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Preventing or Promoting Radicalization? - A Critical Analysis of the United Kingdom’s Newest Prevent Strategy
Screams cut through the air as a suicide bomber detonated at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, leaving 22 dead and injuring 59. Pedestrians sprinted for safety as a vehicle plowed through crowds on the London Bridge, killing seven and wounding 48.[i] The rise of terror attacks across the United Kingdom (UK) has been a harsh wake up call for the nation to re-evaluate its strategy for countering terrorism, known as CONTEST. Its first version was produced in 2003, with updated revisions in 2009 and 2011. Since 2011, the UK has suffered seven deadly terror attacks stemming from both far right wing and Islamic inspired extremism.[ii] The global threat of terrorism has significantly evolved within the past seven years, including the rapid rise of Daesh in Iraq and Syria and the influence of terrorists on social media. As a result, the UK published its latest version of CONTEST in June 2018 to reflect the changes necessary for the country to adapt and strengthen its security apparatuses to counter terrorism over the next three years.
CONTEST is notable for its four “P’s”: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. While overlapping themes exist, each component has its own unique goals. Prevent aims to reduce peoples’ intent to become terrorists, pursue works to diminish the capability of terrorists to carry out attacks, protect focuses on strengthening protection against an attack, and prepare intends to mitigate the impact of an attack when it occurs.[iii] This paper will focus primarily on Prevent, which is UK’s parallel to the United States’ strategy on countering violent extremism (CVE) and is arguably the most controversial aspect of CONTEST. This piece will delineate Prevent’s objectives, how the UK plans to achieve them, and provide an in-depth critical analysis of potential consequences of the strategy.
To understand CONTEST and Prevent, it is necessary to review the recent developments of global terrorism and its implications for the UK. The UK identifies the two largest and influential Islamic terrorist groups, Daesh and Al Qa’ida, noting that the nation failed to account for the rapid rise of Daesh in 2011. At that time, Daesh was still an Al Qa’ida affiliate operating in Iraq (AQI) and the civil war in Syria was in its nascent stages.[iv] The Syrian war dramatically altered the political and security landscape of the Middle East and soon became a contentious battleground for AQI and Al Qa’ida central. Combined with the already existing turmoil between the two groups, AQI splintered from Al Qa’ida central in 2014 as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as Daesh, and the group began to rapidly gain territory throughout the region.[v] CONTEST recognizes Daesh as its most significant terrorism threat, specifically the group’s Salafi-Jihadism ideology and its methodology of inspiring lone wolves to carry out attacks against soft targets. The potency of Daesh’s ideology is demonstrated by the 900 British citizens who travelled to Syria and Iraq, likely inspired by online propaganda that allowed Daesh to extend its reach worldwide and in real time.[vi] Moreover, the UK recognizes that despite Usama bin Laden’s death in 2011, Al Qa’ida affiliates remain a sustained terrorism threat, particularly Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria and Al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. While Al Qa’ida affiliates are more prone to engage with local struggles, the groups also aim to diminish Western influence by using their proximity to European countries to their advantage.[vii]
In addition to the threat posed by Islamic terrorism, CONTEST acknowledges the increasing threat from far right wing extremism and continued threat that stems from Northern Ireland. Far right groups exploit the fear surrounding globalization and share the belief that minority groups will taint the “native” population.[viii] These narratives have been exacerbated since 2011, likely due to the rise of refugees entering Europe from conflict zones in the Middle East. In terms of Northern Ireland terrorism, the UK has had a long history of combating these terror groups. CONTEST notes that small, violent groups, who do not represent the mainstream opinion across Northern Ireland, continue to carry out attacks against police services and are a threat to the public.[ix]
CONTEST also makes an important observation that from 2011 to 2016, most terror attacks targeted symbolic military or political individuals. However, in 2017 the nation experienced four attacks targeted at areas known to occupy higher populations with lower security such as a concert hall or tourist locations.[x] In addition, the perpetrators of UK’s most recent attacks were inspired and acted alone. These lone wolves are more difficult to identify and stop since there are fewer or no direct ties between the individual and a larger group. Consequently, the UK recognizes that security measures need to be strengthened to tackle both the terrorist transition toward soft targets and inspiration of individuals.
Prevent aims to “safeguard people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” and works to rehabilitate those who have already participated in terrorism. As CONTEST’s CVE arm, Prevent has three main objectives to achieve its goal: tackle the causes of radicalization, identify individuals vulnerable to radicalization and intervene earlier, and rehabilitate and reintegrate those who have already engaged with terrorism activities. Figure 1 displays Prevent’s Delivery Model from CONTEST.[xi]
Figure 1: Excerpt from CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018
Tackling the Causes of Radicalization
To tackle the causes of radicalization and respond to the ideological challenges of terrorism, the UK plans to address radicalization factors in local communities and online spaces. The UK will support grassroots organizations that provide educational tools, social activities, and other opportunities for people to get involved in their local communities. The exemplary model that CONTEST boasts is London Tigers, a local organization that works in minority, low income areas of London to engage individuals using opportunities such as sports, mentorship, education, vocational trainings, and community service. London Tigers also offers activities that encourage difficult topics, such as extremism, to be openly discussed to foster critical thinking skills that challenge the terrorist narrative.[xii]
The UK’s support for organizations such as London Tigers is greatly beneficial for the nation’s counterterrorism strategy for several reasons. First, the group is not a product of a government funded CVE program. Often, communities are suspicious, and sometimes rightfully so, that CVE programs are a facade for government surveillance.[xiii] Since these initiatives are not government led, London Tigers and other grassroots organizations are able to gain the trust of its communities and better succeed in achieving its objectives. Second, the primary purpose of London Tigers is not CVE, it is to create opportunities and support underprivileged communities. One of the main criticisms of CVE efforts is that minority communities, particularly Muslims, feel that the government unfairly targeted them due to racial profiling or social economic status.[xiv] This leads the community to feel resentful toward the resources offered and fuels the terrorist narrative that Western governments are scrutinizing Muslim communities, thereby making the effort counterproductive.[xv] Rather than being the main goal, CVE is a tangential benefit for London Tigers, which allows the group to achieve CVE objectives more effectively than an overt CVE program.
In regard to online spaces, the UK will work with and encourage civil society groups to strengthen their ability to challenge terrorist narratives on the Internet. To start, the UK established the Police Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), a collaboration of police and international partners that has already removed over 300,000 pieces of terrorism content from the Internet.[xvi] The UK also hopes to influence the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), an industry led group consisting of Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, and YouTube, to remove terrorism uploads, prevent re-uploads, and eliminate opportunities for new content to be available for users.[xvii] While these efforts are well coordinated, eliminating all safe spaces on the Internet for terrorists will likely be a Sisyphean task. The UK can certainly voice its preferences to the GIFCT but lacks any tangible power to ensure the organization acts on its suggestions. Furthermore, any efforts to combat terrorism online might be detrimental for CVE goals. Terrorists consider the eradication of its content and accounts as a sign of legitimacy that they are posing a threat significant enough to warrant government repercussion.[xviii] This poses a catch-22 dilemma in which terrorism content online is a security threat, but action against the threat fuels the terrorist narrative that the government wants to destroy. It is possible that government attempts to remove terrorism content online allows the group to survive and thrive longer than if the government took no action and allowed the group’s influence to dwindle on its own.
Early Intervention: Safeguarding and Supporting Those Most at Risk of Radicalization by Identifying Them and Offering Support
Prevent’s second objective is to carry out earlier interventions for those who are susceptible to or already in the radicalization process. To do this, the UK aims to conduct Prevent trainings to an additional one million individuals and increase the number of referrals through the Channel program. In 2015, the UK implemented the Prevent statutory duty, which requires that local authorities and educational entities consider the need to protect citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization and to support them as needed.[xix] Since its enactment, the duty has received immense backlash. To start, it incorrectly assumes that all community leaders are a reliable, unbiased source who do not have or will not allow their prejudices to interfere with their duty. Moreover, in theory, this duty places responsibility on community leaders to be aware and active in identifying at risk individuals, supporting the work of security and intelligence agencies to accurately combat radicalization. However, in practice, it has divided communities by raising suspicions between those who are mandated to report and those who may be reported. While the UK states that inaccurate reports will be dismissed, the fear of being reported has created a “them” versus “us” environment, which reinforces the terrorist narrative.[xx] This creates grievances for individuals who may feel disgruntled and resentful toward the government.
To complement the duty, Prevent training is available to the general public, online and in-person, to educate people on how to identify and safeguard those who may be considering or already engaging in terrorism activities. In-person trainings are locally led to ensure that the content is geared toward potential radicalization factors specific to a community.[xxi] The UK correctly recognizes that there is no single path to radicalization and has emphasized conducting thorough research and evaluation on violent extremism at the local level. On the other hand, online trainings are uniform and cover both Islamic and far right-wing extremism. The online training highlights two true cases of individuals who experienced successful early interventions conducted by teachers. While these trainings are not tailored, they emphasize that people should use their own professional and common sense when determining if an individual is at risk. In the two cases, the individuals involved in the intervention reflected common sense and reacted proportionately.[xxii] However, to assume that all British citizens will handle an intervention flawlessly is foolish. Human error is inevitable, and a failed early intervention could be counterproductive and push an individual to further radicalize.
Furthermore, a highly debated system within Prevent is its Channel Program in England and Wales, and the Prevent Professional Concerns (PPC) program in Scotland. These programs encourage the general public to refer individuals who they suspect may be vulnerable to radicalization. Unlike the Prevent duty, British citizens are not mandated to participate in Channel. All referrals are confidential and received by the police. The Channel panel, consisting of leaders within social services, mental health, and education, investigate each individual for legitimate vulnerability and provide tailored support if needed. Support is provided in forms of educational and vocational opportunities or ideological mentoring. If a referral is inaccurate or no threat is confirmed, the case is dismissed. Figure 2 outlines the Channel process once an individual is referred.[xxiii] Since it is impossible for the government, local authorities, and community leaders to closely monitor every single individual who may be at risk to radicalization, the referral program relies on the general public to be actively aware of those in their social circles. In theory, referrals lessen the burden on local authorities and increase the accuracy of identifying vulnerable individuals since they are being referred by people they know. However, when applied, the Channel program has received intense, harsh criticism.
Figure 2: Excerpt from CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018
While Channel targets any extremism, it was found that from 2016 to 2017, 61 percent of those referred were for concerns regarding Islamic extremism and only 16 percent were due to far-right wing extremism.[xxiv] In addition, during this time a third of these referrals were reported from educational entities.[xxv] As a result, Channel has disproportionately impacted the British Muslim community and created a climate of fear. Muslims are paranoid to voice their opinions about Islam or engage in religious behavior for fear of being misinterpreted or profiled for radicalizing. Consequently, this has led to significant challenges for Channel to achieve success.
To start, the fear of being reported has been especially harmful for young Muslims students. In one instance, a four-year-old Muslim boy was threatened to be referred over a drawing that illustrated his father cutting a cucumber but was mistaken for a cooker bomb.[xxvi] In another instance, a 14-year-old Muslim boy was questioned about Daesh after a classroom debate regarding environmental activism. Following the questioning, the boy stated he was “scared and nervous” of engaging in future classroom discussions to avoid being suspected of extremism.[xxvii] In these two cases, neither student was referred, but the stress of potentially being reported was instilled into their minds and the minds of their friends and families. Furthermore, the UK asserts that free speech and open debate in the classroom “is one of our most powerful tools in promoting critical thinking and preventing terrorist and extremist narratives taking hold.”[xxviii] However, the aforementioned incidents prove that the threat of being referred to Channel stunts productive conversation in the classroom. In fact, the detrimental impact of Channel and Prevent has prompted nearly 300 professors across the UK and the United States to sign a letter that disparages the program for stymieing free speech and demands the government repeal the strategy completely.[xxix]
Moreover, the disproportionate impact of Channel and Prevent on Muslims has caused a rift between UK government and the British Muslim community. Organizations such as the Muslim Council of Britain, CAGE, and Prevent Watch have openly criticized and actively work against the CVE programs, claiming that the strategy is baseless, fails to effectively combat extremism, and harms the British Muslim community.[xxx] In response, these groups have been accused of undermining counterterror efforts, which has created a cycle of infighting between the two sides.[xxxi] To make matters worse, Islamic terrorists are able to capitalize on this fear and anger and frame it as an injustice, fueling their narrative that Western governments are unfairly targeting the Muslim community.[xxxii] Furthermore, the results of Channel are bleak. From 2015 to 2017, nearly 15,000 people were referred to Channel, but only 5 percent of them actually received support.[xxxiii] Overall, Channel has yielded counterproductive results for Prevent goals: rather than protecting at risk individuals, it is putting individuals at risk by creating grievances against the government. By increasing the number of referrals, as the UK intends to do in the next year, the government will further alienate the British Muslim community and fuel Islamic terrorist narratives.
Rehabilitation: Enabling Those Who Have Already Engaged in Terrorism to Disengage and Rehabilitate
Lastly, Prevent’s third objective is to enable individuals who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate. To this end, the UK is developing the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP), the newest component of Prevent, which focuses on rehabilitating returning foreign fighters and reintegrating them back into society. The DDP is a reflection of increasing collaboration between Prevent and Pursue branches of CONTEST as it works to thwart future attacks from known terrorist perpetrators. The UK launched its first DDP pilot in 2017 for individuals who were subject to court approved conditions for terrorism related crimes, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), and Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) for fighters who returned from Syria and Iraq. The DDP delivers a spectrum of specially tailored forms of support to address the general drivers of radicalization such as lack of identity, self-esteem, meaning and purpose, and personal grievances.[xxxiv]
DDP’s most glaring flaw is its failure to acknowledge that disengagement does not equate de-radicalization. An individual who is removed from a terrorist group could still be psychologically radicalized. In some cases, they are forced to disengage for factors they could not control, such as Daesh’s significant loss of land that pushed fighters to return home.[xxxv] On the other hand, an individual can also be de-radicalized, but still engaged in fear of consequences for leaving the group. The distinction between the two is critical because providing rehabilitative and reintegration support to individuals who are radicalized and disengaged, would be ineffective at best.
Those who choose not to comply with DDP may be charged for violating conditions or recalled to prison and may be subject to interventions. This is where Prevent and Pursue intersect to reduce recidivism for known offenders. In 2016, an independent review criticized UK prisons for being too complacent in dealing with Islamic extremism. It was revealed that there has been a noticeable rise of a “Muslim gang culture,” “charismatic” prisoners acting as “emirs” to spread extremist ideology, extremist literature available in libraries, and prison staff pressured to leave during prayers.[xxxvi] To address this issue, Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) established two specialist centers at HMP Full Sutton and HMP Frankland. These centers separate terrorist offenders from the mainstream prison population to prevent the spread of extremism.[xxxvii] While separation is the first step in containing the extremist ideology, placing extremists in their own facility may fuel an echo chamber in which these offenders become more hardened and radicalized. In addition, it is unclear if both Islamic and far right wing extremists will be placed in the same separation centers, or if the centers only apply to Islamic extremists. As of June 2018, the number of right wing terrorists in UK prisons have tripled, making up 13 percent of terror offenders while Islamic extremists stand at 82 percent.[xxxviii] As these numbers continue to rise, the UK will soon be faced to determine how to handle both types of extremism in prisons.
Furthermore, the outcome of those who participated in the 2017 pilot have not been released while the program itself is still in its budding stages of development. The DDP is not further elaborated upon in Prevent other than its goals and potential resources for support as previously mentioned. This is concerning considering the UK intends to double the number of participants in the next year. Without understanding the impact of the initial pilot, it may be risky to continue funneling inmates through the program with no indication of an end result.
Moreover, in response to the Manchester and London attacks, the UK is working to increase information sharing between security and intelligence agencies at the local and national level. A series of Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) pilots are set to launch in London, West Midlands, and Manchester, which aim to trial different systems of collaboration and communication between these entities to better understand the terrorism threat and enable interventions earlier.[xxxix] These pilots are a promising development for filling in information gaps at all agencies and encourage a spirit of experimentation to determine the most efficient communication system. With the influx of intelligence at each of these agencies, appropriate frameworks and employees will be needed to effectively filter through the information.
Prevent is one of the world’s most comprehensive soft power strategy to combat radicalization and violent extremism. Since 2011, the UK has experienced a consistent threat of Islamic terrorism and a recent surge of far-right wing extremism. The strategy aims to tackle both types of terrorism by addressing factors that can lead to radicalization, educating citizens about the resources available to intervene earlier, and rehabilitating those who have already engaged in terrorism activities. While there are parts of the strategy that beneficially serve the purpose of CVE, such as supporting grassroots organizations like London Tigers, most of Prevent has yielded questionable and harsh feedback. Prevent as a whole does not target any one community, but the application of the strategy has disproportionately victimized the British Muslim community. This is the overarching criticism of Prevent: in theory, the strategy has the right goals and intentions, but in practice it produces counterproductive results.
The Channel Program has yielded severe blowback and is arguably the most controversial component of Prevent. Channel has divided communities by unintentionally putting British Muslims under intense scrutiny. Consequently, the program has likely put individuals at risk of radicalization while also promoting Islamic terrorist narratives. In addition, Channel has ironically contradicted CONTEST’s goal of reducing risk so that all citizens may “go about their lives freely and with confidence.”[xl] Instead, it has stripped portions of the British community the ability to live freely as they are now paranoid of being suspected of extremism.
Prevent’s newest program, the DDP, is promising as it confronts the issue of recidivism and returning foreign fighters. The DDP represents the need for increasing collaboration between Prevent and Pursue, but for the program to be successful, the UK must differentiate between disengagement and de-radicalization. Furthermore, the challenge of dealing with an influx of both right wing and Islamic extremists in prisons is growing and the UK may need to create a more comprehensive system to effectively contain and rehabilitate these inmates simultaneously. While the DDP is still in the development stage, the UK is on the right track of creating an infrastructure to prevent attacks from known terrorists.
Despite the glaring downfalls of Prevent, no strategy, in any context, will ever be flawless on paper or in practice. In the field of social science, there are always unaccounted factors and unexpected events that occur, dramatically changing the landscape at any moment. As such, does this mean that governments should accept defeat and take no action at all? I argue that an existing plan is better than the lack thereof. The existence of a strategy in itself allows policymakers to learn from the results and, in turn, iterate on the strategy to better achieve its goals. The newest Prevent strategy shows that the UK has failed to make the proper adjustments from its 2011 version based off of feedback from Muslim community leaders, academics, and the general public. In fact, this version of Prevent may exacerbate existing problems by pushing to expand the reach of Channel and Prevent trainings. Moving forward, the UK needs to seriously consider and act upon the criticisms of Prevent stemming from those it is detrimentally impacting. If not, Prevent as we know it will further estrange communities, fuel terrorism narratives, and likely bolster radicalization.
“About Us,” London Tigers, http://www.londontigers.org/about-us/
“CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, July 2011
“CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018
Lizzie Dearden, “Number of Far-Right Terrorists in UK Prisons Triples as Arrests Hit New Record,” Independent, June 14, 2018,
Dodd, Vikram, “School Questioned Muslim Pupil About ISIS After Discussion on Eco-Activism,” The Guardian, September 22, 2015,
“Individuals Referred to and Supported Through the Prevent Programme, April 2016 to March 2017, The United Kingdom’s Home Office, March 27, 2018
Jones, Seth G., Vallee, Charles, Markusen, Maxwell B., “AQ’s Struggling Campaign in Syria,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2018
Laub, Zachary, “The Islamic State,” The Council on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2016,
“London Bridge Attack: Timeline of British Terror Attacks,” BBC, June 19, 2017,
Lusher, Adam, “British Muslim ‘Industry’ Accused of Undermining Deradicalisation Efforts,” Independent, June 3, 2017,
“The Prevent Duty: Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers,” The United Kingdom’s Department for Education, June 2015,
“PREVENT Will Have a Chilling Effect on Open Debate, Free Speech and Political Dissent,” Independent, July 20, 2015,
Quinn, Ben,“Nursery ‘Raised Fears of Radicalisation Over Boy’s Cucumber Drawing’,” The Guardian, March 11, 2016,
Qureshi, Asim, “Our Criticism of Prevent is Based on Facts, Not Myths,” Al Jazeera, July 4, 2017,
“Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth Justice,” The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice, August 22, 2016,
“Tackling Extremism in the UK,” HM Government, December 2013,
Travis, Alan, “Only 5% of People Referred t Prevent Extremism Scheme Get Specialist Help,” The Guardian, November 9, 2017,
Vidino, Lorenzo, Hughes, Seamus, “From Retweets to Raqqa,” The George Washington University Program on Extremism, December 2015,
“You Have Access the E-Learning Training on Prevent,” HM Government,
[iii] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 27.
[iv] Seth G Jones, Charles Vallee, Maxwell B. Markusen,“AQ’s Struggling Campaign in Syria,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2018
[vi] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p 18.
[viii] Ibid, p.21.
[x] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p 20.
[xi] Ibid, p. 31.
[xv] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, July 2011, p. 12.
[xvi] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 35.
[xviii] Lorenzo Vidino, Seamus Hughes, “From Retweets to Raqqa,” The George Washington University Program on Extremism, December 2015, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf
[xix] “The Prevent Duty: Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers,” The United Kingdom’s Department for Education, June 2015, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf
[xx] “Tackling Extremism in the UK,” HM Government, December 2013, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf
[xxi] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 36.
[xxiii] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 38.
[xxiv] “Individuals Referred to and Supported Through the Prevent Programme, April 2016 to March 2017, The United Kingdom’s Home Office, March 27, 2018 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/694002/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2016-mar2017.pdf
[xxv] “Individuals Referred to and Supported Through the Prevent Programme, April 2016 to March 2017, The United Kingdom’s Home Office, March 27, 2018 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/694002/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2016-mar2017.pdf
[xxvi] Ben Quinn, “Nursery ‘Raised Fears of Radicalisation Over Boy’s Cucumber Drawing’,” The Guardian, March 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/11/nursery-radicalisation-fears-boys-cucumber-drawing-cooker-bomb
[xxvii] Vikram Dodd, “School Questioned Muslim Pupil About ISIS After Discussion on Eco-Activism,” The Guardian, September 22, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/22/school-questioned-muslim-pupil-about-isis-after-discussion-on-eco-activism
[xxviii] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 37.
[xxix] “PREVENT Will Have a Chilling Effect on Open Debate, Free Speech and Political Dissent,” Independent, July 20, 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letters/prevent-will-have-a-chilling-effect-on-open-debate-free-speech-and-political-dissent-10381491.html
[xxx] Asim Qureshi, “Our Criticism of Prevent is Based on Facts, Not Myths,” Al Jazeera, July 4, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/07/criticism-prevent-based-facts-myths-170703072558455.html
[xxxi] Adam Lusher, “British Muslim ‘Industry’ Accused of Undermining Deradicalisation Efforts,” Independent, June 3, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/prevent-strategy-extremism-muslims-islamist-terrorism-nazir-afzal-muslim-council-of-britain-islamic-a7771071.html
[xxxii] “Tackling Extremism in the UK,” HM Government, December 2013, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf
[xxxiii] Alan Travis, “Only 5% of People Referred t Prevent Extremism Scheme Get Specialist Help,” The Guardian, November 9, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/09/only-5-of-people-referred-to-prevent-extremism-scheme-get-specialist-help
[xxxiv] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 40.
[xxxv] Jamie McInyre, “Here’s How Much Land ISIS Has Lost Since Trump Took Over,” Washington Examiner, December 23, 2017, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/heres-how-much-ground-isis-has-lost-since-trump-took-over/article/2644137
[xxxvi] “Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth Justice,” The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice, August 22, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice/summary-of-the-main-findings-of-the-review-of-islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice
[xxxvii] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 41.
[xxxviii] Lizzie Dearden, “Number of Far-Right Terrorists in UK Prisons Triples as Arrests Hit New Record,” Independent, June 14, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/uk-prison-far-right-arrests-terrorists-conviction-national-action-a8398146.html
[xxxix]“CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 42.
[xl] “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism,” HM Government, June 4, 2018, p. 7.