Small Wars Journal

Turning Fallujah

Thu, 10/29/2009 - 6:40pm
Turning Fallujah

by Colonel William F. Mullen III

Download the full article: Turning Fallujah

Fallujah is a city that has taken on a tremendous amount of significance because of what happened there from April to December of 2004. It has become one of the touchstone battles of the Marine Corps involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom because of the intensity of the fighting and the number of Marines and Sailors killed or wounded there. It is not a large city in either the space it occupies, or the amount of people that claim it as home. It is a compact, dirty, beat up town that always had a sinister reputation under the Saddam Hussein regime as a smuggling and black market center. This went very nicely with its additional claim to fame as the "city of Mosques" due to the large number of Mosques located within its' boundaries. Its people have been known to be, and still very much are, very xenophobic as their general attitude seems to be "it is us Fallujans against the world." This was directed not only at coalition forces, but also at any Iraqis who were not specifically from Fallujah. It is certainly not a place that will show up as a vacation hot spot any time soon. My personal involvement there started in December 2004 when I went out to Iraq on a Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS). I was the Operations Officer for Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 8 and we would be replacing RCT 1 in February, 2005. It finished, at least for now, when I departed the area in October, 2007 as the commander of 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6) having just spent the previous 7 months in control of the city.

This paper is not an attempt to tell how we did everything right and solved the riddle of "turning Fallujah" from being a constant source of trouble and anxiety, to an example of what could be accomplished in Iraq given the proper COIN techniques. We did not do everything right and our success there, such as it was, could only be described as the culmination of years of dedicated struggle and effort on the part of thousands of Marines, Soldiers and Sailors, as well as members of the Iraqi security forces, many of whom were wounded or killed there. It was also a result of the fortunate coming together of several different events, all happening around the same time, which also happened to coincide with my battalion's arrival in March, 2007. This paper will briefly provide what I know of the history of Fallujah from 2004-2007, the techniques we used as an RCT to try and maintain control of both the town and the surrounding area during 2005 and early 2006, some lessons learned that I took away from observing the units that operated underneath RCT 8 during that year (one of which was 2/6, but under a different commander), the preparations we made in 2/6 after I took over to be ready to return to Fallujah, and finally the specific steps we took to capitalize on the conditions we found when we arrived there in late March, 2007. I firmly believe that it was the preparations we made while training prior to the deployment that enabled us to recognize what was happening in Fallujah and turn it to our advantage. We also developed an approach to turning Fallujah that resonated with the citizens of Fallujah to a degree and generated a level of success that well surpassed what we expected. It was an amazing experience and I feel privileged to have been a part of it.

Download the full article: Turning Fallujah

Colonel William F. Mullen III, USMC, is the Director of the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group of the Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Training Command. In July 2002 he reported to the J-3 Directorate of the Joint Staff in the Pentagon for duty as an Action Officer in the PACOM and then the CENTCOM sections of the Joint Operations Division. In May 2003, he was assigned as the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director for Regional Operations until he returned to Camp Lejeune in June 2004 as the Plans Officer for the 2nd Marine Division. In October, 2004 he was assigned as the Operations Officer for the 8th Marine Regiment and deployed with them to Fallujah, Iraq from February 2005 to February 2006. In June, 2006, he assumed command of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines and returned to Fallujah, Iraq from March to October, 2007. He was promoted to Colonel on 1 Oct, 2007 and reported to the Naval War College as a student in March, 2008 and graduated in March, 2009.

About the Author(s)

Comments

Col Mullen's article is an excellent (and brief) summation of the highlights in Fallujah during this time. From my seat as the RCT's S2, Col Mullen's Bn seized a growing snowball of success the RCT was enjoying outside of the city and created an avalanche of momentum with its nuanced COIN ops in Fallujah. Op Alljah essentially sounded the death knell for AQI in Eastern Anbar and lead to the whole sale buy-in of the Iraqi populace for GoI (and CF) control of Fallujah and surrounding areas.

---------------

MikeF - As RCT6's 'duece' for this time period, I can probably answer your question:

The RCT boundary you are refering to was inclusive of Nasser Wa Salaam (NWS) which sat on the main highway from Baghdad - due west of Abu Ghraib. In reality, this was a horrible placement of the boundary as the NWS population was completely disconnected from the RCT center of gravity in Fallujah and was directly linked to Abu Ghraib & Baghdad. As such, it comprised a complete economy of force mission for my RCT. The RCT had 1 x MTT with an Iraqi Army Bn on the edge of NWS that manned several CPs around the city and did some partolling within. MND-B was supposed to provide a PTT for NWS but only completed this task at the very end of 2007. The MTT OIC had a foot in both IA & IP HQ's and was truly in a tough spot. The RCT's priority for this area was keeping the MSR clear of IEDs and patrolled it multiple times everyday.

At the RCT level, we did have good coordination / cooperation with the adjacent BCT for this area and made a concerted effort to overlap our boundaries. However, we essentially gave the BCT and their subordinate unit a free hand to influence the area as they saw fit since it directly impacted their AO and only tangentially had an effect on our AO. Since the 'information' battle for this area originated in Abu Ghraib - regardless of where the CF boundary was - the IO effort for NWS was mainly orchestrated by 2-5CAV. We did effectively coordinate on the intel side of the house (in my opinion) in order to disrupt AQI and problematic remanants of nationalist insurgents seeking refuge in NWS.

S/f
JT

"Victory" in Anbar Province cannot be attributed to any single deployment. From the time the Marines arrived in March 2004 until today, every Marine has played a significant role in establishing peace and security in this "Wild West" province. Your deployment was a critical point in which we won over the hearts and minds of the people of Fallujah.

You had a tricky mission, clearing the remnants of the insurgency while rebuilding Fallujah and trying to gain the trust of the people of Anbar.

Well Done!

Semper Fidelis,

Richard S. Lowry

PS Watch for "New Dawn" in bookstores in May, 2010. It tells the story of the Joint victory in Operation Phantom Fury. www.richardslowry.com

COL Mullen,

Excellent article, sir. If you have a moment, could you comment on how y'all coordinated boundaries/seams and information with adjacent units, particularly the Army unit in Abu Gharaib? Where y'all able to share info like the vehicle registration between units?

v/r

Mike

Sir,

Rereading through your article, it is amazing to me to see how we all adapted in pretty much the same way at the same time.

That boundary always bugged me. If I was a bad guy, I could drive from Abu G through Fallujah to Ramadi in 20-30 minutes. I always wondered how the adjacent units handled it.

BTW, I received some of the best intel ever from one of your RCT S2s that helped me take down a bad sheik up in Diyala.

Best,

Mike

Mullen (not verified)

Thu, 10/29/2009 - 8:45pm

MikeF - we were completely embedded within RCT-6, so we were not adjacent to any Army units. I suspect the RCT did some coordination, but I never checked as my hands were kind of full with the city.

Thanks for your interest.

Take care,
WFM