Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog. We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.

Steven Metz writes about the psychology of insurgents. It is not mirror-image political concerns that they are after, but psychological needs.

Mike Few interviews civil war historian Mark Grimsley, research affiliate at The Ohio State University and author...

American defense planners must consider what an era of persistent conflict will require of them.  Will the dictates of the Powell Doctrine or the imperatives of "...

Pierce and Zanol offer a concept for maneuver in n-dimensional terrain.  Does this provide the conceptual basis to combat "wicked" problems?

Jeremy Gwinn focuses on the "transition" phase of security force assistance in Afghanistan.

Clausewitz's conception of fog and friction in warfare remains as relevant in ever.  Are you prepared to operate in an environment of uncertainty?

To defend her position, 21st Century America and western powers must seek out and create opportunities for advancement.  To do this, we must change the way we think.

The insurgents have adapted in their ability to deny space to the adversary; rather than settling to eat soup with a knife they attempt to recast the knife as a spoon.

These powerful criminal organizations leverage their competitive advantage to further corrupt the Afghan government possibly creating an endless cycle of dependency.

Chavez undertook a classical Maoist political campaign on Venezuelan society using the military as his modus operandi

It is essential to understand that everything of importance in Afghanistan happens in the village, not in Kabul, or even at the Provincial headquarters. Historically,...

In today’s environment, the United States conducts security cooperation efforts to build partnerships and partner capacity in an attempt to “further the U.S....

A Neorealist Perspective of Iraq after the American Exit

Limiting the definition of insurgency, can limit the military response

Self-organized civilians' activities against the military in war are neither a theoretical assumption nor NEW in history. Today and tomorrow, armies will have to contend...

How do you ensure you have the right amount of junior leaders (rank of sergeant to major) where you need them, when you need them? 

As the withdrawal of US and allied forces continues, the post-2014 allied manning and assistance levels in Afghanistan have yet to be defined.  The absence of a plan,...

A Case Study of the American Experience in Iraq in the Pillar of Justice

Policy analysts question conceptual failure (ends), intellectuals want to know why, and the analysis of organizational and operational lessons learned (ways and means), will...

Kaplan builds a case for the growing importance of the Indian Ocean and its perimeter states as the new geopolitical center of the developing world

Uribe COIN model: Interview with Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Leading thinking about counterinsurgency misses the relevance of religious freedom.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan – What is Being Done Wrong and What Could be Done Better

Non-Commissioned Officer's masters thesis

I place the Libyan Civil War of Liberation within the ambit of 2011 Arab Spring; broadly as a refurbished sprig of Arab people’s movement against their respective...

Leveraging technology, the US could create networks allowing for unprecedented intelligence collection as well as widespread and immediate distribution of information

Fallujah and The Silk Road

The civil war is in full swing and Iran is driving it—it all goes back to the “Green Cresent” and the old “Silk Road”

The Gentile-Nagl Debate is nothing new in military history

The Troops Need Napalm and Flamethrowers