Small Wars Journal

Journal

Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.

We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/08/2010 - 4:48am | 30 comments
Is There an Islamic Way of War?

by Major Mehar Omar Khan

Download the full article: Is There an Islamic Way of War?

Times have surely changed since that noon of March 10, 1982, when President Ronald Reagan dedicated the March 22nd launch of the Columbia Space Shuttle to the valiant Afghans and termed their struggle (Jihad) against the occupation forces of Soviet Union as a representation of 'man's highest aspirations for freedom'. While I remorsefully recognize any nation's right to change and chop morality in the service of supreme national interest, I refuse to respect those dishonest historians and scare-mongering 'experts' who consider it their right to drag a great faith and its messenger into this ugly fight over heaps of sands that hide a lot of oil.

I profess and practice the same great faith as Osama bin Laden and yet the country that I have pledged my life to has lost more than 2500 soldiers and tens of thousands of civilians in our hot pursuit of Bin Laden's gang over the last ten years. Thousands of Muslims across the world have died in the bloodshed caused by large armies of proud nations and small bands of determined fanatics resolved to bomb themselves into paradise. To say that any religion, let alone Islam, can condone or approve killing of innocent bystanders is not only ridiculous but also a lie that has already had catastrophic consequences for humanity. This wholesale branding and stereotyping of a faith, that essentially is a literal extension of Judeo-Christian religious tradition, has pitched two sister civilizations against each other. Evil arguments and wicked debates nurtured in the dark hatcheries of criminal minds have engendered seemingly insurmountable levels of misunderstanding, distrust and animosity.

Fear mongering has become the fastest growing industry over the last ten years in the global fight against terrorism. Thousands of books and articles written by self-proclaimed terror experts, war correspondents and regional gurus have perpetrated intellectual sabotage on the unsuspecting minds of readers and viewers. No limits seem to have been respected in the exercise of intelligence and intellect in defining the 'enemy'. With dehumanization of faceless terrorists, many a legitimate freedom struggle and a whole faith professed by no less than 1.5 billion people have been condemned. Unfortunately, countless sane minds have fallen prey to the vagaries of dishonest words and perverted pictures.

Download the full article: Is There an Islamic Way of War?

Major Mehar Omar Khan, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as a peacekeeper in Sierra Leone, a Brigade GSO-III, an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul, and as Chief of Staff (Brigade Major) of an infantry brigade. He has also completed the Command and Staff Course at Pakistan's Command and Staff College in Quetta.

by Michael Yon | Mon, 03/08/2010 - 3:59am | 0 comments
Of Concern

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Of Concern

Monday, 08 March 2010

Kandahar, Afghanistan

Yesterday, an American involved in the war effort handed me a document. It was an email from a Lieutenant Colonel in the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan. His unit is in combat seven days a week. To be clear, I did not get the email from the officer and I have never met him.

The email is about the abysmal, unsafe conditions which some of our most dedicated troops are living in, at a remote base run by the Spanish military in Afghanistan. All deletions [xxx] are by me. I have the entire email. The serious and disturbing allegations are found in the second and third paragraphs.

Please note, that the failure to support permanent US troops at this Spanish base constitutes real negligence about their ultimate safety. And that comes on top of a degree of harassment that is shocking among allies.

Download the full article: Of Concern

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/04/2010 - 4:31am | 33 comments
The Tribal Path -- A Better Alternative?

by Ken Guest, 'RAM' Seeger and Lucy Morgan Edwards

Download the full article: The Tribal Path -- A Better Alternative?

The current internationally agreed strategy for Afghanistan is unlikely to work as it has been based on flawed assumptions or hopes.

What Afghanistan really needs is a central government with a light but effective footprint, empowered tribal leaders, and a small, professional, well-trained army and police force in support of tribal security forces, provided by and controlled by the tribes. If these could be established and put into effect, they could revolutionise the situation in Afghanistan.

An independent and authoritative study is urgently needed to establish the viability of the tribal path and, more importantly perhaps, how to get on it and follow it successfully.

Download the full article: The Tribal Path -- A Better Alternative?

Ken Guest is a former Royal Marine and photo-journalist. He is currently working in Kabul and has now been closely involved with Afghanistan for 29 years. During their struggle against the Soviets he probably spent more time inside Afghanistan, living and working with the Mujahedin, than any other Western witness to that conflict. A sizable part of this time was with Jalalludin Haqanni, who now runs the Taliban campaign on the Eastern border. He has also drunk tea and discussed religion with Osama bin Laden. As a result of that past, he has a first hand knowledge of not just how the ordinary Afghan thinks, but how the Taliban and Al Qaeda think and act. Ken has written, contributed to and illustrated several books eg Flashpoint! and British Battles.

'RAM' Seeger is a former Royal Marine who left the corps in 1976 after commanding the Special Boat Service. He won a Military Cross with 40 Commando during the Borneo confrontation, was an instructor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and attended the Army staff college at Camberley. After leaving the Corps he set up a Special Force for the Sultan of Oman and then became a security consultant. During the early 1980s he made a number of trips into occupied Afghanistan to give training and help to the Mujahedin. Most of these were to the Panshir valley and for the benefit of the followers of Ahmed Shah Massoud. After this he did an MA degree in War Studies at King's College London. In 2001 he lobbied for Western support of Abdul Hak, along with Ken Guest and another friend and colleague -- Sir John Gunston.

Lucy Morgan Edwards first worked in Afghanistan running urban development projects in Kandahar and Herat. After spending five years there as a journalist and election monitor she became political advisor to Francesc Vendrell, the EU Special Representative. She is currently writing a book on Abdul Haq, and like Ken and RAM, feels that the West missed a great opportunity by not backing him in 2001. She is married to the Director of Law for the International Committee of the Red Cross.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/03/2010 - 5:26am | 0 comments
Addressing the Zawahirist Outsurgency

by James Q. Roberts

Download the full article: Addressing the Zawahirist Outsurgency

We can debate whether we are at war with Al Qaeda, but rest assured Al Qaeda is at war with us. The targets, methods, diversity, geographic dispersion, and lethality or near lethality of the recent series of Al Qaeda inspired attacks should cause us to reassess the very nature of this conflict.

Attacks in the last few months include a shooting spree by U.S. Army Major Dr. Nidal Hasan, at Fort Hood; an attempted aircraft bombing by Abdulmuttalab, a Nigerian, over Detroit; an axe attack by Muhamed Geele, a Somali, in Denmark; and a precision suicide bombing by Dr. al-Bawali, a Jordanian, in Khost, Afghanistan. Only al-Balawi had ever been to Afghanistan or Pakistan; and he was apparently sent there by the Jordanian intelligence service, perhaps with help or urging by our Central Intelligence Agency.

These events show that Al Qaeda franchisees are operating without need of direction from the corporate headquarters. Al Qaeda today is a flat, dispersed, multi-celled structure which executes on "commander's intent" not waiting for orders from above. Actors self radicalize, seek out and connect with inspirational figures like Al Aulaqi in Yemen, and execute plots independent of commands from senior leaders.

This paper proposes a change in our approach. It argues that Al Qaeda is conducting an "outsurgency"- similar to, but different from - an insurgency. Furthermore, that this movement is underpinned by virulent and violent Zawahirist ideology, and that containment (as in the context of the Cold War) and counterinsurgency doctrines might be adapted to form the basis of an improved U.S. national strategy to combat Al Qaeda.

Download the full article: Addressing the Zawahirist Outsurgency

James Q. Roberts is the Principal Director (Special Operations and Combating Terrorism), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

These are his personal observations, and do not represent OSD, DoD, or USG policy.

by Nathan Springer | Mon, 03/01/2010 - 8:40pm | 16 comments

Implementing a Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Strategy

Northeast Afghanistan, May 07 -- July 08

by Major Nathan Springer

Download the full article: Implementing a Population-Centric COIN Strategy

This paper will examine the successful implementation of population-centric counterinsurgency strategy in northeastern Afghanistan through the lens of my experiences executing it in my area of operations as an Army Troop Commander from May 2007 -- January 2008 and as the Squadron Fires Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) Officer in Charge, responsible for the squadron's application of non-lethal effects in the northern Konar provincial districts of Naray and Ghaziabad and the eastern Nuristan provincial district of Kamdesh. I will recount how my unit, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, 173rd ABCT, arrived at the decision to apply a population-centric strategy and will outline the differences between an enemy-centric and population-centric focus, the transition points between the two strategies and within the population-centric strategy, and implementation of the population-centric strategy by line of operation. Finally, I will describe a battlefield calculus in terms of the time, patience, and personal relationships required to immediately empower the traditional Afghan leadership and population, from the village and the tribal levels on up, and at the same time marginalize and isolate the insurgency.

I have had the privilege of deploying to both Iraq and Afghanistan where I witnessed the implementation of two disparate strategies within the context of the War on Terror. My first deployment, OIF II in 2004-05, was set in Iraq's Sunni Triangle within a Squadron Area of Operation (AO) that stretched from Samarra north to Tikrit. My Squadron implemented an enemy-centric strategy. The enemy-centric strategy worked well in the most volatile central and southern portions of our expansive AO but we failed to recognize the situation was different in our northern AO. I didn't know it then but our Squadron missed a potentially game-changing 'transition point' in that portion of our AO. A transition point is a key juncture where the operating environment necessitates the implementation of a new strategy or the adaptation of an existing strategy to accommodate the fluid conditions on the ground. It would take a deployment to Afghanistan in 2007-08 and the implementation of a population-centric strategy for me to fully digest this and to assign full relevance to transition points, whether they represented a 180 shift from a wholly enemy-centric to a population-centric strategy, like our missed opportunity in Iraq, or the simple recognition of the transition points within our population-centric strategy in Afghanistan.

Download the full article: Implementing a Population-Centric COIN Strategy

Major Nathan Springer, U.S. Army, is Chief of Operations of the U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

by Michael Yon | Thu, 02/25/2010 - 10:12am | 0 comments
From Canada: A Thank You to U.S. Service Members

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: A Thank You to U.S. Service Members

Dear Michael Yon,

Today we were sent your story of February 14, 2010. The "unknown" Canadian is our son Danny. He is a 23-year-old solider from Vancouver, Canada.

Your photographs were extraordinary and have impacted so many people here in Canada. There has been an outpouring of affection for the Americans who helped Danny in his moment of need. For that, we thank you for recording these acts of kindness into history.

Danny's injuries were the result of an explosion on February 12, 2010. Four Canadian soldiers were injured and tragically one Canadian soldier was killed. Within 20 minutes of the explosion, Danny was airlifted by helicopter to Kandahar. Upon arrival he received emergency surgery that saved his life and prepared him for the flight to Bagram that you were on.

After landing in Bagram, Danny was again airlifted by a US transport aircraft to the US Army run Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. There he underwent additional surgery that closed up his wounds. Once stabilized, the Canadian government dispatched a Challenger jet to bring him home. This afternoon in Vancouver, the shrapnel that did all the damage to him was finally removed. Danny is now recovering in hospital.

This was Danny's second tour of duty in Afghanistan and his platoon on this tour has had heavy causalities and injuries. Physically, Danny will overcome his injuries. He also has the support of his family, his friends and his community to deal with the emotional side of this war. Our hearts go out to those families who have had the loss of a solider or who have had to deal with greater injuries.

Danny and his whole family are very grateful, and are actually overwhelmed, by the support he received while in US care. The Canadian military have also been wonderful. It is our intention to personally thank everyone who worked so hard to save Danny's life. We have already made contact with Major Deborah "Lucy" Lehker to thank her.

Sincerely,

Jim & Holly

Download the full article: A Thank You to U.S. Service Members

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by Gary Anderson | Wed, 02/24/2010 - 8:58pm | 4 comments
Counterinsurgency vs. Counterterrorism:

A Civilian's View

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency vs. Counterterrorism

Every twenty years or so, our Army has a furious internal debate over what kind of army it wants to be. We are not talking about an argument over civilian driven social experimentation such as the controversy over gays in the military; this one involves basic disagreement on how America's Army should doctrinally fight. With the exception of the Roman Catholic Church, nobody cherishes doctrine more than the U.S. Army and Air Force. The Marines consider doctrine to be a polite suggestion, and the Navy generally refuses to recognize the concept altogether.

The current debate raging among Army professionals is over how we should deal with insurgencies such as Iraq and Afghanistan. One side holds that the best way to defeat an insurgency is to win over the populace; this is loosely called population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN). The other school holds that the correct course is to kill the insurgents and destroy their cadres; this is known as counterterrorism (CT). The debate is less about tactics than it is about the future philosophical orientation of the Army beyond Afghanistan.

Download the full article: Counterinsurgency vs. Counterterrorism

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel. He recently left the State Department after a year tour in Iraq.

by Michael Yon | Mon, 02/22/2010 - 10:20am | 0 comments
Whispers

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Whispers

Around Afghanistan

22 February 2010

"Johnny Boy" Captain John Holland was walking out to the aircraft just as I arrived at the flight line.

Captain Holland asked, "Are you ready?"

"Yes Sir."

The Marjah offensive—billed as the biggest US/NATO/Afghan assault on the Taliban ever—had begun. With it, the attention of nearly all the reporters covering Afghanistan is focused on Marjah. Yet fighting continues across the country, in provinces with names unfamiliar to most people. Men and women are wounded. Some die. Some are saved by dedicated medical crews, and by the pilots who fly into combat to ferry wounded to some of the best trauma facilities in the world, right here in Afghanistan. This story is about the people who care for our troops, wounded correspondents, and many other people, day in, day out.

Download the full article: Whispers

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 02/21/2010 - 9:15pm | 0 comments
Supporting the ISAF Campaign Plan: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Prepares to Support the International Security Force

by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Tilbrook (Australian Army), Lieutenant Colonel Frank Elgin (Netherlands Army), Lieutenant Colonel Ian Kippen (British Army), and Major Grant Martin (U.S. Army)

Download the full article: Supporting the ISAF Campaign Plan

At the end of the 2010 London Conference on Afghanistan, the government of the United Kingdom announced that "a more stable and secure Afghanistan is vital to our national security and to that of the wider world." The plan for the Afghans to take the lead in their own security by early 2011 came with an increase in Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 305,000, enhanced provincial and lower-level government capability, and measures to tackle corruption. These are demanding tasks, given the increase in recent violence. Promises of International debt relief and aid could mean little without stability, but stability is untenable without security and legitimate governance. So what are we doing to achieve this vision of a stable and secure Afghanistan?

On 21 November 2009, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the U.S. Headquarters charged with training and advising the Afghan Police, Army, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Defense closed its doors. Well, not quite. CSTC-A never really went away; for political and monetary reasons it still exists, mainly to provide a link to U.S. funding and activities beyond the remit of Coalition Nations. What took its place is a new, 3-star General Officer Headquarters: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), commanded by Lieutenant-General William B. Caldwell IV, recently the commander of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, KS. Elevating the command to a 3-star position was more than a symbol of President Obama's refocusing of the effort in Afghanistan on building the capacity of the ANSF, the new command comes with a possible increase of $15 billion over the next three years and the transfer of authority for training fully to NATO.

Download the full article: Supporting the ISAF Campaign Plan

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas S. Tilbrook (Australian Army), Lieutenant Colonel Frank Elgin (Netherlands Army), Lieutenant Colonel Ian Kippen (British Army), and Major Grant Martin (U.S. Army) are assigned to the headquarters of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 02/20/2010 - 9:29pm | 0 comments
Jump Starting Your Professional Reading Program:

A Six-Pack of Books

by Captain Kelly Jones and Major Scott Shaw

Download the full article: Jump Starting Your Professional Reading Program

Full Disclosure: We, the authors of this article, are die-hard readers. We love reading, especially anything that can help make us and our Soldiers more effective leaders in this profession of ours in which learning is an absolute imperative. We've incorporated professional reading into our personal development, and we've integrated it as a fundamental part of our leader development program in our units. Additionally, over the past four years we have led the "Pro Reading" part of the Platoon Leader and Company Command online professional forums, which members can find at http://ProReading.army.mil. In that role, we've been exposed to what other members of the profession are reading and what books are making an impact on leaders across our Army.

If one thing is clear about our current fight, it is that junior leaders are being given much more autonomy than many of us ever had. In order to deal with the ever increasing responsibilities of today's platoon leaders, we, the company commanders and field grade officers of our Army, must give these young bucks and buckettes the tools to succeed. This includes the nurturing of analytical skills (Troop Leading Procedures) in conjunction with the intuitive leadership skills that are necessary in combat, and the ability to deal with the aftermath of combat as well. The question is how to do that without breaking the bank. When the price of a platoon leader learning his or her trade could be the life of a Soldier or several Soldiers, then we owe it to those Soldiers to educate their leaders before entering the fray.

One powerful way to develop your leaders is through a professional reading program. The fundamental assumption informing this article is that professional reading is critical not only to individual development but also to collective learning and development in our units. Many of you are undoubtedly saying, "It's too hard. My platoon leaders aren't interested. And, I don't have the time to do it when I am in between deployments." We hear what you are saying and counter it with, "If we could figure out how to do it, then you can too." A dedicated professional reading program costs the unit less than a hundred dollars -- and if you have a library near-by, possibly nothing -- and builds the mental Rolodex of a platoon leader.

To jump-start a reading program, you have to start out with some sort of "What do I want to get out of this?" question. That may seem intuitive, but many leaders just throw out random books, and the result is less than desirable. With the hundreds of books and multitudes of reading lists out there for a platoon leader, how do you narrow down the scope of your reading to what is applicable to you? We don't have the answer, but we would like to share some suggestions. Based on our experience, we offer six books that we believe are classic volumes to give to platoon leaders to start discussion on issues from the tactical to the ethical and everything in between.

Download the full article: Jump Starting Your Professional Reading Program

Captain Kelly S Jones is a recent graduate of the Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course and is the Executive Officer of a Civil Affairs Company. He received a B.S. from Clarion University of Pennsylvania. His military education includes Mounted Officer Basic Course, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Airborne and the Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course. He has served both as a Platoon Leader and Executive Officer in 1-34 AR, Fort Riley, Kansas and Iraq.

Major Scott Shaw is the Bde AS-3 in 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry Division. He received a B.S. from the University of Arkansas, an M.A. from Norwich University, and an M.M.A.S from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served as a Headquarters and Rifle Company Commander in Afghanistan and Iraq and led a Battalion Military Transition Team in Iraq.

Kelly and Scott continue to work with CompanyCommand.com's Pro-Reading Forum and welcome comments and ideas to help promote professional reading at the company and battalion level.

by William McCallister | Sat, 02/20/2010 - 7:48pm | 50 comments
The Men Who Would Govern Marjah

by William S. McCallister

Download the full article: The Men Who Would Govern Marjah

Initial reports are optimistic. The combined Afghan and Coalition forces have successfully penetrated into the Taliban heartland and are well on their way toward securing a key population center. Taliban resistance is weak and disorganized. The local market-place has been liberated from the poppy-mafia. The Afghan national flag flies once again over Marjah.

The popular press describes the battle for Marjah in simple cause and effect narratives. The Taliban, disorganized and weak have quit the town. Civil administrators stand ready to assume the reigns of governance and to initiate economic reforms. Economic development projects will attract the local population to the central government. Enhanced security will encourage the locals to pledge their loyalty to the Karzai regime.

Reshaping the political economy of Marjah is a critical task in winning Afghanistan's population centric counterinsurgency. Afghan forces must be able to compel law and order, impose taxes and draft manpower. They must build new schools, set up health clinics, upgrade the irrigation system, fix the roads and convince farmers and merchants to cultivate and sell something other than poppies and opium. The premise is simple: secure the market-place, fix, upgrade and adapt the infrastructure, administer market commodities and you command the population.

While simple cause and effect narratives make for good reading, cultural complexity is inseparable from the study of cause and effect, especially in a place like Marjah. We continually espouse what we believe ought to happen but rarely how a given political or economic initiative might actually play itself out within a given cultural context. What might the Afghan approach to gaining a foothold in Marjah look like? How might the landowners, merchants and farmers, civil administrators, leaders of the Afghan National Army (ANA), local police, local fighters, and allies of the Taliban interact with one another? How might the imposition of government authority in Marjah play itself out? How might elements of the ANA and police support government administrators in imposing a central authority?

Download the full article: The Men Who Would Govern Marjah

William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. While on active duty, McCallister served in numerous infantry and special operations assignments specializing in civil-military, psychological and information operations. He is a published author in military affairs and tribal warfare and has guest lectured at Johns Hopkins University and presented numerous papers at academic and government sponsored conferences such as the Watson Institute, Brown University, Department of the Navy Science and Technology, DARPA, and the Central Intelligence Agency. He has also appeared as a guest on National Public Radio (NPR). McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International (AKI). He continues to study current events in Iraq and Afghanistan in tribal terms, including the tribal art of war and peace, tribal mediation processes, development of tribal centers of power, and tribal influence in political developments.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 02/19/2010 - 5:26pm | 0 comments

Download Volume 6, No. 2

Small Wars Journal Volume 6, No. 2 includes the winners of Question #1 from our

writing competition. 

Question #2 winners were published in

Issue No. 1.  Congratulations

to:

$3,000 Grand Prize winner, "Being Feared and Not Being Hated Can Go

Together Very Well":  The Problem of Population Control and Legitimacy

in Stability Operations, by Dr. Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh

$500 Honorable Mention, No Silver Bullet: Establishing Enduring Governance and Security

through Micro Level Actions, by Brad Fultz

$500 Honorable Mention,  Towards a Comprehensive Understanding of

Violence in Small Wars, by William Harris

 We are also pleased to present:

How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2020: A Warning from the Future,

by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

Book Excerpt: 

Senator's Son: An Iraq War Novel, by Luke S. Larson

The Scope of Security In a Small War, by Joel Iams

Don't Try to Arrest the Sea, An Alternative Approach for

Afghanistan, by Major Mehar Omar Khan (previously

published in Small Wars Journal)

Download Volume 6, No. 2

by Michael Yon | Thu, 02/18/2010 - 1:50pm | 1 comment
Adam Ray

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Adam Ray

18 February 2010

Kandahar, Afghanistan

On Feb. 9th, in a field near a road, an Afghan soldier squatted to relieve himself. He picked the wrong spot. A bomb exploded, blowing off a leg, and he died. Captain John Weatherly, Commander of Charlie Company of the 4-23 Infantry at FOB Price in Helmand Province, mentioned that in passing as he described the series of events that led to the death of Specialist -- now Sergeant -- Adam Ray, a vigorous 23 year old, born in Tampa, Florida. The bomb the Afghan stumbled upon was near the IED that struck Adam.

Without the thousands of culverts underneath, the roads of Afghanistan would be flooded and washed away during the snow melts and rains. In safe countries, drivers pay as little attention to culverts as we would to telephone poles. As a practical matter they are invisible to us.

In the war zone that is Afghanistan, life and limb depend on noticing normally mundane things like culverts. They are a favorite hiding spot for the Taliban to plant bombs intended to kill Americans driving the roads. Hundreds, even thousands of pounds of explosives can be stuffed inside, launching our vehicles into the sky, flipping them over and over, sometimes killing all. And so, in some areas, soldiers on missions must stop dozens of times to check culverts for explosives. Since we do this every day in front of thousands of Afghans, they know our patterns. In addition to planting bombs in culverts, they plant mines and other bombs near culverts, to get men who stop to check.

Download the full article: Adam Ray

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 02/18/2010 - 10:24am | 14 comments
Half-Hearted: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women

by Captain Matt Pottinger, Hali Jilani, and Claire Russo

Download the full article: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women

By fits and starts, United States and allied military forces are realizing how difficult it will be to win the war in Afghanistan without half its population, the Afghan women.

One of the few military efforts aimed at earning the support of women began a year ago when a handful of female U.S. Marines and a civilian linguist formed the first "Female Engagement Team" (pronounced "FET"). The team visited rural Pashtun women in their homes and distributed humanitarian supplies, in the process earning the goodwill of women who, before they had spoken with the Marine team, had viewed international troops with fear.

Since then, more FETs have stood up. The 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade now employs several teams on an intermittent basis in southern Afghanistan. U.S. soldiers and airmen in the country's east run FETs that, in cooperation with district governments, teach health classes to local women. All international and Afghan security forces were ordered in November to establish FETs of their own.

Download the full article: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women

Captain Matt Pottinger is a U.S. Marine based at International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters in Kabul. He co-founded and trained the first Female Engagement Team in February 2009.

Hali Jilani is a Pashtun-American who has worked at the grassroots level in war and conflict zones for two decades. Fluent in Pashto, she is serving in southern Afghanistan as Task Force Leatherneck's cultural advisor.

Claire Russo is a civilian advisor to the U.S. Army in eastern Afghanistan. She deployed as a Marine officer to Anbar Province, Iraq, in 2006.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 02/17/2010 - 6:06am | 7 comments
Seven Pillars of Ambiguity

by David Mason

Download the full article: Seven Pillars of Ambiguity

These thoughts are penned a few weeks short of a yearlong tour to Iraq. Having worked in cultures across continents in a variety of roles over a number of years, I thought the approach outlined in this paper might be of use to others working in different cultures generally and Arab culture in particular. So, imagine this, you are on your way to Iraq or Afghanistan to be an Advisor where you will likely sit down with a host government official.

TE Lawrence and Ricklefs talk about what you must do. They provide Articles and Rules. This paper on the other hand, outlines what you do not know.

The Seven Pillars of Ambiguity are those things that, unless you are native to the country, you can never really know. What you can do however, is recognize your knowledge gap and work to close it. By understanding the pillars and working to inform yourself, you will feel more confident as an Advisor, and better able to usefully and meaningfully contribute to the mission.

These points are not rules to live by. Rather, they are a test. They set out what you do not know and challenge you to research and try to understand. While they are interdependent, sometimes one will be more important than another, or not be important at all. If you are planning on being an interlocutor, a middle man between one culture and another, these are the things you must think about before you go, to prepare yourself for your deployment. They might be useful when you get there too.

Download the full article: Seven Pillars of Ambiguity

David Mason is a former French Foreign Legion paratrooper, former Senior Advisor in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, and three times in Iraq, as Policy Advisor to the Australian Commander, Senior Advisor in the Iraqi Ministries of Defence and Interior. He is also international lawyer specializing in the Laws of War, and a Reserve Major in the Australian Army Legal Corps. He formerly held the role as Counsel, International Law, in the Australian Department of Defence. Among other academic qualifications he holds an LLM from the Australian National University and is a Barrister of the High Court of Australia.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 02/15/2010 - 11:51pm | 42 comments
R.I.P. Mr. Charles Wilson, Father of the Taliban

by Major Jeremy Kotkin

Download the full article: R.I.P. Mr. Charles Wilson, Father of the Taliban

"The enemy of my enemy is my friend." This proverb which has become a mainstay of foreign policy courses of action has, in fact, pushed the United States to make horrifically misguided and ignorant decisions about how to view challenges across the globe and the ways and means used to confront them. With this proverb in mind, and often with the best of intentions in tow, organs of U.S. national security have walked blindly into situations where our own ignorance became the single most crippling factor to long term success of a program. In turn, this has allowed U.S. strategy to be high jacked by naí¯ve and/or stunningly blinded officials and officers entrusted with defense of our nation. One such official was the Honorable Charles N. Wilson of Texas. His fervent and black and white view of a problem led him to get into bed with a culture, a paradigm, and a mission which had positively no bearing on our national security. Unknowingly, he coupled U.S. foreign policy with a growing and insatiable malevolent influence in the region, and still today, 30 years later, we cannot extricate ourselves from it. The poison he and idealists such as him injected into the veins of our foreign policy runs that deep.

This essay is not simply an interpretation of history to condemn the legacy of a politician. To be sure, the causal events were not Mr. Wilson's doing alone. Two presidencies and a heavy involvement of a handful of CIA officers (who, since rising up the political ladder, are now responsible for current DoD policy) agreed with Mr. Wilson's call to arms and orchestrated and funded his goals. Mr. Wilson has a laudable history of altruistic domestic policies and exertions. Unfortunately, they are not the endowment he will be remembered for. The overriding goal here is to provide a warning for future Strategists. Solutions to wicked problems must be found from within the entire environment of systems and their context in time. Mr. Wilson's solution was, unfortunately, the easy way out which made no effort to consider second- and third-order effects. No realistic appreciation was given to what system we were injecting ourselves into. Finally, this essay is also a condemnation of proxy wars. In the author's view, it is foreign policy cowardice. Using unwitting "means" as the ways to our ends is abhorrent. Abhorrent even when, on the surface, it seems like a noble cause or that the goals of the puppet are temporarily the same as the master. It is as detestable when the Iranians share shaped-charge technology with Arab insurgents to murder Americans as it was to get Afghan mujahedeen to our geopolitical dirty work.

Download the full article: R.I.P. Mr. Charles Wilson, Father of the Taliban

The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Major Jeremy Kotkin entered the US Air Force as a communicator in 1995. He spent 12 years in the USAF and among numerous other overseas assignments, deployed to Italy and Bosnia with NATO/SFOR for Operation JOINT FORGE. In 2008, he performed an inter-service transfer to the US Army and entered as a Functional Area-59, Strategist, assigned to the J5 shop at USSOCOM. In 2009 he was selected to become part of CJCS's Afghan Hands Program and is currently attending Dari language training.

by Michael Yon | Mon, 02/15/2010 - 10:41pm | 10 comments
Patterns

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Patterns

This is a story of warfighting and technology, and what life is like on the ground for our troops, as they do their best in war.

Last night a soldier from the 82nd Airborne Division was killed. The attack occurred just hours before the 82nd was to relieve 1-17th Infantry from duties in portions of the Arghandab River Valley near Kandahar.

Earlier that morning, soldiers from 1st Platoon, B-company (1-17th) had taken me on a short, easy mission out to a micro-base called "Brick 1." The Platoon leader was 1st Lieutenant Ryan Fadden, while SFC Dimico was the platoon sergeant. The platoon was ready. Despite the filthy environment, weapons were clean, the gear was sorted and the men were in good spirits and a business-like frame of mind. They seemed confident. It looked like Lieutenant Fadden and SFC Dimico were on their jobs. The battalion had lost 21 men KIA during the first several months of combat—the Brigade lost 31. An article was about to be published in the Army Times which might lead one to believe that the 1-17th is not combat-ready. The author, Sean Naylor, is as highly respected as he is experienced, and so his words are taken seriously. Yet during my first week, despite serious stresses in some places, the men seemed ready.

And so 1st Platoon drove in their Strykers from COP Jelawur, stopping a couple kilometers away from a small ANA (Afghan National Army) base just on the edge of the Green Zone of the Arghandab River near Kandahar. The heavy Stryker ramps hissed and dropped with a dull thump. The soldiers piled from the backs of the four machines. Two white dogs with wagging tails greeted the men, and the men greeted the dogs as if they were old buddies.

Download the full article: Patterns

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 02/14/2010 - 8:33pm | 7 comments
Jihad of the Pen

A Practitioners Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency

Special to the Small Wars Journal

by Colonel G. L. Lamborn, USAR (Ret.)

Download the full article: Jihad of the Pen

This small work is dedicated to all those who use the power of their minds guided by courage, humility, resourcefulness and compassion to achieve a better world in which the forces of tyranny, hatred, fanaticism, and ignorance are defeated.

In reading this small work, the practitioner must keep in mind the following. In Islam, the concept of "jihad" (the Arabic word means "struggle") consists of two aspects. The Lesser Jihad -- with which the world is unfortunately somewhat familiar -- is defined as "armed resistance in defense of the faith and the Believers,"—but only under prescribed conditions and under properly authorized leadership.

What most non-Muslims do not know is that in Islam the Greater Jihad is the struggle that takes place inwardly -- within each soul and person. It is a great struggle to conquer one's own evil and base desires, and triumph over one's own ignorance, barbarity and spiritual darkness. The Greater Jihad is Islam's great challenge to build a better world, one Believer at a time. Unfortunately, thanks to the cruel deeds of a relatively small number of extremists, the newspaper version of "jihad" has imprinted only a warped definition of the Lesser Jihad as meaning torture, murder, fanaticism, hatred, and xenophobia.

I chose the title "Jihad of the Pen" partly because the Prophet had once said: "The ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr." In part, the title also derives from my fervent belief that the jihad of the pen is the battle all people must wage against ignorance everywhere. Each primary school student today, whether in America or Afghanistan, is carrying on his or her personal "Jihad of the Pen." For it is only through education and a true spirituality that enlightenment -- and peace on Earth -- can someday be realized. And for those of us who must fight the forces of an evil new Dark Age on the battlefield of ideas, "Jihad of the Pen" is equally appropriate. Firepower cannot defeat an Idea; only a better and more compelling Idea can overcome its cruel adversary. When spurred to action by blind hatred and fanaticism, ignorance is mankind's greatest enemy.

Ours is truly a struggle of the pen.

Download the full article: Jihad of the Pen

The author wishes to offer his grateful thanks to the following individuals for their help, expert advice, encouragement, and professional fellowship over the years. Several of the following individuals offered timely, insightful comments on this work while it was still in draft. All contributed over the years to the author's understanding of political warfare and influence operations in support of counterinsurgency efforts.

Dr. Arturo G. Munoz, RAND Corporation; Colonel Grant Newsham, USMC; Dr. John J. LeBeau, George C. Marshall Center; Dr. John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Dr. David Kilcullen, The Crumpton Group; and Dr. Amin Tarzi, Marine Corps University. Special thanks go to Mr. Jack Shea, Department of Defense, Mr. Jason H. Campbell, RAND Corporation; and Captain David M. Lamborn, U.S. Army, for reviewing the manuscript on their own time and making valuable suggestions.

Special thanks also are due to Ms. Cassandra Sheehan for her help with the text, especially with regard to the charts, footnotes and bibliography and to Mr. Tor Achekzai, The MASY Group, who reviewed the Pashto-language proposed military Code of Conduct found in section 23. Author also wishes to thank many others who, though not named, at various times in the author's past have been of assistance. All are deeply appreciated.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 02/13/2010 - 9:02pm | 1 comment
Health Engagement in Foreign Internal Defense

by Colonel Edwin K. Burkett

Download the full article: Health Engagement in Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is the "participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency." Health engagement can be an invaluable component of all types of military actions and can be particularly useful in FID operations as U.S. joint medical personnel can be employed across the full spectrum of operations and span the entire spectrum of FID. Although it has played an important role in almost all conflicts dating back several centuries, health engagement is only recently being recognized as an important component of security cooperation. The type of health engagement employed will vary according to the current capabilities of both the partner nation military (and / or other designated security forces) medical forces and the partner civilian health sector and their respective roles in that nation's Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program. Health engagement by U.S. forces may include varying degrees of military-to-military activities as well as Medical Civil-Military Operations (MCMO) if indicated in accordance with the host military needs. Commander objectives will determine the appropriate balance given the situation at hand. In some countries the military and civilian health systems may be completely separate while in other nations the two systems may be integrated, necessitating a unified approach.

Health sector support to FID may be direct or indirect. Direct support often involves training and mentoring partner military medical forces and can occur at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Training is focused to assist the development of a partner military health system that enhances the operational capacity and capability of its forces. Indirect support might include security assistance, personnel exchange programs, and multinational exercises. The desired outcome is long-range, self-sustaining or self-perpetuating improvements in the host nation's health sector that support and enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the host nation military. Accomplishing these objectives typically requires U.S. military medical forces to partner with other U.S. Government agencies to help address nation-specific political, governance, legal, economic, technological, and cultural aspects of FID, especially as they impact the health sector.

In addition, mil-to-mil FID activities may indirectly impact the civilian health system; therefore, careful advance planning must be done to ensure that any indirect effects are accounted for appropriately. In addition to long-term efforts that build host nation health sector capacity; short-term support of critical areas by U.S. health forces, such as serving as health advisors in combat, can also be effective FID tools that meet critical temporary partner needs or catalyze capacity building actions by the partner.

Download the full article: Health Engagement in Foreign Internal Defense

Colonel (Dr.) Edwin K. Burkett is the Chief, Global Health Branch, in the Office of the Command Surgeon, United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. Col Burkett is a Family Physician, Flight Surgeon, and Air Force International Health Specialist with skills in foreign language and culture, civil-military cooperation, and operational health engagement. Col Burkett co-authored a USJFCOM White Paper entitled Emerging Challenges in Medical Stability Operations and has presented health engagement related topics at several military medicine conferences and training venues.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 02/13/2010 - 11:09am | 15 comments

Criminal Insurgency in the Americas

 

by John P. Sullivan

Download the full article: Criminal Insurgency in the Americas

Transnational criminal organizations and gangs are threatening state institutions throughout the Americas. In extreme circumstances, cartels, gangs or maras, drug trafficking organizations, and their paramilitary enforcers are waging de facto criminal insurgencies to free themselves from the influence of the state.

A wide variety of criminal gangs are waging war amongst themselves and against the state. Rampant criminal violence enabled by corruption and weak state institutions has allowed some criminal enterprises to develop virtual or parallel states. These contested or "temporary autonomous" zones create what theorist John Robb calls "hollow states" with areas where the legitimacy of the state is severely challenged. These fragile, sometimes lawless zones (or criminal enclaves) cover territory ranging from individual neighborhoods, favelas or colonias to entire cities—such as Ciudad Juaréz—to large segments of exurban terrain in Guatemala's Petén province, and sparsely policed areas on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua.

As a consequence, the Americas are increasingly besieged by the violence and corrupting influences of criminal actors exploiting stateless territories (criminal enclaves and mafia-dominated municipalities) linked to the global criminal economy to build economic muscle and, potentially, political might.

Download the full article: Criminal Insurgency in the Americas

John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010).

by Michael Yon | Thu, 02/11/2010 - 1:23am | 0 comments
Seven

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Seven

American forces are stationed at bases far and wide around Afghanistan. Some bases are like towns, such as Camp Bastion, Kandahar Airfield, and Bagram Airfield. But mostly they are small, often occupied by only a handful of troops.

Logistics into Afghanistan is a nightmare, and it only gets worse after you cross the border from the north or from Pakistan. By comparison, Iraq "logs" was like a run to a convenience store down the road. Afghan logs are more like driving from Miami to Seattle for grocery shopping, and then driving the groceries back to Miami while under threat of attack. Not a speck of exaggeration in that statement. Enemy logs interdiction was a large constituent of the Soviet defeat, despite that the Soviet Union comprised the entire northern border of Afghanistan. When the Soviet hammer tried to crack the Afghan rock, the hammer shattered. The Soviets can easily put people in space and keep them there, but they couldn't handle backdoor logistics during their Afghan war. It's easier to keep people in space than to supply our war here.

Our Coalition is stunningly more effective at logistics than were the Soviets. For instance, when the British were resupplying small FOBs near Sangin last year—just a short drive from the origin at Camp Bastion—the monthly convoys were major operations that drained needed combat power, and still vehicles were destroyed with casualties. So powerful are some of the bombs that they can launch the ultra-armored American MRAPs into the air, flipping them like turtles, often breaking the backs of soldiers. Even today, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is making moves to facilitate allies to get more counter-IED gear, such as MRAPs, which seems like a good move because some allies are risk-averse to the point of being ineffective (not that MRAPs are going to save them). By air, when a civilian helicopter was trying to resupply at Sangin, it was shot down just outside the base, killing the crew and at least one child on the ground. Make no mistake: this is a worthy enemy.

Without the U.S. Air Force, we would need thousands more troops here just to run convoys, and bringing in those troops would require more convoys to supply their needs. It's okay to use contractors to bring supplies in from Pakistan or from the north, but driving up into those mountains and other remote locations would be suicidal.

Download the full article: Seven

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 02/09/2010 - 7:32pm | 12 comments
Operational Design: Promise and Problems

by Adam Elkus and Crispin Burke

Download the full article: Operational Design: Promise and Problems

Approaches to Operational Design have become increasingly prominent in both Army and Joint contexts. Design, like all doctrines, is a product of specific political, organizational, and cultural forces, events, and influences both unique to the armed services and external to them. A product born of the US military's experience in counterinsurgency and nation-building campaigns, Design is a process best applied in the planning of campaigns and major operations. It is part of a general family of ideas inspired by FM 3-0 Operations. There are, however, substantial risks in the adoption of Design that must be addressed. Additionally, campaigning needs to be thought of as an aspect of strategy rather than a wholly separate operational level in order to best implement American strategic objectives.

We will first attempt to define the concept within the prism of recent military doctrine and the general idea of campaign design. We will then examine the doctrine's major claims about complexity in military affairs before moving on to a discussion of concerns over Design vis-a-vis more traditional planning ideas, and conclude with some recommendations about the evolution of campaign design in relationship to strategy.

Download the full article: Operational Design: Promise and Problems

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is currently Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. His articles have been published in West Point CTC Sentinel, Small Wars Journal, and other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security and The Huffington Post. He is currently a contributor to the Center for Threat Awareness' ThreatsWatch project.

Captain Crispin Burke is a UH-60 helicopter pilot with assignments in the 82nd Airborne Division during Hurricane Katrina, Joint Task Force-Bravo in Honduras, and most recently, the 10th Mountain Division in Iraq. He writes for Small Wars Journal and under the name "Starbuck" at his blog, Wings Over Iraq.

by Michael Yon | Mon, 02/08/2010 - 9:27am | 0 comments
Special Delivery

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Special Delivery

American troops are spread widely across Afghanistan. Some are remote and accessibility is difficult. In 2008, I was with six soldiers in Zabul Province who didn't even get mail for three months. They had no email. They were on the moon. Six courageous men, in the middle of nowhere, and their nearest backup was a small Special Forces team about five hours away. Resupply to these small outposts is crucial, difficult, and would require major effort by ground. Enter the United States Air Force.

Download the full article: Special Delivery

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work is published at Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media outlets all around the world.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 02/07/2010 - 8:40pm | 12 comments
Unrest in Iran:

A Test Case for Counterinsurgency Theory

by Dr. Dan G. Cox

Download the full article: A Test Case for Counterinsurgency Theory

Recent events in Iran involving the questionable election results that placed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad into his second term as president have raised the levels of public outcry and consternation both inside Iran and internationally. The political pundits and policymakers are speculating on what this means for the future of Iran and how this situation will end. The debate is premature and largely facile at this point, but what is interesting is that the initial Iranian government reaction to the potential insurgency bubbling up from disgruntled Moussavi supporters provides a well-suited test case for some of the commonly accepted counterinsurgency (COIN) tenants. An embryonic insurgent movement borne of deep resentment against the Iranian government and the de facto rulers of Iran, the Supreme Council, coupled with an extremely harsh COIN reaction creates an experimental situation which allows scholars, practitioners, and policymakers a rare opportunity to analyze, in real time, COIN theory.

Download the full article: A Test Case for Counterinsurgency Theory

Dr. Dan G. Cox is an Associate Professor of Political Science, U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies. His most recent book is Terrorism, Instability, and Democracy in Asia and Africa published in July 2009 by the University Press of New England.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 02/07/2010 - 6:21pm | 20 comments
Tribal Engagement:

The Way Forward in Afghanistan

by Steffen Merten

Download the full article: Tribal Engagement: The Way Forward in Afghanistan

Following the cooption of the powerful Shinwari tribe of eastern Afghanistan last week, it seems defense planners have finally realized the unsophisticated reality that tribes form the fabric of Afghan society. The compounded impotence of the Karzai regime and the recent successes of direct tribal engagement have highlighted the potential of empowering tribal institutions, but years after the success of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq, why are we only now choosing to tap the power centers that have driven the history of Afghanistan for centuries? Perhaps it is Afghanistan's imperial legacy, which speaks to the "ungovernable" nature of tribes that have devoured armies whole, or perhaps naive political hopes for a robust central government, a situation more or less unknown in Afghan history. A third possibility may lie in the popular myth that the "backward and anarchic" habits of tribes preclude their integration within the institutions of a modern nation-state, lest their inherently belligerent and barbaric nature lead to its ruin. Whether stalled by daydreams of a different political reality in Afghanistan or by recalcitrant Afghan elites in Kabul, recent developments suggest that warfighters and scholars like Major Jim Gant, author of "One Tribe at a Time" and an outspoken advocate of tribal engagement, seem to be gaining traction within the defense establishment. But the question remains: what will a tribal strategy spell for the future of Afghanistan?

Download the full article: Tribal Engagement: The Way Forward in Afghanistan

Steffen Merten is a Human Terrain researcher specializing in Middle Eastern tribal systems and a former social network analysis researcher at the Naval Postgraduate School Core Lab. Merten served in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003-2004 and is currently developing an integrated methodology for modeling tribal systems.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 02/04/2010 - 5:21pm | 1 comment

Download Volume 6, No. 1

We are bringing back Small Wars Journal in proper multi-article journal style

in a formatted-to-print PDF, just like we

did in the old days.  We

will continue to put out good articles as quickly as we can online, and we will

regularly assemble select content into issues.

Read on for the line-up of Small Wars Journal Volume 6, No. 1 including the winners of Question #2 from our

writing competition. 

Look for Question #1 winners in the next issue very soon.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 02/01/2010 - 8:05pm | 0 comments

Cartel v. Cartel:

 

Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus

Download the full article: Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

As the decade ends, Mexico's criminal insurgency continues. Yet the narco-war in 2010 is not identical to the violence that began three years ago. Mexico's criminal insurgency at the beginning of 2010 is distinguished by three main trends: continuing (though increasingly diffused) violence against the state, increasing militarization of the Mexican state's response, and a growing feeling of defeat among some within Mexican policy circles. Additionally, the conflict has assumed broader transnational dimensions.

On the surface, the conflict has entered into a period of seeming stasis. But it is a bloody stalemate—and the war promises to continue simmering well into this year and beyond. According to the Mexican press, 2009 may have been the bloodiest year of the war, with 7,600 Mexicans perishing in the drug war. Whatever the nature of the conflict, the danger still remains to American interests. As we have noted before, loose talk of a Mexican "failed state" obscures the real problem of a subtler breakdown of government authority and bolstering of the parallel authorities that cartels have already created.

Download the full article: Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). His research focuses on counterinsurgency, intelligence, terrorism, urban operations, and post-conflict policing. He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010).

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is currently Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. His articles have been published in West Point CTC Sentinel, Small Wars Journal, and other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security and The Huffington Post. He is currently a contributor to the Center for Threat Awareness' ThreatsWatch project.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 01/31/2010 - 10:49am | 8 comments
The al Qaeda Franchise Model

An Alternative

by Captain Joshua McLaughlin

Download the full article: The al Qaeda Franchise Model: An Alternative

This article stems from a series of posts I recently wrote at al Sahwa, and is intended to offer an alternative to the commonly accepted "franchise" model that is frequently discussed in reference to al Qaeda (AQ) on a global scale. Just a few examples of the widespread use of the word "franchise" are available here, here, here and here. My intent is not to provide an operational framework or design for AQ subordinates at the operational or tactical levels; instead, my aim is to supplant "franchise" with "conglomerate" as the most representative business model for the relationship between AQ and its affiliate groups.

Download the full article: The al Qaeda Franchise Model: An Alternative

Captain Joshua McLaughlin is a recent graduate of the Field Artillery Captains Career Course. His most recent operational assignment was with 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry in Mosul, Iraq as the Task Force Fire Support Officer. He also blogs at al Sahwa.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/30/2010 - 9:49pm | 21 comments
Why is it Important to Talk to the Taliban?

by Major Ali Iqbal

Download the full article: Why is it Important to Talk to the Taliban?

As an international military student in Fort Leavenworth, I am constantly exposed to public, US Government and international opinion on how to succeed/just stay afloat and not sink in the quagmire of that perilous place called "Afghanistan". Ranging from complex solutions like rebuilding the entire state on the western paradigm, to the irresponsible suggestion of adapting the "It is what it is" policy by creating "Chaositan" - they are all out there on the table. However, as already concluded by many intellectuals, the permanent solution to Afghanistan will be the solution which the Afghans want, not what we sitting many a mile away keep conjecturing about. The harsh reality is that the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated as the Taliban are continuously spreading their influence and cashing in on the frustrations of the people - an ideal force multiplier for the insurgents to leverage for furthering their designs. The main reason why the situation has become so precarious is that the bulk of the country, more precisely east and south east consisting of Pashtuns, is convinced that the Taliban are their real saviors and not the apathetic government in Kabul or ISAF forces. Let us consider why these poor, religiously inclined and simple people favor the "Dark Side" rather than us "Knights in Shining Armor".

Download the full article: Why is it Important to Talk to the Taliban?

Major Ali Iqbal, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as an instructor in School of Armor and Pakistan Military Academy and has twice served as brigade operations officer in an infantry and armor brigade. He has also served as United Nations Military Observer in Sierra Leone. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Pakistan and has a master's degree in Arts and Science of Warfare.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 01/27/2010 - 7:28pm | 2 comments

Haiti: Boots on the Ground Perspective

 

by Colonel Buck Elton

Download the full article: Haiti: Boots on the Ground Perspective

Buck Elton is the Commander of Joint Special Operations Air Component-Haiti. Small Wars Journal inadvertently received an e-mail update from Buck to his family and friends. SWJ asked if we could publish his insightful account and he most graciously agreed. What follows addresses many issues now appearing in the press -- here is a boots on the ground perspective.

Download the full article: Haiti: Boots on the Ground Perspective

More:

Airfield Support in Haiti - Department of State DipNote

Teleconference Briefing on Relief Efforts in Haiti - DoS Telecon with Col. Buck Elton

2010 Earthquake in Haiti - DoS Information Portal

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 01/27/2010 - 8:49am | 11 comments
Do Ideas Matter?

A Clausewitzian Case Study

by Adam Elkus

Download the full article: Do Ideas Matter?

"Ideas matter," the new Army Capstone Concept declares. Ideas certainly do matter, and doctrine can be the key to victory or defeat. But it is immensely difficult to predict the form that ideas will eventually take. The reception and dilution of Clausewitzian theory in American military doctrine suggests that influence is contingent--and the end product of counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine's continuing evolution in American strategy is unlikely to conform to the predictions of either COIN's most fervent admirers or detractors.

Download the full article: Do Ideas Matter?

Adam Elkus is an analyst specializing in foreign policy and security. He is currently Associate Editor at Red Team Journal. His articles have been published in West Point CTC Sentinel, Small Wars Journal, and other publications. He blogs at Rethinking Security and The Huffington Post. He is currently a contributor to the Center for Threat Awareness' ThreatsWatch project.

by Bob Killebrew | Sun, 01/24/2010 - 9:55pm | 6 comments
War, "Like War", or Something Else?

by Colonel Robert Killebrew

Download the full article: War, "Like War", or Something Else?

Bob Killebrew, a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, is heading up a major study on the relationships between gangs, the Chavez government, and U.S. national security. What follows is the central question that is evolving from the study -- is this war? Or something like war? Opinions are not only welcome -- but encouraged; it's Bob Killebrew at bkillebrew@cnas.org.

Purveyors of "Fourth Generation War" have suggested that future warfare will have certain characteristics; that it will be decentralized, complex and transnational; it will involve actors from many networks, and that it will involve political, social, military and economic factors.

What, then, do we make of the activities of Venezuela, Iran, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the Mexican drug cartels and the Latino gangs both destabilizing Central America and operating on our streets today? All are acting from different motives, all are highly organized and, in some cases, networked organizations, and all are, for different reasons, threats to the national security of the United States. And all are connected by the supply of illegal drugs to the U.S. and to other countries.

Download the full article: War, "Like War", or Something Else?

Robert B. Killebrew is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Killebrew is a retired Army colonel who served 30 years in a variety of assignments that included Special Forces, tours in the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, XVIII Airborne Corps, high-level war planning assignments and instructor duty at the Army War College.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/21/2010 - 9:28pm | 1 comment
Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War

by Captain Gina Cairns-McFeeters, Captain John Shapiro, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Nettleton, Lieutenant Colonel Sonya Finely and Lieutenant Commander Daryk Zirkle

Download the full article: Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War

In this era of persistent conflict, the US faces a myriad of challenges—conventional and irregular, with adversaries who increasingly take advantage of the information environment. Fundamentally, we must change our mindset and incorporate the human terrain—and the effects of information warfare—into our operational analysis and planning. While al Qaeda and its adherents try to frame current conflicts as a "clash of civilizations," in reality there is a struggle within Islam to determine the way ahead in the 21st century. Ambassador Holbrooke stated it best: "defining what this war is really about in the minds of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance." In order to achieve success, we must fully understand the power of information and the requirements for intelligence and influence—both being conducted in competition with the adversary's information campaign that complements their dynamic and flat networked organizations. The information components of counter-insurgency (COIN) strategies are the underlying foundation for all other COIN activities.

Download the full article: Winning the Ground Battles but Losing the Information War

Captain Gina Cairns-McFeeters, U.S. Navy, was the Chief, Multinational Force-Iraq IO Cell and led Strategic IO efforts for Iraq. Captain John Shapiro, U.S. Navy, was Multinational-West IO Liaison Officer to the MNF-I IO Cell. Lieutenant Colonel Steve Nettleton, U.S. Army, was the Officer in Charge, Cyber Support Element -- Iraq and provided computer network operations support to MNF-I. Lieutenant Colonel Sonya Finely, U.S. Army, was the Deputy Director, Commander's Initiative Group, MNF-I and assisted the director of the Commanding General's personal staff. Lieutenant Commander Daryk Zirkle, U.S. Navy, was the Information Operations Planner, MNF-I IO and provided planning and staff support to Strategic IO efforts.

by Gary Anderson | Wed, 01/20/2010 - 7:59am | 5 comments
Don't Call it CMOC

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the full article: Don't Call it CMOC

As the disaster assistance and humanitarian relief operation in Haiti matures, there will need to be a coordination center where the U.S. military, non- governmental organizations (NGOs), international relief organizations (IOs), and Haitian governmental ministries can prioritize aid and organize the operation. Whatever we call this coordination center, we should not call it a Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMOC).

CMOCs were formed during complex humanitarian emergencies such as the post-Desert Storm Kurdistan emergency, Somalia, and the Rwanda genocide. They began as ad hoc responses to situations where no host nation government existed to manage humanitarian aid. They usually had an American military officer in charge and they filled a needed coordination function.

Eventually, they found their way into U.S. joint doctrine. In doing so, they morphed from a function that needed to be done into a doctrinal organization replete with a table of organization that is totally inappropriate for a situation like Haiti. Haiti is a simple humanitarian disaster. It has a functioning, if badly damaged, government which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promised to support in her visit last week. An American led CMOC structure would undermine that objective in the eyes of the Haitian people and the world.

Download the full article: Don't Call it CMOC

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who was the J-3 (Operations Officer) for OPERATION SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh and a Military Advisor to the US Mission in the UN-led OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia.

by Gary Anderson | Sat, 01/16/2010 - 4:05pm | 41 comments
Some Advice for Military Humanitarians

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the full article: Some Advice for Military Humanitarians

For military personnel assigned to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HA/DR) in Haiti who might be looking to the Small Wars Journal for some help, I'll offer some thoughts from someone who has done a few of these things and studied them extensively.

Download the full article: Some Advice for Military Humanitarians

Colonel Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps officer. He was the J-3 (Operations Officer) for operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh and has done several published studies on HA/DR.

by Michael Yon | Sat, 01/16/2010 - 10:01am | 3 comments

Spitting Cobra

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: 

Spitting Cobra

Editor' Note: Michael Yon recently spent some time at FOB Frontenac

with the King of Battle and produced this photo commentary.  The disciples

of Saint Barbara may tout that "long distance is the next best thing to being there,"

but next best is not good enough for a real boots on the ground journalist. 

Michael is out there, and now he's here, too.  We're privileged

to bring you some of Michael's work with his kind permission.  View his

other pieces

here at Small Wars Journal, or take a look at

Spitting Cobra

at Michal Yon Online and consider

supporting

the next dispatch of a truly independent frontline journalist.

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan

since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops

in these two wars. Michael's dispatches from the frontlines have earned him the

reputation as the premier independent combat journalist of his generation. His work

is published at

Michael Yon Online and has been featured on Good Morning America, The Wall Street

Journal, The New York Times, CNN, ABC, FOX, as well as hundreds of other major media

outlets all around the world.

Download the full article: 

Spitting Cobra

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/15/2010 - 8:28pm | 2 comments
Host Nation Information Requirements

Achieving Unity of Understanding in Counterinsurgency

by Colonel George Franz, Lieutenant Colonel David Pendall and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Steffen

Download the full article: Host Nation Information Requirements

Understanding the complex operational environment in Afghanistan means seeing the local conditions and activities and how they affect people's lives. If the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are truly focused on gaining the support of the people, we must better understand the lens through which the people are watching our efforts play out and we must know what may drive them away from supporting the government. This means understanding not only the nature of the threats to security posed by negative influences, insurgents, and terrorists but also the aspects of Governance and Development that most impact their daily lives. Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIR) is a category of reporting on these critical factors affecting the people in Afghanistan.

More important than the structure of government, the people are most concerned about the extension of governmental services and the ability for their national and local officials to deliver basic necessities and support for a functioning community—to include security. But the operating environment in Afghanistan is much more complex, nuanced and dynamic than answering the question of satisfactory governance- rendering a basic collection of facts, polling data, anecdotal references and statistics insufficient for true understanding within the partnered commands.

The NATO International Security Force- Afghanistan (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) is instituting a bottom up, inclusive information system to answer key information gaps and assist ISAF and Afghan Partner Commander Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). More than just asking the right questions, the ISAF and Afghan operating forces along with civilian partners in the field, must understand what the answers are that will drive resources and prioritization, providing better insight into the real issues and perceptions at local levels. The IJC has created a reporting system and fusion process to bring this information to the command in a timely, accurate and comprehensive way.

Download the full article: Host Nation Information Requirements

Colonel George Franz is the Chief, Combined Joint Analysis and Control Element for the ISAF Joint Command, Kabul, Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel David Pendall is the Chief CJ2 Planner for the ISAF Joint Command Future Operations Planning Team in Kabul, Afghanistan. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery Steffen is Senior Analytic Fusion Chief, within the Combined Joint Analysis and Control Element, in Kabul, Afghanistan.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/15/2010 - 5:08am | 0 comments
Waiting to Win

From Deterrence to Deferrence in the War on Terror

by Dr. Anthony Vinci

Download the full article: From Deterrence to Deferrence in the War on Terror

Since the War on Terror began with the attacks of on 9/11, there has been a great amount of speculation about how to approach this war and what sort of strategy to use. The problem has been that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are so different from conventional enemies that it is difficult to know exactly how to defeat them in the traditional sense of the word. Al Qaeda and its highly dispersed, networked and franchised organization make concepts like unconditional surrender, destruction of command and control and deterrence hard to conceptualize, much less practically carry out.

Deterrence in particular was a strategic approach that the US had grown comfortable with during the Cold War and which some have tried to apply to the War on Terror. Indeed, Al Qaeda has also thought about strategy against the US in terms of deterrence. While there is some value in a deterrent approach to terrorist organizations, ultimately, it appears that it does not provide an effective defense and does not illustrate an effective offense against terrorist groups.

This article suggests an alternative strategic approach to combating Al Qaeda and in general pursuing the War on Terror. The approach might be called deferrence, as in to defer (not to be confused with deference). The central tenet of deferrence is Clausewitz's observation that time is on the side of the defender. The idea is to defer attacks by Al Qaeda and the strengthening of the Al Qaeda organization, by keeping up ongoing attacks against the organization, which then becomes forced to spend its time reacting, rather than acting offensively. Since Al Qaeda is an essentially military organization, it must continually be on the offense in order to exist. By keeping the busy trying to survive, at an acceptable level of cost and violence, the US will be provided with the time necessary to implement long-term strategies meant to undermine the group, such as ideological arguments, which will lead to the eventual fading away of the group.

Download the full article: From Deterrence to Deferrence in the War on Terror

Anthony Vinci, PhD, International Relations, The London School of Economics, is the author of 'Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents' (Routledge 2008) as well as articles in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Small Wars and Insurgencies and author journals. He currently consults on national security issues.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/14/2010 - 8:11pm | 13 comments
An Asymmetric Approach to Yemen

by Vegetius

Download the full article: An Asymmetric Approach to Yemen

We are in a war of containment against radical Jihadist Islam, and Yemen is the next campaign in that conflict. How we conduct that campaign may be the critical turning point in that extended war. There are more tinderboxes for potential Jihadist outbreaks on the horizon; Somalia and several other places in Africa are among the leading candidates. We are running out of American troops to intervene in these hotspots, but we can ill afford to ignore them. Perhaps it is time to consider some asymmetric approaches to this very wicked problem.

The bad news is that Yemen is a tough nut. It is running out of oil, it has two civil war/insurgency situations, and an exponentially growing number of unemployed young men. The government only controls about a third of the country. In other words, it is a perfect breeding ground for radical Jihadists, and foreign fighters are flocking there in droves.

The good news is that Yemen is not yet a failed state. It has a functioning, if very imperfect, government. We have been able to deal with this kind of situation before. El Salvador is a good example. In that case, we were even able to take a bad government and help it become much better. The government of Yemen will not become a functioning Jeffersonian democracy in the near future, and we do not necessarily need it to become one to achieve and acceptable strategic outcome. What we do need is to have Yemen become a hostile place for radical Jihadists, and do so without committing large numbers of American troops in the process. This is where an asymmetrical approach comes in into play.

Download the full article: An Asymmetric Approach to Yemen

Vegetius is a government employee and former infantryman; he has experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/09/2010 - 7:45pm | 8 comments
Economics: The Better Bullet for Grey War

by Colonel Gregory A. Grimes

Download the full article: Economics: The Better Bullet for Grey War

What do quantum physics and American foreign policy have in common? Both are still searching for a unifying theory. Albert Einstein spent the latter decades of his life searching for a theory that unifies all the forces of nature. The United States lacks a unifying theme for its foreign engagement efforts in combating terrorism and insurgency. Mischaracterization of the problems, competition among implementing agencies and a reluctance to jettison entrenched legacy programs are all obstacles to developing a single, unifying underpinning to American foreign engagement policy in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. The U.S. needs a theme that underlies and unifies our efforts at winning over susceptible populations.

America finds herself embroiled in a tar baby of a war unlike any previously fought. This "grey war," likely to be the definitive style of warfare for this and the next military generation, will simmer as a low-grade, continuous engagement alternating between diplomacy and violence. The United States and assorted extremist groups will jockey for position in a war the U.S. can neither definitively win (a la World War II) nor disengage from. Like the tar baby, grey war will be a sticky mess we cannot easily rid ourselves of. Commonly thought to be a concerted global effort the various terror groups, even those operating under the banner of Islamic jihad, are in reality a hundred different groups with a hundred different grievances. Many of these grievances are catastrophic, some are legitimate and all are meaningful to the people suffering them...

Download the full article: Economics: The Better Bullet for Grey War

Colonel Gregory Grimes, US Army, is a Civil Affairs officer currently assigned to the Standing Joint Force Headquarters at US Africa Command.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 01/07/2010 - 1:18pm | 0 comments

Beyond the "Hybrid" Threat: 

Asserting the Essential Unity of Warfare

by David Sadowski and Jeff Becker

Download the full article:

Beyond the "Hybrid" Threat

Foreword:  Idea papers are key inputs in the Joint Futures

Group's development of the Joint Operating Environment (JOE).  One of our

recent projects involved a multi-national effort to describe the "hybrid" threat. 

In the process of writing the paper, we developed something that took in more

than just the "hybrid" threat.  Although we received many favorable comments

on the paper, we felt our audience was a bit limited.  We are publishing

in the Small Wars Journal in order to generate a wider debate on this important

topic prior to including any of these ideas in the next JOE.

Excerpt:

If we are to get the future "right" we should return to first principles and

arrive at a better understanding of the context within which wars are understood,

and how adversaries will work within that context to arrange capabilities in time

and space to address their own strategic requirements.  Ultimately, the ideas

in this paper must support the Secretary of Defense's intent of re-shaping the culture

of the U.S. Armed Forces into one that is highly adaptive in its organizational

structures, in how it employs the capabilities at its disposal, and in how it conducts

operational campaign design, planning and execution. Through refining the description

of the future threat, we hope to create the correct context that helps force planners

design the future joint force. This imperative applies across all activities

of the Department from relatively small wars to large interstate conflicts, which

will be discussed later in this paper.

So what is a "hybrid" threat?  A definition that is too narrow may miss

important features of our emerging future, while a definition that is too wide defines

nothing at all.  In the case of the "hybrid" threat though, attempts to define

"hybridity" has led to a "confusion of concepts."  Instead of defining the

threat, we propose a description of the threat that is relevant across the entire

range of military operations.  That is, any actors' approach to warfare can

be described by the mix of material and cognitive capabilities it

brings to bear in conflict and war.  "Hybridity" then, should be seen as a

reflection of this underlying unity of warfare, based on an understanding of the

necessity of applying a mix of cognitive and material elements to succeed. In fact,

the ability to shift among material and cognitive approaches with agility and speed

is both the essence of the future threat, as well as of Secretary Gates' vision

of U.S. Armed Forces that are adaptive in organizational design, capabilities development,

and campaign design and execution. In short, the future threat should not be conceived

of as a category of future warfare that is distinct from other forms of warfare

but is instead the very essence of future warfare itself, and are just as applicable

to friendly forces as to our competitors and adversaries. We propose the following

as a starting point for this description:  Future threats will be entities

or movements that continually scan the environment for opportunities, and threaten

to or apply violence to affect the will and psyche of others to achieve their political

objectives.

Download the full article:

Beyond the "Hybrid" Threat

David Sadowski is a senior civil servant with

USJCOM's Joint Futures Group.  He has an extensive background in air operations,

strategic and operational planning, information operations and joint concept development

and experimentation.  He retired from the U.S. Air Force in the grade of Lieutenant

Colonel in 2004, having served as a Weapon Systems Officer in the F-4E and F-111F,

a NATO Staff Officer at RHQ AFNORTH, Brunssum, The Netherlands, and numerous staff

tours within Air Combat Command.

Jeff Becker is a contracted futures analyst for

with USJCOM's Joint Futures Group, and supports a number of military, strategic

and futures studies, including three editions of the Joint Operating Environment

and other concept development and experimentation efforts in USJFCOM and throughout

the Department of Defense.  Mr. Becker has a Bachelor's degree in Political

Science from the University of Iowa, and completed his doctoral coursework (ABD)

in International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 01/06/2010 - 10:24pm | 0 comments
Hybrid Threats and Challenges

Describe... Don't Define

by Nathan Freier

Download the full article: Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe... Don't Define

The emerging concept of "hybrid warfare" is one of many attempts to clarify the contemporary defense operating environment for senior Washington decisionmakers and warfighters in the field. The more intense debates occurring on the margins of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) center on hybrid threats and their impact on defense strategy and plans. Like post-QDR '06 debates on "irregular warfare" (IW), there is a great deal of buzz around hybrid warfare and challenges. In the end, how DoD leaders choose to characterize, respond to, and use outcomes of the hybrid debate will determine corporately what the defense enterprise means by "balance" and how it operationalizes "balance" in the future.

There is a cautionary tale for DoD in the post-QDR '06 quest to define IW. Those familiar with that process know that it ended with a definition few — if any — fully accept to this day. Amazingly, DoD's IW work succeeded in saying too much, too little, or nothing at all depending on one's particular point of view.

Look closely at the definition of IW and it appears to be just another description of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The torrent of "presentism" characterizing contemporary defense discussions about IW is responsible for this. Defense strategists and concept developers tend to project current "irregular" challenges — classical insurgency and terrorism in and around the Middle East and Muslim world — as DoD's dominant IW demands into an uncertain and indefinite future. This may prove grossly insufficient. However, the current defense era's sensational start (9/11) makes it quite difficult to break free from conventional wisdom long enough to explore IW more broadly.

Download the full article: Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe... Don't Define

Nathan Freier is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS and a visiting research professor at the U.S. Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Freier joined CSIS in 2008, after a 20 year army career as a field artillery officer and strategist. During his last eight years of military service, Freier was a key player in numerous strategy development and strategic planning efforts at Headquarters, Department of the Army; the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and on two senior-level military staffs in Iraq.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 01/04/2010 - 9:08pm | 7 comments
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force

A Holistic Perspective

by Colonel Cindy Jebb and Colonel Richard Lacquement

Download the full article: Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force

The purpose of this paper is to provide our observations and preliminary thoughts concerning the way ahead for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) based on our work as part of the Quick-Look Assessment team from 3-19 December 2009. We both had the pleasure to work closely with members of the command whose professionalism and enthusiasm were deeply inspiring. The command confronts great challenges as it pursues a mission vital to coalition success. We are qualified optimists about the potential success of the mission. The most important source of our optimism for eventual mission success comes from our observations of the tremendous talent and dedication of the individuals assigned to this command. We were also heartened by our interaction with individuals from other commands and with many impressive Afghan partners.

COL Jebb primarily worked with the Afghan National Army (ANA) Development office while COL Lacquement primarily worked with the CJ5. Both offices are comprised of selfless, dedicated, and smart professionals. Of particular note, COL Jebb had the terrific experience to interact with senior advisors to the Ministers/General Staff (COLs Mike Barbee, Jim Campbell, Fred Manzo, Tom Donovan, and Kevin Cotten, as well as the senior advisor for ANA development, COL David Henley); COL Lacquement benefitted immensely from the support and collaboration of many CJ5 officers, particularly, COL Don Bigger, COL E.G. Clayburn, LtCol Steve Tilbrook and LTC Norm Fuss and from JAG, COL Tom Umberg.

While here, we both sought to understand the needs of NTM-A/CSTC-A on behalf of our home institutions, the U.S. Military Academy and U.S. Army War College (USMA and USAWC), so that we can best match faculty skill sets, interest, and availability to provide future support if requested. At the very least, this experience will facilitate reach-back efforts for the future. We were able to learn a great deal due to the open command climate and everyone's generosity with his/her thoughts and time. Finally, we offer our sincere gratitude to LTG Caldwell, Dr. Kem, and CAPT Mark Hagerott for enabling this fascinating experience and to MAJ Jon Klug for coordinating the visit and support.

Download the full article: Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force

Colonel Cindy Jebb is a Professor and Deputy Head in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy. Colonel Richard Lacquement is Director of the Military History and Strategy Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 01/03/2010 - 7:29pm | 7 comments
First Anglo-Afghan War

Why are Empires Buried in Afghanistan?

by Major Mehar Omar Khan

Download the full article: Why are Empires Buried in Afghanistan?

Hubris hates history and the latter keeps thus getting an opportunity to repeat itself. Nowhere is this as true as the killing fields of Afghanistan. The sad saga of First Anglo-Afghan War shows how lives of so many were lost in the merciless gorges and blood-thirsty passes between Kabul and Jalalabad, mainly because of the strategic blunders, outright dishonesty and unforgivable chicanery of a few. The story of this war also reveals that, more than the fierce Afghan or his treacherous terrain, the inept and indecisive leadership of the empire was to blame for getting buried in Afghanistan and helping that land become the 'graveyard of empires'.

Some trivia to start with. The war lasted from 1839 to 1842. Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, a Durrani Pashtun, was the legitimate King of Afghanistan before being ousted by the Anglo-Indian army of occupation. The name of the puppet installed by the British was Shah Shuja -- a man expelled in disgrace years before the war and someone who could never hope to step beyond Khyber Pass without foreign assistance.

As seemingly ear-less wise men continue to blunder in that unfortunate land, here are some echoes from the past. Instead of counting the trees, I have focused on the big picture to see how a war that happened 170 years ago could shed some light on the one being fought today.

Download the full article: Why are Empires Buried in Afghanistan?

Major Mehar Omar Khan, Pakistan Army, is currently a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as a peacekeeper in Sierra Leone, a Brigade GSO-III, an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul, and as Chief of Staff (Brigade Major) of an infantry brigade. He has also completed the Command and Staff Course at Pakistan's Command and Staff College in Quetta.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 01/03/2010 - 5:24pm | 3 comments
War Comes to Long An

Back Story to the Writing of a Military Classic

by Jeffrey Race

Download the full article: Back Story to the Writing of a Military Classic

Now being reprinted in an updated and expanded edition, War Comes to Long An was first published in 1972 and was the book I longed to buy in 1965 as the most junior lieutenant in Vietnam—but could nowhere find. Thereby hangs this tale of my adventures then in Vietnam and since elsewhere—a tale with implications for the creative process in academic writing, for the study of institutional change and of the learning disabilities of military institutions, and for priorities in public policy-making in America and elsewhere.

Birthing War Comes to Long An changed my life. I had no inkling when I began the project with trepidation in mid-1967 at the age of 24—using my own funds to satisfy my private curiosity—how it would change both my life and the lives of so many others. Perhaps these notes on the creation of that work may inspire others so inclined to dare the same creative act that summoned me, while at the same time illuminating some issues of public policy.

Between the covers of War Comes to Long An, I kept myself out. In these pages I beg to convey the private side of that public act, inseparable from the process of creation and from what came next. Some readers may find what follows entertaining or amusing; a few may find it helpful or even stimulating. You are my real target.

Download the full article: Back Story to the Writing of a Military Classic

Jeffrey Race is author of War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province. This landmark study of the Vietnamese conflict, examined through the lens of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements in the rural province of Long An up until American intervention in the area, offers a human, balanced, penetrating account of war. Two new forewords by Robert K. Brigham of Vassar College and Jeffrey Record of the Air War College explore the book's enduring influence. A new end chapter offers previously unpublished scholarship on the conflict. The new version is to be published soon by University of California Press.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/02/2010 - 6:29pm | 0 comments
Yemen's Strategic Boxes

by Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

Download the full article: Yemen's Strategic Boxes

As happens episodically, Yemen is once more in the news. The December 2009 raids on al Qaida with some level of US support -- together with Saudi intervention in the north of Yemen and the abortive Delta flight bombing claimed by al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen -- have re-emphasized Yemen's importance in regional and international security.

One problem with much of the analysis of Yemen is that it tends to emphasize the country's impact on external security. Particularly within the US, the stress has been on al Qaida's operations in and from Yemen. Although perhaps justified in terms of overall US strategy, this limited view of issues within Yemen that affect its internal security can create strategic myopia. Ultimately, these broader internal issues are crucial in how well and how —the government of Yemen will cooperate with other countries.

From Sana'a's perspective, there are three critical ongoing threats to internal security. Al Qaida certainly is one, but the other two -- the Houthi uprising in the north and political unrest in the south around Aden -- probably are viewed with considerably more concern by the Yemen government. Although each threat is significant in its own right, the possibility of overlap among them in the future is even more worrisome. These specific threats are even further exacerbated by a long list of broader social, economic, and political stressors, all of which impact on Yemen's capability to respond adequately.

Download the full article: Yemen's Strategic Boxes

Lawrence E. Cline, PhD, is an associate professor with American Military University, and a contract instructor with the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School. He has worked in over 25 countries with this program in national counterterrorism strategy development. He is a retired Military Intelligence officer and Middle East Foreign Area Officer, with service in Lebanon, El Salvador, Desert Storm, Somalia, and OIF.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 01/02/2010 - 6:38am | 6 comments
The Loss of Strategic Legitimacy

by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Weimann

Download the full article: The Loss of Strategic Legitimacy

"War leads to war crimes, and the only sure way to avoid that seems to be to avoid war. Good example, discipline and control (good leadership) can only reduce the problem."

- - Comment on Small Wars Journal discussion board thread titled "The Kill Company" dated 15 July 2009 concerning The New Yorker Article, "The Kill Company" by Kaffi Khatchadourian, July 6 2009

Looking at the latest edition of the DOD Joint Operations Manual (Joint Operations JP 3.0), you noticed, under the "Summary of Changes Section", the addition of three new Principles of Joint Operations (Principle of War). There, in the change section, it states that the publication:

"Establishes 12 "principles of joint operations" by adding three "other principles" — restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy — to the traditional nine "principles of war"

The Department of Defense use to have only nine "principles of war' that included Mass, Objective, Offensive, Security, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Surprise and Simplicity. These principles were burned into the minds of entry level lieutenants with the permanency of a branding iron during their initial officer training using the acronym "MOOSE MUSS". Ahhh yes, good old MOOSE MUSS; because of it most officers will never forget those nine strategic principles of war. The change also raises a question; why, after more than forty years of military institutionalization, did the Department of Defense changed the "Principles of War" with three additions.

Because the original nine principles are based on Clausewitz's work "On War", they represented a young officer's initial introduction to military strategy. Of course, strategy is the realm of generals and junior officers need to know only the basics. Back then, most officers fully agreed to that unwritten rule because they recognized that the basic operation and function of an M-60 machine gun would be much more valuable working at that "eyeball-to-eyeball" level of war. Junior officers and NCOs trusted that the generals had their backs on that strategy thing.

Download the full article: The Loss of Strategic Legitimacy

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Weimann's career spans 24 years as an US Marine Infantry Officer including participating in Desert Shield and Storm with the 2nd Marine Division. He retired in 1996, and lives with his family to Raleigh, NC where he works as an information technology program and project manager. He is also a contributing editor of the Defend Our Marines Web site (www.defendourmarines.com).

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 01/01/2010 - 7:26am | 9 comments
Developing Foreign Security Force Capabilities as a "Strategic Way"by Major Rob Thornton

Download the full article: Developing Foreign Security Force Capabilities

Developing the capabilities and capacities of FSFs (foreign security forces) has become a significant tenet of U.S. strategic dialogue on how to safeguard its interests at home and abroad from terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, criminal organizations with global reach or third party states which sponsor non state organizations. The United States recognizes that the destabilization of, and security threats to other states and political bodies are relative to its own interests as they may involve mutual enemies, or give rise to conditions in which its enemies may find beneficial. As such the U.S. may promote a cooperative "venture" where interests are identified as beneficial to both the U.S. and another entity, but which may be limited in nature and may not signify and enduring partnership.

It is important to understand that these cooperative ventures may be pursued for different reasons to support different ends; ends which may not always align with the long term goals of the U.S., but may support limited cooperation. These mutual interests may not always be apparent while in the making, and may only come forward as objectives and conditions change; for example when another state or organizations realizes that its previous policies no longer promote, but may in fact inhibit or work against the realization of its own objectives. The term venture itself implies a certain level of existing risk where one's membership is based more on conditions than certainty and long term commitment.

Ventures that involve the provision of security may require the U.S. to support the development of the capabilities of foreign security forces of other venture members. This concept of developing capability and capacity assumes that, based on mutual interests, the capabilities developed in a FSF will be employed in such a manner that they will support member objectives in the venture. However, it should not assume that those capabilities will not be employed otherwise at the conclusion of the venture. Capabilities once they are developed may have a life that extends beyond the original purpose. Understanding the nature of the venture is important for its members as it defines how much equity and effort a given member may assume relative to the expectations of the outcomes.

Download the full article: Developing Foreign Security Force Capabilities

Major Rob Thornton is assigned to the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) as an Army FA 59 Strategic Plans and Policy officer. The opinions and thoughts expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of JCISFA. Major Thornton was a contributing writer to the recently published the JCISFA SFA (Security Force Assistance) Planner's Guide to FSF (Foreign Security Force) Force Development.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 12/31/2009 - 10:08pm | 2 comments
One Week with Task Force Buffalo

Changing the Face of the Arghandab

by Captain Jonathan Pan

Download the full article: One Week with Task Force Buffalo

A rebuttal to Sean Naylor's Army Times Article, "Stryker soldiers say commanders failed them."

ARGHANDAB RIVER VALLEY, Afghanistan -- Sitting on the banks of the Arghandab River is the Baba Sahib Shrine. It provides a great view to the verdant Arghandab Valley, which is in stark contrast to the rest of the dusty province.

One can see the magnificent Baba Sahib shrine from the Arghandab District Center, which is where Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment (Task Force Buffalo), 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) centered their counterinsurgency efforts. While one can enjoy a lush view of the Arghandab River Valley and its beautiful sites from the district center- that is probably the last thing on the unit's mind.

Task Force Buffalo has suffered a lot of casualties and has therefore been the subject of over a dozen articles over the past few months. Through the fog of war and the emotional loss of comrades, it is difficult to see the good being done. Yet, facts show that Task Force Buffalo has helped many Arghandab residents who braved staying in the district while the Taliban campaigned to infiltrate Kandahar City from the north. However, it is discouraging to not see any articles in relation to their stability and development efforts. Here is a one-week snapshot at the activities of Task Force Buffalo in Arghandab.

Download the full article: One Week with Task Force Buffalo

Captain Jonathan Pan is the Economics Development Officer, Task Force Stryker (5/2 ID SBCT) in Afghanistan.

by Michael Yon | Thu, 12/31/2009 - 9:01am | 0 comments
Into Thine Hand I Commit My Spirit

by Michael Yon

Download the full article: Into Thine Hand I Commit My Spirit

Arghandab, Afghanistan

New Year's Eve, 2009

On this small base surrounded by a mixture of enemy and friendly territory, a memorial has been erected just next to the Chapel. Inside the tepee are 21 photos of 21 soldiers killed during the first months of a year-long tour of duty. The fallen will belong forever to the honor rolls of the 1-17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, and they will join the sacred list of names of those who have given their lives in service of the United States of America.

The symbol of the 2nd Infantry Division is the Indian Head. At night, soldiers of the "Indian Head Division" can be seen passing by the tepee, sometimes stopping to peer inside before walking into the darkness.

Download the full article: Into Thine Hand I Commit My Spirit

Michael Yon is a former Green Beret who has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004. No other reporter has spent as much time with combat troops in these two wars.