What the 34-day War Has to Teach the US Army

Dave Prugh:

My primary objections were to what I perceived as logical puzzles in the argument. That was my primary rationale in writing what I wrote. I do not necessarily disagree with much of what was written. For example, as noted, I think the 34 Day War and Hezbollah are both worthy of study, something I would not write were I dismissive of the type of threats they pose, or (as for Hezbollah) an adversary for which it is unworthy to prepare.

Once more, my primary quibble was the structure of the following two arguments.

First, resource constraints mean only one type of war can be prepared for, yet the adversary to prepare for should be Hezbollah, since it fights both regularly and irregularly.

Second, protracted conflicts and thus irregular wars are unlikely to be fought, yet the adversary to prepare for should be Hezbollah, since it fights irregularly (as well as regularly).

The logic of both arguments struck me as hard to grasp.

I do think the dialogue this has created has raised important questions, e.g., given the choice (or necessity) of having to pick one, is it batter to have a battalion trained for combined-arms that has to perform COIN/SASO, or a battalion trained for COIN/SASO that has to train for combined-arms? I am not asserting in any way, shape or form that the type of future conflict can be predicted, although I agree with what was stated above, that "enablers" ought to be listened to with great care prior to any initiation of a conflict. Nor am I asserting that there is no "learning curve" in fighting future adversaries, a point alluded to in the reference to "An Army at Dawn" (although admittedly a point made, at best, quite obliquely).

In summary, though, yet again, my primary objective was to understand and clarify an argument that I found confusing.

Respectfully,
ADTS

ADTS,

This isn't a matter of MAJ Oliver or anybody else wanting to "have their cake and eat it too". It is a matter of stark reality.

In order to serve our nation's interests, our military must be capable of winning irrespective of the type of operation called for. If we need to do COIN, we need to do COIN. If we need to be capable of conducting large-scale conventional operations, then that's what we need to do.

Moreover, we cannot afford to go thru a protracted let's-learn-how-to-do-this-stuff period. We must be able to execute faster than our adversaries can react (which, if I recall correctly, is one of the ways to articulate the definition of the Principle of War called "Surprise").

Sure, our politicians can tell us that we are resourced only with enough to focus on one or the other (COIN or Conventional) while they spend trillions of tax dollars on complete garbage, but that doesn't change the harsh reality that we cannot afford to be at least adequate at all types of operations.

Phil:

Regarding your first paragraph, I definitely (as stated before) think it's important to study the 34 Day War and Hezbollah. Your comparison with the evaluation of the 1973 War is potentially instructive. Then it probably was evident (or perhaps not?) that precision-guided munitions were going to evolve, or at least, not evaporate.

However, I wonder (1) how typical Hezbollah-type organizations in the present, and (2) how typical Hezbollah-type organizations will be in the future. In other words, is it possible that Hezbollah is, and perhaps will be, sui generis, and hence drawing lessons from the conflict ought to be done with the utmost caution? I don't necessarily agree with this line of thinking, and again, *do* think the 34 Day War ought to be studied greatly.

That said, all wars, it's been noted (I think) contain an element of "hybridity" (e.g., the American Revolution or the Civil War); and defining a conflict as regular or irregular is arguably a judgment call, based on the preponderance of the type of combat conducted. Perhaps what distinguishes Hezbollah is, first, the extent to which its combat was mixed so evenly between regular and irregular war that it could *only* be termed hybrid, and second, in my opinion, its extensive use of the DI and E of DIME.

And furthermore, the IDF's comparatively rapid reaction after the 34 Day War leaves room for contemplation as well (as I noted above in this thread, I don't consider Operation Cast Lead to be clear and convincing evidence of Israeli military evolution, but I was impressed by its conduct of information operations, and have been impressed what I've read in the open source press, e.g., the Jerusalem Post about the IDF restructuring itself).

So, in summary, three points: (1) the 34 Day War is worth studying; (2) Hezbollah may be the ultimate practitioner of hybrid warfare both today and in the future, so how much to generalize from and about Hezbollah is an open question; and (3) the way in which the IDF restructured itself is worthy of note.

Respectfully,
ADTS

Major Oliver:

Here is where I get confused. I understand the argument that there are constraints placed on the US military. I understand the argument that this forces the US military to make tough choices. Yet you seem to be eliding those tough choices by picking an adversary upon whom to base training (and force structure presumably) that is both conventional and irregular (hybrid). In other words, despite the constraints you've specified, you seem to be trying to "have your cake and eat it too," to be colloquial: you want to train for major combat operations and irregular warfare. Is your argument, then, that current training is too far toward one end of the spectrum, and needs to be evened? Or is it something else?

I apologize if I'm being obtuse, and asking you to repeat what you've already stated. I just genuinely am somewhat confused. I can understand the rationale for focusing on Hezbollah quite well - as the Greg Jaffe article in the Washington Post stated, the Army has sent a dozen teams to study the conflict; it (Hezbollah and the 34 Day War) clearly has relevance for the US military.

Again, though, I'm more just struck by the structure of your argument, which seems to imply an *either/or* decision needs to be made, but then seems to choose *both.*

Respectfully (sincerely),
ADTS

I certainly did not said that Hezbollah was not fought and it had been. Israel did face a defeat. But hezbollah did not face a victory.
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I concur with this. I think Cordesmans work on the conflict is the most systematic and well-reasoned attempt to determine whether Israel achieved its objectives. I'd suggest you look at it, if you're so inclined.

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What I just wanted to say is that Hezbollah did have an operation that was including also the humanitarian/civilian when they launched their attack on Iraely border post. They did prepare all sides of the consequences of that decision. They had a hearts and minds strategy ready and the war was not even finished that they already launched their post conflict hearts and minds operation.

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I concur here as well. I lack the detailed knowledge that you possess, but my understanding is that Hezbollah executed a WHAM/social services campaign both promptly and efficiently.

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Also, and that was the response to Colonel Gentil question, they did have both military and stabilization ready. And I am not capable to advice for USA to make a choice. I personnaly believe that anyways stabilization (as a strategy or approach or policy making or doctrine...) has to be fully revised to be addapted to post Cold War conflicts but not necessary only in the perspective of COIN or Counter terrorism... Several steps previously considered as the end (election, creation of an administration as examples) are now just tools and not end.

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Im not sure how this relates directly to the Colonel Gentile point, which I took to be - primarily, at least - that its easier to have a combined arms unit transition to COIN/SASO than the reverse. That said, Im curious what you mean by "not necessarily only in the perspective of COIN or CT." The interpretation I take of what you're saying is that you're less in favor of combined arms-oriented units and more in favor of COIN-oriented units.

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Secondly, Thanks for making me discover Jeffrey Record. To answer the specific question you asked, in the case of Hezbollah, it's difficult to say that US did not prepare anything on the "social side", organization building. As example, you had long term development project ran by IRC in Nabathyia, hand to hand with Hezbollah.

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First, circumstances dictated that I could only read about the first third of Record, but it's great, isn't it?

Second, in this paragraph, are you stating "US" when you mean *Israel* with respect to organization and "social side?" I think it would be difficult if not impossible for Israel to "operate" in such a fashion in Lebanon.

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I am not sure that qualifying Hezbollah, for instance, as a social movement is acurate. Hezbollah is a "micro state/nation". And that's most probably the force of such movements.

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I think here we might be quarreling over definitions. Perhaps a microstate/nation is a social movement writ large, or a more robust social movement. I like the term "parastate."

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Finally, I do not have enough knowledge of viet nam war to be abble to fully answer. But I would say that Hezbollah is more like a regular army with strong irregular fighting capacities rather than a purely irregular force.

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I dont know enough about Hezbollah (and perhaps the Vietnam War as well) to be able to answer. But that sounds right to me based on what Ive read in the Biddle/Friedman piece.

I hope I understood your post accurately, and provided corresponding and appropriate responses to it. Please correct me where I have misunderstood or strayed.

Respectfully,
ADTS

<b>ADTS:</b>

Thank you. True on the enablers, I think. My comment was that they should be listened to as opposed to being ignored -- not only Crocker but others on Iraq and still others in Somalia, in Viet Nam and even in Korea. The problem is the major policy 'deciders' dismiss the hard earned knowledge of the people their predecessors were smart enough to spend a lot of money educating, training and familiarizing on and in an area or body of knowledge.

That applies not only to the FAO but as well to the warfare specialists -- in each conflict cited, there were prescient folks who warned of problems, both cultural and military that massive egos foolishly believed <i>they</i> could overcome even though others had failed in similar attempts. Thus, the dismissal in all cases of not only FAO advice but that of SF and CA folks as well as some sharp S/G/J 2 and 3 people down the food chain a bit on total mission parameters.

It is possible to succeed where others failed. That rarely occurs if practical advice is spurned. We need enablers, we need fewer large egos to dismiss those enablers.

Your mention of "An Army at Dawn" triggered, as mention of the book always does, thoughts of Terry De La Mesa Allen and what the US Army of today would have done with or to him. Or he to it.

Good challenge to Gian on the Paper comparison of the "curves." I think the mechanics and thus time and effort of the two types training will be broadly equal with transition from MCO to COIN working out a bit cheaper and taking slightly less time. What the paper probably cannot adequately address is the adaptation of mindsets, probably the most critical diffrentiating factor. It also does not lend itself to metrication...

First, Ken White. Thank you for your kind (and thorough) response. Your counterarguments to Rosen are instructive (even if it remains, in my opinion, a great book, even if - especially now - not entirely convincing). Reading your response, I thought of Rick Atkinsons "An Army at Dawn," and the rate at which certain people (e.g., Eisenhower) ascended, and other people (e.g., Freydenhall) descended. (Im probably a bit prone to thinking of that era and that idea because I just went back to the website for my grandfathers WW II division and perused its AARs.) As for enablers, though, to quarrel a bit: Would not FAOs, while willing to question policy - just as Ambassador Crocker apparently wrote a memo warning about the risks involved in invading Iraq - nevertheless be, if not unable, then certainly quite constrained in determining or shaping it ("it" being policy)? Im referring, of course, as I think you are, to "major" policy, such as an adequately sized Phase IV force, rather than (say) interagency disputes while working as an FAO?

Second, Colonel Gentile, to answer your more narrow question. Ive never actually sat down, printed, read, underlined, and notated the Elliott familys RAND work, as is my habit (need?) for work I want to really absorb; Ive just skimmed whats online. (As a fun fact, did you know - at least Im "pretty" sure - his father was Henry Kissinger and Samuel Huntingtons - Brzezinski too? - dissertation advisor?) And Ive been daunted by the length and font size of both his two-volume history and his "condensed" version of the same. I have browsed Mai Duong Elliotts memoir/family history at the bookstore, and it looks interesting; I think Stathis Kalyvas has actually cited it in some of his papers, even if not in "Logic."

http://www.amazon.com/Sacred-Willow-Generations-Vietnamese-Family/dp/01…

Last but not least, theres a review article in the Annual Review of Political Science from a few years ago that, well, reviews the literature on the Vietnam War; it may be useful to you.

For what its worth, this is what Id say encapsulates your position as well as anything:

"as matter of strategic risk I would much rather have a combined arms army that has a bit of a learning curve to do a Coin or Stability operation than an Army made up of OHanlon style Peace Brigades that had a steep learning curve if it had to fight an enemy like Hizbollah. And as matter of strategic risk I would much rather have a combined arms army that has a bit of a learning curve to do a Coin or Stability operation than an Army made up of OHanlon style Peace Brigades that had a steep learning curve if it had to fight an enemy like Hizbollah."

First, I would just be curious if youd lay out "what the curves look like:" how much time would it take for a combined arms battalion to transition to COIN or SASO well than for a COIN battalion to transition to combined arms? Why would it take said amount of time - of what would the curves consist? I think it has the potential for an interesting paper - a side-by-side comparison of the costs of the two transitions - and best of all, one I dont have to write. :)

Second, of course, is M-A Lagranges point that Hezbollah cannot be considered to have been fought because it was/is more than a fighting force; it is a social movement. I think it *can* be fought, as it certainly was during 34 days of 2006. The question becomes, How does one defeat a social movement? I will put words in your mouth and say Hezbollah and 2006 represents a "hybrid" in many ways respects. Nonetheless - and this is directed at M-A Lagrange more than at Colonel Gentile - Im reminded of Jeffrey Records observation that the war for Long An was won very early on by the Viet Cong, because they had done the difficult work of organization-building compared to the government. Obviously the Israeli government is not the South Vietnamese government, nor the South Vietnamese Army the IDF. But Im struck by the comparison - is Hezbollah the NVA, or Viet Cong Main Force, and if so, does that have any bearing on the debate?

Respectfully to all,
ADTS

M-A Lagrange:

Fair points.

My answer is in terms of how the American Army should transform, optimize, train, and organize itself within this construct of full spectrum operations which essentially says that we have to be able to do it all. Fine, so be it, we will have to do a lot of things, but for the American Army we simply dont have the unlimited resources to be able to organize and optimize an army for all of those things.

So my question to you then would be along the spectrum of conflict, what aim point do you pick to organize the American army? Stability so that we can do, using your example of Hizbollah and social services, nation building operations; or is it fighting at the higher end of the spectrum so that we can fight effectively as Hiz did against Israel in 2006?

I say that we cannot organize and optimize to do it all, and that we have to make hard choices on where to focus. My choice would be making the aim point toward the higher end of the conflict spectrum with an army trained and optimized for combined arms warfare because as I have already argued if we can do that right then we can do most other things as well.

ADTS:

right, now I remember those days on AM's blog. I am thinking it is about time for Exum to replace the Arabic word for "movement" with "establishment."

Well since those days I have been doing some primary and secondary research for an essay I am working on the Vietnam War and I have read most of Elliot's Rand studies on Vietnam and his masterly and recently published multi volume work on revolutionary and social change in the Mekong Delta. By the way have you read Mai Elliot's recently released Rand monograph on Rand and Vietnam? Like David's work hers is also masterly and better yet it is available online.

Agree with your summation of my position on the Oliver piece. I also agree with Ken White's post.

Yet not to bring out old angry saws but it is true that since 2006 and the ascendance of 3-24 and the Coin Crowd the American Army has been taught to feel guilty about being good at combined arms: like combined arms competencies caused it to fail in Iraq, and previously in Vietnam. Nothing could be further from the truth. Yet the conventional "truth" within the American Army is still dominated by flawed works on the Vietnam War (Sorley, Nagl, Krepinevich) and more currently flawed work on Iraq and the Surge (Ricks and Robinson).

In many circles within the American Army it is not uncommon to hear such quips as "we need to move beyond combined arms to whole of government" as if competency at combined arms is something simple and easy. It is not, as Lebanon in 2006 definitely shows. And as matter of strategic risk I would much rather have a combined arms army that has a bit of a learning curve to do a Coin or Stability operation than an Army made up of OHanlon style Peace Brigades that had a steep learning curve if it had to fight an enemy like Hizbollah. The British Army in the Second Boer War is another good example of what happens when armies focused on irregular war has to fight an organized and competent foe that uses sophisticated combined arms itself.

I think the notion of full spectrum operations is dangerous because it lacks focus and it lacks the necessity to make hard choices about training, organization, and equipment. The term full spectrum operations is often bandied about just like the term "balance" or even "hybrid war." All of these terms are metaphors and therefore lack clear meaning which then allows folks to use them and argue for whatever kind of force transformation they are looking for.

We know that in the future we are going to have to fight, we also know that we will be told to do many other things as well. But in that uncertain future the American Army must first and foremost be premised on combined arms warfare. If it can do that it can do almost anything else. Dont let the Coin zealots with their flawed histories and current conceptions convince us otherwise.

<b>ADTS:</b>

I share the confusion on your point 4 of Major Oliver's post. However with respect to your comments on Gian's post, I gather we're in agreement; that a decently trained combined arms battalion can switch to a COIN effort more rapidly than a COIN trained battalion can switch to competent combined arms work.

I also suggest that Stephen Rosen is in error stating that adaptation occurs between rather than during war because time to assess what works and what does not is lacking. Looking at WW II, the Armies that fought in the 1939-42 period and those that were fighting in 1945 were mostly very different creatures. Similarly, in Korea, Viet Nam and today the amount of change during the wars far exceeded anything envisioned by the Armies involved before those wars. The big catalyst for change is the war itself. Combat lends a certain urgency to improvements that is totally lacking in peacetime. Not to mention the enemy seems to always be a little better than was predicted...

Between the wars foolishness is what causes debacles like the M3 Medium tank or the immediate aftermath of our invasion of Iraq. Or ignoring COIN for 25 years.

Or even worse, not convincing everyone involved that while one <b>has</b> to be prepared for and know how to conduct COIN operations, they should be avoided unless there is absolutely no alternative -- they are messy, protracted, wasteful and rarely turn out well. There will be no win, only, hopefully, an acceptable conclusion -- and what is 'acceptable' will always be scaled down as the effort continues.

As to your very valid question on 'enablers,' I'd say just a slight bit more than we did before 2001 -- however, in the future, lets listen to those enablers instead of ignoring them as we get ready to go blithefully off to war.

Mea culpa: I screwed up and reversed my "Gentile Point #1." Read with the appropriate caution. Usual disclaimers apply.

ADTS

Here's how I understand (and don't understand) Major Oliver's argument, which is basically that it represents a cost-benefit analysis regarding how the Army should choose to train:

1) Perfection is impossible, but the Army needs to train as best it can nonetheless.

2) Hezbollah, and/or the 34 Day War, represent a "two-fer," because it represented a hard case with respect to COIN, and also fell on the conventional as well as the unconventional or irregular spectrum of war (or am I taking too much from the Biddle/Friedman article?).

3) Accordingly, it is the ideal around which Army thinking should organize itself.

4) Point 3) also corresponds with the reality(ies) that large-scale conflicts and/or protracted conflicts are unlikely, and/or budgetary constraints require the Army choose the battles for which it chooses to train, and that the 34 Day War represents the best battle for which to train.

I have no problem understanding Points 1-3 (at least, I *think* I understand them; naturally and obviously, please feel free to correct me anywhere I am wrong) but Point 4 is more confusing to me. I concur that protracted conflicts are unlikely after OIF and OEF, but isn't one of your arguments for training for the 34 Day War that it is a COIN engagement (ie, potentially protracted) to a degree? Similarly, you *are,* as I understand, arguing that mid- or high-intensity conflict is more likely, and since the 34 Day War included a component of that as well, training for it is a worthwhile investment of limited resources.

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Here's how I understand Colonel Gentile's argument:

Condensed *considerably,* a unit trained for combined arms warfare can transition to COIN if necessary, but a unit trained for COIN cannot transition to combined arms warfare if necessary.

Some quibbles and/or "relatively random" thoughts:

1) Stephen Rosen, in "Winning the Next War," argues that adaptation occurs between rather than during war, because time to assess what works and what does not is lacking. Maybe this is wrong for COIN - his cases tend to be mostly if not entirely "WW II-centric" rather than COIN- or protracted conflict-centric. But I raise it as a point to ponder. How long does it take to transition for a COIN battalion to combined arms versus a combined arms battalion to COIN? I imagine you'd say the latter takes longer (and would do worse) than the former, but, as I noted, these are just some random thoughts.

2) Have the Israelis demonstrated competence at combined arms operations since the 34 Day War? I tend to agree based on what I've read in the Jerusalem Post, etc. Yet I don't count Operation Cast Lead as convincing evidence, because the power asymmetries were great. And, to play the devil's advocate, what the Israelis did very well in part (at least in my opinion) was manage information operations (was not now-Ambassador Michael Oren the head PAO?) - which I don't think Colonel Gentile has in mind when he writes of combined arms competencies. In other words, how hard is it to transition from COIN (and I'm not sure the Israelis were practicing COIN in the same way the US practices COIN) to combined arms, based on the Israeli case?

3) Maybe a combined arms battalion can do all the tasks a COIN-trained battalion can, but not the other way around. Nonetheless, even if the Army should ensure it retains its combined arms compentencies, how much should it devote to "enablers," e.g., foreign affairs officers, post-graduate schooling in social science disciplines, human terrain teams on tap, etc.? I realize that's a hard question to answer - FAOs are not going anywhere, I doubt a Stanford PhD questions the value of post-graduate education (although I imagine you'd be relatively dismissive of HTTs) - but I ask because, while they're not combined arms battalions, they still represent an expenditure of what Major Oliver rightly notes are finite resources.

By the way, I regretted that I could not seduce you into blogging again by way of the Elliotts' original RAND documents. Glad to see you again! (We blogged back and forth a bit on Abu M's board.)

ADTS

One of the primary reasons (accepted by numerous analysts) that the Israeli Army performed so poorly in Lebanon in 2006 was due to the fact that it had lost the ability to conduct combined arms operations at all levels in the face of a hostile foe that fought in a sophisticated way. During the intervening years between Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008 the Israeli Army got back to basics and focused on combined arms training from brigade and below.

What underwrites an army's ability to learn and adapt is combined arms competencies. If the American Army maintains combined arms competency then it can gain the initiative and if it has the initiative learning and adapting can follow.

But this doesnt work the other way around. That is to say an army should not make as its organizing principle the need to learn and adapt, but instead combined arms. Anyway isnt it a well understood truism that military organizations must learn and adapt in war?

Unfortunately today in the American Army the consumption with Coin and the notion that conventional army's habitually fail at it so therefore must always learn and adapt toward better Coin tactics has in a sense put the cart before the horse. And the horse that I am speaking about is combined Arms competencies. If we can do that, we can do just about anything.

If I had to take a rifle battalion into Darfur to assist with humanitarian relief I would much rather take one that has been trained to the utmost in combined arms and not one that has spent the preceding year learning about Darfurian culture. To be sure an understanding of culture is necessary, but that delta can be made up by education of key leaders. It is like General Slim said in his memoirs reflecting on operations in Burma in World War II if he had well trained infantry battalions he could do just about anything.

For some reason though we seem to be taking our eye of the ball in the American Army about combined arms competencies. Cultural knowledge, emotional relationships with locals, full spectrum operations, whole of government approach, hearts and minds, clear hold build, whatever the de jour cool phrase or idea of the day is, if you want to accomplish any assigned mission you better be good at combined arms first. The other competencies, knowledge, and methods can follow.

I agree with the idea that the Army should foster a culture where leaders are adaptive and flexible and that Soldiers should be trained to use force most effectively with the minimal collateral and unintended consequences. However, these traits have been the desired end state of Army leaders for quite a while. I would argue that the Army does try to train Soldiers to be flexible and judicious in their use of force, but there is no 100% solution - not as long as warfare remains a human activity. Soldiers, leaders, and units no matter how well their training will sometimes fall short of the goal. That being said, training and education complement each other and reduce the inevitable failures that occur in war. Providing an educational base that more widely encompasses the spectrum of warfare will provide a foundation for Soldiers and leaders where there are gaps in training. Training should prepare Soldiers and units for specific tasks - the most likely tasks based on planned or potential deployments and contingencies.
I hold the war with Hezbollah as the model by which the Army should focus its efforts because of the applicability across the spectrum of warfare. Hezbollah was (is) a well-trained irregular force with a mix of modern military and commercial hardware and fairly competent leadership. It demonstrated an ability to severely test what many see as the premier fighting force in that part of the world. From a conventional standpoint, Hezbollah is a representation of the most likely enemy the US will face in the near future. It isnt heavily mechanized, it relies on decentralized light infantry to utilize complex terrain and civil infrastructure to mitigate the advantages of industrialized state armies.
On the other end of the spectrum, Hezbollah is a distinct challenge. Any counterinsurgent force would be hard-pressed to separate a group like Hezbollah from the civilian population and 'win the civilians hearts and minds. The native knowledge of the local culture, language, and terrain would limit the advantages an external intervening force, like the US Army, would have. The reality and difficulty of Hezbollah makes it a suitable template for the most likely enemies the United States can expect to face.
The Army cannot organize, train, and prepare for all of the possible threats - time and money are very limiting. The likelihood of massed armored battles in the deserts of the Middle East or the plains of Europe isnt high, but the systems that underpin the ability to fight those battles must be preserved. This "era of persistent conflict" doesnt make much sense either. The idea that the United States will find itself committed to small conflicts around the world for the next ten to twenty years isnt linked to political or economic realities.
From a political standpoint, I have a difficult time imagining a US President telling the American people that he or she is getting involved in another protracted nation building or counterinsurgency effort unless there is an identifiable existential threat. The republican liberal constraints on the use of force will probably limit the policy options of future civilian leaders. This was the case after Korea and Vietnam - our other controversial post-WWII wars.
Economically, unless something drastic happens in the near future, the budgetary priorities of the United States will have to change. The costs of the economic recovery and other recent US expenditures are bound to alter discretionary spending, which includes defense spending. In the Department of Defenses prioritization, policy makers must weigh persistent engagement requiring large and continued force deployments against maintenance of Americas decisive air and naval advantages. The idea that the US will remain engaged in a global counterinsurgency doesnt seem to have considered how the US will pay to stay engaged in the era of persistent conflict. If I were a betting man, Id venture to say that the US will be much more selective in its future engagements. Why are Predator strikes and special operations actions becoming more common in South Asia and the Horn of Africa instead of larger troop deployments?
By focusing on Hezbollah and reorganizing the Army to be more generalized, the US would be hedging its bet on what the next war will be instead of preparing to fight the last one.

it should identify and implement organizational methods for streamlining adaptability and change in complex and uncertain situations.

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the military needs to institutionalize flexibility at the operational level

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Major Kaperak:

In some ways, it seems you arguing the impossible. Organizations exist to streamline adaptability and change. They will encounter anomalous situations occasionally - here I draw on Charles Perrow's "Normal Accidents" - and when these do occur, the organization will fail. The organization is designed to fulfill the task that will occur 90% of the time or more, not the task that occurs or will occur 10% of the time or less. That is why organizations exist - precisely to codify and enact, execute on, and perform procedures that enable the organization's task(s). The problem is that the tasks may, occasionally, not be the typical one encountered. Institutionalized flexibility, with all due respects, seems like an oxymoron, like telling someone, "Don't think of blue elephants!" (the best example I could think of. How does one institutionalize - that is, routinize - something by definition is not susceptible to being routinized? Adaptation is difficult for any organization, for any number of reasons, and I suspect that one should not be surprised that the military is any different in this regard.

All that said, I am tremendously interested in "The 34 Day War." I've read Exum, some of Helmer, and much of Matthews' and Cordesman's work. I'd be very curious to hear what you, and others, think of the IDF's performance, strategy, operations, tactics, etc. For example, and to tie this into what I wrote above, could one argue that the IDF's organization was "geared" towards its "90%" task of - depending on one's perspective - guarding or occupying the West Bank? Or was its civil-military relations and the strategy that those leaders fostered *so* bad that the IDF's performance was a preordained outcome? Or was the IDF's performance a failure on many levels? Or are we interpreting the IDF's failure wrongly - that Hezbollah was bloodied badly in the war. Finally, has the IDF transformed itself, and if so, how and how does said transformation correlate to what we wrote?

Respectfully,
ADTS

MAJ Oliver, thank you for your insights and analysis of the 2006 Lebanon "34-day War."
Hezbollah certainly surprised the IDF with their innovative tactics in 2006; however, I think it is a stretch to say that the 2006 Lebanon War should serve as a template by which the U.S. should plan and organize for future hybrid wars. Instead, I would suggest considering the recent Hezbollah case as an example of what can happen when a nation or military does not fully know or understand its adversary. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong employed unique tactics to help make up for their disadvantage in conventional capabilities to match those of the U.S. military in the 1960s (i.e. moving so close to U.S. formations so as to render U.S. fire support irrelevant). Tactically, U.S. forces have seldom had difficulty adapting to new and creative enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures. In general, the U.S. problem during the Vietnam War and recently in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been its inflexibility at the organizational level combined with a lack of creativity that would enable the U.S. to stay ahead of its adversaries at the operational level of war. Repeatedly, the U.S. allows its enemies to dominate the information war and continues to feed enemy information campaigns with operational errors. Many U.S. commanders would rather kill an IED emplacer with a $68K munition fired from an UAV or manned aircraft (see youtube.com for countless examples) than consider the potential collateral damage and alternatively use that $68K toward addressing some of the conditions that made that IED emplacer consider fighting for the enemy in the first case (this may be changing though). No doubt, U.S. forces could be more creative and judicial in their use of force and real time intelligence.
The U.S. military is a bureaucracy and understandably slow to embrace change, but if anything, it should identify and implement organizational methods for streamlining adaptability and change in complex and uncertain situations. An example of U.S. sluggishness is the amount of time it took for the military to publish a new COIN Manual/Doctrine (2006), although it might have been more practical to just dust off and put to use some of the countless dated texts on COIN whose principals still apply. How can it be that it took the military more than 6 years as an organization to realize that knowledge of language and cultural awareness are critical elements for first understanding and subsequently countering an insurgency?
It is my assertion that the military needs to institutionalize flexibility at the operational level. The Armys concept of Full Spectrum Operations is at least a step in the right direction toward understanding the nuances of the use of force in the contemporary operational environment. The concept of Full Spectrum Operations acknowledges that there is no set combination of offense, defense, or stability operations that will achieve success in any given situation or conflict.
Culturally, Americans, and the military in particular, tend to want tangible results quickly and are slow to accept the idea of an era of persistent conflict. Once the U.S. accepts that shortsighted operational timelines only work to the adversaries advantage, then it can truly begin to make progress in wars that do not fit into the conventional model of conflict.
It is difficult to be a master of all trades, especially in warfare as you outline in your case study of the IDF. As you suggest in your recommendations, education at all levels is key, but I propose as an alternative to reorganizing the Armys structure yet again, attempt to inculcate a mindset in our leaders that embraces flexibility and adaptability vice looking to apply template solutions to situations that at best have few similarities. Train our soldiers to close with and destroy the enemy and to understand the implications of the application of force across the spectrum of conflict. Train our leaders to understand when, where, and how to employ force in any given operational environment and to be flexible and judicial in the application of force.
Major Mark Kaperak, student, Command and General Staff School, Fort Belvoir Satellite Campus.
The views expressed in this blog are my own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.