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The Shining Path of Peru: An Analysis of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Tactics
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is a Maoist faction of the Peruvian Communist Party that began its armed struggle against the Peruvian government in 1980. The most active and violent period of the insurgency lasted from 1980-1995. Although the Shining Path has carried out attacks in recent years, it has been on a much smaller scale. According to the Peruvian sponsored Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as many as 70,000 Peruvians were killed throughout the insurgency. Therefore, this has been one the country’s bloodiest conflicts in recent history. [i]
The Shining Path, led by Abimael Guzmán, first gained prominence in the Ayacucho region of south-central Peruvian highlands (see Map 1). It largely drew its support from university students and professors, as well as highland farmers and the urban poor of Lima.[ii] These groups felt neglected, both socially and economically, by the government. Under the guise of a pro-Indian movement, the Shining Path initially appealed to the most isolated sectors of Peruvian society.[iii]
This paper discusses the tactics the Shining Path employed to spread their influence from the southern Andean highlands throughout the majority of Peru. First, the origins of the insurgency, to include the socio-economic climate of the 1970s and 1980s, is discussed as a means of contextualizing the root causes. Next, the strengths and weaknesses of the Shining Path is analyzed. Finally, the paper delves into the government’s counterinsurgency campaigns in an attempt to offer insight into the duration, effectiveness, and brutality of the insurgency. Furthermore, the inability of the government to tackle the grievances of the rural and urban poor populations has allowed the group to remain active, though much weaker. Through the framework of Anthony James Joes’ “Elements of a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” this paper will analyze how the Peruvian government effectively decapitated the Shining Path, but failed to address the root causes of the insurgency.[iv]
Figure 1. Political Map of Peru[v]
Origins of the Insurgency
The Partido Comunista del Perú (PCP), or ‘Peruvian Communist Party,’ emerged in the 1960s during the wave of pro-communist movements throughout the globe. In 1964 the PCP became split between pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing factions, with the PCP-Bandera Roja, or ‘Red Flag,’ aligning themselves with Maoist teachings. [vi] The main point of contention between the two groups was the role of armed struggle in the revolution. The pro-Moscow group was decidedly against violence, while the PCP-Bandera Roja believed violence to be a necessary means to achieve their goals. An additional fissure took place within the ranks of the PCP-Bandera Roja in 1967 as a result of further infighting between the leadership and those members who called for violent revolutionary action.[vii] Thus, under the direction of Abimael Guzmán, the PCP-Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) was formed in 1970.
Guzmán was a professor of philosophy at the National University of San Cristobal de Huamanga (UNSCH) in Ayacucho. This would serve as the center for Shining Path activity and recruitment during the group’s early years. In 1971 Guzmán became the Director of Personnel, which allowed him to control the hiring and firing of faculty members. This position proved crucial as it enabled him to create a cycle of indoctrination: radical professors recruited students, who became teachers and, upon graduating, returned to their villages to spread Guzmán’s message.[viii]
The Shining Path spread easily throughout Ayacucho as the population was severely impoverished. Many peasants already felt disenfranchised by the government, who implemented a much-needed land reform program in the 1960’s, but failed to redistribute land in the highlands. Economic conditions in Ayacucho only worsened throughout the 1970s. The subsistence crisis is most shocking when analyzing per capita income in the region, “which fell 20 percent in the 1970s to about $60 to $70 by the early 1980s.”[ix] In addition, the majority of the population was indigenous and spoke Quechua, which further disconnected them from the Spanish-speaking government.[x] Guzmán and the Shining Path exploited this isolation and the economic crisis of this region to gain support for their movement. Therefore, it was not difficult to encourage rebellious sentiment in a population that felt more or less abandoned by the Peruvian government.
Ultimately, Guzmán and the Shining Path promised to rid Peru of a “foreign-dominated political system” and replace it with a more nationalistic and “Indian” democracy.[xi] When they were forced out of UNSCH in 1974 they went underground, but continued recruiting throughout rural Ayacucho. This allowed them to work rather clandestinely until they decided to make their intentions known during the 1980 presidential election, which was the country’s first in seventeen years. The night of May 17, 1980 would become known as the official beginning of the “People’s War.” The Shining Path began small by burning ballot boxes and voting lists in the town of Chuschi on the eve of the election. Little attention was paid to the group as they were thought of as a radical, regional group, but their violence increased by the end of the year when citizens found dead dogs hanging from lampposts.[xii] The violence quickly escalated throughout Peru as the insurgency turned into the bloodiest campaign in the country’s memory.
Strengths of the Shining Path
The Shining Path’s home base of Ayacucho proved to be strategically advantageous for numerous reasons. It is important to note the geographical advantage the highlands offered, as the Shining Path did not have outside sanctuary. As discussed above, UNSCH and its majority peasant, student population proved to be the perfect breeding ground for revolutionary activity. As the students returned to their villages and spread the message of the Shining Path, a political network began to form. Before expanding into urban areas, the insurgents spread their influence throughout the highlands. As previously mentioned, these areas were relatively isolated so the Shining Path faced little ideological competition.[xiii] Thus, they were able to steadily build their strength for almost a decade before beginning their overt revolution in 1980.
Both the Shining Path’s relatively small size and isolated base caused the Peruvian government to severely underestimate its power at the beginning of the insurgency. In 1980, during the early days of the “People’s War,” nobody could have guessed that a fringe leftist movement would become a legitimate threat against the Peruvian government. Furthermore, The Shining Path enjoyed a geographical advantage during the initial stages of the insurgency. The jungle and mountain terrain of the highlands made it very difficult for the Peruvian government to reach and successfully exert their control over the population.[xiv]
In addition, the longevity of the Shining Path’s insurgency may be traced back to their recruitment process and their organizational structure. Guzmán retained tight control over the organization, ensuring the decision-making processes were highly centralized, despite its reach throughout the country. Because of the expanse of the Shining Path’s territory, Guzmán and his top commanders created a “National Directorate and a Central Committee, which together [oversaw] the movement’s operations.”[xv] Furthermore, as the military became more present in the Shining Path’s rural bases, they turned their attention to the cities. They successfully infiltrated cities by decentralizing the organization into five autonomous zones: south, central, Lima, southwest, and north.[xvi] This was an impressive strategic move as it conveyed a sense of much greater strength and a wider spread of influence than the organization actually enjoyed.
In addition, Guzmán himself served as one of the organization’s greatest strengths. His strategy for a protracted campaign was a modification of Mao’s three phases. His version was the following five-point program that would culminate in the overthrow of the Peruvian government: “(1) agitation and armed propaganda; (2) sabotage against Peru’s socioeconomic system; (3) the generalization of the guerilla struggle; (4) the conquest and expansion of the revolution’s support base and the strengthening of the guerilla army; and (5) general civil war, the siege of the cities, and the final collapse of state power.”[xvii] He may very well have completed all five phases had he not been captured in 1992. Furthermore, Guzmán, affectionately referred to as Comrade Gonzalo, effectively portrayed himself as an almost godlike figure to his followers, many of whom were enamored by him despite never meeting him.[xviii] While this image fostered group unity, it proved highly detrimental to their long-term success as the group largely disintegrated after his capture.
Although the Shining Path had sympathizers throughout the country, it is their rigorous recruitment process of their active members, or Senderistas, that offers insight into the dedication of the movement. The number of Senderistas was estimated around 5000, but it is important to note that Guzmán highly favored quality of personnel over quantity.[xix] Therefore, recruits were required to pass through a rigorous vetting process to test their devotion to the group. They were put through increasingly difficult tasks, which culminated in the killing of a police officer and stealing his weapon.[xx] This process ensured that only the most loyal and violent became full-fledged members of the Shining Path.
In an effort to increase their rank and file membership, the Shining Path began to use front groups, which they called “generated organisms.” The decision to create these organisms came in 1986 and marked a distinct shift in strategy. Before this, the Shining Path eschewed such tactics as a means to further separate itself from the legal Left. However, in an effort “to mobilize and unify the broadest level of anti-government sentiment,” several organisms were formed.[xxi] These groups allowed the Shining Path to operate freely within Peru’s democratic society. Thus, they attempted to undermine the government’s legitimacy by tempting them into a crackdown.[xxii] They were largely comprised of rural youth, who felt the Peruvian state offered them little chance of upward mobility.[xxiii]
Weaknesses of the Shining Path
While the Shining Path’s spread of influence was greater than anticipated, their increasingly brutal tactics disenfranchised many of their rank-and-file members. The insurgents followed “an ideology that made violence an absolute value rather than a relative or proportionate instrument.”[xxiv] Furthermore, violence was viewed as a purification method. Thus, crimes as small as petty theft resulted in the beheading of the offender. This, coupled with their ideological rigidity, caused popular support to wane by 1985-1986 especially in the Ayacucho region. [xxv] As Orin Starn explains, “An absolute, even arrogant, certainty about the dictums of ‘Marxists-Leninist-Gonzalo Thought’ and the infallibility of the revolution turned out to be a serious liability for the Shinning Path, as the guerrillas were incapable of compromise with the peasantry.”[xxvi] Their inflexibility and brutality resulted in an armed revolt, led by the peasant rondas, which will de discussed later as one of the most successful counterinsurgency methods employed in this struggle.[xxvii]
Another significant weakness of the Shining Path was their inability to find sanctuary and outside support. Support from foreign governments can often mean the difference between success and failure for an insurgency. Unfortunately, the Shining Path ostracized themselves from other communist regimes as they made disparaging statements against the Soviet Union and China, which they described as ‘revisionist.’[xxviii] Furthermore, they refused to cooperate with the other leftist organizations within Peru. They often clashed and outright attacked Izquierda Unida (IU), “the coalition of Marxist parties that participates in Peru’s electoral process.”[xxix] The Shining Path took issue with the Left’s decision to participate in electoral politics after twelve years of military rule (1968-1980).[xxx]
The most significant weakness of the Shining Path may have been their inability to fully understand the social norms and practices of the rural peasants and Indians, those populations they claimed to be fighting for. Their proclivity for executions and massacres ran completely antithetical to the peasants’ need to protect the economy. As Carlos Iván Degregori explains, “In a society with a precarious economy that establishes intricate networks of kinship and complex strategies of reproduction, one had to take great care to protect the labor force.[xxxi] Additionally, in territories controlled by the Shining Path, they attempted to “strangle” cities and towns by prohibiting the sale of surplus crops. This was done to both exert their power and to ensure that all excess food was given to the Senderistas. However, this severely backfired “as the marketing ban shut off a source of social interchange and economic income so long a fulcrum of Andean life.”[xxxii] Furthermore, instances of Senderistas ordering rural youth, often their main link to these communities, to kill cattle forced them to reevaluate their loyalties.[xxxiii]
Ultimately, by “block[ing] all but subsistence economic activity,” the Shining Path proved that they neither understood the needs of the rural peasantry nor were they trying to improve their desperate economic situation.[xxxiv]
In addition, the Shining Path quickly resorted to murder and assassinations to heighten fear and annihilate dissidents. Their punishments were severe and pervasive; often, entire communities would disappear for resisting or defying the insurgents. They frequently murdered peasants, mayors, members of international NGOs, and journalists. They believed the fear of violent retribution was sufficient motivation to persuade even the most resistant peasants.[xxxv] Their most infamous case was the 1983 Lucanamarca Massacre. More than eighty villagers, including women and children, were massacred in retaliation for the killing of a Senderista.[xxxvi] Guzmán justified this massacre by claiming that they were sending a message to the Peruvian Armed Forces: “[…] we were ready to do anything, anything.”[xxxvii] He believed that fear was the most useful tool in recruiting those more reluctant to join the revolution. However, he did not anticipate the backlash his movement would face for such brutality. As Orin Starn explains, “The murders often embittered the friends and relatives of the dead, and extended the erosion of the initial aura of Maoists as beneficent champions of the peasantry.”[xxxviii] By the mid 1980s, the Shining Path was beginning to lose its base of support in Ayacucho and the Andean highlands.
Finally, as mentioned above, the Shining Path’s dependence on and reverence of Guzmán proved to be a fatal mistake as the organization became largely inactive after his September 12, 1992 capture. During the 18 months preceding his capture, approximately 3,600 Senderistas and rank-and-file members were either captured or surrendered themselves.[xxxix] It is important to note that his capture coincided with an offer of amnesty to his supporters under the Repentance Law.[xl] Having lost their Comrade Gonzalo, numerous rank-and-file members offered crucial intelligence to the Peruvian Armed Forces that allowed them greater insight into the insurgents’ plans. As Lewis Taylor explains, “The personality cult ultimately proved to be Sendero’s Achilles’ heel, in that the General Secretary’s arrest dented severely cadre morale and undermined the belief of many grass-roots Party members in a victorious outcome.”[xli]
Strengths of the Peruvian Government and Military
Although the counterinsurgency efforts of the Peruvian government were often marred with allegations of human rights violations, they were able to adapt their strategies to effectively take advantage of the anti-insurgent momentum of the mid-1980s. . Using Joes’ “Elements of a Counterinsurgency Strategy” as a framework, this section will analyze the government’s most successful tactics: dividing insurgent leaders from their followers and offering amnesty. As briefly mentioned above, the rondas campesinas allowed the rural peasants to defend themselves, with the help of the Peruvian government and military, from the Shining Path.[xlii] These groups along with the declaration of states of emergency (referred to as emergency zones) allowed the government to separate the insurgent leaders from their followers. Additionally, the passing of the Repentance Law offered the rank-and-file members of the Shining Path amnesty or reduced sentences, while also providing the government with much needed intelligence on the insurgents’ locations and plans.[xliii]
The ability of the Peruvian government to successfully divide leaders of the Shining Path from their followers via emergency zones is problematic to analyze. In 1982 the democratically elected President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985) declared the first emergency zone in Ayacucho.[xliv] These zones, which were under direct military control and greatly limited civil and political liberties, quickly expanded under the following two presidents: Alan García Pérez (1985-1990) and Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). [xlv] By 1990 approximately half of the population lived in emergency zones (see Map 2). The military control of these zones led to the installment of the Civil Guard. Despite numerous reports of military abuses, which are discussed below, the military presence showed the rural peasants that the Shining Path was not their only option. As military and police atrocities became less frequent throughout the second half of the 1980s, community groups such as the rondas began to take over policing duties.
Figure 2. Peruvian Emergency Zones 1981-1990[xlvi]
Arguably the most successful tactic of the Peruvian government was the utilization of rondas campesinas, or peasant patrols.[xlvii] Formed as an alliance between the military and rural peasants, these Peruvian rural defense units allowed the peasant communities to defend themselves against the insurgents. Although not without its critics, “the massive expansion of the organizations in 1990 and 1991 corresponded to a 30 percent decline in recorded casualties and deaths in the departments of Andahuaylas, Apurímac, Ayacucho, and Junín.”[xlviii] Furthermore, in 1992 President Fujimori (1990-2000) passed a national law that gave the ronderos the right to bear arms. This was highly symbolic as it reversed the colonial tradition that forbade Andean peasants from possessing technologies of war. It served as a concrete gesture of Fujimori’s confidence in the alliance between the Peruvian government and the Andean peasants.[xlix] These patrols provided a more indirect way for the Peruvian government to divide the insurgent leaders from their followers.
Finally, by offering amnesty to the insurgents the government not only denied Shining Path leaders their followers, but also offered an invaluable source of intelligence to the counterinsurgents. Under President Fujimori, the Law of Repentance was enacted, which “granted amnesty or reduced jail terms for individuals who chose ‘voluntarily’ to abandon armed struggle and collaborate with the authorities by betraying their erstwhile comrades.”[l] Many rank-and-file members of the Shining Path, particularly young, unemployed men, did not hold the strong convictions of the Senderistas. Thus, they were easily swayed to surrender themselves under the Repentance Law, especially after Guzmán’s capture significantly lowered morale. “Taking advantage of the Repentance Law, they started to collaborate actively with the intelligence services.”[li] Additionally, ronda controlled villages often offered their own form of amnesty to former Shining Path supports “[…] if [they were] willing to abandon the doctrine of revolution at any cost.[lii]
Weaknesses of the Peruvian Government and Military
Although the Peruvian government employed several successful tactics, which led to the capture of Guzmán and a de-escalation of violence, they made numerous errors and, therefore, prolonged the conflict. First, as discussed above, the government greatly underestimated the scope of influence and the strength of the Shining Path. As early as 1979, naval and army intelligence were aware of the Shining Path’s training for the eventual “People’s War.” However, these were easily dismissed as too small and too remote. Simon Strong argues, “[Shining Path’s] existence made a mockery of twelve years of military rule, while its public acknowledgement might look as if the military were trying to prolong its stay in power.”[liii] The missteps of the Peruvian government often aided the Shining Path in recruiting members to its cause. Using several of Joes’ “Elements of a Counterinsurgency Strategy” as a framework, this section will analyze the government’s weaknesses.
First, although it is discussed above as a limited strength of the counterinsurgency, it is important to note the negative impacts of the government’s attempts to separate the insurgent leaders from their followers. Their main attempt at separation was the declaration of emergency zones, which were placed under direct control of the military.[liv] Their methods resulted in too many civilian casualties to be considered a complete success. As Joes describes, “Effective counterinsurgency means marginalizing the guerrillas, by providing security to civilians.”[lv] Unfortunately, allowing the military free reign in the emergency zones resulted in numerous human rights violations. As is common in counterinsurgencies, the abuses of the military further isolated the rural populations and pushed them into the arms of the insurgents. Additionally, many people fled emergency zones and contributed to the high number of displaced people throughout the insurgency, which further worsened the economic situation of Peru.[lvi]
Second, the counterinsurgents must display rectitude so as to further marginalize the insurgents and protect the population. As Starn details, “Torture, rape, and murder of suspected rebels remained a mainstay of the counterinsurgency in subsequent years, leaving Peru the world’s highest number of ‘disappeared’ from 1988 to 1991.”[lvii] Throughout the 1980s, the Peruvian military was consistently accused of brutality and human rights violations. Among the most commonly reported military abuses was the arbitrary detainment of suspected guerrillas. Within the emergency zones the “specialized anti-terrorist Sinchis of the Civil Guard” were most notorious for human rights abuses.[lviii] Often young men were rounded up and interrogated as suspected guerrillas. They were frequently beaten and taken to prison in Lima if coincidental evidence was found to confirm insurgent-related activity.[lix] Furthermore, infamous instances, such as the August 14, 1985 massacre in Accomarca, Ayacucho in which Peruvian military killed approximately sixty unarmed men, women, and children, only showed that the military was just as brutal as the Shining Path.[lx] Additional massacres occurred June 18-19, 1986, which garnered international outrage. The prison massacres at San Juan de Lurigancho, Santa Mónica, and El Frontón resulted in the deaths of 271 prisoners and 4 members of the armed forces.[lxi] The disproportionate number of casualties was a clear sign of the military’s penchant for using excessive force. Additionally, this brought greater attention to and increased sympathy for the Shining Path’s cause. Recruitment increased as a new wave of students and supporters of the revolutionary left swelled the ranks of the Shining Path.[lxii]
Third, placing an emphasis on intelligence is essential to any successful counterinsurgency operation. Unfortunately, as the Shining Path operated mostly within the Andean highlands and the jungle, the military had limited access to the population, particularly during the first few years of the insurgency. As Lewis explains, “Unfortunately for the Peruvian armed forces, upon their arrival in Ayacucho they possessed minimal knowledge about PCP-SL organistational structures and membership.”[lxiii] To further complicate this issue, many of the security forces deployed to Ayacucho came from other departments. Thus, not only did they possess a minimal understanding of the culture and terrain, but they were also unable to communicate with the Quechua-speaking population.[lxiv] The declaration of emergency zones also impacted the collection of intelligence. The rural population largely distrusted the Civil Guard as they were forced to live with their brutality.
Overall, the most significant error committed by the Peruvian government was their failure to adequately address both the security and civil pillars of counterinsurgency. The emphasis was too heavily placed on the security pillar, which often led to abuses committed by the military. Furthermore, the insurgency was born out of economic hardships and feelings of isolation. If the government had focused on the civil pillar of counterinsurgency they would have effectively addressed the root causes of the insurgency and further destabilized the Shining Path’s support base. William Hazelton and Sandra Woy-Hazleton argue, “In part, Sendero’s persistence is due to the failure of two democratic governments to implement viable socio-economic reforms and an effective counterinsurgency strategy.”[lxv] This failure has allowed the Shining Path to continue moderate activity throughout the mid-2000s.
Conclusions and Looking Forward
Overall, despite numerous errors on the side of the Peruvian government, they were able to effectively decapitate the Shining Path and greatly reduce their activity within Peru. The Shining Path suffered because of their brutality, inflexible ideology, and their abandonment of their projected goals: to protect and improve the economic situation of the indigenous and rural populations. By the late 1980s many of these peasants were less wary of the government and military as the rondas provided them sense of self-defense. Furthermore, President Fujimori enacted several laws that distanced his administration from the colonial-era practices that were prevalent throughout the 20th century.
Analyzing the Shining Path’s insurgency has been remarkable in that neither side’s tactics were decisive in declaring a victor. Both sides resorted to brutal tactics to intimidate their allies and enemies. The government began to amend its strategies by the late 1980s, but few of their tactics were overwhelmingly successful. In the end, the organizational structure of the Shining Path proved to be the most detrimental as Guzmán’s capture caused the group to implode. It is clear that neither side truly understood nor adequately attempted to address the grievances of the rural peasants.
Thus, it is imperative to remember that the government’s failure to address the root causes of the insurgency has allowed the group to remain active in the Andean highlands. With violent activity occurring as recently as March 18, 2017, it is clear the Shining Path has not been completely eradicated.[lxvi] Because Peru enjoyed a relatively peaceful period during the early 2000s the government was lulled into a false sense of calm, which has left them unprepared for the recent resurgence of Shining Path activity. To atone for the atrocities committed during the counterinsurgency, the government greatly reduced their intelligence capabilities. Furthermore, the few development projects the government created during the crisis have since fallen by the wayside.[lxvii] It is clear that the government and military have mostly abandon their counterinsurgency tactics in an attempt to keep their brutality in the past. On the contrary, the Shining Path completed a five-year study of their methods and has since abandoned any violence against the general population. They have recommitted themselves to their cause and adopted a “FARC-like strategy,” which depends on narco-trafficking profits.[lxviii] The government appears to have forgotten that lack of development and economic stagnation were two of the root causes that permitted the Shining Path’s ideology to spread so quickly throughout Peru. It will be interesting to monitor how the government handles another counterinsurgency.
Burgoyne, Michael L., “Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight Against Sendero Luminoso.” Military Review (2010): pp. 68-73.
Degregori, Carlos Iván. How Difficult it is to be God: Shining Path's Politics of War in Peru, 1980-1999. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
Goi, Leonard. “Recent Attack on Peru Police Shows Shining Path Still Strong.” InSight Crime, March 20, 2017. Accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/recent-attack-police-shows-shining-path-still-strong.
Holmes, Jennifer S. “Sendero Luminoso after Fujimori: A Sub-National Analysis.” The Latin Americanist (2015): pp. 29:50.
Joes, Anthony James. Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004.
Kent, Robert B. "Geographical Dimension of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru." The Geographical Review 83 (Oct 1993): p. 447.
Manwaring, Max G. “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Path Beckons.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 541 (1995): 157-166, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1048282.
McClintock, Cynthia. “Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” World Politics 3 (October 1984): pp. 48-84. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010306
McCormick, Gordon. “The Shining Path and the Future of Peru.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3781.html.
Palmer, David Scott. The Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.
Peru Support Group, The Findings of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. London: Peru Support Group, 2004.
Ron, James. “Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation.” Journal of Peace Research 38 (2001): pp. 569-592. http://www.jstor.org/stable/424776.
Stern, Steve J. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.
Strong, Simon. Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru. New York: Random House, Inc., 1992.
Taylor, Lewis. Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006.
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Woy-Hazleton, Sandra. “Peru,” in Richard F. Staar (ed.), Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1987, Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1987 pp. 130-140.
Woy-Hazleton, Sandra and William A. Hazleton. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” Third World Quarterly 12 (1990): pp. 21-35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992257.
Yaworsky, William. “Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of US Army Psychological Operations.” Journal of Strategic Studies 32 (2009): pp. 651-666. DOI: 10.1080/01402390902987087.
[i] “Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Peru Support Group (2003), p.1.
[ii] Gordon McCormick, “The Shining Path and the Future of Peru” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990), p. 5.
[iii] Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru (New York: Random House, Inc., 1992), p.12.
[iv]Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), pp. 232-245.
[v]“Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Peru Support Group (2003), p.7. The Ayacucho region is emphasized with the red arrow.
[vi]Lewis Taylor, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006), p. 3.
[vii]Gordon McCormick, “The Shining Path and the Future of Peru,” p. 4.
[viii] Ibid., p. 5.
[ix] Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 245.
[x] Michael L. Burgoyne, “Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight Against Sendero Luminoso.” Military Review (2010): p. 68.
[xi] Max G. Manwaring, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Path Beckons.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 541 (1995): p. 158.
[xii] Carlos Iván Degregori, “The Origins and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views” in Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru, pp. 33-34.
[xiii] Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy,” p. 22.
[xiv] Jennifer S. Holmes, “Sendero Luminoso after Fujimori: A Sub-National Analysis,” The Latin Americanist (2015): p. 44.
[xv] Gordon McCormick, “The Shining Path and the Future of Peru,” p. 6.
[xvi] Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” Third World Quarterly 12 (1990): p. 23.
[xvii] Gordon McCormick, “The Shining Path and the Future of Peru,” p. 15.
[xviii] Ibid., p. 7.
[xix] Max G. Manwaring, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: The Path Beckons.” p. 160.
[xx] Gordon McCormick, “The Shining Path and the Future of Peru,” p. 13.
[xxi] Ibid., 11.
[xxii] Ibid., 12.
[xxiii] Carlos Iván Degregori, How Difficult it is to be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980-1999 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012) p. 136.
[xxiv]Carlos Iván Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 144.
[xxv] Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956, p. 213.
[xxvi] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 237.
[xxviii] William Yaworsky, “Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of US Army Psychological Operations.” Journal of Strategic Studies 32 (2009): p. 653.
[xxix]Cynthia McClintock, “Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” World Politics 3 (October 1984): p. 51.
[xxx] Steve J. Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p.1.
[xxxi]Carlos Iván Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 138.
[xxxii] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 236.
[xxxiii]Carlos Iván Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 144.
[xxxiv]Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” p. 22.
[xxxv] Ron, James. “Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation.” Journal of Peace Research 38 (2001): p. 577.
[xxxvi] Carlos Basombrío Iglesias, “Sendero Luminoso and Human Rights: A Perverse Logic that Captured the Country” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 434.
[xxxvii] Abimael Guzmán (1988) as quoted in Carlos Iván Degregori, “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho” p. 143.
[xxxviii] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 237.
[xxxix] Michael L. Burgoyne, “Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight Against Sendero Luminoso,” p. 70.
[xl] Lewis Taylor, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997, p. 169.
[xli] Ibid., p. 174.
[xlii] Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, pp. 232-245.
[xliii]Lewis Taylor, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997, p. 169.
[xliv]Michael L. Smith, “Shining Path’s Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte” in Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru, p. 133.
[xlv] Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” Third World Quarterly 12 (1990): p. 21.
[xlvi]Kent, Robert B. "Geographical Dimension of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru." The Geographical Review 83 (Oct 1993): p. 447. The shading indicates when the area was declared an emergency zone.
[xlvii] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” p. 225.
[xlviii] Ibid., pp. 244-245.
[xlix] Ibid., p. 232.
[l] Lewis Taylor, Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru’s Northern Highlands, 1980-1997, p. 169.
[li] Ibid., p. 174.
[lii] Ibid., p. 244.
[liii] Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1992) p. 22.
[liv] Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy,” pp. 22-23.
[lv]Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, p. 238.
[lvi] Michael L. Smith, “Shining Path’s Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte” in Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru, p. 133.
[lvii] Orin Starn, “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes,” in Stern, Shining and Other Paths, p. 237
[lviii]Ronald H. Berg, “Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas” in Palmer, The Shining Path of Peru, pp. 94.
[lix] Ibid., pp. 94-95.
[lx] Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, p. 133.
[lxi]Sandra Woy-Hazleton, “Peru,” in Starr, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1987 (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press) p. 134.
[lxii] Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” p. 23.
[lxiii] Taylor Lewis, Shining Path, p. 35.
[lxv]Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William A. Hazleton. “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy.” p. 21.
[lxvi]Leonardo Goi, “Recent Attack on Peru Police Shows Shining Path Still Strong,” InSight Crime, March 20, 2017, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/recent-attack-police-shows-shining-path-still-strong.
[lxvii]Michael L. Burgoyne, “Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight Against Sendero Luminoso,” p. 70.