Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog. We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.

American leaders secured victory by reviewing the strategy and making corrections.  Conversely, Tripolitan leaders placed their faith in a comfortable, outdated strategy...

Cann’s book is very much a must read, especially considering the painfully limited Anglophone literature on the Portuguese Overseas War.

While not democracy in the American image, the Arab Spring has the potential to bring Islamists into conflict with jihadists.

The Battle of Chancellorsville ended 150 years ago this week. It still holds lessons for us.

Why acronyms are ruining shared military understanding.

Syria is already in crisis but the death or departure of President Bashar al-Asad is likely to intensify violence and destruction in the country, not quell it.

Combating the marijuana cartels on America’s public lands.

A Q&A with Kirk Sowell of Inside Iraqi Politics.  

The pressures on Yemen are centrifugal rather than centripetal, by which the power of the center is weakened to the benefit of poles of regional power. These centrifugal...

Bringing time into the assessment of counterinsurgency warfare.

Implications for information operations in Guatemala.

Why is this new age an age of instability—instead of an age of empires, or warring states, or even peace and prosperity?

If we ignore village life – or try to bend it to our view of what it should be – we will fail in Afghanistan as we did in Vietnam.

A new perspective on alternative analysis and the intelligence process

A critical analysis of statements by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri reveal a fragmented and weakened Al Qaeda disguising its internal incoherence and lack of appealing...

Ten easy to follow recommendations to help you become an effective military advisor.

Unlike a certain mathematical solution counterinsurgency is a laden with human error and complexity.

Interoperability is a function of leadership, hardship, and time. To quickly achieve it, focus on individual personalities, understand that everyone has value, and exercise...

Good stories trump doctrine for effecting cultural change because they reach us emotionally; they inspire.  Consider America's first battle and what we can...

An interview with MIT Professor Roger D. Petersen.

Understanding the correlation between an insurgency’s goals and their IED design is crucial to defending against the devices and forecasting IED threats.

Guerilla warfare is not an “Eastern Way of War,” it is the universal war of the weak.

Some US objectives remain unmet.

Chavista strategists have decided its best course of action is to run Chavez for president for a fifth time, only this time by proxy.

The issue of the reach of the state needs to be put into a wider focus by including women and gender issues as part of the narrative.

One consistently wrong—but always convenient—prediction has been the improbability of ground wars and the declining utility of ground forces.

If physical success on the battlefield cannot be translated into part of a larger aim, it is largely irrelevant even if it does a great deal of physical damage to the enemy...

The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN approach usually fails where security force assistance could succeed.

Deeper understanding of groupthink, its causes, and mitigation techniques should help a commander and his staff prevent it from occurring, and red teams can assist in the...

Despite success at degrading Philippine terrorist networks, much of the security gains have been transitory, while the underlying socio-economic problems in Mindanao and...