealing with detainees is lacking in much of this literature.

In early 2005 Task Force Guardian, the Military Police brigade task force in Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-76 in Afghanistan began a new approach to detainee operations. This was accomplished by building on the hard work of previous rotations and allowed leaders to simultaneously meet broader counterinsurgency objectives as set out by CJTF-76 while improving the welfare of the detainee population. Two things were done differently in 2005 than in previous years. First, there was a push to vastly improve the living conditions and welfare of the detainee population beyond those required by international and historical norms. Secondly, Task Force Guardian initiated a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) program in the detention facility in order to convey key messages to the detainee population. This combined effort placed the leaders of Task Force Guardian in a better position to meet desired CJTF-76 counterinsurgency objectives. This paper highlights some of the lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used by Task Force Guardian in 2005 to meet desired end-states in the area of good detainee operations in counterinsurgency operations.

Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 08/30/2009 - 5:56pm | 20 comments
Is the War in Afghanistan in the Interests of the United States and its Allies?

by Major Jeremy Kotkin

Is the War in Afghanistan in the Interests of the United States and its Allies? (Full PDF Article)

Is the war in Afghanistan in the interests of the United States and its allies? If so, at what point do the resources we are expending become too high a cost to bear? What are the strategic limitations of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations? And if the war is not in the interests of the United States and its allies, what are U.S. and allied interests in South and Central Asia -- and how do you propose to secure them?

Beyond the hyperbole that Afghanistan is a graveyard of empires, current misconceptions and conventional 'wisdom' could certainly lead the United States to a similar fate as our Victorian British or Soviet predecessors. Aside from 1842 or 1979 allegories, neither US policy nor grand strategy in 2009 can justify long-term military (General Purpose Force) presence in Afghanistan. Plainly put, creating, defending, and institutionalizing top-to-bottom cultural, governance, or humanitarian reforms in Afghanistan are not vital national interests to the United States. With those ends outside the precepts of stated US policy, there is no justification for any of the ways and means of armed nation-building, security or stability operations, or anti-drug operations conducted by the US military in Afghanistan.

The only hypothesis that can begin to explain the continued military presence in Afghanistan is the theory that defense of the homeland begins at the Hindu Kush; we fight them there so we don't have to fight them here. The immediate corollary being to prevent another 'strategic shock' like the events of 9/11, we must secure and stabilize the ungoverned, radical breeding ground from which they were hatched and could once again return to set up shop anew. There are multiple flaws in this argument which, taken at face value, yields a slippery slope of never-ending military engagements for anyplace we find an 'ungoverned space' or anywhere we find extremist elements which violently disagree with US policy or presence. Furthermore, this "strategy" to use the term loosely, will forever keep us on the strategic defensive, letting the 'enemy' call the shots while not enabling us to see beyond the tactical, threat-focused lens of the Cold War's dead-and-buried paradigm.

Is the War in Afghanistan in the Interests of the United States and its Allies? (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 08/28/2009 - 1:57pm | 5 comments
Complexity, Defense Policy, and Epistemological Failure

by Adam Elkus

Complexity, Defense Policy, and Epistemological Failure (Full PDF Article)

"Complexity," "uncertainty" and "chaos" are currently the preferred terms we use to describe modern conflict. It is an accepted truth that today's world is more complex, more dangerous, and more uncertain than it was before 9/11. But is conflict significantly more complex than it has been in the past? While everyone feels that his or her own era is somehow unique, our perception of unprecedented chaos is powerful evidence that the intellectual framework that we draw from to analyze US defense policy is broken.

At heart, our intellectual impoverishment is a linguistic problem. The traditional US tendency is to bracket off politics from defense, depriving us of the vocabulary we need to analyze the world and the challenges we face. The unfortunate result is an erroneous perception that conflict has taken a quantum leap into chaos, a lack of imagination concerning threats such as failed states, and the confusion of operational and strategic approaches.

Complexity, Defense Policy, and Epistemological Failure (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 08/26/2009 - 5:43pm | 2 comments
Dealing with the Crisis in Zimbabwe

The Role of Economics, Diplomacy, and Regionalism

by Logan Cox and Dr. David A. Anderson

Dealing with the Crisis in Zimbabwe (Full PDF Article)

Once, one of the better run economies in Africa, Zimbabwe has descended into one of the worst, above only Somalia and Sudan. Zimbabwe's history is one common to most of Africa: European colonization, minority rule followed by a war for independence, and subsequent autocratic rule by a leader from the independence struggle. Despite sanctions to oust the white-minority rule, the economy of Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), was able to grow and to develop import substitution products. After transfer to majority rule, particularly after chaotic land reforms in 2000, the economy of Zimbabwe has been in steep decline, with foreign investment vanishing and a willful dismantling of the commercial agricultural base of the economy. The Southern Africa Development Community was formed to improve the conditions of its member states but has been ineffective in positively affecting the situation in Zimbabwe. The member countries are inwardly focused due to inherent economic weaknesses, and the leaders of the SADC and member countries are institutionally un—to criticize a revolutionary leader from one of the independence movements of the 1970s. Since the SADC finally was able to push a unity government in Zimbabwe, the SADC must assume its declared role as a forum for regional stability and economic progress. The United States and other western countries and international institutions must be —to assist in the rebuilding of Zimbabwe through focused and closely monitored aid, while insisting on political and economic reforms. There may be an enduring role for U.S. AFRICOM to play in the region as well.

Dealing with the Crisis in Zimbabwe (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 08/24/2009 - 9:37pm | 8 comments
Cultural Awareness or Cultural Apperception

Is There a Difference?

by Colonel Victor M. Rosello

Cultural Awareness or Cultural Apperception (Full PDF Article)

One of the more favorable byproducts of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is the US Army's rediscovered interest in the importance of foreign cultures. Of course this statement goes above and beyond the traditional elements of the US Army that have been educated and trained in foreign cultures and languages, such as Foreign Area Officers and Special Forces soldiers. It speaks to the heart of a matter that has created initiatives such as the TRADOC Culture Center at Ft. Huachuca, AZ or the mandatory Arab language training and enculturation of US Army majors at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. It is ironic to note that the efforts to immerse soldiers in a foreign culture came only as a result of the bogging down of conventional US Army armor and mechanized units in Baghdad following the invasion in 2003. If the Abrams' and Bradley's had been met by cheering and American flag waving Iraqis in downtown Baghdad, this interest in Arab culture may have never surfaced; anymore than it surfaced following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. But this is a moot point and should be left for historians to ponder. What is important is that the enculturation has occurred and has given the US Army a more multidimensional quality, leading to an enhancement and effectiveness of its efforts in theater. But has it really?

Cultural Awareness or Cultural Apperception (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 08/17/2009 - 4:59am | 5 comments
To Kill a Mockingbird

The Deconstruction of Information Operations

by Colonel Randolph Rosin

The Deconstruction of Information Operations (Full PDF Article)

With the publishing of FM 3-0 in February 2008, the Army ushered in a new information doctrine. Based on the premise of an operational environment of increasing informational complexity, the Army made the determination that the current concept of information operations (IO) was too limiting in scope and necessitated a paradigm shift. The problem set, as defined by the Combined Arms Center (CAC), was "an inadequate capability to communicate effectively and coherently;" "no single cyber/cyberspace theory;" and "a perception that IO has somehow failed to deliver the goods."

To address this problem set, CAC created a conceptual framework based on five information tasks consisting of information engagement (IE), Command and Control Warfare (C2W), information protection, Operations Security (OPSEC) and military deception (MILDEC). IE is intended to address the first problem of an inadequate capability to communicate effectively and coherently while C2W and information protection intend to address the cyber/cyberspace issue. Organized along functional lines, former IO capabilities disaggregate and reapportion to different staff sections. Consisting of a blend of public affairs, Functional Area (FA) 30 and PSYOP personnel, IE is the staff responsibility of the G7. Electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO) form the C2W cell under the fires support coordinator (FSCOORD). Information protection, formerly information assurance, remains with the G6; OPSEC belongs to G3 Protect, and MILDEC, to G3 plans. Effectively, the new Army doctrine deconstructs the IO concept.

In deconstructing IO, the Army is pursuing an independent path that diverges significantly from the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD) and, in so doing, begs the question whether or not it is heading down the right path. Because the information domain cuts across traditional military distinctions of land, air and sea domains, a common joint understanding of concepts becomes an imperative to ensure unity of effort.

The Deconstruction of Information Operations (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 08/13/2009 - 9:16am | 1 comment
Inception and Early Evolution of a Partnership Doctrine

Building Afghan Army Capacity While Fighting a Counterinsurgency

by Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Ledford

Building Afghan Army Capacity (Full PDF Article)

During a 20 June 2007 press conference in Afghanistan, 82d Airborne Division's Colonel Marty Schweitzer described the approach to which he and the Soldiers of his 4th Brigade Combat Team had committed themselves during their rotation in the war-weary nation: "The 4th Brigade of the 82d is a subordinate formation to Colonel [sic] Khaliq and the 203rd Corps ... [Khaliq] developed this plan that we're currently executing."

Schweitzer added, "We've been fortunate . . . to be partnered with General Khaliq." Incidentally, General Khaliq sits to Colonel Schweitzer's left - in fact leading the press conference.

That press conference was over two years ago, so it was bitter irony to read Joe Giordono's Stars and Stripes article in February titled Afghans Will Help Plan, Execute Joint Missions. For fifteen months, from about January 2007 to April 2008, Soldiers of the 82d Airborne had set aside stereotypes, preconceptions, pride, fear and their more conventional and familiar tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to grow a significant and productive degree of trust between our Soldiers and the troopers in the Afghan National Army. They planned missions together, briefed missions together and executed missions together -- that was partnering. The idea Giordono's article headlines as a novelty or innovation was really old news...

That is, it should have been old news. At that point, we should have been well beyond thinking that Afghans will help our efforts; at that point, every coalition leader in Afghanistan should have understood that the Afghans must do much more than help.

The perspective we must adopt if we are ever to move forward is that we are there to help and support the Afghans succeed, and partnership is a big part of what will be that success. But we must understand what effective, embedded partnership means, and we must take it to its logical conclusion to achieve the greatest effects.

Building Afghan Army Capacity (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 08/12/2009 - 8:50pm | 1 comment
Bil Janoob: Multi-National Division-South Security Force Assistance

By Brigadier General Jeff Buchanan & Major Todd Clark

Read the Full Article as a PDF.

Task Force Mountain assumed responsibility for Coalition Forces (CF) in Multi-National Division-Center in June, 2008. Upon the completion of its tour, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) -- now as Multi-National Division-South -- oversaw nine provinces encompassing the entire southern portion of Iraq. Within these provinces, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) included nine Provincial Directorates of Police (PDoP) of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), three Iraqi Army (IA) divisions, three National Police (NP) brigades, and three regional Directorates of Border Enforcement along both the Saudi Arabian and Iranian borders.

Through this collection of observations regarding teaching / coaching / mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), we intend to provide a holistic view of ISF professionalization endeavors in MND-S. We do not focus on a specific ISF component, but rather generalize to cover the IA, the NP, the IPS, and the Department of Border Enforcement.

Coalition Forces (CF) operations in the sovereign Republic of Iraq changed significantly with the implementation of the Security Agreement. The primacy of CF for both operations and national decision making yielded to elected Iraqi officials and ISF leaders regarding both political and operational decisions. The significant transformation from having CF "in the lead" with a token attempt to "put an Iraqi face" on operations has developed into fully Iraqi-led and inspired endeavors. In effect, CF now serve in a "supporting" instead of "supported" role.

The change to the operational environment required aggressive endeavors by CF leaders to set the conditions for Iraqi partners' success. This does not mean that the CF must acquiesce to every Iraqi concept. It does require that the CF both understands and appreciates the nuances of the Iraq operational environment. The key to assisting the goals of the Republic of Iraq -- particularly the ISF -- lies in developing influence with ISF partners.

We believe that the key operational demand in Iraq is developing cultural intelligence within CF partnership units. Cultural intelligence is a broad term that denotes gaining the ability to work in different cultures with a minimum of friction. The friction -- often caused by cultural ignorance -- threatens both relationships and force protection. This is primarily because the two are largely intertwined. BCTs may improve their capabilities by developing intellectual capacities, honing social skills, and through regular exposure to the local populace and environment. In addition, it is critical to understand the limitations of western culture. Many "best practices" are counter to the "American Way." It is important to be cognizant of such things as pride and vanity -- and the different views of these traits in differing societies.

Read the Full Article as a PDF.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 08/05/2009 - 1:05pm | 5 comments
The 800-Pound Gorilla

The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan

by Major Bradley Boetig

The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

On October 7th, 2001 the United States military embarked on a quest to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations. Before 2001, antiterrorism efforts were generally limited to direct-action efforts against terrorist camps and interests. After 9/11, however, it was determined that the United States has both a strategic and a moral interest in a prosperous and peaceful, democratic Afghanistan. It was thought that ad-hoc efforts to disrupt terrorist operations in one area would simply lead to terrorist activity moving into other areas, and that a lasting peace could only be attained through a comprehensive effort to eliminate the conditions that allow violent, extremist ideologies to flourish. Over the past eight years the international community has made tremendous effort to bring security and economic development to Afghanistan, but it has barely lifted a finger to help modernize the culture. It's now well understood by U.S. strategists that we'll never have lasting security in Afghanistan without economic development, but we haven't yet learned that there won't be sustainable economic development without cultural change. We must recognize that culture, economics, and security represent the three legs of a stool that is Afghanistan -- ignore one and it will never stand on its own.

Establishing democracy was presumed to be the solution to the Afghanistan problem. We quickly learned, however, that the Afghans are far more concerned with security and economic necessities such as food, shelter, clean water, and jobs -- concerns much lower down on Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs. This was made astoundingly clear in 2004 when the people voted overwhelmingly for a constitution that established the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as a representative democracy, yet the breadth and strength of the Taliban has only been growing.

The Afghanistan conflict is now fully recognized as a counterinsurgency operation. Insurgencies gain the critical support they need from the population by exploiting grievances often unrelated to their cause. In rural Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban are often the only option the people have for security and jobs. Coalition forces are working furiously to counter these deficits by training the Afghan Army and Police, and by financing the building of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and a wide variety of public works projects. This insurgent-counterinsurgent tug-of-war appears to have become a stalemated contest of wills and endurance. And unfortunately, if there's one thing that insurgencies in Afghanistan are good at it is outlasting their foreign opponents.

The Interrelationship of Culture, Economics, and Security in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 08/05/2009 - 12:32am | 2 comments
Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan

by Colonel Donald C. Bolduc

Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

The collapse of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 led to the challenges of creating and then maintaining a stable, safe, and secure environment for the people of that nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) failure to organize and establish the unity of command, unity of purpose, and unity of understanding needed to implement under an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has resulted in the ISAFs inability to assist the Afghan government to gain and maintain security, prevent a resurgence of the Taliban, and develop an effective infrastructure development plan. This paper uses key counterinsurgency principles to suggest a way to organize NATO and ISAFs political and military effort in order to succeed in Afghanistan.

NATO and ISAF can facilitate the Afghan's efforts, but the Afghans must win the counterinsurgency war. In 2009 the Afghan government clearly does not have the capability and capacity to effectively govern and provide security, stability, and safety to the Afghan people. NATO must build this Afghan capability and capacity so NATO can relinquish the role of leading the nation-building effort and assume an advisory or supporting role to the country's new central government. NATO has organized its current forces to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan instead of leading counterinsurgency operations in support of the Afghan government. To lead the counterinsurgency, NATO must develop a balanced COIN strategy, reorganize their COIN force, and consider relocating their bases to conduct internal defense and development (IDAD). President Karzai has informed NATO that more than anything else the Afghans need to rebuild their human capital and their institutions, their army, police force, administrative structure, and judiciary. When this comprehensive rebuilding process is successful, NATO can relinquish the role of leader and then serve as Afghan advisors and supporters.

Organizing Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 08/02/2009 - 9:44am | 21 comments
Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes

by Dan Green

Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes (Full PDF Article)

As United States policy-makers undertake a series of exhaustive reviews of U.S. policies in Afghanistan, they are taking a closer look at Afghan tribes as part of a new strategy for confronting increasing violence.

Much of this newfound interest stems from the very successful turnaround of Anbar Province, Iraq, where Arab tribes played a key part in changing the province from a hotbed of the Sunni Arab insurgency to a place where security has improved to the point that U.S. troops are beginning to be withdrawn.

The tribes are also receiving increased attention because the U.S. does not have enough troops available to undertake a proper counterinsurgency campaign, because of existing requirements in Iraq and the dwell time required between deployments.

But as tribes assume a more central role in our Afghanistan strategy, it is essential that we approach the challenge informed by our experiences in Iraq, not dominated by them, and that we craft a pragmatic strategy that will achieve enduring security effects for the Afghan population.

Afghanistan's tribes must forcefully confront the insurgency and not be overwhelmed by it, while maintaining the active support of the people and reducing the tendency of the tribes to fight among themselves.

All of this must be done while building the capacity of the Afghan state without creating a parallel tribal system. Though this would seem to be an almost insurmountable challenge, it is not impossible, and to quote General David Petraeus's view about creating security in Iraq: "Hard is not hopeless."

Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan's Tribes (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 07/31/2009 - 6:23pm | 1 comment
Why Civil Military Operations will be a Combat Multiplier in Counterinsurgency Operations

by Master Gunnery Sergeant John Ubaldi

Why CMO will be a Combat Multiplier in COIN (Full PDF Article)

For the second time in a generation America went to war prepared to fight utilizing a conventional war strategy against an irregular army. Again, the U.S. failed to understand the premise that Clausewitz articulated, by entering into a war that we wanted to fight, not the war that we ended up with. Historically the U.S. defense and military establishments have focused efforts on the institutionalized combat operations of modern warfare, never completely understanding the enemy we were fighting. This lack of strategic vision crippled efforts to stabilize Iraq & Afghanistan and now has the U.S. embroiled in counterinsurgency campaigns in both countries. The United States is again seeing the emergence of fourth generation warfare, where terrorist groups and other factions use irregular warfare to devastating effect. Defense and military staff planners failed to move beyond the concepts of high technology and conventional attrition warfare that is ingrained in U.S. military doctrine. The insurgency the U.S. found itself fighting after the 2003 invasion of Iraq was the result of three failed premises of American strategic planning: over-utilization of traditional military doctrine; failure to plan for post stabilization operations; and failure to embrace the concept of civil military operations.

Debate rages within the U.S. defense community whether to embrace counterinsurgency techniques or to fall back on traditional conventional war fighting strategies. Unfortunately, current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown a lack of strategic thinking in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in hampered U.S. operations in both countries.

Why CMO will be a Combat Multiplier in COIN (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/29/2009 - 6:58pm | 1 comment
Troubled Waters

by Will Rogers, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Troubled Waters (Full PDF Article)

The success of our military campaign in Afghanistan may rest squarely on what happens in Pakistan. And though it may not be the obvious lynchpin for America's military strategy in Afghanistan, turning the tide there may involve the nexus of natural resources and national security in Pakistan.

Climate change is having a devastating impact on the region's water security. Scientists project that by 2035 the Himalayan glaciers may completely disappear, taking away the water source that supports the Indus River and its tributaries, leaving millions of Pakistanis -- already suffering from severe drought -- parched.

Water has been an undergirding issue for Pakistan's long-term stability. Competition over already scarce water resources has factionalized the society. Severe droughts have incited riots in its major cities like Karachi, while drought-induced grain shortages have shaped election outcomes. With Pakistan hinging on the verge of further destabilization, an irreversible water crisis that threatens the livelihoods of millions of Pakistanis may be the last straw.

Troubled Waters (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 07/27/2009 - 7:25pm | 3 comments
Six Reasons Counterinsurgencies Lose

A Complementary Perspective

by Captain James Cahill

Six Reasons Counterinsurgencies Lose (Full PDF Article)

Dr. Donald Stoker's article, Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose: A Contrarian View, provides a welcome paradigm shift to assist U.S. military practitioners analyze the outcome of past insurgencies, and by extension formulate strategies to defeat future insurgencies. Similar to Stoker's argument that insurgents often fail through their own missteps, counterinsurgents can also be their own worst enemy. Therefore, the following list of reasons why counterinsurgencies lose complements Dr. Stoker's perspective.

Six Reasons Counterinsurgencies Lose (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 07/24/2009 - 11:03pm | 6 comments
Avoiding Dien Bien Phu

by Captain Patrick McKinney

Avoiding Dien Bien Phu (Full PDF Article)

On 19 December 1946, armed members of the Viet Minh, a communist Vietnamese resistance group, launched countrywide attacks on French garrisons in Indochina. After more than a year and a half of delicate negotiations, limited conflicts, and the French failure to legitimize their authority, Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh's leader, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, the leader of its armed forces, launched a war that would continue for another eight years until a final French defeat in 1954. More than 300,000 Viet Minh, more than 150,000 Vietnamese citizens, and more than 80,000 French soldiers were killed during the conflict. The French fought the First Indochina War as Allied forces had fought in World War II, focused on controlling terrain and killing the enemy. The Viet Minh fought a different war, focused on winning the Vietnamese people while bleeding the French forces until their withdrawal or until a final guerilla offensive.

In October 2001, American Soldiers and intelligence officers began an offensive in Afghanistan against the ruling Taliban regime and its terrorist allies, al Qaeda. Using indigenous allies, American forces were able to drive the Taliban and al Qaeda from power and into hiding in the mountainous border region with Pakistan. After this initial defeat, the Taliban regrouped and gradually begin a strategy similar to the Viet Minh, focused on the rural and mountainous villages of Afghanistan. Though American strategy was broader in scope, the military strategy remained largely enemy focused, hoping to kill or capture High Value Targets and destroy Taliban, terrorists, and insurgents when engaged. American forces constructed bases throughout the countryside to serve as staging areas for raids, interdictions, and to prevent infiltration. Some units on the ground did conduct population focused counterinsurgency, but as a whole, the military conducted an enemy focused approach.

Avoiding Dien Bien Phu (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 07/23/2009 - 7:06pm | 0 comments
Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space (Full PDF Article)

The last fifteen years have yielded a rich literature on structural dimensions of modern-day tactics and operational art, particularly on the challenge posed by information age command and control (C2) technology, decentralized swarming, and irregular opponents. The linguistic shift of "battleground" to "battlespace" recognizes the current reality of forces operating in a multidimensional battleground against complex opponents. Similarly, many have recognized that in a rapidly urbanizing world, cities will be the main battlefields in fights between military/police units and "hybrid" opponents. "Global cities" such as New York, Tokyo, London, and Mumbai have become prime targets for terrorists, networked insurgents, and criminal organizations. Operations in global cities carry a special weight because of the strategic compression created by globalization, and pervasive communication networks—raising the significance of what would ordinarily be considered purely tactical counterterrorism operations.

In our previous pieces "Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege" and "Preventing Another Mumbai: Building a Police Operational Art" we've explored the operational level of police and counterterrorism response. While military doctrine for operations is sophisticated and battle-tested, police operational doctrine has lagged behind. Counterterrorism response—situated in a complex operational space (opspace)—can now be considered as part of the operational level of maneuver, the midlevel point where strategic objectives are implemented on the theater level. Genuinely operational doctrine for this unique form of engagement is underdeveloped, consisting of an ungainly mishmash of police, military, and emergency response tactical doctrine.

Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 07/16/2009 - 2:25pm | 2 comments
Mistakes Were Made

How Not to Conduct Post-Conflict Management and Counterinsurgency

by Dr. Wm J. Olson

Mistakes Were Made (Full PDF Article)

We are awash in how-to manuals on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and how we should successfully do the next Iraq or Afghanistan, presumably because we got the first attempt wrong. While the various manuals, hints, cheat sheets, doctrines, wiring diagrams, proposals for the reform of the 'whole of government', and all the paraphernalia of post-conflict management pouring forth from every think tank, government research institute, and now-knowledgeable 'expert' are not totally useless, they are virtually impossible to make sense of or implement if one could. If for no other reason than they are mutually exclusive, navel-gazing, self-referential, and voluminous. But they also miss the point, misdirect, misinform, and muddy the waters. They are all after the fact, what we should have done not what we did. So, what follows is a 'How Not To' manual. As such, it will have no audience, no following, no conclusions, and no effect.

The first part of what follows is a quasi-case study of decisions to invade Iraq and to a lesser degree the evolution of responses there and in Afghanistan. It concentrates on the context for war with Iraq and the Bush Administration's arguments for war with Iraq. This is not a study in lessons learned. Partly because I was not involved in the processes leading up to the invasion of Iraq, although on the margins I was one of those voices that questioned the thinking behind the decision making. I am also not a big believer in 'lessons learned'. History is not kind on the subject. Long experience in government in playing in and watching similar efforts as well as a lifetime scholarly interest in how governments screw up guide my thoughts and have 'taught' me that we do not learn lessons. We might identify them, but if they do not coincide with our prejudices and inclinations and skill sets, we discount the lesson or fail to take it into account or enlist the wrong ones. And lastly, there are significant cognitive obstacles to learning lessons from complex events that are inherent and unavoidable and whose operation at a given moment and throughout is beyond awareness before the fact and recondite at best afterwards.

Mistakes Were Made (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 07/15/2009 - 6:22pm | 0 comments
The US Air Force and Irregular Warfare

Success as a Hurdle

by Captain Daniel L. Magruder, Jr.

The US Air Force and Irregular Warfare (Full PDF Article)

The Air Force's difficulty transforming to support irregular forms of warfare is the most pressing issue facing the institution today. The United States Army, Marines Corps, and special operations forces rely on the Air Force's ability to deliver desired effects on the battlefield. Current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are harbingers regarding the ascendance of low-intensity conflict (LIC). Irregular warfare (IW) is yet another classification of war and the use of asymmetric tactics are generally ascribed to it. Colin Gray, a preeminent strategist states that irregular warfare "calls for cultural, political, and military qualities that are not among the traditional strengths of Americans." For the Air Force, adapting to a bifurcated strategic environment is a challenge. To be sure, the Air Force has provided the nation with decades of unparalleled excellence in pursuit of air dominance. The point is not to quibble over whether the Air Force can perform its mission in large-scale conventional warfare, but to the degree to which the institution adapts to contemporary security threats. It is a matter of focusing resources and investing in ideas that optimize the unique characteristics of airpower while at the same time meet the traditional expectations of an air force. Three aspects composing Air Force identity influence the institution's ability to meet organizational demands: the pursuit of technology, a culture of individualism, and the theory of progressive airpower. In fact, the factors facilitating the Air Force's institutional success simultaneously limit its ability to adapt to irregular warfare.

The US Air Force and Irregular Warfare (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 07/09/2009 - 1:27am | 0 comments
America's Strategic Intent Applied in South Asia

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Scott

America's Strategic Intent Applied in South Asia (Full PDF Article)

Secretary of Defense Gates, in his prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 27 January 2009 stated, "There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan". The Secretary of Defense went on to describe the linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that any solution will have to take both nations, and the rest of the region, into account. More importantly, the Administration signaled that it will increase the level of U.S. combat forces deployed to Afghanistan and refine its support to Pakistan in order to achieve a more stable environment in that region. Acknowledging the linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan in any strategic engagement is an improvement in our understanding of the region.

Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA) define the world we live in. Afghanistan and Pakistan are an example of the strategic dilemma facing the international community in the VUCA world. The strategic dilemmas facing the U.S., and by extension the rest of the world, defined by their intractable nature and characteristics, have driven many to approach them as "problems" that can be solved. The U.S. will not succeed in lessening either the number or nature of strategic dilemmas, if it continues to attempt to solve them as it has in the past. We must change the manner in which we view the paradigm that is the VUCA world from one of solving problems to one of managing strategic dilemmas.

America's Strategic Intent Applied in South Asia (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 07/06/2009 - 5:54am | 1 comment
Information Counterrevolution

by Adam Elkus, Small Wars Journal

Information Counterrevolution (Full PDF Article)

When Iranians took to the streets to protest vote-rigging by their nation's theocratic-military dictatorship, the West was more transfixed by the medium rather than the message. Many journalists fixated on the supposedly revolutionary usage of social media technology by the Iranian protestors, their diaspora supporters, and the bloggers who relayed their messages to the outside world. According to the narrative that developed, Twitter and other microblogging tools offer unprecedented real-time access to crisis situations like the Iranian uprising, giving social media users a vast information advantage over those who rely on traditional forms of media such as magazines and network television.

One writer worried that this self-selecting "information elite" could use their power to rapidly access information and form opinions to influence public views and policy. His concerns, while thoughtful, are ultimately misplaced. Instead of creating a new information elite, Twitter has added another dimension to the longtime problem of the tactical information junkie. Tactical open-source information culled from social media is only useful if it is filtered for white noise, integrated within a sound long-range conceptual frame, and mediated by a mature community of users. As RAND Corporation scientist David Ronfeldt insightfully noted, the real information elite will be those who use networks—both technological and social—to effectively contextualize this tactical information and exploit it.

The purpose of this article is not to bash Twitter, social networking, or blogs, but to critically examine problems in the open-source information ecosystem that "infoenthusiasts" largely ignore and explore possible solutions to the data glut. Twitter and other microblogging tools may not lead to an information elite, but they can undoubtedly be part of a crowdsourced solution.

Information Counterrevolution (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 07/04/2009 - 6:47pm | 0 comments

Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin America

 

by Dr. Hal Brands, Small Wars Journal

Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin America (Full PDF Article)

In May 2006, a previously obscure gang known as the First Capital Command (PCC) threw Sao Paulo into chaos. Over a period of five days, the PCC attacked hundreds of public buildings and private businesses, murdered policemen and civilians, and brought life in South America's largest city to a standstill. The scope of the violence clearly overwhelmed state and local authorities, and order was restored only after negotiations with the gang's leader, a man named Marcola. All told, the incident demonstrated that the PCC—rather than the government—effectively ruled large parts of Sao Paulo. As one Brazilian security official put it, "The sad reality is that the state is now the prisoner of the PCC."

Roughly a year and a half earlier, another Latin American gang staged an even more shocking display of its power and ruthlessness. In December 2004, members of Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, stopped a bus in Chamalecon, Honduras, and proceeded to massacre 28 passengers. As Ana Arana relates, the killings were as notable for their apparent randomness as for their gruesomeness. "The slaughter had nothing to do with the identities of the people onboard; it was meant as a protest and a warning against the government's crackdown on gang activities in the country."

Both the December 2004 incident in Honduras and the May 2006 attacks in Sao Paulo are part of a broader trend in Latin America: the rise of sophisticated, internationally-oriented, and extremely violent gangs. These "third-generation gangs," as they are often called, participate in the drug trade and myriad other illicit economies, and use violence and corruption to undermine the state. They increasingly straddle the line between crime and insurgency, and constitute a dire and growing threat to internal stability in the region. This phenomenon is most pronounced—and most remarked upon—in Central America, but it has spread well beyond the isthmus and now plagues countries from Mexico to Brazil.

Third-Generation Gangs and Criminal Insurgency in Latin America (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 07/04/2009 - 3:25pm | 0 comments
Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose

A Contrarian View

by Dr. Donald Stoker, Small Wars Journal

Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose (Full PDF Article)

The American conventional wisdom is of the all-powerful, all-knowing, invincible insurgent. Insurgencies always win; it is pointless to resist them. The archetype is the black pajama-clad Vietcong guerrilla triumphing over supposed American imperialism in Vietnam. The truth, in the case of Vietnam, as with insurgencies in general, is much different.

Insurgencies generally lose, not win. The Dupuy Institute, using a database for an ongoing research project that includes 63 post-World War II insurgencies, found that the insurgents only win 41% of the time.

Insurgencies do win, and most of the writing and talking about insurgencies (which is often very good) focuses on what insurgencies do to win, or how to conduct an effective counterinsurgency. More often, insurgencies lose, and sometimes their defeats are a result of the inherent weaknesses of insurgencies, or of their own actions. There are six critical reasons why insurgencies lose, curses brought down upon their own houses, and not induced by counterinsurgent forces. But first, we need to lay the groundwork for our discussion.

Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 07/02/2009 - 6:19pm | 0 comments
Enhancing the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force to Satisfy the Needs of the Uncertain Global Security Environment

by Major Vincent A. Ciuccoli and Dr. David A. Anderson, Small Wars Journal

Enhancing the Security Cooperation MAGTF (Full PDF Article)

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has developed the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) concept of force employment that will enable partner nations to foster stability in their respective regions. The USMC is prepared to be the solitary architect of this force; however the proposed employment of the SC MAGTF is a bold unilateral endeavor. A regionally focused security cooperation force is the ideal employment construct for the Department of Defense (DOD) but it must sufficiently integrate United States government agency capabilities and incorporate joint force multipliers. This paper analyzes the potential requirement for a specialized DOD security cooperation force and determines whether a joint and interagency venture will further enhance and legitimize the US Marine Corps' current employment concept. The aim of this paper is to develop a significant contribution to the format of the SC MAGTF in order to ensure its success and permanent establishment within the regional civil-military arsenal.

Enhancing the Security Cooperation MAGTF (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 07/02/2009 - 1:40pm | 9 comments

Not So Fast, Amigas y Amigos

 

by Colonel Robert Killebrew, Small Wars Journal

Not So Fast, Amigas y Amigos (Full PDF Article)

The United States has always had mixed feelings about our relationship with Central America, so when the Honduran Army sent President Manuel Zelaya packing last week, we joined with a chorus of regional leaders, including Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez, in condemning the soldier's putsch.

But now that we've exercised our moral indignation, we ought to step back and take a deep breath. As reports continue to come in, it appears that it was Zelaya, not the army, that was most egregiously breaking the law. The president was apparently involved in his own takeover, against the courts and Honduran Congress, and was about to stage a Chavez-style referendum" on ballots printed in Venezuela and looted from an army warehouse where they were being safeguarded. The army's move was legitimized by the Honduran Supreme Court and applauded by the Congress, which has appointed a stand-in president until regular elections this November.

Certainly we deplore military coups, just as we deplore sin. But in the tangled web of Central American politics, Honduras has long been the U.S.' most staunch ally. Among the four states from Nicaragua north, it has tried hardest to convert from a military-run banana republic to a constitutional democracy and, until just the other day, with some success. It supported U.S. trainers in the Salvadoran civil war. It houses an American military joint task force. At our request, Honduran soldiers fought in Iraq. So while the verdict must be that military takeovers are bad, surely in this case there are extenuating circumstances for a faithful ally, particularly since the bottom-line issue seems to have been the survival of its constitutional form of government.

Not So Fast, Amigas y Amigos (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/30/2009 - 6:30pm | 2 comments
From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats

The Coming Revolution in Civil Military Relations

by Dr. Tony Corn, Small Wars Journal

From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats (Full PDF Article)

The irrelevance of International Relations theory to the conduct of foreign policy has received renewed attention since 9/11. Though lamented by a few, this state of affairs has been on the whole lauded by a profession by now unreflexively committed to evaluating the degree of originality" of any academic research on one criteria only: its degree of policy irrelevance.

Much less has been written on the irrelevance of civil-military relations theory for the conduct of military policy -- and for a good reason: outside of military circles, few people are even aware of the existence of this obscure sub-field which has been an intellectual backwater for the past generation. If you like the proverbial insularity of IR theory, you have to love the intellectual in-breeding permeating a field cultivated by two dozen practitioners mono-maniacally obsessed with the civilian control of the military," and who keep plowing their ever-shrinking plot seemingly unaware of the law of diminishing returns.

In the academic pecking order, specialists of civil-military relations rank toward the bottom - somewhere between sports sciences and gender studies; yet, over the years, this little-known academic tribe has managed to yield a disproportionate influence on military culture through its role in the equally little-known domain of professional military education (PME).

From War Managers to Soldier Diplomats (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/29/2009 - 5:31pm | 4 comments
The Navy's Gators

An Endangered Species?

by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong, Small Wars Journal

The Navy's Gators: An Endangered Species? (Full PDF Article)

For over five decades the nuclear powered Aircraft Carrier has been the center of naval strategy and policy for the United States of America. In the 1950's the big guns of the gray-hull battleships had been America's capital ships since the Spanish American War. In the six decades that the battleships ruled the seas they brought the United States from a regional power to a global leader in the bipolar world of the Cold War. The Carrier and its embarked air-wing have dominated the oceans, littorals, and near-shore, taking the United States to its current position as the world's lone Superpower. In the post-Cold War world, filled with asymmetric threats, a global war on terrorism, and the prospect of mounting regional stability operations, it is time for the Sea Services to re-evaluate what they consider their capital ship. In the 21st century the busiest and most important naval vessels, and therefore our capital ships, are the Amphibious Assault Ships, known affectionately by their Sailors and Marines as The Gators.

Throughout the United States Navy's 233 year history strategy and policy have dictated what vessel was the focus of our nation's shipbuilding plans. The early Navy was based around the strategic concept of guerre de course, and its missions of commerce protection and commerce raiding. The result was an American Navy based around Humphrey's Fast Frigates as the capital ship. As the nation left the age of sail and the littoral warfare of the Civil War behind us, and began to move toward the world's stage, it became clear that a blue water fleet was required. Visionaries like CAPT A.T. Mahan helped lead to a fleet dominated by battleships and the battlefleet. After years of struggle against the battleship mafia" by men like ADM Moffet, World War II dramatically demonstrated the importance of the Aircraft Carrier. The struggle against the Soviets placed it and the Air Wing as the central vessel of the time. American naval strength throughout history has been ensured by the ability to recognize when new strategic challenges present themselves. It is time to consider what asset best accomplishes the strategic missions of the new century as a guide to identify today's capital ship and shipbuilding priority.

The Navy's Gators: An Endangered Species? (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 06/28/2009 - 1:56am | 4 comments
The People in Arms

A Practitioner's Guide to Understanding Insurgency and Dealing with it Effectively

by Colonel G. L. Lamborn, Small Wars Journal

The People in Arms (Full PDF Article)

Since Clausewitz's day, many thinkers, military and civilian, have written about the problem of insurgency or, as Clausewitz put it, the people in arms." Unfortunately, on the one hand, many of these works were written at the level of the political scientist or sociologist, and were therefore largely theoretical, and thus of little interest to the tactician. On the other hand, many works were purely tactical in nature -- useful to the man at squad or platoon level, but lacking any broader theoretical context to explain why what is observed exists. These tactical manuals thus became formulaic" -- in such and such a circumstance, do this." But explanations of why a particular insurgency came to be, or its specific dynamics or vulnerabilities, have generally been given short shrift or ignored entirely. Thus, many tactical books are long on how to conduct kinetic" activities, but woefully short on what really matters about dealing effectively with insurgencies. The theoretical books are long on what ought to be done, but often lack an operational perspective that would provide some idea as to how to go about doing what is recommended.

Clausewitz himself admits (Chapter 26) that his understanding of the people in arms" was limited, though he states that the importance of this form of conflict would grow with the passage of years. Clausewitz evidently did not understand that the people in arms" was to become far more than merely a useful adjunct of conventional operations, such as the partisan or resistance movements in Napoleon's day or in Nazi-occupied Europe. From peasant uprisings and relatively unfocused tribal warfare in remote areas of the globe during the nineteenth century, irregular warfare has evolved into a distinct species of conflict with its own rules" and dynamic. Unfortunately, many senior Western military officers, trained in the strategy and tactics of conventional warfare, are slowly (sometimes very painfully) learning that the rules" of conventional warfare as taught at Sandhurst, West Point, or Saint-Cyr do not necessarily apply to insurgency.

The author has been a student and observer, and sometimes a participant, in various insurgencies since his initiation" in Vietnam in 1969. What is presented in this work is a distillation of those experiences and studies gathered over approximately forty years on four continents, to include some firsthand experience with the contemporary American struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as some experience in working with insurgent movements in the 1980s. This short work is intended to give the reader an understanding of the true nature of insurgency and a glimpse at the reasons why we have not always dealt with it effectively. If the reader gains some insight into insurgency, and can apply his knowledge intelligently, Jimmy Doolittle's wish will come true: we will start fighting more from the neckline up -- and less from the neckline down.

The People in Arms (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/18/2009 - 8:00pm | 0 comments
Turkey's Border Porosity Problem with PKK

by Berfu Kiziltan, Small Wars Journal

Turkey's Border Porosity Problem with PKK (Full PDF Article)

The porosity of the border between Turkey and Iraq has been a pressing issue in combating PKK terrorism. The fact that the PKK has moved considerable material and personnel support through that border is undisputed, as is the fact that absent such support, the PKK would pose a far less menacing threat to the safety of the Turkish people. Since it took arms in the 1970s, the PKK has used the mountainous border area between the two countries to establish bases of operations from which it has launched attacks. It is estimated that the loss of lives within the Turkish army is higher than 6.000 in fighting with the terrorist group, PKK. In order to decrease casualties and build an effective system of border monitoring utilization of UAVs is a must. While employing UAVs has several limitations as well as disadvantages, their advantages outweigh its drawbacks.

Border porosity could be broadly defined as the high permeability of a land, sea or maritime border to illegal trespassing or hauling of personnel or material as a result of inadequate or inefficient border security and monitoring. UAVs are defined as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry lethal or nonlethal payloads.

In combating PKK terrorism, border porosity should receive increased attention chiefly because the PKK keeps the bulk of its forces and resources in hideouts in Qandil Mountains, which lie further south of the border. The choice of Qandil Mountains is no coincidence, as it is relatively more secure for the PKK than the immediate vicinity of the border, and because the rugged terrain rarely provides a ground for operations for the Turkish military. In addition, Turkey faces several political challenges both at home and abroad while conducting cross-border military operations against the PKK, and in this regard, the fact that the Qandil Mountains lie south of the border provides the PKK practical as well as tactical advantages. Before we can eliminate the PKK completely, we should first deny the organization's access to Turkish territory through the border. Once that is accomplished, the raids on Turkish military outposts along the border will dramatically decrease in number, and the majority of the PKK's resources will be confined to the Kurdish-controlled Northern Iraq.

Turkey's Border Porosity Problem with PKK (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/18/2009 - 3:32am | 5 comments
Counterinsurgency

Is Air Control" the Answer?

by Major Angelina M. Maguinness, Small Wars Journal

Counterinsurgency: Is Air Control" the Answer? (Full PDF Article)

Within the last few years, many airpower theorists advocated for the creation of a more air-centric approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. They point to modern airpower successes as the central component in military strategies, such as the successes in Bosnia in 1995, in Kosovo in 1998, and in the air policing operations conducted over Iraq from 1991 to 2003. Other airpower proponents decry the lack of air-mindedness" and the short attention given to airpower in the 2007 United States (US) Army and Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency. They call for a truly joint COIN doctrine that recognizes and leverages airpower's combat capabilities instead of relegating its use solely to support for ground forces.

Many of these arguments are reminiscent of the early airpower zealots who believed airpower's emerging technical capabilities promised less costs in money, lives, and resources with equal or better results than the use of large armies. Airpower, however, is not a cure-all in COIN, as demonstrated by Britain's foray into colonial policing from 1919 to 1939. These lessons are applicable today, as military leaders continue to explore alternatives and supplements to existing American COIN strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. While there is no doubt airpower plays a prominent role within COIN strategy, airpower's most prudent use should not be as a primarily offensive weapon but as a component within a restrained combined arms approach.

Counterinsurgency: Is Air Control" the Answer? (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/16/2009 - 7:56pm | 1 comment
Common Analytic Standards

Intelligence Community Directive # 203 and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence

by Lieutenant Colonel Von H. Pigg, Small Wars Journal

Common Analytic Standards (Full PDF Article)

On 21 June 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), signed and implemented Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 203, Analytic Standards," governing the production and evaluation of intelligence analysis and analytical products. ICD 203 articulates the mission and commitment of all analytic elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) to meet the highest standards of integrity and rigorous analytical thinking. The DNI, via ICD 203, established doctrinal requirements designed to improve the quality, relevance of and confidence in the analysis and conclusions of intelligence products produced for policy makers and military commanders. As the Marine Corps' service component intelligence agency and member of the IC, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) at Quantico adopted the promulgated analytic standards, along with a required self-evaluation program. Rigid application of the standards, combined with critical self and other IC evaluations will ensure MCIA and the entire USMC intelligence apparatus consistently produces timely, objective, multi-source based intelligence products resulting from sound analytic tradecraft practices. The purpose of this article is to examine the reasoning and rationale for prescribed IC Analytical Standards and how MCIA is implementing the standards and overcoming implementation challenges for the purpose of improving intelligence support to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Air Ground Task Force(s) (MAGTFs), USMC supporting establishments as well as the IC at large.

Common Analytic Standards (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/15/2009 - 5:31pm | 1 comment

The Seven Deadly Questions

 

How to Think about Mexico and Beyond

by Roger Pardo-Maurer, Small Wars Journal

How to Think about Mexico and Beyond (Full PDF Article)

Quick Quiz

By the beginning of the new counterinsurgency strategy and arguably a turning point of the War in Iraq (late 2006 - early 2007), which country after the United States and Great Britain had the next largest combat-related loss of citizens in Operation Iraqi Freedom?

The answer is - Mexico .

Blood is indeed thicker than water, or at least thicker than the Rio Grande. If ever proof were required of how our two peoples have become intertwined in ways we can hardly begin to imagine, one could hardly do better than to point to the fact that Mexico, or rather, the people of Mexico, were in effect an invisible member of the Coalition.

A Country Taken for Granted

Since the Spanish-American War, the grand strategy of the United States has been to rely on stability in the Western Hemisphere in order to pursue its interests in Europe and Asia. If Mexico is not already our most vital strategic relationship, it will become so over the next generation: as a trade partner, as a source of demographic and cultural renewal, and as a pillar of our strategic worldview so taken-for-granted that it is difficult to imagine how things could be otherwise.

How to Think about Mexico and Beyond (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 06/14/2009 - 9:07am | 0 comments
Thanks to Greg Smith for making available his October, 2008 pre-deployment interview with Brigadier General John Nicholson. BG Nicholson is the Deputy Commander of RC South. Greg is a freelance journalist and research consultant.

From the introduction:

The interview was originally designed to be an emphasis on leadership, actors, and COIN operations. With a very small bit of reengineering what materialized is a candid and up to date snapshot of the intricacy of COIN operations in southern Afghanistan. The intricacy is still very much alive and this interview is now available for public consumption.

Read the full transcript of the interview.

Some recent news interviews quoting BG Nicholson include:

U.S. Military Works to Bring Stability to Remote Afghan Areas at the PBS Online News Hour, June 9, 2009. (BG Nicholson quotes are toward the end of the piece)

Top U.S. General in Southern Afghanistan Optimistic More Forces Will Turn Tide by Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service, May 11, 2009.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 06/14/2009 - 8:22am | 2 comments
Poppy is Not the Most Profitable Crop, It's the Only Crop

by Allison Brown, Small Wars Journal

Poppy is Not the Most Profitable Crop, It's the Only Crop (Full PDF Article)

If poppy were really the most profitable crop in Afghanistan, farmers would be growing it year-round. They're not, nor are they growing all that much of it outside 4 provinces in the south. How can this be if poppy is such an economic slam dunk?

It is no lie that poppy has advantages. Poppy fits a special niche in the agriculture calendar, the winter season when very few valuable crops can grow. The harvested opium gum is imperishable and easily transportable and it increases in value with age, serving as a home-grown, interest bearing bank account. And the opium can be used as a pain killer where there are no doctors. The disadvantages of poppy -- that it is illegal, haram (forbidden), and a management nightmare -- are overshadowed by farmers' need to survive. But the notion that opium is the most profitable crop is a myth.

Poppy is the most profitable crop when there is little else to sell. That is, growing poppy is the most profitable option for farmers who are too far from a marketplace, farmers who have no access to modern technologies and reliable farm supplies, and farmers who live where gangsters rule -- a gun at your head is a compelling inducement to do most anything.

Poppy in southern Afghanistan is a winter-season monoculture and farmers are mere contract growers. The gangsters provide a full agriculture extension package -- seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, labor management and immediate payment for the product at the farmgate. The rest of the year the Afghan government, with the help of international aid programs, struggles to promote other crops.

Poppy is Not the Most Profitable Crop, It's the Only Crop (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 06/10/2009 - 6:40pm | 0 comments
Winning Damaged Hearts and Minds: An Irregular Warfare Concept

by By Brigadier General David L. Grange, Scott Swanson, and Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Christian, Small Wars Journal

Winning Damaged Hearts and Minds (Full PDF Article)

In ungoverned and under-governed environments, the local populace is usually the center of gravity. Other centers of gravity within the population may include the will of the people that takes form as support for the governing authority or other political, economic and ideological forces. To win their hearts and minds and wean them off our adversaries' control requires effective communication using the local information systems." Effective communications at the local level earns trust, which, in turn, establishes loyalty to our cause, commitment, and eventually buy-in to the regime we support. It also requires a focus on the local economic ecosystem that delves down to the community level, improves basic prosperity, honors local culture, and reinforces what's important to the people. It requires a focus on the local political system that respects local codes, social networks, and empowers local leaders that eventually will connect to the state, region, and national political system.

Our goal must be to establish capabilities that support the creation of enduring, safe, and secure environments with local participation and responsibility. We want to develop Community Internal Defense (CID) participation with local, state, and foreign governmental and civilian agencies with, and for, the people with the purpose of protecting its citizens. This community provides a safe and secure environment, economic and social well-being, effective governance, human rights, and rule of law with a capacity to counter lawlessness. This is similar to the end-state of America's historic Wild West" communities.

Winning Damaged Hearts and Minds (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/09/2009 - 10:00pm | 0 comments
Thoughts on Advising Iraqi Security Forces Using an Organized Development Approach

by Major Decker B. Hains, Small Wars Journal

Thoughts on Advising Iraqi Security Forces (Full PDF Article)

We have heard in some form or fashion that our exit strategy for Iraq is putting the Iraqis, more specifically the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), in the lead". As a Military/National Police Transition Team Chief, working with both ISF and Coalition Forces (CF), I often contemplate what in the lead" really means. Do we simply say to our Iraqi counterparts, you are in the lead, please let me know if you need help and we'll see what we can do?" Of course not. Our focus cannot be just getting them to take the lead; rather, we must enable them to stay in the lead. We must assist our ISF counterparts as their organizations, i.e. battalions (BN), brigades (BDE), divisions (DIV), etc. continue to develop and grow. The goal is long-term stability and growth and we must focus on the systems within the organizations to affect positive and lasting change. In other words, to more effectively advise and enable our ISF counterparts, we must focus on facilitating their organizational development.

This paper will discuss the application of organizational development principles to advising ISF, suggest areas of emphasis that transition teams and CF should focus on to assist in ISF development, and will recommend the ISF BN as the appropriate lower level for advisory efforts.

Thoughts on Advising Iraqi Security Forces (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 06/07/2009 - 10:43am | 2 comments
Adapting the British Light Infantry Section and Platoon Structure for the Contemporary and Future Operating Environment

by Lieutenant Chris Shaw, Small Wars Journal

Adapting the British Light Infantry Section and Platoon Structure (Full PDF Article)

Regardless of what form or resultant outcome the debate of strategic force structures takes both within the United States and subsequently within the NATO and ABCA nations, there will always be a role on the battlefield for the infantry forces of the developed world. The Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) has seen demand for the west's infantry formations rise dramatically. 'COIN operations place a premium', notes the recently released US doctrinal publication Tactics in Counterinsurgency FM3-24.2, 'on boots on the ground.' The necessity to secure and engage a population through sustained and persistent patrolling is most easily fulfilled by a dedicated infantry force. While there no doubt remains a place for supporting arms in the counterinsurgency fight the ease through which an infantry formation can navigate, sustain itself within and persecute offensive, defensive and support operations within the human geography of a foreign culture has made the infantry synonymous with COIN campaigning.

Even if one views future conflict as being characterised by high-intensity, conventional conflict the existence of an infantry arm remains entirely necessary for the conduct of operations across differing types of terrain. The ability of the developed world's infantry to adapt to and assimilate technological and doctrinal innovation in military campaigning will be important to future battlefield success and minimisation of casualties and tactical failure.

Has the infantry adjusted or adapted to the Contemporary Operating Environment? It is easy to argue 'yes'. At the tactical level, the majority of the infantry Battalion's within the developed world are now far better prepared and postured to participate in the '3 Block War' where violence is administered surgically and sparingly. Doctrinally COIN philosophy has taken hold through the vast majority of armies, with 'non-kinetic' effects and lines of operation having gained currency in the military's professional vocabulary. Multi-national exercises such as 'Co-Operative Spirit' held between ABCA nations in Germany last year are now based upon the full-spectrum environment necessitated in the fight against an insurgency, whereas a similar exercise a decade ago would have seen the forces facing a conventional, Soviet-influenced foe.

Adapting the British Light Infantry Section and Platoon Structure (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/04/2009 - 9:57pm | 12 comments
Flawed Doctrine or Flawed Strategy?

by Sergeant First Class Morgan Sheeran, Small Wars Journal

Flawed Doctrine or Flawed Strategy? (Full PDF Article)

The United States and her allies are in trouble in Afghanistan. That's not hard to see. What seems to be taking up all the bandwidth these days is a conversation about how to go about reversing the backwards slide that Afghanistan is in. The Department of Defense notes in its January, 2009 report on Afghanistan, The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and has coalesced into a resilient and evolving insurgency." It goes on to state, Shortfalls limit the Allies' capacity to fulfill all aspects of the COIN strategy." Meanwhile, the military's senior leadership is spending its time discussing such things as the appropriateness of the doctrine developed to fight and succeed in such wars. Some are even excusing failure beforehand. Air Force Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. pointed out in the pages of Armed Forces Journal that the United States did not lose" the Cold War as a result of our failure in Vietnam, thereby implying that failure in Afghanistan would be less than catastrophic and therefore tolerable.

Assessing the acceptability of loss in the central campaign of the Global War on Terror is certainly a diversion from any assessment on how to succeed in a difficult enterprise. It is not the conversation that military leadership should be having at this or any point. While the Army managed to get COIN right just enough to avert a massive failure in Iraq, any self-congratulations are misplaced. The Army has still not wholeheartedly embraced the only doctrine that we possess which is specifically designed for use in counterinsurgency warfare.

Flawed Doctrine or Flawed Strategy? (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 06/04/2009 - 12:49am | 1 comment
Helping Others Help Themselves

by Colonel Bruce Boevers, Small Wars Journal

Helping Others Help Themselves (Full PDF Article)

Recognizing the requirement for the United States to succeed by, with, and through" our allies, friends and partners, the Department of Defense has taken several actions to improve Department capabilities to conduct Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities. Most recently, DoD has designated U.S. Special Operations Command as joint proponent for SFA and there is an implementing DoD Instruction in the staffing process now. Current emphasis on SFA is critical, if indeed not overdue. Several factors have led us to this point.

Existing and developing threats, as listed above, when coupled with some discernable trends, force the U.S. military to rethink how it will do business in the future in response to these factors. In short, because the Joint Force will not be able to deal with all challenges unilaterally, it will have to act in concert with partners around the world. The ability to do so contains the implied mission to develop the capabilities and capacities of those foreign security forces. Although the United States has been engaged in assisting foreign partners for years, it is now time to develop a broad-based construct that encompasses all components of the Joint Force and that integrates all available tools" for working with others. The era of niche mission areas and stovepipes" or cylinders" of excellence is over.

Helping Others Help Themselves (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 06/02/2009 - 8:34pm | 0 comments
American Counterinsurgency Strategy During the Moro Rebellion in the Philippines, 1903-1913

by Major Daniel G. Miller, Small Wars Journal

COIN Strategy During the Moro Rebellion (Full PDF Article)

The American military government of the Moro Province from 1903 through 1913 remains a grossly overlooked part of U.S. military history. However, it is a significant episode. The period of military governance in the Moro Province of the Philippines represents the first time the U.S. military conducted a counterinsurgency campaign within an Islamic society. Given that nearly one hundred years later U.S forces returned to the southern Philippines to assist the Philippine government in suppressing Moro insurgents as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, it is important that the U.S. military give more study to that earlier counterinsurgency campaign conducted by the military government of the Moro Province from 1903-1913. The evolution of the military government's overall strategy in pacifying the Moros is particularly important in light of current U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine that focuses on a whole of government approach to dealing with insurgencies.

COIN Strategy During the Moro Rebellion (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 06/01/2009 - 9:17pm | 4 comments
Command of the Air

Rebooting the Discussion of Air Power and Small Wars

review essay by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong

Small Wars Journal

Rebooting the Discussion of Air Power and Small Wars (Full PDF Article)

There has been a great deal of debate over the role of air power in counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns and small wars. This discussion has occurred over a broad range of media, from traditional military journals, to magazines and online hybrids like Small Wars Journal. At times it has been heated and frequently the discussion focuses on the capabilities of today and predictions for tomorrow. However, modern counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics are founded in the many lessons of history. It is time that we reboot the discussion of airpower's role in COIN by doing some reading and adding a consideration of the history. The following are three books that provide students of military affairs with a solid basis of preflight planning" in order to restart the discussion.

Rebooting the Discussion of Air Power and Small Wars (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 05/31/2009 - 11:39am | 7 comments
Human Terrain

A Strategic Imperative on the 21st Century Battlefield

by Nick Masellis, Small Wars Journal

Human Terrain A Strategic Imperative (Full PDF Article)

Six months into a one-year deployment, my unit was shifting its area of operation from the southeastern Tigris River city of Al-Kut, to one of the main centers of adherents to the Shia sect of Islam -- Karbala. The city of Karbala, and particularly the twin mosques that tower over it, is central to the Shia Islamic faith. The significance of these structures is embedded in the culture, economy and faith of the over half a million residents, as well as of the millions of people who pilgrimage every year to visit the sacred, ancient metropolis.

However when I first arrived to the city and noticed the massive golden domes, I knew nothing of their significance; I knew nothing of the story behind the shrines and the history behind them; and I was still ignorant of the general cultural milieu. I was not at all unique -- we all were mesmerized by the mosques and the culture around us, but had no clue where to begin in order to understand what they meant in the context of our presence among the people apart from: 1. do not get near the mosques; and 2. do not fire on them if fired upon from its vicinity. But more importantly, the prevailing attitude at the time seemed to be that we didn't really have to understand anything beyond the latter. That seemed to be a reasonable tenant; after all, why would it be necessary to know such things about any given area, people or buildings? How, if at all, is it pertinent to the mission?

Well, one of the gravest shortfalls in the early years of Iraq stabilization" was the lack of such understanding. That the tribes and religious sheiks had, in the midst of the political vacuum that developed after the fall of Saddam's regime, assumed control and influence. The majority of military and civilian leadership in Iraq did not understand these religious and ethnic nuances, which heavily contributed to the sectarian violence and militias that developed in areas like Najaf and Karbala. Moreover, corruption in the country ran rampant, especially through the local police, who had a long history as a force of subversion and brutality. Even the interpreters were at times influenced by their own biases; to include the fear for their own lives and those of their families. As a result, this depreciated the value of effective translation, actionable intelligence and serious engagement with the population -- essential components in counterinsurgency operations.

Human Terrain A Strategic Imperative (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 05/31/2009 - 8:56am | 1 comment
SAS Secret War

Operation Storm in the Middle East

reviewed by Travis Weinger, Small Wars Journal

SAS Secret War (Full PDF Article)

SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East. By Major General Tony Jeapes. London: Greenhill Books, first published 1980, this edition published 2005. 253 pages. $22.95. Reviewed by Travis Weinger.

A fanatical group, playing upon political and economic grievances in an isolated province, develops a base of support among the local tribes and launches a full-blown insurgency against the government and foreign power supporting it. The group violently attempts to break the traditional power structures and elites of the tribes and imposes a brutal and foreign ideology in their place. Realizing their mistake, the tribes begin, fitfully, to fight back against the outsiders, slowly reconciling with the counterinsurgents. The counterinsurgents partner with these tribal fighters to great effect, and the back of the insurgency is largely broken.

This could be a description of the course of the modern insurgency in Anbar province. Instead, it is the picture we get of the Dhofar insurgency in Oman in SAS Secret War, written by Major General Tony Jeapes, commander of the first full Special Air Service (SAS) squadron in Oman and SAS Commanding Officer from 1974 until the end of the war in 1975. Republished in 2005 (originally written in 1977), doubtless to cash in on the interest in counterinsurgency generated by the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, General Jeapes' first-hand account of the successful British campaign in Oman during the 1970s is a fascinating read, both on its own merits as a story of war and in light of present-day discussions and debates about the nature and best practices of COIN.

SAS Secret War (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 05/31/2009 - 8:09am | 1 comment

Future Conflict

 

Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence

by John P. Sullivan, Small Wars Journal

Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

Gangs dominate the intersection between crime and war. Traditionally viewed as criminal enterprises of varying degrees of sophistication and reach, some gangs have evolved into potentially more dangerous and destabilizing actors. In many areas across the world—especially in 'criminal enclaves' or 'lawless zones' where civil governance, traditional security structures, and community or social bonds have eroded—gangs thrive. This essay briefly examines the dynamics of crime and war in these contested regions. Specifically, it provides a framework for understanding 'criminal insurgencies' where acute and endemic crime and gang violence challenge the solvency of state political control.

Criminal gangs come in many forms. They challenge the rule of law and employ violence to dominate local communities. In some cases they are expanding their reach and morphing into a new warmaking entities capable of challenging the legitimacy and even the solvency of nation-states. This potential brings life to the prediction made by Martin van Creveld who noted, "In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit upon more formal titles to describe themselves."

Some advanced gangs—known as 'third generation gangs' and/or maras—are waging 'wars" and changing the dynamics of crime. In some extreme cases they are waging a de facto criminal insurgency. As Adam Elkus and I recently noted: Criminal insurgency is haunting the police stations and barracks of North America. Powerful criminal networks increasingly challenge the state's monopoly on force, creating new threats to national security." Mexico is currently challenged by extreme criminal violence, but it is by no means the only state in the Americas suffering from criminal insurgency. Transnational criminal organizations ranging from the transnational street collective Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) to the powerful Mexican drug cartels are steadily increasing in both power and reach. Even some American street gangs are evolving into 'third generation' gangs: large, networked, transnational bodies that may yet develop true political consciousness.

Criminal insurgency presents a challenge to national security analysts used to creating simulations and analytical models for terrorism and conventional military operations. Criminal insurgency is different from regular" terrorism and insurgency because the criminal insurgents' sole political motive is to gain autonomy economic control over territory. They do so by hollowing out the state and creating criminal enclaves to maneuver.

Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 05/28/2009 - 2:45pm | 1 comment
Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut

by Clint Watts, Small Wars Journal

Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)

Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, which ended in early 1989, created a glut of foreign fighters, who found themselves unwanted by their home/source countries and restless for another Jihadi campaign. This First Foreign Fighter Glut" spawned al-Qa'ida (AQ) and a decade of increasingly lethal terrorist attacks leading up to September 11, 2001.

Today, Western nations face a smaller, more lethal threat resulting from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut." As major conflicts in Iraq and later Afghanistan diminish in scale, a new generation of former foreign fighters will sit idle in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The future success of AQ hinges on its recruitment process in which former foreign fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan guide the recruitment and production of future foreign fighters who will conduct regional and global terrorist attacks. Left unchecked, the Second Foreign Fighter Glut will produce the next generation of terrorist organizations and attacks much as the First Foreign Fighter Glut fueled AQ.

Current Western counterterrorism (CT) strategies, largely overshadowed by counterinsurgencies (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan, place great emphasis on eliminating the supply of foreign fighters at their intended targets. These strategies fail to adequately mitigate the demand for jihad by young recruits in foreign fighter source countries.

Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 05/20/2009 - 10:53pm | 0 comments
Treading on Hallowed Ground

Counterinsurgency in Sacred Places

reviewed by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal

Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)

C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, eds. Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York: 2008.

A common tactic used by Shi'ite militias and rogue elements during Operation Iraqi Freedom has been the use of holy shrines for sanctuary and logistics. In 2004, for example, the US military fought members of Moqtada al-Sadr's militia in Najaf, one of Shi'ia Islam holiest cities. On two occasions that year, followers of al-Sadr used the grounds of the most sacred Iman Ali shrine to conduct military operations and terrorist attacks. These operations posed particularly thorny issues for responding forces who were very sensitive to possible repercussions resulting from any damage to the shrine.

Obviously, the use of force against holy sites can antagonize and deeply affect religious communities. Any desecration, whether perceived or real, can generate a back-lash of local sentiment against the counterinsurgency force. The potential for a positive outcome in the eyes of the insurgent forces means that we can expect them in future security environments to continue to use this tactic. Thanks to this book, however, we can now identify some valuable lessons learned that warrant our attention. When responding to insurgents using sacred sites, counterinsurgent forces often failed to achieve desired outcomes due to several critical shortcomings: poor or faulty intelligence, the absence of a deft public relations strategy" and a lack of restraint on the use of force.

Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 05/19/2009 - 9:08pm | 0 comments
Perspective on the Systems Perspective

How Army Special Forces Can Use Existing Systems within the Operational Environment

by Major Michael Longacre, Small Wars Journal

Perspective on the Systems Perspective (Full PDF Article)

The purpose of this article is to articulate how Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) can use existing elements of the Operational Environment (OE) to accomplish desired military endstates. SOF assets gain marked advantages by indentifying and making use of pre-existing structures within the EO and ensuring the roles these systems play within the EO support our objectives. As a military, we would not ignore or destroy a country's entire road systems and then create a new road network on which to operate our vehicles. Nor would we attempt to conduct a lodgment without using existing sea and air ports. However, as a nation we attempted to support a fledging state in Iraq by disbanding its existing security apparatus and the Ba'ath party that had previously ran the daily functioning of the government. In contrast, preserving, influencing, and strengthening the social, political, and economic infrastructure better allows us to achieve our aims and fully embraces the by, with, and through" approach that has made ARSOF so successful.

In order to discuss how ARSOF may use these pre-existing components of the OE, this article first discusses the nature of these components, then explores some specific ways in which ARSOF and existing elements of the OE may support each other.

Perspective on the Systems Perspective (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 05/18/2009 - 10:25pm | 0 comments
Embedded

A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army

reviewed by Major Niel Smith, Small Wars Journal

Embedded (Full PDF Article)

Embedded: A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army by Wesley Gray, Naval Institute Press, 2009, 256 pages.

Embedded presents a tale not often told among the growing collection of memoirs by former company grade officers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Marine Capt. Wesley Gray served as an embedded combat adviser with an Iraqi battalion in Haditha, Iraq, during 2006. Gray deserves great credit for shining the spotlight the critical effort to develop competent Iraqi security forces. For those who have never had the pleasure of closely working as an embed, Gray's narrative reveals the herculean challenges that most combat advisers face.

Although limited in scope to his location and time in Iraq, the situations he encounters are common to most advisers in Iraq. Gray's account of his learning curve is the strongest aspect of the book.

Embedded (Full PDF Article)

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 05/15/2009 - 12:41am | 14 comments
The Pope

by Dalton Fury, Small Wars Journal

The Pope (Full PDF Article)

Behind his back we referred to him simply as SAM or Stan the Man. Always with reverence and respect of course. Later on, about the time he started to wear shiny silver stars, we started to refer to him as The Pope.

LTG Stanley McChrystal's meteoric rise through the ranks is no surprise to anyone that has ever had the opportunity to work for or with him. I was fortunate, from a subordinate officer perspective, on numerous occasions.

Few know the facts just yet as to why GEN McKeirnan was moved out of command in Afghanistan. Regardless of the reasons, and I'm certainly not read on to the scuttlebutt, I do know that America's interests, America's warriors, and America's mission in Afghanistan couldn't be in better hands under LTG McChrystal. My biggest concern is that I hope the senior officers in Afghanistan soon to be under LTG McChrystal's command are well rested.

The Pope (Full PDF Article)