I first posted this short piece at the Urban Operations Journal on 28 February 2003 and reposted it here at SWJ on 17 December 2007. Here are the considerations, again.

The latest in the TRADOC G-2 / SWJ Mad Scientist call for papers series.

This paper seeks to identify lessons from the Afghanistan “COIN Development” experience at the strategic level.

How do we measure the on-the-ground costs of taking civilian lives?

Every SOF practitioner will be required to understand the basics of cyberspace, computers, and coding because they’ll need those skills to conduct cyber special...

This is a world of closely-knit communities. It signals the end of closed border politics, the irrelevance of the politics of containment and the risks of double-standard...

Continue on for a TRADOC G-2 / Small Wars Journal "Mad Scientist" call for papers update.

In order to predict future impacts of megacities to the US Army, the global drivers and trends leading to megacity development must be identified.

We can become so preoccupied with how to win over the population we fail to ask when attempting to do so is even appropriate.

On the surface, facilitating mentoring seems very simple, but even establishing a common definition is a significant challenge.

In dispute is how to make attack pilots trained in and flying in an aircraft designed for an attack mission into aerial scouts.

While it contends with the Islamic State and al-Qaida an insurgency intent on challenging the sovereignty of the U.S. government is already here.

The Army must develop a holistic solution to Army-wide cyber resiliency and hardening of electronic systems to address our current cyber capability gap.

The growing planned use of UMS and robotics on the future battlefield affords both great opportunities and challenges to far future medical operations.

Interview with Kate Clark of the Afghanistan Analysts Network.

If we aren’t willing to use American infantry against ISIS, perhaps we might consider using robots.

SWJ discussion with Alexander Lanoszka, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College.

Kilcullen has six maxims to manage company-level COIN operations, and for me the most interesting one of the six is “travel light, and harden your combat service...

This research examines the cyber battle space, why it poses a significant threat, and how attribution difficulties can create significant issues for deterrence of cyber-...

Lawyers like to say that “bad facts make bad law” – and that could be at play here.

America has been ignoring the overall threat that has been attacking her people since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Like the Battle of the Bulge, the 1972 Easter Offensive has often been referred to as an intelligence failure because it caught the U.S. and S. Vietnam completely by surprise...

Statecraft stands apart as a more elevated undertaking than politics... statecraft is fundamentally a strategic enterprise, while strategy in turn is... an ethical enterprise...

Are American terrorists considered combatants if not in an active combat zone engaging U.S. forces on the ground and should they be accorded additional consideration before...

This research paper examines four cells of individuals, both rooted in society and of a high socio-economic status, whose members have radicalized within North America.

The true goal of Special Forces physical training should reflect that which was sought by the OSS—complete confidence to handle uncertainty.

Egos and agendas are destroying the prospect for a powerful alliance against ISIS.

People have always given our Nation and our Army the competitive advantage. In the Cyber Domain, the people continue to be the central factor to our success.

I am struggling to think of a single insurgency that was defeated by airpower, primarily defeated by airpower, or even seriously undermined by airpower.

Allah versus the ISO’s fraudulent martyrdom - a fraud that is sinful at many levels.