Small Wars Journal

Mobilizing Identity in the Pashtun Tribal Belt

Wed, 03/17/2010 - 8:59am
Mobilizing Identity in the Pashtun Tribal Belt

by Colonel Ellen Haring

Download the full article: Mobilizing Identity in the Pashtun Tribal Belt

Today, violent conflict in the Pashtun tribal belt in Afghanistan and Pakistan is increasing and a number of experts are attempting to understand the dynamics driving this conflict. An examination of two key identities of the Pashtun people reveals how religious identity is being mobilized by one group for political purposes and ethnic identity is inadvertently being threatened by another group. The resulting vortex of threat and mobilization are the source of this increased violence. This paper analyzes the ethnic and religious identities of the Pashtun people to illustrate how identities are used to influence conflict and it will then offer ways for the US and the international community to adjust their activities to reduce conflict in the Pashtun tribal belt.

Download the full article: Mobilizing Identity in the Pashtun Tribal Belt

Colonel Ellen Haring is a civil affairs officer assigned to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command at USJFCOM but currently serving as an assistant professor for the US Army's Command and General Staff College. She teaches a range of topics related to strategic and operational planning for the Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations. She holds a masters degree in Peace Operations Policy from George Mason University and her graduate studies and personal interests are in conflict analysis and resolution with a regional focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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Comments

Hamid Hussain (not verified)

Fri, 03/26/2010 - 3:26pm

March 26, 2010

Colonel Ellen Haring has done an excellent job in summarizing conventional knowledge about tribal Pushtuns in the context of ongoing violence. We simply complex phenomenon for better understanding and this article is a good effort in such excercise.

There are few areas which need more detailed analysis as article gives an impression of generalization about tribal behavior. Tribes along both sides of the Durand Line have been fractured along several lines over the last three decades. Some relevant ones are ideological (i.e. Wazir, Mahsud, Mohmand, Afridi tribal elders were assasinated by their own tribal copmatriots working with militants), national (many tribesmen are senior officers in army, police and bureacracy in Pakistan)and class (in Swat poor Gujjar and Mullah class brutally killed influential local leaders forcing them to flee the area). In addition, segmentation along clan, subclan and family lines even in a single tribe makes it very difficult to control the whole tribe.

Historically, efforts to bring the tribes on 'your side' or at least keeping them neutral in a conflict is largely based on bribes. In First Anglo-Afghan conflict of 1839-42, the simple fact that East India Company cut the subsidy of border tribes along Khyber pass from 80,000 ruppees to 40,000 ruppees was responsible for the 'end game'than any other factor. Pakistan and U.S. engagement is essentially on the same lines. Basic tenet of tribal politics is to secure maximum gains and the best opportunity for the tribe is to be in the middle of a conflict between two parties. Tribesmen will fleece both parties. During Soviet-Afghan war, Afridi and Shinwari tribesmen would take money and weapons share from 'mujahideen' passing through their territory. When government garrisons were besieged by 'mujahideen', same tribesmen would now sell Afghan army provisions and weapons at inflated prices. This is what is exactly happening even today.

The recipe of empowering tribal groups and leaders can bring some stability by creating small islands of relative peace, however the dynamics of such endeavours require intricate knowledge about each tribe and geographic area. In addition, some 'side effects' from this remedy are unavoidable. First of all, many influential local elders have been killed and many forced to leave their areas. The incentive has to be lucrative enough for the risks of coming back to the 'swamp'. Second, more educated leaders are not likley to be coming soon therefore reliance will be more on second rate leaders as well as 'shadowy characters' not exactly the likes which you will invite for dinner to your home. Many such leaders are neck deep in drug trade. Currently, many such leaders working with U.S. are also making handsome money by 'moonlighting in drug trade'.

Tribal elmement is a key factor in the ongoing violence and there is debate among experts about how this should be incorporated in the strategy. A more intimate knowledge about current dynamics of tribal factor and not reliance on old and mostly outdated ethnographic and anthropology data should be the way forward.

Sincerely,
Hamid Hussain
coeusconsultant@optonline.net