Small Wars Journal

IC Directive # 203 and USMC Intelligence

Tue, 06/16/2009 - 7:56pm
Common Analytic Standards

Intelligence Community Directive # 203 and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence

by Lieutenant Colonel Von H. Pigg, Small Wars Journal

Common Analytic Standards (Full PDF Article)

On 21 June 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), signed and implemented Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 203, Analytic Standards," governing the production and evaluation of intelligence analysis and analytical products. ICD 203 articulates the mission and commitment of all analytic elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) to meet the highest standards of integrity and rigorous analytical thinking. The DNI, via ICD 203, established doctrinal requirements designed to improve the quality, relevance of and confidence in the analysis and conclusions of intelligence products produced for policy makers and military commanders. As the Marine Corps' service component intelligence agency and member of the IC, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) at Quantico adopted the promulgated analytic standards, along with a required self-evaluation program. Rigid application of the standards, combined with critical self and other IC evaluations will ensure MCIA and the entire USMC intelligence apparatus consistently produces timely, objective, multi-source based intelligence products resulting from sound analytic tradecraft practices. The purpose of this article is to examine the reasoning and rationale for prescribed IC Analytical Standards and how MCIA is implementing the standards and overcoming implementation challenges for the purpose of improving intelligence support to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Air Ground Task Force(s) (MAGTFs), USMC supporting establishments as well as the IC at large.

Common Analytic Standards (Full PDF Article)

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Comments

StructureCop

Tue, 06/16/2009 - 9:40pm

Hats off to the Marine Corps for raising the bar for itself in this respect. As a wise chief warrant officer once said, if you act like a low-budget, poor quality operation you will generate a low-budget, poor quality product. The opposite is also true. In my limited experience reading Marine Corps HET reporting, I found their assessments more open and honest, of higher quality, and more relevant to the needs of a battlespace owner than their Army counterparts. I believe that comes from higher expectations of the collectors.

On the other hand, the Army OMTs were much more concerned with trivial grammatical and stylistic issues than with the quality and relevance of the reporting. In typical Army form, teams with voluminous, substanceless reporting were rewarded far more than teams which produced fewer, more detailed reports.

On the analysis side, I saw more than a few AO assessments by Army MI officers which dismissed consistent, reliable reporting in favor of an "analysis" that was little more than wishful thinking hoping to make their AO look safer than it actually was. There is little discussion in Army circles about intelligence epistemology in a very real sense, other than the superficial assessments that are built into the system.