Small Wars Journal

Reexamination of a Quintessential Joint Force Operation Case Study: Urgent Fury

Wed, 08/18/2010 - 8:56am
Reexamination of a Quintessential Joint Force Operation Case Study: Urgent Fury

by Thomas Bundt

Download the Full Article: Reexamination of a Quintessential Joint Force Operation Case Study: Urgent Fury

Although Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 American-led intervention in Grenada, was a successful operation from a public approval standpoint, significant concerns developed over the performance of the joint command structure charged with the conduct of the mission. Examination and reassessment of relevant literature reveals the overall operation as a textbook case study of the intricacies of joint forces command. In an effort to continue to capture historical lessons learned, further introspection of Operation Urgent Fury, if only to reexamine the primary shortfalls of a joint command experience, is necessary. Reviews of literature mixed with current updates to this operation delineate significant components and recommendations for consideration in future joint doctrine reviews. This analysis narrows the components and recommendations into three mutually 'inclusive' categories as they relate to three key joint force doctrine tenets: command and control, operational techniques, and equipment interoperability (joint procurement/acquisition).

Operation Urgent Fury was the U.S. response to the growing destabilization in Grenada that climaxed with the assassination of Maurice Bishop, Grenada's president. Following the Iranian crisis and expansion of communist presence in the region, this operation proved critical to America's prestige and commitment to national security. Because of the nature of the crisis, the time in our nation's history, and the prior military fiasco demonstrated by Operation Desert One, diplomatic and military bodies seriously considered the measures necessary to ensure success. The primary mission imperatives included the neutralization of the Grenada forces, protection and evacuation of US and designated foreign nationals, stabilization of the internal situation, and transition to peacekeeping. To complete these mission imperatives, the US deployed nearly 6,000 soldiers, marines, airman, and sailors to the region under the command and control of a single joint force commander.

Although this vast force complied with the mission imperatives, significant incidents and unintended casualties resulted from deficient command and control relationships, unfamiliarity with operational designs, and the lack of interoperability of key equipment. Some of these same themes likewise resonate with current challenges in present day joint operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specific to Operation Urgent Fury case study these issues raised great concern for Department of Defense planners, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense in the mission's aftermath. Aside from specific lessons learned annotated in after-action reviews, the single greatest commitment to amend these shortcomings was the enactment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act legislation.

Download the Full Article: Reexamination of a Quintessential Joint Force Operation Case Study: Urgent Fury

LTC Thomas S. Bundt is a Medical Service Corps Officer and the Commander of the 187th Medical Battalion, 32nd Medical Brigade, at Fort Sam Houston Texas. LTC Bundt has served in a variety of command and staff positions from Mechanized Infantry to fixed Army Hospitals. His latest overseas tour was to Iraq where he served as the Deputy Health Attaché to the US Embassy in Baghdad working directly with the Minister of Health on the first implemented health policy since Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is published in several journals to include Military Medicine, AHIMA, and Military Review. LTC Bundt holds a B.S. in Psychology from the University of Washington, a Masters in History and International Relations from Louisiana State University, a Masters in Healthcare Administration, a Masters in Business Administration and a Doctorate in Health Services Research from the University of Florida and a M.A. in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College Class of 2009.

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Comments

Fred (not verified)

Thu, 08/19/2010 - 1:44pm

Tom,

I would say it was a response to the disaster of the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanan, not Desert One. As to political fall out, White House aides not withstanding, Prime Minister Margeret Thatcher was not even told until one day before hand, nor were many members of the British Commonwealth of Nations too happy at the time. Neither was the Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill.

"...revisions to the acquisition and contracting processes ... " This has far more to do with the Iraq war and the 'reforms' under Secretary Rumsfeld than to Operation Urgent Fury.